
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












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THE SCOTS GREYS AT MALPLAQUET AND BLENHEIM.

The moral of the grand work done by the North British Dragoons in these two great battles is that Cavalry, if well trained in peace, can work equally well mounted or dismounted, as the occasion may demand, in war.

This dual use of Cavairy, as illustrated in these twin pictures by Mr. R. Caton-Woodville is equally valuable in the present day,


MALPLAQUET. 11th September, 1709.

British and Imperialists under Duke of Marlborough and Prince Eugene.

Our forces were besieging Mons when the French under Villars came to its relief and entrenched themselves in a strong position among wooded hills.

Mariborough and Prince Eugene attacked both flanks of the position, but lost heavily and were checked in doing so. Our Cavalry then came up in the centre, and after one heavy repulse by the French Life Guards, they finally burst through the centre and rolled up the French right. In this fight the Greys distinguished themselves in the overthrow of the French Guards Cavalry.

Malpiaquet was one of the bloodiest battles ever fought, the French losing between 12,000 and 17,000 killed and wounded, while the Allies in the attack lost nearly 20,000.



BLENHEIM. 13th August, 1704.

52,000 British and Imperialists under Mariborough and Prince Eugene. 60,000 French and Bavarians under Marshals Tallard and Mensi.


The French were drawn up in favourable position behind a swampy stream, with their right on the Danube at Blenheim village, and left at Lutzingen


Marlborough, after great difficulties in getting his force across the stream, attacked Blenheim, unsuccessfully at first; he then charged the centre with Cavalry and cut the enemy in two, driving their Cavalry into the Danube, while Prince Eugene drove in their left and centre. Marlborough then surrounded Blenheim with Infantry and Dragoons, and eventually took as prisoners 27 battalions and 12 squadrons.

The French lost altogether 40,000 killed, wounded, and prisoners.

In the first attack on Blenheim General Rowe led the attack dismounted, and refused to retire till he had stuck his sword into the defence-palisade of the place, and in doing so he fell severely wounded.

N.B.—There is some doubt as to whether the Scots Greys actually did attack on foot under General Rowe at Blenheim, as here depicted. With a view to clearing up the situation, we offer a prize of £2. 2s. to any of our subscribers who can establish the fact on satisfactory authority.





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THE

CAVALRY JOURNAL

WITH SANCTION OF THE ARMY COUNCIL, AND
UNDER DIRECTION OF THE COMMANDANT, CAVALRY SCHOOL
ASSISTED BY THE INSPECTOR OF CAVALRY
AND LIEUT.-GENERAL B. S. S. BADEN-POWELL, C.B.

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THE

CAVALRY JOURNAL

JANUARY 1907

EMPLOYMENT OF EX-SOLDIERS

In publishing below the essay which has won the prize given by the CAVALRY JOURNAL on this subject we append some remarks to show how the matter affects the officer, and how the man should help himself; also a statement of what the authorities have been doing, up to date; particulars of the technical school for soldiers at the Royal Marine Artillery Barracks, Eastney; and some hints to soldiers from the Secretary of the National Association for Employment of Reserve and Discharged Soldiers.

WHAT THE OFFICER SHOULD DO FOR THE MAN

THE whole subject of employment for ex-soldiers and how the men should be prepared for civil life whilst serving with the regiment is one which should be studied by officers of every grade, because it is another phase of the 'Man-mastership' already alluded to in the CAVALRY JOURNAL, and affects also the efficiency of our branch.

The main point is so to prepare the men that there would be a real demand for ex-soldiers by employers. If every well-behaved soldier is thus practically assured of employment on conclusion of his service it may be inferred that the Army would ipso facto attract a much better class of recruit and thereby gain very considerably in efficiency.

The first step is the formation by the officers of the *character* of each individual man by developing in him ideals of pride in

himself and in his profession, self-respect and patriotism, and loyalty to his officers. From these arises a better form of discipline than any that is merely the outcome of fear of repressive measures, and a higher form of courage and endurance than a merely animal want of sensibility which often passes for pluck.

Without these the soldier is only partly trained to war, however complete may have been his instruction in drill and skill at arms, &c.

And yet it is a branch of training which has not, so far, received the attention which it deserves at the hands of officers as a rule.

The more material influence of self-interest as regards the man's future employment can be used by the officer as a lever towards developing in him ideals of self-reliance, and of self-respect and self-discipline which eventually lead to self-sacrifice and patriotism.

WHAT THE MAN SHOULD DO FOR HIMSELF

I am continually—I might almost say daily—appealed to by ex-soldiers to find employment for them, good men too—many of them N.C.O.s, and others with excellent characters—ready to take any kind of job that will keep them from the workhouse.

Very few of them have saved money while in the service, nor have they looked out for billets before taking their discharge, and they are all at sea on commencing civil life with nothing to keep them going while looking for work; consequently, instead of selecting good permanent billets, they are very soon on their last legs, seeking any kind of casual job.

Yet all admit that had they thought of it in time they might easily have saved a very fair independence while in the army, and at the same time could have trained themselves to a trade.

The service is a very bad training for a man in self-reliance

and hard work; but if he had the idea put into him he could very easily save ten shillings a week for himself, instead of frittering it away in the canteen and in walking-out expenses. This in his seven years would give him a balance at his bankers or in a benefit society of £180. And if instead of 'dossing down' in the afternoon he were to apply himself to learning a trade he would be a really qualified workman, and would be sought after by employers.

As it is most ex-soldier applicants say 'I have no money; I am prepared to take $any\ kind$ of job,' which is just the worst thing they can put forward: it generally means they are equally unfit for any. Whereas the man who can say 'I am a qualified motor driver, willing to do a bit of gardening, and I have £200 in the bank,' is pretty certain to get a good situation booked for him the day he leaves the army.

As a nation we are not thrifty; when we draw good pay we spend it, and when bad times come round we regret it.

The factory girls of a certain manufacturing town in the Midlands earned unusually good wages at one period during the Boer war. What did they do with their earnings? They gave dinner parties to their friends, giving one course at one restaurant, journeying to another for the next course, and so on.

The money spent in the United Kingdom in drink during the past year (exclusive of that spent on 88,000,000 lbs. of tobacco) amounted to £64,000,000, not one penny of which was necessary to life.

The money put by in all the savings banks and benefit societies in Great Britain did not amount to so much.

Thrift is at the bottom of social prosperity, but it is only growing very slowly in this country. And yet for the soldier thrift is very easy, and when he has the sense to see this the results are most successful and encouraging.

The question of thrift for soldiers is not a new one. When I discussed with Mr. Stuart Sim (the Chief Registrar of Friendly Societies) the possibility of making a benefit society for soldiers,

he pointed out to me the interesting fact that Daniel Defoe, whom we all know as the author of 'Robinson Crusoe,' wrote in 1692 an essay on 'Projects,' and one of his projects was the formation of a benefit society for soldiers.

Thrift is the main thing to inculcate in the man from the first day he joins the service; and after that, that he should prepare himself for one or two special trades on leaving.

WHAT THE CAVALRY JOURNAL HAS DONE

In order to get practical ideas on the subject we have put the question to our readers in the form of a competition essay, open to all ranks, for a prize of £5 5s.; the essay to be judged not by its composition or length, but on its merits as a practical suggestion.

The best of those sent in is that by 'Experientia Docet,' which we publish in full, and some ideas from several other good essays are added at the end of it.

PRIZE ESSAY BY 'EXPERIENTIA DOCET' (Lieut. and Quartermaster J. V. Laughton, 21st Lancers.)

In preparing Cavalrymen for employment when they return to civil life, it becomes necessary to ask:

- (a) If the man had no trade on joining, what employment does he appear most suitable for?
- (b) What means exist to teach him to qualify for that employment?

Under (a), certain positions in civil life require certain qualifications, *i.e.*, physique, good appearance and manners, education, &c. Therefore a most careful classification is required as to the capabilities of each man when selecting him for a trade.

Once this selection is made, and the man agreeable to it, we may proceed to (b).

An eight-years man will have learnt his drill and duties thoroughly by the end of his fifth year. He may be eased down

a little for the last three years of his colour service. This appears to be the most suitable time to teach him.

Taking a Cavalry regiment as 700 strong, we probably find:

- (a) 200 men under 2 years' service.
- (b) 250 men between 2 and 5 years' service.
- (c) 170 men between 5 and 8 years' service.
- (d) 80 men extended or re-engaged.

It is therefore the 170 men of the (c) class that we have to deal with. To do this the existing means are small, and extra expense cannot be admitted. Under these circumstances the attached table, showing details of proposed trades, numbers, teachers, tools and materials, for the 170 men is given:

Trade	Nos.	Teacher	Tools, Material, &c.
Blacksmiths .	25	Farrier-Major	Available
Coachmen and Grooms	20	S. SMajors	Wagons, &c., available
Saddlers Harness Makers	16	Saddler-Sgt	Available
Carpenters and Glaziers	8	S. Treemaker	Available; supplement with chests, 3 B and 12 D, as per Para. 275, Eqpt. Regn. Pt. I.
Clerks and Typists	15	Schoolmaster Office work	Available
Shoemaker	8	Master Bootmaker .	Tools not available, but easily
Tailors	12	SgtTailor	purchased by man. For material allow a certain percentage of garments of stock sizes to be made up regimentally
Telegraphists .	10	SgtSignaller	Dummy keys available; in some places telegraph offices
Gardeners	8	Selected from Trades- men (gardener)	Seeds and garden tools supplied as at present
Cooks, &c., for Shipping Lines	8	Cook-Sgt	Available
Valets, Waiters, Ship Stewards	30	_	Nothing required
Civil Service Class	10	Schoolmaster, &c	Nothing required. These to learn duties of Customs, Post Offices, &c.
Total	170		

As in some cases, the classes may appear too large for the existing accommodation, it must be remembered that some of the men will be absent through duty, furlough, musketry, &c.

The working hours would be arranged according to the station in which the unit is serving, but not to interfere with any duties.

If possible, a Regimental Employment Association should be formed, supported by a small sum from the men concerned, so as to insert and answer advertisements, &c.

On the subject of thrift, 'Tommy' should be taught how difficult it is to stand alone in civil life. A soldier's life is not conducive to thrift, and no experience can be gained. His meals, clothing, lodgings, &c., are all found for him, and he therefore does not value money as he should do. Where everything is made easy no experience is gained.

It is only when too late, on entry into civil life, that he finds out what the world is like and what he has wasted. Nothing can be done well without some physical or mental labour; but as 'sufficient for the day is the evil thereof,' many soldiers fight shy of anything that involves extra labour, on the expectation that something good will turn up at the required time. This usually results in disappointment and failure when they go into civil life.

Get 'Tommy' to think of the money that passes through his hands, and how he spends it. In the first two years of his service little can be saved. But, after the first two years, when on service pay, messing allowance, &c., his pay is £39 10s. 10d. per year. Deduct £7 for messing and washing, and £2 10s. for other stoppages (an ample allowance), leaves £30 per year at his disposal.

Spending £10 per year allows 4s per week as pocket money, and the other £20 could be saved yearly for the last six years, making a total of £120 on leaving the colours.

The above money passes through his hands—how should he save it? This can only be done by the man himself. No more assistance can be given than exists at present.

The Post Office Savings Bank presents facilities to anyone desirous of saving money. Privacy is ensured, there is no risk, and the interest is fair. Saving £20 per year for six years gives £8 as the interest.

But some men cannot be trusted with four weeks' furlough money because they spend it all in the first week. They know that they can fall back on their regiment for support. These men would fail anywhere.

'Tommy' must be made to realise that he must rely upon himself. Youth does not always last, and provision must be made for old age. If he cannot increase his income he must decrease his expenses. To do this he should 'buy only what is required, and see that he gets a shilling's worth for a shilling.'

A well-written poster on 'Thrift' would look much better than the 'Scale of Fines for Drunkenness' in every barrack room, as at present.

In civil life experience is the school, and one stands or falls according to his abilities; to be successful requires constant energy and thought.

The subjects of this essay raise the old question, viz., 'Which is best, a sum of money or a trade?' I trust that I have shown that both can be acquired by an energetic and thoughtful soldier.

EXTRACTS FROM OTHER ESSAYS.

'JOHN.'—The best market for labour at the moment should be made known to men leaving their regiments. It is not possible, nor necessary, to fit a man for work in the regiment. There is plenty of demand for good smart men, and each man should seek his own work and avoid employment societies.

'OLD MAN.'—All saddlery should be made by soldiers actually serving. Regimental shops should be turned into real schools of work. Men should be encouraged to bank some of their pay.

'PANCAKE.'—Make useful clerking, typewriting, &c. part of the qualification for a 2nd Class Certificate of Education. Encourage first-class men to learn trades by excusing them

from fatigues, giving them prizes, &c. Deduct some of the man's pay monthly and deposit in Savings Bank. Secretaries of employment societies to give lectures on how to qualify for and obtain employment.

- 'CONAMUR.'—Officers should interview the men one year before their time is up, and have them specially trained in the line for which they are best fitted, by regimental instructors. Restore deferred pay and reopen regimental savings banks.
- 'ISHMAEL.'—A man on joining the regiment should learn a trade by an annual course of four months, and all Government work should be done by regimental shops.
- 'Curlew.'—Start a Government horse-breeding establishment, and employ old soldiers up to 60 per cent. of the establishment.
- 'SOLOMON.'—Army training as it exists is a good education to the ordinary recruit. There is neither time, nor a sufficiency of instructors, nor apparatus, for teaching every man a civil trade while serving. The one thing that requires developing is the soldier's self-reliance and initiative.
- 'SABRE.'—The present system of education should be encouraged. Recruits should be obliged to learn a trade, and all men should work at a trade in the afternoons. Nothing unfits a man so much for civil employment as the habit of afternoon loafing. Reintroduce an improved system of deferred pay.
- 'ICH DIEN.'—The existing advantages in a regiment only require to be fully utilised by the men, in their spare time, for learning trades. Classes to be formed in account keeping. Deduct 6d. a week to be used as a subsistence fund on a man's discharge, until he obtains some employment.

WHAT IS BEING DONE OFFICIALLY

The difficulty experienced by ex-soldiers in obtaining civil employment on completion of their term of Army service has frequently been brought to public notice, and attempts have, from time to time, been made to devise some means of mitigating it, but hitherto with only partial success.

The question has been raised in both Houses of Parliament and various committees have considered it, but beyond the spasmodic interest which has been momentarily generated by its public discussion, the subject has, with one or two prominent exceptions, been relegated, after a short time, to the region of general indifference.

The War Office, the General Post Office and the Office of Works have played no unimportant part in the endeavour to provide public employment for the ex-soldier, but with these notable exceptions, Government departments have not shown that avidity to make use of this class of employee which might have been reasonably expected, having regard to the strong recommendations of previous committees, and to the claim which such men have upon the State.

Meanwhile, various voluntary associations, hampered by lack of funds and by separate organisations, have been at work doing, as far as the limitations under which they laboured admitted, much good work in finding employment in civil life for soldiers of good character on quitting the Army, or on completion of their colour service.

It had, however, long been felt that matters could not be allowed to remain in this unsatisfactory state, and the appointment of another committee with power to inquire into the working of the associations referred to and to make recommendations as to the better provision for employment generally, was hailed as the omen of a definite attempt to grapple with the subject.

This committee, presided over by Sir Edward Ward, the Permanent Under-Secretary of State for War, and numbering amongst its members prominent representatives of the National Association for the Employment of Reserve and Discharged Soldiers and of the Incorporated Soldiers' and Sailors' Help Society, and having the advantage also of the services of the General Manager of the London and North-Western Railway Company and Sir George Livesey, met in December 1905, and after exhaustive inquiry, in which evidence was taken from all

sources likely to afford information on the subject, reported in July last.

The report covered the whole field of the ex-soldiers' employment, and whilst, on the one hand, recommending the substitution of one central association (with branches in the cities and towns of the country) in substitution for the various societies already existing, whose work had been proved to overlap, to the prejudice alike of the employer and ex-soldier, it also made suggestions of no unimportant character as to equipping the soldier before leaving the colours with some sort of technical knowledge which, by making him a handy man, would facilitate his endeavours to obtain work outside.

The recommendation as to the formation of the central association has not yet borne fruit, but is still the subject of consideration. The need for such an association has been made abundantly clear by the evidence tendered to the committee, and, pending its creation, any attempt to deal on systematic lines with the registration of employers and employees and the search for employment cannot be expected to attain complete success.

Distinct progress has, however, been made with a number of the other recommendations, foremost among which may be mentioned that of providing the means of technical instruction for soldiers whilst serving. At Malta a committee of officers interested in technical education and a sub-committee of non-commissioned officers and men, were formed in August last, and, as a result of a special appeal, no less than 900 men volunteered to undergo courses of instruction at their own expense. With the assistance of a local engineering firm, and by obtaining certain disused War Department material, great advances have been made in the desired direction.

A circular letter has been addressed by the War Office to the general officers commanding-in-chief of the various commands and the general officers commanding at foreign stations, calling their special attention to the subject and asking them to take steps on the following lines, viz:—

- 1. To interest the men in the question of their future prospects of employment by making clear to them the difficulties with which they may expect to be confronted on quitting the service.
- 2. To arrange for the appointment of a committee of officers interested in the subject of technical education, whose duty it would be to ascertain to what extent and at what cost instruction could be given in the command, to suggest methods of instruction, and to get into touch with the technical institutes of the various cities and towns where soldiers are quartered.
- 3. To arrange for the communication of information on the subject to the men.

In addition to this, endeavours are being made to start courses in platelaying and signalling, with a view to fitting men for railway work in Canada, where there are an increasing number of posts with good pay available, which many leading Canadians have expressed the desire that ex-soldiers should fill.

The subject of technical instruction has also met with outside sympathy from the Automobile Club, which has formed a committee with the object of assisting in arranging for the instruction of ex-soldiers as chauffeurs.

Side by side with these endeavours, the Secretary of State has approved of the formation of a special standing committee at the War Office for the purpose of advising, from time to time, on the subject of technical education, and of assisting the committees formed in the commands with such general advice and information as they may require. This special committee has also been charged with the duty of keeping in touch with outside civilian committees such as that of the Automobile Club.

It being fully realised that instruction which costs the recipient nothing is not likely to produce the best results, a small charge will be made to the man, and by this means his own independence will be cultivated, and the greater prospect of his making up his mind to profit by the instruction ensured.

What is really necessary to make the scheme successful is an intelligent desire on the part of all concerned to concentrate their

attention on those trades which are best calculated to assist the men, the endeavour being not to make the man a tradesman, but rather to give him just that addition to his knowledge which will put him in the position of a man who has something more than unskilled acquirements to offer on entering the labour market.

Full consideration is also being given to those recommendations of Sir Edward Ward's Committee which aim at the encouragement of thrift, and it is hoped that schemes may be devised on the lines indicated in the report, whereby men may be encouraged to save money whilst serving, and also to become members of some of the well-known friendly societies before or after leaving the Army. To secure either or both of these objects should be the aim of all who are brought in contact with the soldier, for not only will the money saved prove beneficial to the man when he first leaves the service, but the acquisition of thrifty habits should do much, by improving the character of the soldier, to raise him above the possibility of proving a cause of reproach either to himself or to the Army of which he is, or has been, a member.

The Earl of Portsmouth, Under-Secretary for War, speaking on the subject in the House of Lords, said: 'It had been impressed upon the proposed committee in each command that no trade should be included in the list unless it were such a trade as could be conveniently and profitably taught in the particular district, and that the instruction in any particular trade should be given only to such a number of men as would be likely to find employment in it. As far as possible the technical training should be given to any man who might desire it, but preference should be given to men in their last two years of the colour service. The training should not be confined to men who had borne good characters, but on the contrary it should be made known generally that the course was open, as far as possible, to all men willing and able to avail themselves of it. The Government proposed to make some contribution towards the initial cost. The amount and character



of the contribution were at present under consideration. It was the intention of the Government that the men themselves should bear a portion of the expenses of their own training, their contributions varying according to the trade they selected, which it was hoped would prevent men taking up the course light-heartedly, and throwing it over before they had obtained enough knowledge to give them any material benefit, a danger which previous experiments had shown to be serious.'

TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION AT EASTNEY BARRACKS, PORTSMOUTH

The success which has attended the Royal Marine Artillery School of Technical Instruction for soldiers still serving is most encouraging, and has led to similar efforts at Clarence Barracks, the Naval Barracks, Plymouth, and elsewhere.

Voluntary classes are held for instruction in boot-making and repairs, painting and glazing, general blacksmiths' work, motoring, and electric wiring.

To cover the initial cost of material a loan was obtained from the canteen funds, but after a year's working the school became self-supporting from the men's subscriptions. A small sum, varying according to the different subjects, from 1s. for shoemaking, &c., up to 4s. 6d. for motoring, is paid by the pupils weekly in advance. In addition they deposit a guarantee of from 5s. up to £1 on commencing, to ensure that only those who want to learn join the classes. This is repaid at the end of the course, less any subscription that may be due. At the termination of the course the class is examined by experts, who grant certificates. The school is managed by a committee, with an officer as president, five or more warrant or senior non-commissioned officers as members, and an honorary secretary. Civilian instructors at from 2s. to 4s. an hour are employed.

Of the various subjects on which the committee imparts instruction, motoring and electric wiring produce the most gratifying results. In the former trade nearly a hundred men have already obtained situations, and no complaints concerning them have been received. The examination is carried out on the lines advised by the Automobile Club representatives, and includes written papers on theory, mechanics, rules of the road, and Motor Act, a driving test upon the road and round a course, a viva voce on adjustments and care of garage, and a practical examination in soldering, file work, &c.

In short this organisation furnishes a working model, which demonstrates that technical instruction is possible in his Majesty's service, and might be initiated with advantage during the nontraining season in most garrison towns.

Some Hints to Soldiers while serving re Employment in Civilian Life

Major Wilkinson, Secretary of the National Association for the Employment of Reserve and Discharged Soldiers, writes:—

It is well for a soldier always to keep in mind that the struggle for employment in civil life is very severe, and whether he will be successful or go to the wall depends largely upon himself. The main point while serving should be to gain an 'Exemplary' or 'Very Good' character. A man with less than a 'Good' character has little chance of obtaining work in civilian life, and even a 'Good' cannot compete with 'Exemplary' or 'Very Good.' A real total abstainer or a non-commissioned officer is as a rule given preference by employers.

With a view to preparing for civil life while serving it is not sufficient to scrape through without serious crimes, but a man should try to improve his intelligence, learn to act for himself, improve his education, obtain a first-class certificate, cultivate a civil, cheerful, and willing manner, and also perseverance. In slack seasons employers discharge slack men, but I have known employers keep good men on when they have had little or no work for a time, rather than lose them.

An ex-soldier is a marked man. Civilians are taken on and

dismissed without notice being taken of the fact, but if one soldier turns out badly he gives other army men a bad character.

While serving, men should avail themselves of all opportunities to prepare for employment in civilian life. In large towns they can often attend evening classes and technical schools.

The following are some of the billets which are open to ex-soldiers in addition to Government posts: porter (uniform and warehouse) &c., grooms, stable-helpers, coachmen, carmen, horsekeepers (foremen and working), motor-car drivers, servants, valets, attendants, stewards, cellarmen, cooks, storekeepers, clerks, handymen, carpenters, &c. There are often chances of qualifying for such work while serving, as by learning to drive pair or single horse, to drive and repair a motor car, by acting as officer's servant, mess waiters, by passing a veterinary, saddler's, or saddle-tree maker's course, by working in the sick lines, by learning carpentering, or to do small repairs, by acting as butcher, by undertaking clerical work (shorthand, typewriting, book-keeping, use of telephone), by nursing and doing hospital work, &c., some knowledge of engineering and electrical work is also most helpful.

A man should put away some of his money in a savings bank; not only is the habit of thrift an excellent one, but after a man leaves the colours he may be out of work for a long time. A man sometimes loses a good job by not being dressed neatly. It is a great pity for a young fellow to embark on matrimony too soon—if he does, he should think of the future. I have known many ex-soldiers, excellent men fully qualified for highly paid billets as married couples, who have lost a place because in early life they have married some silly slovenly girl.

The National Association for Employment of Reserve and Discharged Soldiers, 119 Victoria Street, S.W., registers men of 'Exemplary,' 'Very Good,' and 'Good' character only, and charges no fees whatever—there are branches in all the large towns of the United Kingdom. Applications for registration

can be made any morning at 10.45 A.M., except Saturdays, personally, bringing all their documents. Men should register while on furlough, pending discharge, or immediately on leaving the colours; no time should be lost, as there is frequently a delay of many weeks before a suitable billet can be found.

They should realise beforehand that work in civilian life is as a rule much harder than in the Army, and that the working hours are much longer, also that employers often do not give high wages at first. There are as a rule hundreds of applicants for each good job, business men will not throw money away, and until they have proved a man they will not give him high wages simply because he has been an Army man. It is often well worth a man's while to accept a mere living wage so as to get a footing in a good firm. I have known many cases of men who have accepted a modest opening and, having proved their value, have been promoted.

There is a useful little book published by Messrs. Suffolk & Watts, 12 Wilson Street, E.C., 'How and where Ex-Soldiers can get Work.'

THE CANADIAN CAVALRY OF THE PRESENT DAY

By LIEUT.-COLONEL V. A. S. WILLIAMS, A.D.C., Royal Canadian Dragoons, C.S.O., Eastern Ontario Command.

The establishment of the Permanent Force—Cavalry schools and provisional courses—The Royal North-West Mounted Police—The mounted forces of the Dominion.

THE Establishment List for the Canadian Cavalry for 1906-07 has been issued, and a considerable increase in that arm of the Service is noted. The Permanent Force has heretofore had a strength of three weak squadrons of Cavalry; two of Royal Canadian Dragoons, one stationed at Toronto, Province of Ontario, and one at St. John's, Province of Quebec, and one squadron of Royal Canadian Mounted Rifles, stationed at Winnipeg, province of Manitoba. According to the new Establishment Lists there are to be three strong squadrons of Royal Canadian Dragoons, two of which, it is presumed, will be stationed at Toronto and one at St. John's, and six squadrons of Royal Canadian Mounted Rifles—to be organised within the next two or three years—stationed at points in the Provinces of Saskatchewan and Alberta, formerly part of the North-West Territories. The headquarters of the Royal Canadian Dragoons is at present in Toronto, while that of the Royal Canadian Mounted Rifles is at Winnipeg.

The Royal Canadian Dragoons saw considerable service in the Canadian North-West Rebellion in 1885, and again in 1899 the regiment was sent to South Africa as a Special Service regiment, its ranks being very considerably augmented by many officers and men from the various Active Militia Cavalry regiments of

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the Dominion. While in South Africa the regiment was attached to the Cavalry under the command of General Sir John French. The squadron of Royal Canadian Mounted Rifles also saw much service in South Africa.

There are at present three Cavalry schools in the Dominion, at Toronto, St. John's, and Winnipeg. These schools are carried on in conjunction with the permanent Cavalry squadrons stationed there, the squadrons being used for instructional purposes as well as for ordinary garrison duties. To these schools of instruction the officers and non-commissioned officers of the Active Militia proceed for the purpose of obtaining instruction, and to qualify for the rank held by them in their regiments. All officers and N.C.O.'s must qualify for the ranks held by them.

There are 'short' courses of instruction at each of these Cavalry schools which last for a period of three months, and 'special courses' which last for seven days and over, not exceeding three months. Officers and sergeants may attend at any of the 'special' courses of instruction and obtain certificates, non-commissioned officers below the rank of sergeant must attend for a full 'short' course before obtaining certificates. Officers are obliged to pass examinations for each step in rank, as is laid down in the King's Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Forces. At the end of each course of instruction examinations are held, those successfully passing the required standard are awarded certificates.

In many cases it has been found impossible, for business reasons, for the officers and non-commissioned officers of the Active Militia to spend the necessary time at a school of instruction, and to meet these cases permission is granted from time to time, authorising a 'provisional' school of instruction to be carried on at central points within the Dominion, the adjutant and sergeant-instructors being provided from the Permanent Force, the school itself being under the supervision of the District Officer Commanding within whose district the school is carried

on. At the conclusion of these courses examinations are held and certificates granted. These schools last for a period of not more than six weeks.

Those officers who attend these schools of instruction who desire to qualify for captain's and field officer's certificates, are required to spend seven days or more at one of the regular schools of instruction before obtaining their certificates. The establishment of these provisional schools has proved a great benefit to the force at large, as many officers and non-commissioned officers found it impossible to otherwise obtain certificates.

There are three regular short courses held during the year, a special course being carried on concurrently with the short course. There are as many as fifty officers and non-commissioned officers attached to the different Royal Schools of Cavalry for each course.

In the Western part of Canada there is a force of Royal North-West Mounted Police, consisting of some seven hundred men. This force was organised many years ago for the protection of the settlers in the North-West Provinces and also to prevent cattle stealing. This force has done magnificent service, and it is regretted that it is now under consideration—since the new provinces of the West have been formed—to reduce and divide this force equally between the two provinces, as the Western part of Canada is now getting thoroughly settled, the Indians more civilised, and the horse thieves are not as much in evidence. It is understood that when the new Squadrons of the Royal Canadian Mounted Rifles are formed, the officers, non-commissioned officers and men of the R.N.W.M.P. may be absorbed as vacancies exist.

The mounted forces of the Dominion, other than those of the permanent force, consist of regiments of Cavalry (Dragoons and Hussars), Mounted Rifles and Light Horse. During the past year these have been Brigaded. In all there are fifteen regiments of Cavalry, five of Mounted Rifles and Light Horse, and also independent squadrons of Mounted Rifles and Light Horse.

Each regiment has a strength of four squadrons. The officers of these regiments spare neither time nor money to make their respective units as efficient as possible.

The N.C.O.s and men of the City regiments are employed in different walks of life, those of Country regiments being recruited entirely from the young farmers. Each regiment has its own district from which to obtain recruits, that district being again sub-divided for recruiting ground for each squadron and troop.

Each Squadron Commander has his own Armoury where his Squadron Stores, &c., are kept under his own supervision; for this an annual allowance from the Government is granted.

In most cases the officers do their utmost to keep the men of their squadron together during the winter months. In order to do this they have rooms set apart in their Armouries where lectures are given by officers and senior non-commissioned officers. There are billiard and reading rooms in some cases connected with these lecture rooms. By this means the men are kept together, and when the training season arrives they are ready for the summer's work. In some parts of Canada the Armouries are small and inadequate, but these are gradually being replaced by better buildings.

It is only within the last two years that the active Militia has been extended to the North-West Territories, in the provinces of Saskatchewan and Alberta. In these provinces is to be found a magnificent body of mounted men. The mounted troops of these new provinces are being increased yearly as it is found that the rancher—the man who is continually in the saddle—makes an ideal Cavalry soldier.

The officers, non-commissioned officers, and men of the Canadian Cavalry are, taken as a whole, a most intelligent lot and are always anxious to learn; they are keen and think for themselves. The officers of the Canadian Cavalry deserve the greatest credit for the many sacrifices made by them for the benefit of not only their own regiments, but of the forces of the Dominion.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE YEOMANRY

By Colonel Gerald C. Ricardo (late 14th Hussars) Commanding Berkshire Imperial Yeomanry

The Yeomanry a century ago—Arms and accoutrements—Latter-day changes and improvements.

IN THE 'GOOD OLD DAYS'

THERE is no force in His Majesty's dominions that has changed its character so much as the Yeomanry.

In my own county of Berkshire, we have statements founded on fact more or less that a force for home defence called the Yeomanry and Volunteer Cavalry Force was called into existence by an Act 37 Geo. III. c. 6, dated November 11, 1796, but two years previous to this, viz. in 1794, successful attempts were made to raise troops of mounted citizens.

In different parts of the county troops were raised by private enterprise, but the Acts of Parliament coming into operation at the latter end of 1796, the patriotism of the country was fully roused, and Yeomanry troops and squadrons sprang into being in nearly every county.

It is not my intention, however, to describe how step by step this county force came to be recognised, as I could only do that by describing my own county Yeomanry record, and that would be neither instructive nor amusing to the readers of this article.

It appears that the Gentlemen and Yeomanry Cavalry Corps and Troops, upon their formation in 1794 and at subsequent periods, received an allowance of money from Government, about £1 10s. per man, to provide them with equipment, viz. waist-belts for pistols, cartouch boxes with king's belts for swords, and generally the swords themselves.

ARMS

The swords originally issued had a straight blade with a leather scabbard; afterwards these were exchanged for Light Dragoon sabres, with iron scabbards, and sword-belt and knot.

When the carbine came, the different regiments were at first armed with the Westley Richards—this was about from 1871 to 1881—then the Snider from 1881 to 1886, then the Martini, and this last existed for a very long period.

The Cavalry sword with steel scabbard, pattern 82, was also in use in most regiments even up to the time of the last South African war.

The clothing also has undergone great changes.

I have by me old pictures of the force in 1807, a very tight tunic with silver facings, a steel sort of cap with an immense plume and feather. Then, as years went on, tight stable jackets (even I remember these) and booted overalls came in.

Jack-boots did not come in until the eighties, and serge jackets ten years later.

MEN

The class of men, too, has varied beyond conception; in the old days the Yeomanry was essentially manned by the farmers and their sons—in fact, the whole force was a relict of the bygone ages, when the feudal lord had his own troop of retainers.

Then, as times grew bad, the old race of farmer gradually died out, and small tradesmen and innkeepers came in—in fact anyone who was able to provide a horse.

This, I always think, was the best part of the old force, that no one belonged who could not provide a horse at a moment's notice, and the commanding officer had the power (as he has now) of rejecting any horse not suitable.

DRILL

What the drill used to be like before the sixties I do not know, but there was a certain amount drilled into the men.

The weak part was the officers, for after the commandant the other officers knew very little.

I have myself seen once when the colonel was not out at the training, another officer in command, who, at the beginning of the day, pulled a bit of paper out of his holster pipe and read the drill through.

Most weird movements they were.

'Change front threequarters right back, on the third squadron,' was a sample one.

This took at least ten minutes to perform, for it was done very solemnly, at a walk, of course, and as every troop leader had to give some different word of command, very few gave a right one.

We all used to look over our shoulders and ask our



sergeant-major for the proper word, so it naturally took time.

Then, far too much time was wasted in marching past—this was always a favourite pastime of the old Yeoman, and took years to eradicate.

Outpost work was only practised once in the eight days' training, so it naturally followed that the force was not strong at it.

STABLE MANAGEMENT

Then the old system of billeting the men in towns was never a good one. Men brought their own grooms, or rather one man looked after about three Yeomen's horses, the actual rider never saw his horse from the time he got off him in the afternoon till he got on to his back again next morning; he never put on his own tackle, never knew whether his horse had even been fed, or what sort of food he required; all he knew was, that if he was blown up by his captain for some irregularity of putting on, or cleanliness of kit, it was his man's fault.

His one ambition was to have a good week, and as a rule he had it.

The present system of store-rooms has this great advantage, that saddlery can be kept in first-class order, but it has this disadvantage that, in case of mobilisation, it would take a certain time to fit the squadron out on sudden emergency.

THE N.C.O.

In the cases of the ordinary N.C.O.s, nothing has been so marked of late years as their improvement. In former years, hardly any of them could lead troops, much less instruct the men; now all that has been altered; the present N.C.O. is a very competent man, very nearly as good as his brother, the regular, for he comes from exactly the same class, and with as much training would be identical; he is selected by merit, and has winter instruction.

INSPECTIONS

What used to strike the Inspecting Officer more than anything, was that the men drilled well enough for all intents and purposes, but the constant chatter, so different from a

regular regiment, used to make him wonder how it was the work was done at all. Now, I am happy to say, this is a thing of the past.

Whilst on the subject of Inspecting Officers, it is very gratifying to notice the great change that has swept over the Yeomanry since it has had its own Inspecting Staff Officers.

Formerly, the usual plan was to send for the nearest Cavalry colonel, who, as a rule, made too much allowance for Yeomanry, and did not like to hurt their feelings by giving an indifferent report, although in justice to the force I must say, after about thirty years' experience of it, that however badly the men had been doing on the day previous, no matter whether the day was fine or wet, they always pulled themselves together on the inspection day, and did their best for the credit of the regiment. The talking was appreciably less, and they one and all tried to help the officers.

The present Staff Officers for Yeomanry take a personal interest in the several regiments in their command, go and stay a day or two with each corps and generally identify themselves with the several units, thereby finding out each regimental system and giving valuable advice.

OFFICERS' MESSES

The old officer's mess used to be as expensive as it was possible to be—it was held at the principal hotel in the town.

Officers invited half the county to dinner, drank champagne by the bucketful, either had big gambles, or else jovial spirits would paint the town red—this, I am happy to say, has quite gone out owing to the advent of camp life and its proper discipline.

This also means that an officer's mess bill is very slight compared with what it used to be; whisky and soda has taken the place of champagne, and the county is only invited to the regimental sports.

The uniform that an officer has to provide now is very different, there is no excuse for extravagance, and a subaltern can

live in an ordinary regiment now at very little expense over and above his pay.

Of course, the officer is expected to know more, he has to go to the School as soon after joining as he can conveniently do so, he is expected to go either to Hythe or to the School for Signalling—in fact, he can go to something every year almost.

Much more is, however, expected of him—he is required to be thoroughly conversant with every detail connected with his squadron, in fact, to know everything a Cavalry subaltern is supposed to know.

I fancy the usual average of quartermasters is one of the weakest points of the Yeomanry of the present day, for most regiments do their own regimental messing, and everything has to be bought by the quartermaster, and he is responsible to the colonel that the most is made out of it. In a regular regiment, Government takes the burden off his shoulders with its own contractors, in a Yeomanry one he has to supply every cook, waiter, &c., besides buying all the meat, bread, and coffee-shop requisites.

Efficiency

I believe the shooting of the Yeomanry averages very much what it did before—it was never very brilliant, at the same time it never was very bad; I think the general tendency now is to improve.

I do not consider the horses as good as we used to have; so many more horses are hired, and as most of the regiments go out about the same time, the horses are all wanted at once. This is as it should be, for otherwise the same horse would be hired out to different regiments.

I am quite certain the principle of regiments having military sports is a very sound one; men are taught a good deal of horse-manship whilst tent-pegging, lemon-cutting, bare-backed riding, &c., and no amount of military races can do this.

It may knock up the horses a little more, considering what is

done in the way of work by the modern Yeoman, but it is better than racing.

I may add that the keenness of the modern man is extraordinary; he is keener than the regular, and thoroughly enters into the spirit of modern mimic warfare.

A night attack is a source of enjoyment to the Yeoman, and he can turn out if required as noiselessly as anyone. This I proved myself at this last year's training.

I believe the Yeoman would be an ideal person for the new trials of long-distance rides, getting messages through difficult country, and the thousand and one things that occur in the modern requirements of war.

The objection he finds is that he has his own business to attend to, and cannot spare more time to his military training than what he can do in his hours of leisure; this is particularly applicable to signalling, for it is very difficult to get ten or a dozen men together from different parts, to form a chain of posts on any one night.

I fancy the time will come when the whole force will be commanded almost entirely by regular officers—not that I have a word to say against the many civilian ones, who have cheerfully borne the burden and heat of the day in bygone days, but it stands to reason that if the force is to be called upon to take its share in service abroad in time of war there are large numbers of Yeomanry officers who, however competent and willing, would be unable, owing to their own business, to give up an unlimited period to campaigning abroad; as a rule two-thirds of Yeomanry officers are married, and certainly half of them are professional men.


The same applies in equal case to the men.

Towards the close of the first year of the South African war it became quite apparent that very few of the original Yeomanry force which went out early in 1900 could spare more time than a twelvementh to being away from their own duties at home, hence the enormous leakage amongst those at the front. There

were several cases in which men lost permanent billets and never regained them.

I have endeavoured to make this slight sketch of the Yeomanry force as free from criticism as possible. I joined the Yeomanry in 1869, four years before I went into the service, and after I left the service in 1882 I went back again to the Yeomanry, so I may fairly claim to know something about it.

The stories I could tell would fill a book, but this is not the place for them, I have only tried in this simple article to trace the progress of the force from its origin, and to point out the vast improvement which has taken place, and which I sincerely hope will continue to take place, in this very old constitutional force.



THE GUIDON OF THE ABINGDON TROOP OF THE 1ST BERESHIRE YEOMANRY CAVALRY, BEARING THE DATE, APRIL 1794

NOTES ON THE FRENCH REMOUNT SYSTEM

By Colonel W. H. Birkbeck, C.B., C.M.G.

Co-operation between Military and Civil Authorities—Military Horse Shows—Purchase and disposal of Mares—Depôts and Farms—Purchasing.

THE Horsebreeding or Stud Department, whose mission is the improvement of the French breeds, is administered by the Minister of Agriculture: its operations are admittedly directed, in the first place, though not solely, towards the production of animals for the service of the army, which buys its remounts almost exclusively from among the produce of the Government sires.

The Remount Department, under the Minister of War, is entirely distinct from the Stud Department, which is purely civil, and it is with the former that this paper will principally deal, though showing how cordial are its relations with the latter, and how thoroughly the officers of the Remount Service are in touch both with the Stud Officials, and with the horse-breeding and horse-raising farmers of France.

The horse-breeding work of the French Agricultural Department is doubtless as efficiently performed in the British Isles by private enterprise, and by the efforts of societies for the improvement of various breeds of horses, but from the close connection and co-operation of Remount Officers and breeders I venture to think that we can learn a useful lesson, which may help us to save our supply of war horses from extinction.

Insular prejudice makes no greater mistake than in looking down on the Frenchman as a horse-breeder and horse-master. Anyone who spends a few weeks touring in Normandy cannot fail to be struck with the size, shape, condition, and docility of the horses in general use: the plains of Caen are full of young horses in the best of condition, the farmers drive to market behind animals that would do credit to Yorkshire or Leicestershire, and in the towns private horses, cab-horses, and van-horses are all of the best and in first-class condition.

In short, the French farmer of Normandy at any rate knows just as much about a horse as we do, and takes as much, if not more, care of him: in one all-important point alone he is at a disadvantage, *i.e.* that France has no national pursuits like foxhunting and in lesser degree polo.

MILITARY HORSE SHOWS

In order to encourage breeders of saddle-horses for the army, special shows are held under the auspices of the Remount authorities, at which prizes are given for the best geldings and mares three and a half to six years old, shown under saddle and sold to the Remount Department.

These shows are said to have an excellent effect in bringing breeders together, engendering a healthy rivalry among them, and improving their relations with the Remount Officers in pursuance of the French Remount policy of buying as far as possible from their breeders direct, animals of known and approved parentage at a price which pays the breeder to produce them.

Young Mares bought and left with Breeders

Remount Committees usually buy three-year-olds in the autumn of their fourth year: in the case, however, of mares suitable as brood-mares, they are authorised to purchase in March or April, paying down their full value, and leaving them with their owners upon the following conditions, which are embodied in a regular legal contract. The farmer undertakes to feed the mare and keep her in good condition on light work only (hauling timber, earth, sand, &c., being specially prohibited),



paying all expenses including forage, shoeing, veterinary medicines, &c.

He further undertakes to put the mare to a named Government saddle-stallion two years in succession, *i.e.* in her fourth and fifth years, the produce remaining his absolute and unconditional property. The mare is at all times subject to military inspection, and is moreover formally brought before the Remount Committee on tour in her fifth year with foal at foot.

Mares are finally taken over by the Remount Authorities in the autumn of their sixth year, when the second foal is weaned.

Premiums may be given for good condition not exceeding 250 francs (£10) for the first year, and 400 francs (£16) for the second year, according to the estimated increase in the mare's value during the time she has been in the farmer's hands. In case a mare is barren these premiums are reduced to a maximum of 150 francs each.

Strict clauses are included in the contract to deal with cases of loss or injury by preventable accidents or neglect, and the Remount Department is empowered to withdraw the mare instantly if she is not well looked after.

Such action is, however, seldom necessary, for so well do the Remount Officers know their districts, and the character and reliability of the farmers therein, and so actively are they assisted by the civil authorities, that trouble of any kind is quite exceptional.

The bargain is satisfactory to all parties; the farmer gets the use of his money and of his mare as well, and probably two foals; the army gets a young remount well cared for without expense, instead of sending it to a Remount Farm to mature; and the State's equine resources are probably increased by two embryo war-horses.

In cases where the owner of a young brood-mare either does not wish, or from any cause is unable, to keep her as described above, she may be handed over to another farmer under similar conditions.

CAST MARES SENT TO BREEDERS

Mares under fourteen years old, cast from the service but considered suitable as brood-mares, are sold by auction at special sales at which only approved breeders are allowed to bid. Draught mares are sold at the unit's station, but saddle brood-mares are sent to the Remount Depôts situated in districts where their services as mothers will best be turned to account.

The only obligation laid on the purchaser is that he shall put the mare to an approved stallion.

The utmost care is taken to ensure not only that all mares cast as brood-mares are suitable as such, but also that all (saddle-mares especially) that are suitable as brood-mares shall be cast as such, and sent to breed in the districts to which they are suited.

Every remount's birth certificate, or record of his breeding, is obtained at the time of purchase, and accompanies the animal to its corps; this document, together with the veterinary history sheet, is handed over with the cast brood-mare to her purchaser; the final certificate also given with the mare includes:—

Number— Name— Age— Height— Colour—

Veterinary history accounting for any blemishes and the final cause for casting.

Notes by the P.V.O. on conformation, temperament, peculiarities of digestion, &c.

Notes by the C.O. on the mare's character as a troop horse or charger. Ridden by an officer, won regimental steeplechase, &c.

CLOSE TOUCH BETWEEN REMOUNT OFFICER AND FARMER

Close personal touch and continuity of dealing between Remount Officers and breeders is the essence of the French Remount system; year after year as the Remount Committees tour their districts they buy from the same farmers, who are thus sure of a direct market for the right class of animal, without the intervention of any middleman, and in spite of any changes in



the horse market that have resulted from the adoption of motor traction.

The territorialisation of the French Army enables mounted corps to be supplied always by the same depôts, and thus it comes about that certain troops and even squadrons are mounted exclusively from certain groups of farms; the individuality of the young remount is not lost sight of, and the interest of some farmers in the military career of their young stock is as great as that of the owner of a thoroughbred stud in the turf performances of the yearlings he sells at Newmarket or Doncaster; and finally it often happens that the mares come back at the end of their service to the same farm that reared them, and their places in the ranks are eventually filled by their progeny.

DEPÔTS

Remount depôts, of which there are seventeen in all, are usually commanded by Cavalry majors (extra-regimentally employed), and include one or two captains as purchasing officers, a veterinary officer, a captain or lieutenant for depôt duty, and a sufficient number of the rank and file of one of the remount companies.

Commanders of independent depôts look to the Inspector-General as their circle commander.

REMOUNT FARMS. 'ANNEXES'

To each depôt are attached one or more remount farms, where horses under five years old are kept from date of purchase to date of delivery to corps.

These farms are either on State lands, or on communal or private property leased to the army; and as a large number of horses can seldom be maintained satisfactorily on the same ground year after year, the system of leasing farms is greatly preferred.

The remount farms are looked after by captains of Cavalry with veterinary officers to assist, or by veterinary officers alone,

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and are administered by the depôt to which they are attached, and through which stores of all kinds are drawn; they are the object of constant surprise visits by the depôt commander, and are further subject to inspection by the local intendance officers of the territorial district. The animals destined to form the annual remount of each corps are sent (after a stay of not more than twenty days at the depôt) to particular farms, the personnel of which are drawn from the corps whose remounts are located on them. This personnel consists of N.C.O.s and of men in the proportion of one to ten animals, chosen from among recruits of the groom and jockey class, and sent to the farms direct on enlistment.

Not only is the maintenance of discipline, difficult enough in such semi-military establishments, thus facilitated, but regimental interest in the animals is created from the outset, and the recruits are taught the rudiments of drill and barrack life by N.C.O.s of their own corps.

The routine of a remount farm is necessarily very much in the hands of subordinates, the commander being able only to exercise a general supervision over his scattered establishment.

The horses live as much as possible out of doors in paddocks, coming in only at night, in bad weather, and for their daily feed of corn; they are either kept moving in their paddocks for exercise, or are driven round a ring for an hour daily; for a few weeks before delivery to units they are tied up, regularly groomed and exercised by hand.

The instruction of the men is confined to drill with arms, squad drill on foot, miniature range practice, and lectures on equine hygiene and hippology.

The farmer provides ground for the cultivation of vegetables, fuel, and such lodging as the farm buildings permit; barrack routine, cleanliness and the putting up of beds and kits being carried on as regularly as is possible.

The great point after all is to keep the young horses in condition, and free from disease, and to that everything else is secondary.

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Purchasing

The War Department fixes each year the programme of purchasing, based upon the forecasts and proposals of circle and independent depôt commanders.

Purchases are actually made by committees of three members, who must always all be present.

Committees on tour are accompanied by a clerk, a farrier with branding-irons, and a few soldiers.

Purchases are made either at the depôts on fixed days in each month, or at convenient centres which are visited by the committee on tour, in accordance with a regular programme previously drawn up and widely advertised.

The heights of the various classes of remounts are:

			metre		metre
Cuirassiers	•		1.55	to	1.64
Dragoons	•		1.52	,,	1.57
Light Cavalry .	•	•	1.48	,,	1.54
Artillery and Transpo	rt	•	1.54	,,	1.62
Infantry chargers.		•	1.46	,,	1.55
Mules	•	•	1.48	,,	1.54

That is, roughly, from 16.2 hands for Cuirassiers to 14.2 for Infantry officers' chargers.

Chargers, and Cavalry and Horse Artillery remounts are bought at three years old, Artillery and Transport horses at four years, and eight is the limit of age never to be exceeded.

Thoroughbreds, certified to have been in training, may be bought at two-and-a-half years old, and are distributed equally among corps as chargers.

The cast-offs of racing stables are much sought after, and make excellent chargers.

Purchasing takes place in public, officers being always in uniform.

Horses foaled or raised in one district are never bought by the Purchasing Committee of another district. The average price is fixed by Army Estimates.

The papers certifying an animal's breeding are always delivered at the sale, and accompany its records throughout its military career.

Thoroughbreds invariably retain their stud-book names.

Prices vary greatly within the specified average: those which the writer actually saw paid and recorded, reached a maximum of 1,800 francs (£68) for a practically thoroughbred hunter-like three-year-old charger of great bone and substance, and a minimum of 800 francs (£32) for a weedy three-year-old dragoon remount.

Cuirassier remounts in the Caen district seem to average about £50, and Artillery horses £40; no light Cavalry horses are bred in that country.

The animals purchased are usually sent to the depôts, where they remain not more than twenty days as a rule, but if the farm to which they are allotted is much nearer to the place of purchase, they may go there direct, instead of to the depôt, upon whose books they are, however, inscribed.

The greatest and most intelligent care is taken of the animals in the depôts; veterinary observation is constant and minute, and hygienic conditions are as perfect as possible.

The utmost latitude is allowed in clothing and feeding, with a view to the gradual return to natural conditions of animals which have been made up for sale.

The French remount system leaves little to be desired, but their animals must cost them, from first to last, an average of some £80 apiece before they join their corps.

THE NEED OF NUMBERS

By CECIL BATTINE

This paper shows briefly and consistently the necessity for quantity as well as quality in the Cavalry branch. Most of the Cavalry successes in history have been gained by use of large numbers.

'THE Cavalry officer should be thoroughly conversant with the whole domain of tactics, be a good horseman and good shot, be both intelligent and energetic, and should possess all the qualities necessary to make him a pattern to his men.' This is quoted from the July number of the CAVALRY JOURNAL, and is extracted from the paper of a Russian Cavalry officer writing on the war in Manchuria. When the present writer joined the Army, incontestably its most important officials were the troop sergeantmajors, whose inflexible virtue, faultless punctuality, and minute knowledge of their numerous duties excited his respectful admiration. But a troop sergeant-major of 1887 was a weak, frail, and erring mortal, compared to the standard of excellence demanded to-day of a squadron officer. Nor should it be forgotten that this paragon of all the virtues and talents must have been brought up in the luxury of wealth, and have acquired the graces of idleness, which can best be got by three or four years' residence in the restful atmosphere of a big public school. strenuous life begins on joining the Cavalry.

The serious student of politics and war cannot refrain from wondering whether the burden thus laid upon the shoulders of the Cavalry cornet is not unreasonably heavy, and whether the responsibility for the excellence of the Cavalry arm should not be shared by more exalted persons. In particular the events of recent campaigns point to the necessity for adequate numbers in the units employed both in tactical and strategical operations.

Learned works on war confidently recite a number of instances where Cavalry has failed to defeat trustworthy Infantry in the open field. If the examples so glibly quoted were more narrowly examined, it would be found that the Cavalry failures were, almost without exception, instances of a great inferiority of numbers. Nowhere in English literature is due homage rendered to the victories of the Carthaginian, Hungarian, and Norman Cavalry, nor to the decisive successes gained in modern war by German, French, and American horsemen acting in masses of 10,000 and more.

The first work of value which appeared on the subject of the Manchurian campaign was 'The War in the Far East,' by the 'Times' correspondent. Everyone who wishes to understand the events of the war should study this book, if only on account of its maps of the battles with contending forces marked thereon. The letterpress is short, and even an overworked subaltern might find time to glance through its pages, and to pore over the maps, which show how evenly balanced was the struggle, right up to the final drama before Mukden.

In a remarkable paper by General de Négrier a very short account is given of the mighty struggle which ended the land campaign in favour of Japan, and he shows how important was the part played by the small force of Japanese Cavalry in obtaining the victory. If his information is correct, it can be confidently asserted that the ruin of the Russian right wing with all its momentous consequences was effected by Japanese horsemen turning the scale, at the moment when the Infantry of the contending armies held one another in check on a front of over seventy miles. No continental army needs to learn how important may be the power of Cavalry to charge on horseback with sword and lance, or doubtless the General would have dwelt upon the great opportunity, which was lost, of utterly destroying the Russian Army, had the Japanese Cavalry been present in sufficient numbers to consummate their victory.

The greatest advantage which the Japanese possessed over

their European adversaries consisted in their freedom from traditional follies and their plan of subjecting every move in the game to critical common sense. For example, they promptly broke the law of European armies, which lays down that the Cavalry, never too numerous, must be used up in providing a screen for the other arms. This duty was executed by small detachments of the numerous, well trained, and swiftly marching Infantry, accompanied by the smallest possible number of horsemen, while the mass of the Cavalry was reserved for fighting purposes. The long range and smokeless ammunition of the rifle of to-day renders the task of providing security more suitable to dismounted than to mounted troops.

It would be unreasonable to expect, nor is it the least necessary, that the cost of maintaining in peace the forces required in war should be added to the very heavy taxation already imposed upon our people for military purposes. In the Boer war large forces of mounted troops were obtained, not by using and expanding existing organisations, but by improvising fresh ones composed of Volunteers, of Infantrymen, and even of Artillerymen. That scheme, as a military measure, was, as everyone knows, disastrous and costly beyond precedent. If we are to enter upon our next war with a sufficient force of trained Cavalry it is obvious that we must adopt some plan yet to be devised.

It may be asked how such questions of high military policy concern the majority of our readers.

Petit poisson deviendra grand Si Dieu lui prête la vie.

Subalterns in process of time become generals and colonels, whose opinions and advice officially given sometimes carry weight in the councils of the State. Anything like a consensus of opinion among the officers of the Cavalry, moreover, is bound to exercise a certain influence, and it is with the hope that this paper may lead to reflection on the all-important question of how our Cavalry can be made strong enough for its work in the next war that it is respectfully offered to the Editor.

CONFEDERATE CAVALRY IN VIRGINIA

By Major D'Arcy Legard, 17th Lancers

Introduction—Ashby covers Winchester—March on McDowell—Surprise—Front Royal—Stuart—Bull Run—Retirement from York Town—Chickahominy Raid—Chancellorsville—Brandy Station.

To a student of the action of Cavalry, who wishes to gain from a study of the past some assistance for use in the future, an investigation of the Cavalry and its leaders in the American Civil War is peculiarly interesting.

Here for the first time were mounted men compelled to face the new breech-loader and the rifled cannon.

Since the last important war there had been change and improvement in the material of every arm. Only two factors had remained stationary—the range of vision and the endurance of man, and the pace and carrying capacity of the horse.

I propose to select a few examples in chronological order of the part played by Cavalry in the war, both strategical and tactical, and to bring forward special lessons to be deduced from them.

How the value of Cavalry became realised

In 1861 both Confederates and Federals were unprepared for hostilities, and the troops on both sides had to be raised gradually as time went on. At the outset, *i.e.* at the Battle of Bull Run, there were only about 2,500 cavalrymen on each side, which numbered altogether 40,000 men, a proportion of only one-sixteenth of the total force.

The view, accepted at first, that Cavalry were of little value



against the new firearms, was soon changed to a recognition of their importance; and the shrewd inhabitants of both Northern and Southern States set to work to increase that arm of the service, with the result that, at the end of the war, the Cavalry on the Northern side alone numbered 80,000.

General Morgan, a Kentuckian, is said to have been the first to perceive the value of a mounted rifleman. He armed his men with the long rifle in place of their almost useless carbine, and taught them to fight on foot as well as on horseback. They were thus able to give full effect to that mobility which has always made Cavalry formidable. They could, to protect themselves, form their own pivots of defence, and their own escort to their (horse artillery) guns.

It must not be concluded that these American horsemen were merely Mounted Infantry; Cavalry combats such as Brandy Station, cases of Cavalry charging Infantry as at Chancellorsville and Aldie, are far too numerous to admit of this view being taken by even the most bigoted and prejudiced advocate of Mounted Infantry.

The truth is that the Americans struck the proper mean between shock tactics and dismounted work, and used both in close and effective co-operation.

This becomes the more worthy of note when we remember that the men who composed the army were accustomed from their youth up to the rifle, skilled in its use, and moreover had, to start with, a sublime contempt for the sabre. The sabre, then, had as hard a battle to fight against prejudice in those days as the rifle has to-day, among the old Cavalry school. We find that it prevailed.

In the early days of the Civil War the Federals were sadly handicapped by the want of mounted men. Their lack of Cavalry made it almost impossible for them to obtain reliable information in the enemy's country. Every spy exaggerated the strength of the Confederate forces, and their inexpert reports frequently misled them.



ASHBY AS A CAVALRY LEADER

In the army of Northern Virginia the Cavalry of Ashby rendered most invaluable assistance to Jackson; though at that period their successes were lessened by the indiscipline which can be understood, though not condoned, in a hastily raised force, which had yet to build up a spirit of esprit de corps. In the Valley, whilst Jackson's troops reposed at Winchester, the south bank of the Potomac, forty miles to the front, was closely patrolled by Ashby's men. The duty demanded of them was not only to watch the frontier, but to gain information of the strength of the enemy, the position of his camps, and the direction of his movements—from which deductions of his intentions could be made. To penetrate the enemy's lines, and watch his columns, were the tasks carried out by Ashby's troopers. Banks, with less efficient Cavalry, was perpetually groping in the dark.

Tents, overcoats, and knapsacks were discarded. With a couple of blankets, an indiarubber sheet and a haversack, which carried their few wants, the men rode light and the horses lasted well.

Much of Jackson's success was due to his policy of mystifying and misleading the enemy, and in this he was ably seconded by Ashby.

In his march from Elk Run to Staunton on his way to McDowell, Ashby had picketed all the roads leading South from the North. He had made a vigorous demonstration towards Harrisonburg and driven Banks' Cavalry back on his main body. Twenty-four hours later he rejoined his chief, leaving Banks utterly mystified as to where Jackson was or what he was doing.

In the subsequent advance to Front Royal, Ashby's men kept the line of advance a secret, severed the communication between Front Royal and the rest of the Federal troops, while a regiment under Colonel Flournay charging down the main street of the town in fours, captured a battery and 600 men and put the rest of Kenley's force to flight.

In the retirement from Winchester it was Ashby's guns and Cavalry which kept Fremont at a distance; his rearguard, burning the bridges as they passed, and occupying successive positions, dismounted, while the mounted men worked round the flanks and charged the Federal Cavalry when an opportunity offered. It was thus Ashby met his death.

"JEB" STUART AS A LEADER

A fitting successor was found in Stuart to command the Cavalry of the army.

J. E. B. Stuart has been described by those who knew him as the ideal of a Cavalry soldier. Educated at West Point, trained in fighting the Indians on the prairie, his constitution was as hard as steel, and his mind and body active. His invariable custom was to give personal instruction to every party which went out on patrol, while he set his men a capital example of untiring energy and keenness.

Previous to the Battle of Bull Run, he had been instructed by Jackson to cover the march of the main body, to co-operate with Johnston. So well did he keep the Federals "amused" that the departure of the Infantry was not discovered until they had crossed the Blue Ridge and gained twenty-four hours' start.

On the actual battlefield of Bull Run, Stuart, with a battery and two companies of Cavalry, had as large a share in saving the battle as any of the commanders according to the manuscript narrative of General Early. He successfully carried out the task of covering the left Confederate flank, keeping the enemy in check on that side. When the tide of battle turned and the Confederates could advance, Stuart pursued the fugitives for twelve miles till his command had been reduced to a mere handful by the sending of prisoners of war to the rear. From this a useful lesson might have been gained, for the German Cavalry of '70 at Wörth, Spicheren, Weissenburg and Rezonville, had their leaders chosen to avail themselves of it.

The next few months were passed in frequent small skirmishes with the enemy, and in the daily and personal instruction of the troopers under Stuart himself.

In April 1862, McClellan had landed his army at Fort Monroe and was marching on Yorktown. Having delayed the Federals for a month, the Confederate army evacuated the entrenched line there and the duty of covering the retirement devolved on Stuart and his Cavalry.

Stuart was now a Brigadier, and disposed his six regiments on the three roads which led westward from Yorktown. Cooperation was difficult, but each force held its own by fierce hand-to-hand encounters, for a whole day, though overmatched in Artillery, and fell back behind the Infantry lines of Williamsburg at nightfall.

According to official despatches, 'the comfort and quiet of the march of the troops were largely due to the admirable dispositions and watchfulness of the Cavalry rearguard.'

STUART'S RAIDS

Stuart was the first of the Southern Cavalry leaders to undertake extensive Cavalry raids against the enemy's flanks and rear.

These were more than mere forays, and were carried out by considerable bodies of Cavalry and Artillery, stripped of everything that might impede their mobility and with a specific objective in view. The value of these missions in certain cases cannot be overestimated. In addition, the embarrassment caused to the mind of the Federal Generals and the feeling of uncertainty of the troops was very considerable.


THE CHICKAHOMINY RAID

The first of these raids was that made in June, 1862, round McClellan's army in front of Richmond.

The orders given him by Lee after a full discussion were as follows:



'You are desired to make a scout movement to the rear of the enemy posted on the Chickahominy, with a view of gaining intelligence of his operations, communications, etc., of driving in his foraging parties and securing such grain and cattle as you can collect. Another object is to destroy his wagon trains passing from White House to his camp. I recommend you take only such men as can stand the expedition. . . You must leave



sufficient Cavalry here for the service of this army and remember that one of the chief objects of your expedition is to gain intelligence for the guidance of future movements.'

With 2,500 Cavalry and two guns he set out north on the 12th June, reached Taylorsville that night, then turned east, drove off the hostile bodies sent to resist him, and reached the rear of the Fèderal Army at the old church ten miles northwest of White House at midday on the 18th.

Here he found a Federal squadron drawn up to oppose him.

Without any hesitation Stuart's leading squadron charged in column of fours with the sabre down the road and broke the enemy. Again the latter re-formed, and again were dispersed by the Confederates.

Stuart had now accomplished the first part of his mission—the discovery of where the enemy's right flank rested. The pressing need now was to carry back this information safely to Lee. He had gathered that his retreat was already barred at the creek he had crossed in the morning. He therefore decided to continue his march southwards in the direction he was least expected. On the way he effected the second part of his task—the burning of a quantity of stores and the destruction of the railway and telegraph at Tunstall's Station, which connected the Federal army with its main depôt at White House.


It is quite an error to suppose that Stuart's force felt their way along the road by mere fortune. Every chance had been carefully calculated, and the position of most of the enemy's camps located by individual guides who led the force along the particular section of which they themselves were natives and knew every yard.

At midnight the march was resumed.

The ford they were aiming for over the Chickahominy was found to be impassable owing to heavy rains; but a broken bridge a little lower down was found to have sufficient *débris* left to facilitate its reconstruction. The timbers from a warehouse close by were utilised, and very soon a plank bridge was made sufficient for the troopers to cross by, holding the bridles of their horses, which swam alongside the bridge.

In three hours it was ready for the artillery and vehicles, and by 1 P.M. the rearguard, who had kept off small parties of the enemy, were withdrawn, and the bridge burnt.

On arrival, at sunset, at Charles City Court House, Stuart handed over command, and rode 30 miles into Richmond to give in his report in person. He had ridden 100 miles in less than three days. His important information enabled Lee to plan the





RW.H.

Union Cavalryman



Virginian Cavalry

subsequent operations of the 'seven days.' Apart from strategic considerations, the effect on the *moral* of the Federal army was great. Confidence in McClellan was severely shaken. Extra troops were detached to guard the line of communications—an important result.

STUART'S CATLETTS RAID

A few weeks later, August 22, Stuart made his second raid in rear of General Pope's army at Catletts Station. He destroyed vast supplies, captured the official papers of General Pope giving the strength and dispositions of his force and the plans of the campaign. This information enabled Lee to map out the turning movement through Thoroughfare Gap, which culminated in the second battle of Manassas and the defeat of Pope.

CAVALRY INCREASED

In June 1868, both armies had been reorganised and increased. The Confederate Infantry totalled 55,000 men, the Cavalry nearly 10,000 men with 80 horse guns, organised in five brigades.

The Federals totalled 78,000 Infantry, the Cavalry about 9,000 with 54 guns, organised in a corps of three divisions.

The proportion of cavalrymen to Infantry therefore in the Confederate ranks was rather more than one-sixth, in the Federal ranks rather less than one-sixth.

Truly an increase in the number of Cavalry since June two years before, when 2,500 mounted men were the most that either side could put in the field.

There had been time and opportunity enough, without doubt, to judge of the value of an efficient Cavalry, which both sides had not failed to mark and act upon.

HOOKER'S FEDERAL RAID SPOILT

After four months' inactivity, during which time the army of the Potomac had been placed under a new commander—Hooker—this new commander-in-chief determined to turn Lee's left flank on the west, and march straight on the Confederate capital; at the same time sending Stoneman with a force of 9,000 Cavalry on a wide raiding movement intended to sever Lee's army from its base at Richmond. This force of Cavalry reached Gordons-ville practically unopposed, and drove in the brigade detached by Stuart to keep him in check, or at any rate in view. Hooker had failed to realise how essential is the close co-operation of the Cavalry to the Infantry of an invading army.

Out-numbered and out-manœuvred by this Federal advance, Stuart's dispositions were masterly. Detaching all the force he could spare to check the enemy's Cavalry corps, he hastened inwards and eastwards with the remainder to take post at the vital place—the flank of the contending armies. There he swept away the weak patrols opposed to him, and lapped round the enemy's flanks till he found their exact position and their weak points. This valuable information was then transmitted at speed to headquarters, and with the aid of this, Jackson's great turning movement at Chancellorsville was planned.

The Federal Cavalry were kept in sight by a small force and practically allowed to rip, it being certain that with the defeat of the main army they would be recalled.

Without his Cavalry, Hooker was deprived of all insight into the operations, till the fog of war was finally dispersed by Jackson's riflemen charging into his midst.

Almost the last words of Jackson on his deathbed on hearing of the Federal defeat were that 'Hooker's plan was a good one, but that it had been spoilt by the misuse of his Cavalry.'

A SMALL ARMY REQUIRES MUCH CAVALRY

Right well did Lee recognise the fact that a numerically inferior army—and this applies with special force to our British army of the present day—can never stay still if it will win against superior forces. It must therefore manœuvre, and it cannot safely manœuvre, so as to surprise the enemy, without being covered by an efficient mounted force.

GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN

In June 1863, both armies were facing each other on the Rappahannock on the line they had occupied since the Chancellorsville campaign. Eastwards from Fredericksburg the Infantry were encamped; Stuart's Cavalry watched the fords of the upper Rappahannock with their headquarters at Brandy Station, while General Pleasanton had his outpost line from Falmouth to Warrenton, with his headquarters at Warrenton Junction. Lee assumed the initiative, with the intention of moving down the valley of the Shenandoah into Pennsylvania, and his first objective was Culpepper C.H.

General Pleasanton was ordered to ascertain whether the Confederate army was moving to Culpepper, and if so in what force; whether any force was moving westwards from Culpepper, and if so, in what direction.

BRANDY STATION

To increase Pleasanton's force two Infantry brigades were attached to him. As his task demanded celerity rather than force, this would not seem to add to his chances of success.

Pleasanton divided his force of three divisions of Cavalry and two Infantry brigades into three columns. The right one, which he accompanied, was to cross at Beverley Ford and move on $vi\hat{a}$ St. James's Church on Brandy Station.

The centre and left were to cross lower down at Kelly's Ford and then separate, the centre division to move direct on Brandy Station, the left to move on Stevensburg.


The right column dislodged the Confederate picquet and support at the ford. They fell back to St. James's Church, where three Confederate brigades were drawn up, but meantime the situation had become serious in another direction.

The centre column, Gregg's, advanced from the S.E. of Fleetwood Hill, the centre and key of the position, seized it after a struggle, well supported by their Horse Artillery, and drove

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back the few Confederate troopers who occupied it. Meanwhile Stuart was on his way back. He heard of this second Federal column; he instantly grasped the danger to his communications, and made his plans to meet it.

Leaving one brigade, Jones's, to hold Buford in check and keep him occupied, he withdrew the remainder, and galloped back to Fleetwood Hill, where they had bivouacked the previous



night. Somewhat blown by their rapid pace of advance, Hampton's right flank regiment, 200 strong, charged the Federals in line, but were met and driven back by superior numbers. The next two regiments formed in close column of squadrons, swept into line round the eastern end of Fleetwood Hill and cleared it. There was now a brigade of Cavalry involved in the mêlée on each side—by far the biggest Cavalry engagement in the war. After minutes that seemed hours, the tide of battle turned in favour of the Confederate troopers, and

the Federals were driven out of the station and fell back east-wards to join hands with Buford near St. James's Church. Away on the left the other Confederate brigadier, Munford, had been delayed by ambiguous orders. He had been sent no information as to the progress of events, and had been obliged to feel his way to the front on Lee's left.

Duffie's brigade drove back the troops sent towards Stevensburg by Stuart, to cover the right flank, but did not press his advantage, and he retired to the railway bridge, where he joined Gregg.

The inactivity of Robertson is certainly surprising. He reported the advance of the Federals, but beyond that did nothing, and remained at Brown's House all day.

If, however, the Federal general had kept his force united, and acted with the same boldness on the offensive that Stuart did on the defensive, it is probable that he would have gained his object. One squadron sent through Kelly's Ford and thence towards Brandy Station, while a couple of officers' patrols were detached to reconnoitre towards Stevensburg and Culpepper, would have carried out the duty as well, or better, than the divisions of Gregg and Duffie; these were essential to success against Stuart's brigades.

LESSONS OF THE FIGHT

The Battle of Brandy Station illustrates several points:

- 1. The power gained by a close combination of mounted and dismounted action.
- 2. The weakness of the policy of splitting up a force of Cavalry which could, if united, achieve far greater results. Not only the Federals made this mistake, but also Stuart. His first move when attacked was to order the concentration of his force, which need not have passed the night spread over so wide an extent of country.
- 3. The need for detached commanders like Robertson to act with boldness and vigour.

4. The need for making the commander of reinforcements, like Munford, acquainted with the situation at the same time as orders are sent to co-operate, so that he may arrive on the scene with a clear idea of how he can best assist.

It is persistent and perpetual use that keeps a weapon bright. There is no doubt that (1) the length of the war, (2) the fact that each side possessed an intensely keen and capable Cavalry in almost equal numbers, contributed to work out the duties of Cavalry to their logical conclusion. From the Cavalry of 1870 as compared with 1862, we are less able to gain lessons of value, for the Germans were opposed by a supine and disheartened enemy, cramped by the spirit of the past, and blind to the lessons of the war we have just been considering.

CAVALRY LESSONS OF THE AMERICAN WAR

Summarising the tactics of Cavalry as they appear from this war we see the principles to be, in brief:


- 1. The combination, in the conflict, of fire and shock action.
- 2. Concentration of forces as opposed to dissemination.
- 3. That the prime factor is the worth and spirit of the leaders. In the words of Colonel Henderson, who had studied the campaign most carefully on the ground, 'the horseman of the American War is the model of the efficient cavalryman.'

WEST POINT

By a CAVALRY OFFICER

A few notes on the Military College at West Point, made during a short visit there.

WITH two establishments conducted on such a different basis, at West Point (to which all branches of the United States service



Marks are given to cadets for conduct and discipline in the following proportion:

First year cadets 50, second year 75, third year 100, fourth year 125. Offences are divided into seven classes, for which points are deducted as follows, 10, 7, 5, 4, 8, 2, 1. The company commanders are responsible for the marking.

When a cadet joins he agrees to serve for eight years, inclusive of his term as a cadet. The State thus ensures some return for his training.

Field telegraphy is taught, also signalling, and made use of practically.

The cadets are required to keep their own rooms clean, tidying them up after réveille, and they are inspected by company officers; marks are forfeited for slackness, dirty rooms, and kindred offences. Discipline is very strict.

Young Instructors

The instructors are selected for West Point, when possible, four years after graduating there, on the presumption that the sooner an officer returns within reasonable limits the better qualified he is likely to be for his work, and for gaining the attention of the cadets. Also they are chosen for their ability independently of their arm of the service. Thus a Cavalry officer may be an instructor in engineering, and so on.

Additional courses of lectures, including some of the following subjects, are given to the cadets:

Company records and returns.

Customs of the service.

Quartermaster's records and

Uniform and field equip-

returns.

ment.

Recruiting returns.

Military etiquette.

Regimental returns.

Horse equipment.

Cadets, during their final year, are present at the Sunday morning inspections of each of the detachments of privates, troopers, or sappers attached for duty at the Academy.

Cadets who qualify for the same are allowed to wear marksmen's badges. This adds keenness to the musketry course.

Plans, sections, and elevations for the rough housing of a company, squadron, or battery are taught at the drawing classes. Special attention is paid to drawing instruction. Whistler graduated at West Point, and some of his drawings as a cadet are exhibited there.

Each class consists of about ten cadets. Round the room against the wall are blackboards; two cadets recite or answer questions from the instructor, two others listen, the remaining six

are at blackboards writing down headings for their recitation or lecture when it comes to their turn.

Cadets in their final year go out for a four-days' course of mounted reconnaissance and road-map making, combined with camping, bivouacking, cooking, sentry go, and care of horses.

Last year the cadets were exercised in a practice march under service conditions, organised as one battalion Infantry, one troop Cavalry, machine gun detachment, and Engineer detachment.

PHYSICAL EXERCISES

Special attention is devoted to the French style of fencing, and arrangements have been made for instruction in the art of Jiu-Jitsu.

The system of physical development is most thorough, and worthy of special attention. There is a fixed standard to which the cadet should conform on joining in proportion to his height and weight, and a chart is made of his actual measurements; should he not be up to the standard in any portion of his body, he joins the most suitable class for improving such deficiency. The cadet is examined by the doctor and a new chart prepared every month, and the results are extraordinarily satisfactory.

RIDING

When the cadets first commence riding they ride on blankets, without stirrups or saddles; they then use a stripped English regimental pattern saddle for some time, and finally use their own saddle complete. The training is combined with constant gymnastic practice on the parallel bar, wooden horse, &c. They are allowed to go out for voluntary horse exercise, and to play polo, ponies for which are provided, and during the winter these ponies are used in the riding school. They ride with very long stirrups and use a double rein. The cadets in their final year are very good at trick riding, quite as expert as those who perform at our Military Tournament.

Commissions in the Cavalry are only given to those cadets whom the authorities consider qualified by temperament, interest in the horse, and physical ability.

The cadets are trained in squadron drill mounted, in Artillery drill, and as Infantry. Their smartness in turn-out in their old-time uniform, and their steadiness in drill on ceremonial parade, are admirable.

Conclusions

During a three-days' visit to West Point one could not fail to be impressed with the thoroughness of the training throughout, down to the minutest detail. Nor is this to be wondered at when one reads the following remarks of the Commandant: 'Our aim is to include in the course every requirement and duty that a military man is called upon to perform as an instructor of enlisted men; based on the principle that an officer, to be an efficient instructor and leader, must be practically and intimately acquainted with all the details of his work and personally capable of their performance. With this end in view the programme includes the actual performance of all the duties of an enlisted man; and the last year the cadet has in his turn opportunities for exercising the functions of command and instruction in all the various duties, drills, and exercises. In tactics the work embraces infantry, cavalry, and artillery, drill and exercises, minor tactics, target practice, tent pitching, field entrenching, mountain gun and pack instruction, combined manœuvres of the three arms, stable management, and company administration.'

THE OTTOMAN CAVALRY

FROM AN ARTICLE IN THE 'REVUE DE CAVALERIE'

Terms of service—Organisation—Officers—Pay and allowances—Establishment—Arms and accourrements—Remounts—The Redif Cavalry—The Irregular Cavalry.

As is well known, all Musalman subjects of the Sultan are theoretically obliged to render military service; in practice, however, there are many exemptions. The Kurds do not serve, neither do the Bedouins of Syria, the people of Tripoli, the Albanians of Scutari, the islanders of the Archipelago, the inhabitants of Constantinople or of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina.

According to the law of 1886, modified in 1893, all Mahometans are liable to military service from the age of twenty to that of forty; they serve nine years in the Nizam or active army, whereof in the Cavalry four years are with the colours and five are in the reserve—although as a matter of fact the men are usually retained in the ranks for far longer periods—nine years in the Redif, corresponding to the Landwehr, and two years in the Mustafig or Landsturm.

The Turkish army is organised in seven army corps and two independent divisions; the corps numbered one to three are quartered in Europe, the whole of the remainder in Asia Minor and Tripoli, and to the first six army corps a Cavalry division, nominally composed of three brigades each of two regiments, is attached. The seventh corps, quartered in Yemen, has two squadrons of Cavalry and is also provided with three companies of mounted Infantry, while of the two independent divisions,

one—that quartered in Tripoli—has one brigade of Cavalry, and the one in Hedjaz has two squadrons mounted on camels.

The Turkish Cavalry may be divided into three groups—Nizam, Redif, and Irregulars.

THE NIZAM CAVALRY

The Nizam Cavalry consists of 42 regiments, exclusive of the two squadrons, forming a special force, with the seventh corps.

The first four regiments of Cavalry bear no numbers and are in a measure household troops. These are the regiments: Erthogroul, the Lancers of Misrakli-Alai, and the two regiments of Light Hamidié, of which the last two were only raised as recently as February 1903. The remaining 38 regiments are recruited in the territorial districts of the army corps of which they form a part, and thirty-six of them are distributed in numerical order among the Cavalry divisions of the first six corps, while the 37th and 38th regiments form an independent Cavalry brigade at Tripoli. Each regiment has five squadrons, but on mobilisation takes the field with four only, the fifth remaining behind to form a depôt.


Besides these there are two special corps—the Sultan's guard consisting of one squadron, and the Remount regiment of seven squadrons.

Officers are obtained for the Cavalry in two ways: either through the military school in Constantinople, which turns out about sixty to seventy subalterns annually, or through the ranks. The latter are selected from among the non-commissioned officers, but there is no regulation on the subject of selection. Officers of all ages are found in the Ottoman army—very young generals and white-haired subalterns; officers of sixty and seventy are by no means rare, and, since there is no age-limit, some remain on in the service until they are even older.

The pay of the Cavalry is not high; a private draws about three shillings and ninepence per month or about three half-pence per diem, a sergeant-major gets something under eleven shillings









a month, and a subaltern (sub-lieutenant) about £2 7s. 6d., but the officers are given free rations on a lavish scale—a marshal receiving daily fifteen rations. The subalterns also receive free clothing, while in barracks captains are given each a room to himself, while the lieutenants double up four or five in one room.

The regimental staff of a Cavalry regiment consists of a colonel commanding, a lieutenant-colonel, two majors, one captain, one standard-bearer (a lieutenant), two medical officers, two veterinary surgeons and the usual subordinates, while each squadron has two captains and four subalterns, but all regiments, except the four regiments of the Household Cavalry, are under-officered. The establishment of the squadrons varies very much, from 132 in the corps d'élite to 100 in the Cavalry of the European army corps, and as low as 60 in the others. As an average a squadron can perhaps muster, during peace, 75 sabres, but in time of war the effective strength of the Line Cavalry is supposed to be 112 men and 100 horses per squadron.

Each trooper carries in the field 30 cartridges and three days' rations, while in regimental transport 30 more rounds per carbine and 2 to 3 days' rations per man are carried. The whole of the regimental transport for a regiment of Turkish Cavalry is by pack animals, and of these 29 are first line and 45 second line transport. When tents are provided—which is the rule—they are issued at the rate of one for every ten men, and one bât animal for every three tents.

The 4th and 5th regiments have at present only 3 squadrons each, so that there are altogether 208 squadrons of Ottoman regular Cavalry; of these 106 are in Europe, 92 in Asia and 10 in Tripoli.

The men are, as a rule, armed with the curved sword and Mauser carbine, model 1880, but two regiments of the Household Cavalry and one regiment in each division are armed with lances also. The officers and non-commissioned officers carry sword and revolver.

The whole of the Cavalry is uniformed in blue; the head-dress is black lamb's-wool; chain shoulder-guards are worn; in summer a white uniform is worn by all ranks.

The question of remounts appears to have been only of late years seriously taken in hand, when the Sultan handed over a property in Asia Minor to form a horse-breeding establishment and gave 200 animals to form the nucleus of a stud. The farm now contains some 2,000 horses; the stallions are mostly French, German or Hungarian, the mares either Hungarian or Russian. Three other stud farms have lately been established in Europe, four in Asia Minor, and the creation of four others is contemplated. The efforts made have already borne fruit, and fewer horses than heretofore are now purchased in foreign countries, but Turkey still purchases 1,000 horses per annum from Hungary alone for her Cavalry, and the same number from Russia for horsing her guns.

During peace Turkey has 15,000 regular Cavalry; on mobilisation she should have 21,000, and 4,000 pack animals, without taking the irregular corps into consideration. The Remount Regiment has four of its squadrons with the 1st Army Corps in the capital, two with the 4th Corps in Erzinghian, and one with the 5th in Damascus.

THE REDIF CAVALRY

The Redif Cavalry was organised in 1899, up to which time the 2nd Line troops consisted only of Infantry. Twelve regiments were then formed, viz. four each for the districts of Constantinople, Adrianople, and Salonica. A regiment of Redif Cavalry has four squadrons and a permanent cadre during peace composed of a lieutenant-colonel, four captains, eight subalterns, and for each squadron one non-commissioned officer, 20 privates, and 20 troop horses. The regiment is completed on mobilisation by men who have served their nine years in the Nizam Cavalry, and they would be mounted on horses obtained by

requisition. There are at present only Martini-Henry carbines available for the Redif Cavalry on mobilisation, but it is hoped that ere long it may be possible to provide Mausers, and in all other respects—strength, composition, etc.—the Redif Cavalry would, on a war footing, be as the Nizam Cavalry. The regiments are, however, not brigaded, as it is at present only intended to use them as divisional Cavalry. It is likely that before long this organisation will be extended to other districts.

THE IRREGULAR CAVALRY

For some years past the Turkish Government has made many attempts to utilise for military purposes some of the Musalmans who escape regular military service. These attempts have at last resulted in the creation of local militia corps, most of them mounted; among these are the Kurd Hamidié regiments in Anatolia and the Arab Corps in Tripoli and Mesopotamia, while the Lebanon Militia may also be considered as in the same category.

Hamidié Cavalry: The Kurds are too intractable to submit to ordinary discipline, but they are natural fighters and born horsemen, and their loyalty to their chiefs has enabled their qualities to be utilised under a special organisation. They are organised in local irregular Cavalry regiments, and these have been given the title of Hamidié in honour of Abdul-Hamid II., who was responsible for the creation of these corps. Service is obligatory from seventeen to forty years of age. From seventeen to twenty the men undergo a month's training each year; from twenty to thirty-two they do a certain training, under supervision, at their own homes, and are also called out for two months once in three years; a particular feature of the training of them and their horses is the carrying of an Infantry soldier behind them on From thirty-two to forty they are available for service in national emergency, but are never called out for any purpose whatever during peace-time. These tribesmen are exempt from nearly all taxes, but they supply their horses



saddlery, uniform, etc., receiving only a carbine and ammunition from the depôts when actually called out, during which time they also draw pay and rations for themselves and their horses.

The superior officers are either officers of the Nizam Cavalry or local officers; the lower ranks are all 'locals.' A good deal is done to ensure a number of well-trained officers being present with the irregular Cavalry; annually, two men are sent from each regiment to Constantinople to be attached to a regular Cavalry corps, and another is sent to the military school: these return to their regiments with enhanced rank and eventually become The organisation of these regiments is purely tribal, and the incorporation of the men of different tribes in one corps is strictly prohibited. If one tribe cannot find enough recruits to form an entire regiment, it forms an independent squadron, which is attached to other similar squadrons only for manœuvres or on mobilisation. As the organisation is based on the numbers in a tribe, it follows that the establishment varies in different corps, a regiment containing four to six squadrons, and the squadron from 128-192 troopers. The staff and number of squadron officers is much the same as in the regular Cavalry.

The whole of this tribal Cavalry is under a divisional general, who is under the orders of the commandant of the 4th Army Corps. The divisional general is assisted by brigadiers, and the regiments are grouped in brigades; the movement only commenced in 1891, and already, counting five regiments of Arabs, there are upwards of sixty-four regiments, each with from two to six squadrons. Altogether these irregular corps could probably put 32,000 men in the field, and although not yet sufficiently trained or disciplined on modern lines for employment in masses, they would be invaluable in the defence of their own borders, or for harassing an enemy's communications.

Tripoli furnishes six regiments of irregular Cavalry, with a total of thirty squadrons; they are said to be well mounted, and it is thought that the force might be considerably expanded if necessary.

In the Lebanon there is one irregular squadron 100 strong, which acts as a sort of mounted gendarmerie.

Were the whole of the Ottoman Cavalry mobilised for war, it could probably place some 60,000 horsemen in the field:

Nizam Cavalry				•	170 squadrons.	
Redif	,,	•	•	•	48	,,
Irregular	,,	•			8 06	••

It is, however, quite out of the question that this mass of horsemen could ever be brought together in one theatre of operations, and all that can be said is that possibly in a European war Turkey might be able to place in the field, within the first few weeks, a hundred squadrons of Nizam Cavalry, forty of Redif, and a few irregular squadrons, say one hundred and fifty squadrons in all, reinforced by from fifty to one hundred more, Nizam and Hamidié, later on.

On the Russo-Persian frontier, on the other hand, Turkey could dispose of a very considerable force of Cavalry, since she should be able to place in line at one time practically the whole of her irregular mounted troops, in addition to the forty-eight squadrons of Nizam Cavalry of the 4th and 6th Corps.

MINOR CAVALRY TACTICS IN MANCHURIA

The following letter from an officer of the Ural Cossacks, communicated to the 'Ruskii Invalid' gives some interesting details of some mounted actions of the Ural Cossacks against both Japanese Cavalry and bands of Hunghouses which proves the value maintained by mounted action when vigorously carried out.

A MOUNTED FIGHT

Towards the end of April the brigade of Ural Cossacks was sent to Liao-Yang-Vo-Pen to observe the Mongolian frontier, along which Japanese detachments and Hunghouse bands were operating. On the 31st the whole brigade received orders to carry out a reconnaissance towards the south.

A heavy gale of wind from the south-west caused thick clouds of dust which prevented anything being seen beyond 200 yards. After having proceeded cautiously for about a dozen versts (about nine miles), the main body was about to halt for the day, when the patrols sent word that a village in front was occupied by the Japanese.

Whilst the advanced guard sotnia prepared to make a frontal attack, the 4th sotnia of the 5th Regiment was dispatched to turn the village from the east, and the 4th sotnia of the 4th Regiment to carry out the same manœuvre from the west. The latter, which was commanded by Captain Jeliesnov, soon disappeared into the dust. After reaching the advanced guard, this sotnia turned to the west, and after having gone a verst (three-quarters of a mile) in this direction, turned again to the south and deployed into lava* formation, being preceded 250 yards in advance by a troop, also in lava formation. Three miles were marched in this order without anything being seen, Captain

* The traditional tactical formation of the Cossack Cavalry, more or less similar to the French en fourrageurs, or extended order.



Jeliesnov therefore halted and despatched a report to the brigade commander by a patrol. Within five minutes the patrol commander returned at a gallop and stated that a Japanese squadron was leaving the village followed by another body of Hunghouses going towards the north. Captain Jeliesnov reassembled the sotnia so as to prepare to charge when the hostile squadron had passed the second village. His subaltern, who was on the left of the sotnia, bravely hurled himself, with a few Cossacks, on the head of the hostile squadron. One troop went to his support, and the three other troops of the sotnia fell on the enemy's flank. After sabring some Japanese the sotnia pursued them as they fled southwards. Whilst the Russians used, almost exclusively, the arme blanche, the Japanese endeavoured to use their rifles.

MOUNTED ATTACK AGAINST A DEFENSIVE POST

On May 2, while the brigade was returning, the flank patrols signalled that an equivalent to a squadron of Hunghouses had entered a neighbouring village, and a portion of them were occupying a small wood. The 6th sotnia was sent to drive them out. A half sotnia advanced in *lava* formation, the other half followed grouped in support. At 1,500 yards from the wood, the bullets began to whistle round, which caused the second half sotnia to also deploy into *lava*. The first half then drew swords and charged, supported by the second half.

At about 1,000 yards from the wood a marshy piece of ground had to be crossed, which the horses could only do slowly. It was nevertheless crossed, and the charge resumed. The Hunghouses allowed them to get up to within thirty paces, and then only attempted to escape, but left twenty-five of their number on the ground. The pursuit was checked by a heavy fire from the villages; the sotnia therefore reassembled under cover, and, dismounting, opened fire. The Hunghouses, numbering about 500, finally drew off, when a sotnia of the 5th Regiment fell on their flank. The Cossacks had only two men wounded, who were able to remain in the ranks.

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PATROL LEADING

By Major Smyth, V.C., The Carabineers

Extracts translated from the German work on tactics by Major Balck of the general staff, instructor of the War Academy, Berlin.

In this exhaustive work, which was published the year after the conclusion of the South African war, all departments of an army are dealt with. The second volume treats of the formal tactics of Cavalry and Field Artillery, but the fourth volume is especially interesting, comprising information on railways, transport by sea, quartering of troops, outposts, reconnaissance and supply.

The chapter on Reconnaissance deals with the Cavalry divisions and leads on to the consideration of officers' patrols, their importance, duties, and strength; preparatory measures, and the conduct of the patrol in the field; examples of the swimming of rivers; the patrol's mission; the passage of defiles; resting and precautions for safety; and examples are given of patrols being surprised. The last division of this chapter may be quoted in full.

CONTACT WITH THE ENEMY

The first hostile patrol which one comes across, or any new kind of Cavalry which is observed, and the first Infantry patrol, must be reported in case our patrol does not reach to any further points.

If one encounters a hostile patrol, one asks oneself the questions: Is it stronger than ten men? Is there an officer with it?

Although it is a principle that patrols do not fight but only observe, yet the demand that patrols must always avoid one another cannot in every case be complied with, more especially when the enemy is seriously determined to bar the way of the patrol.

On the principle of affecting the enemy's morale from the commencement of first gaining touch, they must be intimidated, and, as already explained earlier in this book, it will in most cases be advantageous to forbid their advance and so stop the hostile patrols from riding far afield.

The strength of a column of route is best ascertained from its flank. One must not be satisfied with such a report as, for instance, 'long columns' but one must seek to make out the number of the battalions and batteries. It is of the utmost importance to be able to specify what point the head of the Infantry has reached at a certain time.

With outposts and defensive positions one must ask oneself, with the map, How would I safeguard and defend myself if I were there? and after answering these questions, one must search the country with eye and glass to decide the flanks of the enemy's position, and endeavour to estimate what is behind the first line.

If our patrol draws fire, then the men must open out and ride in serpentine lines. It was found by the French, in experimental firing at the camp of Chalons, that with the M. 86 rifle an Infantryman took sixteen to seventeen shots to put a moving rider out of action at 600 metres. But the danger to the rider is considerably lessened if he rides forward diagonally to the enemy's front or gallops parallel to its length. It requires more practice than the Infantryman usually possesses to hit a single rider sideways if he is moving at a sharp gallop. It is most probable that the majority of the shots fall behind the object. This concerns obviously only a single horseman, for the leader of the patrol will consider it his honourable duty under such circumstances to ride forward and reconnoitre alone. Undoubtedly a party of horsemen following him would be crushed by the hail of bullets.

From the above it follows that a patrol which suddenly comes under hostile fire will rightly not gallop back straight, but will do better to scatter in various directions and re-assemble at a rendezvous out of the efficacious range of the enemy. It is

important to report the spot where the troopers drew fire to assist in judging of the situation of the enemy. Similarly, the patrol leader must strive to ascertain whether the fire was opened by Irregulars, by dismounted Cavalry, or by Infantry. Moreover, the reports sent back must be condensed and sifted.

REPORTS FROM PATROLS

A patrol sent far ahead of the army will have other matters to report than, for example, a leader of a Cavalry point would.

At great distances and over wide expanses one cannot report each small matter; then it is a question of dealing with very different distances to those of peace manœuvres. It is not a question of the quantity of the report but of quality. What is of importance, what is worth knowing, the leader of the reconnoitring detachment must judge for himself. He can only do this when he understands the war situation, and is posted in the intentions of the commander and can put this information to advantage.

Clear and precise orders are as necessary as a correct allocation of the patrols.

Often, also, the leader of the patrol must give up carrying out his orders on horseback, and must dismount with his party, leave the horses behind in a hiding-place, and reach the goal on foot and with the carbine.

In calculating the moment for despatching reports, it must be remembered that the number of despatch riders is limited, that they mostly cannot return to the patrol, and that the service of sending messages ceases when there are no more despatch-riders. Also security in sending back the message must be considered. At great distances in an enemy's country the despatch of single orderlies will generally prohibit itself.

CARRIER PIGEONS

Messenger pigeons may be usefully employed if a despatchrider cannot get back, and if the horses are exhausted. At

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remote and out-of-the-way places, even if secure telegraphic communication remains from the direction of the base, messages sent by carrier-pigeons can frequently get home in a shorter time. It must be remembered that the pigeons interrupt their flight during the night, that mountains and large woods with their birds of prey bring into question the safety of the forwarding of the messages.

RETURN OF THE PATROL

On the return ride observation must not be relaxed, therefore the patrol must frequently make a halt and look all round.

The leader remains responsible that touch once gained with the enemy is not lost. It is better in every single case to find out whether the reporting patrol is to follow up the enemy or may turn back. The orders must therefore show clearly if the patrol is to remain with the enemy, perhaps for a period of several days (strategical reconnaissance), or is to return at a definite time to rejoin the troops (tactical reconnaissance).

SUPPORTING SQUADRON

A reconnoitring squadron, which has to do tactical reconnaissance mostly, moves by leaps forward from one natural position to another, and will appoint a spot where its detached patrols have at a fixed time to meet together. That the reconnaissance may not be interrupted, a fresh series of patrols is sent forward in good time. Only by this means is it attained that strength is spared and the patrols do not rove about without aim or object. The length of these leaps depends on the distance of the enemy—they may be as long as ten kilometres. But it must always be noted that the patrols which are sent out for several days do not remain sufficient. The enemy can wipe them out or can interrupt their communication with their own troops, and therefore new dispositions for reconnaissance must be made daily.

WHICH IS THE CHIEF CAVALRY WEAPON?

EXTRACTS FROM 'LE SPECTATEUR MILITAIRE'

On the subject of armament of Cavalry—Showing that rifle, lance, or sword are equally important, to be used according to the occasion, but that the horse is the chief weapon of all.

In a charge, according to statistics of the late wars, little harm is done with the sword, but by the cohesion of the ranks and by pace &c. In a *mêlée* the weapon is useless unless handled by an adroit *horseman*.

In France the sword is the chief arm of the Cavalryman.

In Germany the lance is his chief weapon. The 'Field Manual' says: 'The sword is necessary for the trooper to have to fall back upon when he has unfortunately lost or broken his lance. He should be trained so as to be able to use it under the simplest conditions.

- 'The steel weapon is used for charging the enemy's troops when they are surprised or decimated.
 - 'The Rifle is for dislodging them from positions.'

DISMOUNTED ACTION

We should teach our Cavalry not only to ride and use the sword, but to fight on foot and make good use of their rifles.

The Arabs, Tartars, Cossacks, &c. (all great people for horses) have always looked on fire action as a matter of course, and have

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always employed the method which appeared best—either fighting on foot or on horseback.

Cromwell, Frederick, Sheridan, and Napoleon all gave their Cavalry rifles, and were enabled to make their mounted troops play a prominent part in the wars of their time.

The idea that fighting on foot will rob Cavalry of its enterprise, dash, &c. is entirely false, for it rests on the lack of knowledge of human nature and the proper employment of the arm.

Veterans will tell you that fighting with the sword is the only way—the use of the rifle nonsense and dangerous folly.

To these dashers of another age I would tell what General Hohenlohe found in the campaign of 1870:

'The lack of rifles was daily felt to such an extent that at the end the true rôle of Cavalry disappeared.'

'The officers' ideas should be trained in the attack and carefully kept from the prevalent mistake of seeing in the use of "fire action" a means of shirking the stern resolution and responsibility which are necessary in a bold dash and hand-to-hand fighting with the enemy.'

Are small detachments of Cavalry which have not Artillery to help them to make no use of the rifle? Certainly not!

In our days, with long-range rifles, we can ignore the support of Infantry and guns.

General Hohenlohe says that it is in defence that Cavalry fights on foot, especially when it has the time to occupy a position and well hide itself. This is bound to deceive the enemy and may check his main body from taking a part in a decisive

action; or prevent him from seizing and occupying important strategic points before the Cavalry's own force comes up.

Cavalry will often meet groups of the enemy's Infantry skilfully concealed, who will keep it at a distance and prevent it getting near the main position.

The Cavalry will not be able to dislodge the Infantry by the use of the sword, and yet it must go on with the reconnaissance.

The Cavalry must consequently attack on foot.

Advanced guard Cavalry may see the necessity of checking the enemy until his own Infantry comes up to hold advantageous positions.

When Cavalry are checked by small Infantry detachments, outflanking movements should be employed.

Cavalry should employ dismounted action when holding a pass or defile to allow its main body to come through, combining this, of course, with Cavalry movements in the open, if necessary.

Marshal von Moltke says that it is often useful to have a squadron dismounted when holding an important pass, a rallying or covering point, until the Infantry arrives or passes.

Under these circumstances he advises the rest of the regiment to remain close at hand to charge and so cover the dismounted men, if necessary, when they have to mount.

General Schlichting says that it is not pleasant for the Cavalryman to have to fight on foot and to leave his horse in the face of hostile Cavalry, and yet it is the surest way of holding them when they are in superior numbers.



WHICH IS THE CHIEF CAVALRY WEAPON? 78

A squadron cannot hope to check and drive back by charging a regiment of enemy's Cavalry, but with dismounted action it may succeed in doing so.

In the American War, with the Southerners the charge in close order was favoured, but they often had recourse to fighting on foot, as they were useful with firearms.

When they met opposing Cavalry in concealed trenches or could not calculate his strength, quickly a few crack shots were dismounted, who endeavoured either to dislodge him or make him show his strength.

The Northerners had a great predilection for firearms; they invariably combined fighting on foot with fighting on horseback.

On August 20, 1862, at Brandy Station, Colonel Jones, leading the 7th Virginian Cavalry, after having taken a half-squadron of the enemy prisoners, was held by some skirmishers in a wood. He dismounted his regiment while General Robertson, with three regiments, attacked the enemy in flank.

At Poolesville, Stuart, finding the ford of the Potomac held by a strong force of Infantry, dismounted his leading squadron, which opened fire on the enemy. Under cover of this he found a ford at Whiteford, crossed with his force, and drove back the enemy.

In 1870, the Germans, whose Dragoons of the Guard and Hussars alone carried firearms, often regretted their scarcity of arms, and eventually issued the chassepots taken from the French to their cavalry N.C.O.s and best men.

In front of La Chesne, two squadrons of the 16th Prussian Hussars stormed the villages, taking the French troops prisoners, whilst the other two squadrons were turning the position. This fight opened to the German Army the road to Bazancy.

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During the Turco-Russian War of 1877, we find most constant examples of fighting on foot. The Russian Cavalry got their rather exaggerated predilection for this sort of fighting from this Balkan War, as the Turks did not care to meet them with cold steel.

In defending the Chipka Pass the 1st and 2nd sotnias of the 28rd Regiment of the Don dashed as hard as they could for the position, dismounted, and checked the Turks' forward movement by fire.

Whether the fight is offensive or defensive, it is necessary to attain the object as quickly as possible; and therefore, so as to get the greatest effect of fire, the largest available force should be employed.

MOUNTED ACTION

Are we Cavalry to think that our time has gone by? No! a thousand times. In spite of quick-firing guns, with long ranges, smokeless powder, and high explosives, the Cavalry, well armed, well instructed, and well commanded, will still know how to fulfil a most important part. Before, during, and after the battle let our Cavalry be good horsemen, let them know how to use the rifle as well as the sword.

But in all things let the Cavalry remain Cavalry, turning the horse to account and making it its chief weapon.

Let the Cavalryman ride and fight with his sword whenever he can, choosing favourable opportunities and the best ground, only attacking demoralised Infantry and Cavalry when on the move and unsupported. The charge will always remain the thing in which it will be the Cavalryman's pride to die sword in hand; nevertheless, let us seize every opportunity which may occur for dismounted action, and thus do all the damage we can to the enemy.

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This fighting on foot must be of short duration and of no great importance.

It would be absurd to turn the Cavalryman into a mongrel—neither an Infantry nor Cavalry soldier.

Fighting on foot should be barred except when it is impossible to fight on horseback.

These considerations must be decided by the officer's tact, judgment, and nerve, but to say that fighting on foot robs Cavalry of its 'spirit' is absurd.

General Hohenlohe says that of yore a strong arm, a good sword, and a good horse were the requisites of a good Cavalryman, but now intelligence and energy are also needed.

Horsemastership is of supreme importance.

Cavalry is the arm of surprise, and this can be accomplished by the swiftness and skill of its attack with the sword. Cavalry can also, thanks to the long range of the rifle it possesses, throw confusion, at long distances and unexpectedly, into the enemy's columns, force its Infantry to deploy, and then, the effect being produced, vanish and renew the same tactics at another point, thus employing its privileged mobility to harass and demoralise the enemy by repeated attacks, whilst remaining itself out of reach.

THE CUTTING POWER OF THE SWORD

The following is an extract from 'Reminiscences of the Great Mutiny, 1857-59,' by Sergeant Forbes-Mitchell, of the 93rd Sutherland Highlanders, and gives some interesting experiences of the power of a properly-made and properly-sharpened cutting sword.

Although an Infantryman I saw a good deal of sword practice, because all the men who held the Secundrabagh and the Begum's Kothee were armed with native tulwars from the King of Oude's armoury, in addition to their muskets and their bayonets, and a large proportion of our men were killed and wounded by swordcuts.

In the first place, then, for cutting, our English regulation swords are too straight; the Eastern curved blade is far more effective as a cutting weapon. Secondly, our English swords are far too blunt, whereas the native swords are as keen in edge as a well-stropped razor. Our steel scabbards again are a mistake for carrying sharp blades; and, in addition to this, I do not think our mounted branches who are armed with swords have proper appliances given to them for sharpening their edges. Even in time of peace, but especially in time of war, more attention ought to be given to this point, and every soldier armed with a sword ought to be supplied with a means of sharpening it, and made to keep it with an edge like a razor. I may mention that this fact was noticed in the wars of the Punjaub, notably at Ramnugger, where our English Cavalry with their blunt swords were most unequally matched against the Sikhs with tulwars so keen of edge that they would split a hair.

I remember reading of a regiment of British Cavalry charging a regiment of Sikh Cavalry. The latter wore voluminous thick puggries round their heads, which our blunt swords were powerless to cut through, and each horseman had also a buffalo-hide

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shield slung on his back. They evidently knew that the British swords were blunt and useless, so they kept their horses still and met the British charge by lying flat on their horses' necks,* with their heads protected by the thick turban and their backs by the shields; and immediately the British soldiers passed through their ranks the Sikhs swooped round on them and struck them back-handed with their sharp, curved swords, in several instances cutting our Cavalrymen in two. In one case a British officer, who was killed in the charge I describe, was hewn in two by a back-handed stroke which cut right through an ammunition pouch, cleaving the pistol-bullets right through the pouch and belt, severing the officer's backbone, and cutting his heart in two from behind. It was the same in the Balaclava charge, both with the Heavy and Light Brigade. Their swords were too straight, and so blunt that they would not cut through the thick coats and sheepskin caps of the Russians; so that many of our men struck with the hilts at the faces of the enemy, as more effective than attempting to cut with their blunt blades.

I believe that the manufacture of real Damascus steel blades is a lost art. When serving in the Punjaub about thirty years ago I was well acquainted with an old man in Lahore who had been chief armourer to Runjeet Sing, and he has often told me that the real Damascus blades contained a large percentage of arsenic amalgamated with the steel while the blades were being forged, which greatly added to their hardness, toughness, and strength, preserved the steel from rust, and enabled the blades to be sharpened to a very fine edge. This old man's test for a sword blade was to get a good-sized fish, newly caught from the river, lay it on a soft, yielding bed-cotton quilt folded up, or any soft, yielding substance—and the blade that did not cut the fish in two across the thickest part behind the gills, cutting against the scales, at one stroke, was considered of no account whatever. From what I have seen no sword blade that bends, however sharp it may be, will do that, because the spring in the steel causes the blade to glance off the fish, and the impetus of the cut is lost by the blade quivering

^{*} In which case they would have been simply ridden over.



in the hand. Nor will any of our straight sword blades cut a large fish through in this manner: whereas the curved Oriental blade, with a drawing cut, severs it at once, because the curved blade presents much more cutting surface. One revolution of a circular saw cuts much deeper into wood than one stroke of a straight saw, although the length of the straight saw may be equal to the circumference of the circular one. So it is with sword blades. A stroke from a curved blade, drawn through, cuts far deeper than the stroke from a straight blade.*

I will mention one instance at Lucknow that came under my own notice of the force of a sword-cut from a curved sword of rigid steel. There were three brothers of the name of Ready in the 98rd, called David, James, and John. They were all powerful, tall men, in the prime of life, and all three had served through the Crimea. David was a sergeant, and his two brothers were privates. When falling in for the assault on the Begum's palace, John Ready took off his Crimean medal and gave it to his brother David, telling him that he felt a presentiment that he would be killed in the attack, and that David had better keep his medal and send it home to their mother. David tried to reason him out of his fears, but to no purpose. John Ready replied that he had no fear, and his mother might know that he had died doing his duty. Well, the assault took place, and in the inner courts of the palace there was one division held by a regiment of dismounted Cavalry, armed with swords as keen as razors, and circular shields, and the party of the 98rd who got into that court were far out-numbered on this occasion, as in fact we were everywhere else. On entering James Ready was attacked by a sowar armed with sword and shield. Ready's feather bonnet was knocked off, and the sowâr got one cut at him, right over his head, which severed his skull clean in two, the sword cutting right through his neck and half-way down through the breastbone. John Ready sprang to the assistance of his brother, but too late; and although his bayonet reached the side of his

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^{*} These remarks of Mr. Mitchell's are quite true as regards curved swords; but he forgets that the *point* is the most effective attack against Eastern swordsmen.

opponent and was driven home with a fatal thrust, in doing so he came within the swoop of the same terrible sword, wielded by the powerful arm of a tall man, and he was also cut right through the left shoulder diagonally across the chest, and his head and right arm were clean severed from the body. The sowâr delivered his stroke of the sword at the same moment that he received the bayonet of John Ready through his heart, and both men fell dead together. David Ready, the sergeant, seized the tulwar that had killed both his brothers, and used it with terrible effect, cutting off the heads of men as if they had been mere heads of cabbage. When the fight was over I examined that sword. It was of ordinary weight, well-balanced, curved about a quarter-circle, as sharp as the sharpest razor, and the blade as rigid as cast-iron. Now, my experience is that none of our very best English swords could have cut like this one. A sword of that quality would cut through a man's skull or thigh-bone without the least quiver, as easily as an ordinary Birmingham blade would cut through a willow.

I may also mention the case of a young officer named Banks, of the 7th Hussars, who was terribly cut up in charging through a band of Ghâzis. One leg was clean lopped off above the knee, the right arm cut off, the left thigh and left arm both cut through the bone, each wound produced by a single cut from a sharp, curved tulwâr. I do not know if the young fellow got over it *; but he was reported to be still alive, and even cheerful, when we marched from Lucknow.

It may be noted with reference to the above interesting experiences, that the cutting power of a curved and properly tempered blade, which has been kept sharp, is enormous, but at the same time the Oriental swordsman admits—and I have asked several leading members of the native sword-fighting schools—that no cutting swordsman can fight on even terms with one who uses a long thrusting sword.

^{*} He did not.

CAVALRY OR GUNS?

(General Bonnal, the military correspondent of the *Temps*, in taking part in the discussion now going on in France, as to whether the Cuirassier regiments shall be sacrificed in order that more batteries of heavy Field Artillery may be provided, raises the question of 6-gun batteries as opposed to the 4-gun batteries of the French Artillery. General Bonnal's article is of additional interest as dealing with the probable relative action of the French and German Cavalry in any war of the future.)

THE writer begins by declaring that the rôle of Cavalry on the field of battle is becoming of diminishing importance, and that the proportion it bears to the other arms is constantly lessening. In the middle of the 18th century the Cavalry was generally one-third or one-fourth of the whole army; under Napoleon the proportion dropped to one-eighth, while if a war were to break out to-morrow between Germany and France, the Cavalry of the former Power would be about one-thirteenth, that of France about one-sixteenth of the total force on the two sides. support of his theory of the vanishing influence of Cavalry on the battle-field, the General instances the war of 1870, wherein he can find but two Cavalry actions which produced decisive results; and were Cavalry to be employed only in the attack there would appear, as he seems to imply, to be some ground for calling for a reduction in the strength of the French Cavalry, in order that steps might be taken for putting the French Artillery on a numerical equality with the German. As matters now stand, France would take the field with two guns only to every three of the Germans, and the General advocates an increase of two guns to each French battery and the immediate provision of the 2,000 men and 8,000 horses which such an increase demands.



General Bonnal does not propose, as does General de Nègrier,* the total abolition of the thirteen regiments of Cuirassiers, but he would have in their stead twelve regiments of light Cavalry, which can be mounted far more cheaply, and would hand over the horses of the Cuirassiers to the Artillery. This, however, would take time, and to the writer it appears that the provision of the men and horses for the increase of the Artillery is a matter of urgency. For the horses he proposes to obtain 4,000 by dismounting one-third of the mounted gendarmes, 2,000 from the train, 700 from the 18th Cuirassiers, whom he proposes to disband, and the remainder from small equine economies in other corps and departments. The men he would obtain from the pick of the Cuirassiers and from the Foot Artillery and Engineers.

Reverting to the employment of Cavalry, General Bonnal enumerates the many duties of Cavalry other than the Cavalry combat, and comes to the conclusion that the reduction of the number of regiments is out of the question, since nothing can ever take the place of Cavalry. He calculates that France would be able to take the field with eighty regiments of Cavalry, and that half these being affectés à la sûreté des corps d'armée, there would remain forty to form the eight independent Cavalry divisions of from four to six regiments. These would be opposed by ten German Cavalry divisions each of six regiments, and the writer emphasises the absolute necessity of powerful Artillery support in order to make up to the French Cavalry for their numerical inferiority.

In a war with Germany these divisions would not be able to operate in front of their armies, and would seek preferably the flanks—the southern flank, owing to the hilly nature of the country, being less favourable for the employment of masses of

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
^{*} General de Nègrier, in an article in La France Militaire on the scheme for the reduction of the French Cavalry, proposed that the thirteen Cuirassier regiments should be abolished, being of opinion that a very light Cavalry is the only efficacious one. The abolition of these regiments would provide the 9,000 horses necessary to equip the 120 heavy Field Artillery batteries, which should be raised without delay.

Cavalry than the northern. The Germans will endeavour to attack us at some point in overwhelming numbers, like the Japanese at Mukden, and this attack will be masked by their Cavalry. It will be the duty of the French Cavalry to tear aside this screen, to give timely notice where the blow will fall, and these forty regiments are the smallest number which can be set aside for the purpose, when it is remembered that these must oppose sixty German regiments.

The first great battle will consist of a number of minor actions along the whole front, and of engagements on the flanks—especially on the northern flank. It is here that the Cavalry on either side will be employed, as occasion offers, on the fringes of the various minor actions. To this Cavalry will fall the duty of a pursuit sans relâche as in the campaign of 1806, or that of covering the retreat of a beaten army.

The writer then gives several examples from former campaigns to show the absolute necessity for France to have as numerous a Cavalry as possible—the sterile victories of Napoleon at Lützen and Bautzen in 1818, due to his want of Cavalry to oppose that of the Allies; the successes of the Germans in 1870; the 'might-have-beens' in the campaign in Manchuria, had either side possessed a powerful and well-trained mounted force.


GERMAN CAVALRY.



- 1. Squadron in Line Rising at a Ditch. (Rear rank thrown back owing to the dust.)
- 2. Lance Exercise. (Note the downward stab at Infantry.)
- 3. Squadron Trotting Past In Line. (Lances at the Engage.)



GERMAN CAVALRY.



- 4. Swimming Horses. (Note breadth of lake.)
- 5. Riding and "turn out" Competition for N.C.O.s.
- 6. Filling the Boats. (Note boats collected under cover prior to starting.)

'CAVALRY IN FUTURE WARS'*

This book, originally written in 1899 by Lieut.-General F. von Bernhardi, has just been brought up to date by him, and exceedingly well translated into English by Mr. C. Sydney Goldman, the well-known author of 'With General French and the Cavalry in South Africa.'

Mr. Goldman was also one of the founders of the CAVALRY JOURNAL, and we therefore join with a special personal feeling in the congratulations which have greeted this latest contribution to Cavalry literature at his hand.

It is a book every Cavalry officer should study—not only every *Cavalry* officer but every officer who aspires to command a mixed force, or to be in a position to criticise Cavalry.

Briefly summed up the book shows how under the changed conditions of modern war the value of Cavalry is on the whole increased. The tactical possibilities open to it may be somewhat more restricted, but its strategical importance is greatly increased and its potentialities promise in the early stages of a war to produce effects so decisive as to influence and even determine the succeeding phases of a campaign.

But such success can only be attained where the Cavalry is trained on the best and most up-to-date lines, and is led by men who have really seriously studied and practised the science of Cavalry leading.

Sir John French has supplied the Introduction to the book, which not only fully sums it up but also shows so convincingly how its lessons apply to British Cavalry that we reproduce it in extenso.

• By H. E. Lieut.-General Frederick von Bernhardi; translated by Charles Sydney Goldman; with Introduction by Lieut.-General Sir John French, K.C.M.G. (John Murray.)

GENERAL SIR JOHN FRENCH'S INTRODUCTION

- 'General von Bernhardi's work, "Cavalry in Future Wars," is a most valuable addition to modern Cavalry literature, and appears at an opportune moment to counteract and dispel some misleading conclusions which have been drawn by certain writers (both English and foreign) from reported operations in the late Manchurian War.
- 'One or two distinguished foreign soldiers who have publicly commented upon that campaign have said that what is termed the "Cavalry spirit" is opposed to the idea of dismounted action. They hold that the Cavalry disdain to dismount, and they see in riding the end instead of the means. They consider that events in the Far East teach us that we must render our Cavalry less devoted to "manœuvres" and to "tournaments," in order to enable them to fit themselves to take part in modern fighting; that the times have come when the methods of warfare should be changed; and that the Cavalry must determine to defeat the enemy by dismounted action entirely.
- 'I cannot speak with any certainty as to what has happened in European armies, but as regards the British Cavalry, I am absolutely convinced that the Cavalry spirit is and may be encouraged to the utmost, without in the least degree prejudicing either training in dismounted duties, or the acquirement of such tactical knowledge on the part of the leaders as will enable them to discern when and where to resort to dismounted methods.
- 'How, I ask, can the Cavalry perform its rôle in war until the enemy's Cavalry is defeated and paralyzed? I challenge any Cavalry officer, British or Foreign, to deny the principle that Cavalry, acting as such against its own arm, can never attain complete success unless it is proficient in shock tactics.
- 'Cavalry soldiers must of course learn to be expert rifle shots, but the attainment of this desirable object will be brought no nearer by ignoring the horse, the sword, or the lance. On the



contrary, the *elan* and dash which perfection in Cavalry manœuvre imparts to large bodies of horsemen will be of inestimable value in their employment as mounted riflemen when the field is laid open to their enterprise in this rôle by the defeat of the hostile Cavalry.

'That the Cavalry on both sides in the recent war did not distinguish themselves or their arm is an undoubted fact, but the reason is quite apparent. On the Japanese side they were indifferently mounted, the riding was not good, and they were very inferior in numbers, and hence were only enabled to fulfil generally the rôle of divisional Cavalry, which they appear to have done very well. The cause of failure on the Russian side is to be found in the fact that for years they have been trained on exactly the same principles which these writers now advocate. They were devoid of real Cavalry training, they thought of nothing but getting off their horses and shooting; hence they lamentably failed in enterprises which demanded, before all, a display of the highest form of Cavalry spirit.

'The author of this book is an eminent soldier, possessing an intimate knowledge of practical fighting, gained chiefly in one of the greatest wars of modern times—the Franco-German Campaign of 1870–71.

'His opinions are entitled to profound respect, and demand close attention and consideration. The General has treated his subject, and marshalled his arguments and statements in so logical and intelligent a manner, and the principles he deduces seem so sound and appropriate, that the conclusions he arrives at appear to me unanswerable.

'In the exhaustive and capable summary of the work of Cavalry in war, General von Bernhardi seems to follow very closely the line of thought which has in recent years occupied the brain of many practical Cavalry soldiers in this country. He appeals strongly to our intellectual sympathy when he first of all discusses the strategical employment of Cavalry in all its bearings, and afterwards proceeds to unfold his views as to the rôle of the Cavalry arm, first when the enemy's Cavalry has been driven from the field, and secondly in conjunction with the other arms. Personally, I have never known the "Case for the Cavalry" stated more clearly and intelligently.

'In recommending the study of the book to all British soldiers, I would draw particular attention to the author's constant and repeated references to the necessity of first seeking out and fighting the hostile Cavalry and driving them from the field—in other words, to the immediate and complete attainment of the moral superiority.

'In support of his opinions, he reminds us forcibly that the important results gained by the German Cavalry in the 1870–71 campaign were due to the absence of opposition on the part of the French Cavalry more than to anything else, and he contends that in future wars, where the Cavalry on either side have been properly trained as such, this supremacy will have to be fought for, and will involve an enormous increase in the difficulty with which the Cavalry arm will carry out its rôle. He scoffs at the idea held by so many "amateurs" that "Cavalry duels" are superfluous.

'Only those who have led Cavalry on active service in the field, and have been charged with their training in peace time, can realise to the full the absolute soundness of the conclusions at which General von Bernhardi has arrived, and it is much to be feared that the mischievous teaching which scoffs at "manœuvres," "tournaments," and the "Cavalry spirit," proceeds almost entirely from the pens and from the brains of men who have no practical knowledge of the handling of the Cavalry arm.

'The great value of this book to the British Cavalry officer of to-day seems to me to lie in the fact that this particular vein of thought and argument pervades it throughout.



'The General tells us, with the soundest argument and the most positive proofs, that "the brilliant field of enterprise which is open to the Cavalry soldier in his rôle as a mounted rifleman can only be attained by him when he has overthrown the enemy's Cavalry."

'The author, having unmistakably insisted upon the preliminary overthrow of the enemy's Cavalry, proceeds to vindicate the idea that the Cavalry spirit is in any degree opposed to the idea of dismounted action when necessary. On the contrary, he declares emphatically that the Cavalry fight is only a means to an end, and that the hostile Cavalry, once disposed of by means of horse and cold steel alone, a brilliant rôle lies open to that arm by reason of their possession of an efficient fire-arm, in the use of which the Cavalryman has received a thorough training.

'The great difficulty, he tells us, lies in the necessity of discovering a leader who possesses the "power of holding the balance correctly between fire power and shock, and in the training for the former never to allow troops to lose confidence in the latter." "Whether," says the General, "it be in the working out of some strategical design, or in joining hands with the other arms to obtain by united fire action some common purpose, a balance of judgment and absence of prejudice is implied which is of the rarest occurrence in normal natures."

'In dwelling so persistently upon the necessity for Cavalry being trained to the highest possible pitch to meet the enemy's Cavalry, I do not wish to be misunderstood. I agree absolutely with the author in the principle he lays down that the Cavalry fight is only a means to an end, but it is the most important means, and I have thought it right to comment upon this because it is a principle which, in this country, since the South African war, we have been very much inclined to overlook. To place a force of Cavalry in the field in support of a great army which is deficient in the power to overcome the opposing Cavalry is to act like one who would despatch a squadron of war vessels badly



armed, badly trained, and ill-found, to blockade a distant coastline defended by a powerful fleet. What is the naval fight in the open sea but a means to an end? it would be as sensible to dwell on the inutility and waste of a duel between hostile fleets as to lay down the principle that the "Cavalry battle" in no way affects the mutual situation of hostile armies.

- 'But the "end" in view which General von Bernhardi has so clearly laid down must never be lost sight of.
- 'Whilst the conditions of modern war have rendered the service of reconnaissance far more difficult, the same causes lend themselves to a much easier deception of the enemy by means of feints, etc. Cavalry, when working with the other arms, can render valuable service in this way, and also in bringing rapid supports to a main or counter attack.
- 'Another most important point must be noticed. I allude to the increasing tendency of umpires and superior officers to insist on Cavalry at manœuvres and elsewhere being *ultra-cautious*. They try to inculcate such a respect for Infantry fire that Cavalry is taught to shirk exposure, and the moment Infantry come within sight, squadrons are made either to retire altogether, or dismount and shoot, regardless of what the "Cavalry value" of the ground happens to be.
- 'I have no hesitation in saying that immense harm is done to the war efficiency of Cavalry by decisions of this kind, which disregard altogether the human factor in the problem. We ought the more to be on our guard against false teaching of this nature, seeing that there are many grave warnings to be found in history of the inevitable consequences of thus placing the weapon above the men.
- 'After the war of 1866 the great Von Moltke made the following report to the King of Prussia:
- "Our Cavalry failed, perhaps not so much in actual capacity as in self-confidence. All its initiative had been destroyed at



manœuvres, where criticism and the blame had become almost synonymous, and it therefore shirked independent bold action, and kept far in the rear, and as much as possible out of sight" (Moltke's "Taktisch-Strategische Aufsätze," Berlin, 1900).

'By like method in peace training prior to the war with Turkey such timidity had been developed in the Russian Cavalry that, in the words of General Baykow, Cavalry commanders showed a marked disinclination to undertake operations which were well within their powers, but which might bring them in contact with the Turkish Infantry, and so run risk of suffering loss.

'History is full of similar instances of how not to train Cavalry, and I hold most strongly that the arm must be educated up to a readiness to act, to come to close quarters in co-operation with the other arms, and to risk casualties, as Infantry have often done before without losing its "battle" value.

'To sum up, training with a view to self-sacrifice during peace exercises is essential for the success of all arms in war, but especially so for Cavalry.

'With remarkable perspicuity and telling conviction, General von Bernhardi has dealt in an exhaustive manner with every subject demanding a Cavalry soldier's study and thought. I am convinced that he who thoroughly masters the contents of his book will feel no doubt, and will entertain no misapprehension as to the vast rôle his arm is called upon to fulfil in war, and he will realise how, in mastering the great essentials of which it treats, he will himself be assisting in the best possible manner to maintain the prestige and the glory of the great service to which he belongs.'

Such are the views of Sir John French on the question, but von Bernhardi's writings are of such inspiring importance that we propose to give a further résumé of his book in our next issue.



REVIEWS

CAVALRY ON SERVICE *

The value of this work for the young Cavalry officer lies in the detail of what the work of Patrols has actually been on service: how they succeeded and where they failed. Of special value for lecturing purposes.

'CAVALRY on Service,' though not intended to serve as a history, is written principally in narrative form, and certainly forms a highly valuable and enlightening chapter illustrative of the history of the great war of 1870, every care having been taken by the author to check the German description of the work of the Cavalry of their First and Second Armies by information subsequently derived from French sources. The result is an extraordinarily vivid picture of war, or rather a series of pictures, in reading which the least imaginative student can realise what the German Cavalry achieved, how it earned its successes, and what caused its failures, during the nine days (from August 7 to 15 inclusive) covered by the narrative.

The author, when dealing with the efficiency, or the reverse, of the leadership of the great bodies of Cavalry in 1870, warns his readers that, before criticising, they must call to mind the views then in vogue as to the proper use of Cavalry. Those views being kept in mind, rather than the modern principles which thirty-six years of study and experience have since evolved, criticism of the errors committed will be of a fair and moderate nature, and not mere 'wisdom after the event.'

* Cavalry on Service. Illustrated by the advance of the German Cavalry across the Mosel in 1870. Translated from the German of General von Pelet-Narbonne by Major D'A. Legard, 17th Lancers. London: Hugh Rees. 1906. Price 7s. 6d.

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MISUSE OF CAVALRY

While criticising the higher leaders strictly according to the rules thus laid down, General von Pelet-Narbonne frankly states that the handling of the great bodies of the German Cavalry in 1870 was unsatisfactory throughout, and he shows that the training of the Cavalry in matters of detail was also defective, though here individual intelligence could often supply the missing knowledge.

Dealing first with the higher leading, the General attributes its shortcomings to the fact that, neither in war nor in manœuvre, had the commanders of armies any previous experience in strategic reconnaissance.

Starting thus equally at a disadvantage, the Cavalry work of the Commanders of the First and Second Armies is selected for comparison; the former, General von Steinmetz, being doubtless he who showed himself most incapable of all in the use of that arm, while the latter, Prince Frederick Charles, is declared to have been the only one of the higher leaders who showed himself a capable commander of Cavalry.

General von Pelet-Narbonne considers that the time has now come when the defects of 1870 can be fearlessly exposed to candid criticism, and a comparison between the methods of these two army commanders enables him to illustrate in a striking manner the principles of Cavalry action which he desires to inculcate. He shows us, in a word, how General von Steinmetz acted up to his opinion that Cavalry should be kept in rear, while Prince Frederick Charles, animated by different ideas, pushed his Cavalry ever to the front.

Thus, while we are told that General von Steinmetz was responsible for the failure of the German Cavalry to pursue the French Second Corps after the battle of Spicheren, criticism on which fact would be a mere platitude, it is instructive to learn that when the General did order certain reconnaissances to be executed by his Cavalry, the patrols were sent out, by his orders, from the

Cavalry Divisions which he kept, according to his ideas, in rear of his Infantry; and that he further neglected to move bodies of troops forward in support of these patrols, so that they were unable to carry out their duties thoroughly, both from the fact of their having started from the rear of the army instead of the front, and from the lack of a base from which to operate.

GOOD USE OF CAVALRY

In contrast we are shown how Prince Frederick Charles, when advancing towards the French frontier, took his Cavalry to the front from the first, ordering them 'under all circumstances to keep touch with the enemy, and keep forward as much as possible.' Behind the screen thus formed the Second Army effected its concentration and moved forward without disclosing its intended line of advance to the enemy. The Prince also recognised from the first the necessity of sending forward reserves, in order to give timely support to the advanced squadrons which had been ordered to hang on to the enemy.

PATROL LEADING

Descending from the Commanders of armies to the Generals of Cavalry Divisions, General von Pelet-Narbonne shows us how they failed in their arrangements for strategic reconnaissance, rarely giving definite instructions to the patrol leaders whom they despatched, and sometimes recalling them just at the moment when they were doing most valuable service and it was supremely important to keep them in touch with the enemy. These and similar errors, which will certainly never again be committed by German Cavalry Generals in war, are attributed by their critic to the fact that the Divisions had been improvised on mobilisation and had had no peace training as such.

It is perhaps in the narratives of the experiences of patrols that the most instructive portion of 'Cavalry on Service' is to be found: they certainly contain the liveliest reading. Here we

find a series of episodes of actual war, described with rare spirit and, we are convinced, with great accuracy. In the description of the achievements of Second-Lieut. Stumm, of Lieut. von Ramin, of Major von Thiele, of Graf Iltenplitz, and of that model Cavalry subaltern, Lieut. von Ebart, any young English officer can learn what the German officers of 1870 (with much less to guide them in the way of even vicarious experience than he possesses) were able to achieve in virtue of stout hearts and ready wits: qualities in which he certainly will not fail to equal them. He may read, too, with at least as much benefit to himself, where some of these officers went wrong, usually with excellent motives such as might actuate himself. No young soldier, we are convinced, could fail to be interested by the remarkable achievements of the first officer mentioned above, Second-Lieut. Stumm, whose services we select as a good sample of many others given in the book.

SECOND-LIEUT. STUMM'S PATROL

Second-Lieut. Stumm's regiment, the 8th Hussars, formed the Divisional Cavalry of the 13th Division, then on the march to the frontier, and on April 6 had been in the saddle since 5 A.M. At noon Second-Lieut. Stumm was ordered to start at once with one N.C.O. and twelve picked men on a reconnaissance to the left bank of the Saar. He was to march as quickly as possible to St. Avold, where the enemy's main force was believed to be, in order to clear up the situation on the rear and left flank of the enemy's position. He was free to remain out two or three days, according to need, perfectly independent, to act on his own initiative, and merely to send back speedy and frequent reports to the rear. Truly, as General von Pelet-Narbonne says, a glorious mission with clearly defined duties and a free hand. What young Cavalry officer but would rejoice to find himself with a similar chance of distinction, and would be glad to know how Second-Lieut. Stumm acquitted himself? Suffice it to say, for space will not allow us to follow his patrol through its

adventures, that the young Hussar, after fifteen hours in the saddle, found himself by nightfall inside the enemy's outpost line and close in front of his main position, whence, at 1 A.M. on April 7, he wrote his third report by the light of a lantern carefully concealed by a cloak. It need hardly be added that the patrol had an exciting time of it that night. At three in the morning Second-Lieut. Stumm resumed work, sending three men to gain information regarding certain ground. At five he advanced with the whole patrol, and soon afterwards was able to report to his General the presence of three Divisions of Infantry and several Cavalry Regiments, and to describe their intended movements. He had thus admirably fulfilled his mission; but mark the sequel! Immediately after sending off his last message, Second-Lieut. Stumm's hopes of doing further service were dashed to the earth by a peremptory order to return at once and report himself to that very Divisional General who had started him off with a free hand the day before. Nor was this his only discouragement, for the invaluable report, to write which he and his men had run such risks and endured such exertions, was delayed 22 hours by a Staff Officer on its way to the Royal Headquarters.

Truly the names of the General and the Staff Officer deserve immortality, for instructional purposes, as much as that of the brave patrol leader.

Equally enterprising and more fortunate was the patrol of Lieut. von Ebart, another inexperienced young officer, whose report is quoted by General von Pelet-Narbonne as a model for such tasks, with the comment that 'no experienced officer of the General Staff could have carried out the reconnaissance more successfully than this young Lancer officer.'

To all Cavalry officers then, whatever their rank, General von Pelet-Narbonne's book will be as a mine of suggestion, both of what to do and what to avoid. To them and to all desirous of studying the art of war we cordially recommend 'Cavalry on



Service,' which in addition to the value conferred by the admirably clear and simple style of its author, has the minor but considerable recommendations of being printed in very clear type and provided with a liberal supply of good maps. Much credit is due to Major Legard for his excellent translation, which has the fluency and ease of an original composition, and should fulfil the wish with which he undertook the work, namely, 'that it might induce the Cavalry officers of our Army to make a further study of military history in general, and Cavalry history in particular.'

Horses, Saddles, and Bridles. By General W. H. Carter, United States Army. Baltimore, U.S.A.: the Lord Baltimore Press, 1906.

THE first edition of this book was published some eleven years ago, when the cessation of Indian hostilities and consequent absence of active service duties had begun to change many of the old conditions of army life in the United States. It was written in the hope of improving generally the system of instruction, and to inculcate a more widespread knowledge of certain elementary facts and principles among the mounted branches of the service; and in the present edition the contents of the original volume have been re-arranged and amplified, while a considerable amount of entirely new matter has been included.

In the introduction the author points out how in the Cavalry, more than in any other arm, careful peace training, both of men and horses, is all-important, and reminds his countrymen of the costly and humiliating lessons learnt by the Federal Cavalry in the Civil War, where it was so often found that training, discipline, and patient work are more potent agents to command success than enthusiasm, patriotism and intelligence, coupled with ignorance and lack of experience. The first as well as one of the longest and most important chapters in the book treats of the Cavalry horse, calls attention to the various forms of horses, and explains the relative value of the different points, while there

are some very careful veterinary notes for those officers who may have to choose remounts without professional assistance. The framework of the horse, gaits, bits, bitting and training, saddles and seats, are all very thoroughly gone into, and in the chapter on bits there is a detailed description of the Austrian mouthgauge for ascertaining the dimensions of a horse's mouth. There are illustrations of most of the military bits used by European armies, and in regard to ours General Carter is of opinion that 'it does not compare favourably with the other equipment of the British Cavalryman, which is second to none in Europe.' General Carter has some particularly sound remarks on 'seats,' and in regard to the American custom of teaching recruits to ride bareback before allowing the use of a saddle, he suggests that a more reasonable course would be to first teach the correct seat in the saddle and afterwards perfect it by riding without one. 'Timid men,' he says, 'should not be forced too fast or made to mount vicious horses, but left for time and their own ambition to overcome their fears. . . . The herding of the troop-horses in the field is of great assistance in making bold cross-country riders of many otherwise timid men. If a recruit can be given enough confidence in his seat and horse to enable him to stay with a stampeded herd until the horses have recovered their senses sufficiently to be rounded up, there need be no fear of his not learning to ride.' There are in Chapter VIII. a number of interesting descriptions, illustrated by photographs, of the equipment of modern Cavalry, but the most interesting chapter in the book, perhaps, is that which treats of the 'endurance of horses,' and which should receive the careful attention of all officers of the mounted branch. General Carter declares—and we may lay the flattering unction to our souls—'that heavy losses in horses should be expected on service and are absolutely inseparable from active and successful campaigning.'

The remaining chapters deal with age of horses, stable management, veterinary supply, diseases and injuries, and forage—with useful illustrations and descriptions of various grasses—

while at the end are some remarks on 'transportation of horses by rail and at sea,' in regard to which, if our knowledge equals our experience, we should know as much as others.

Kavalleristische Monatshefte

A NEW CAVALRY JOURNAL FOR AUSTRIA

We have been favoured with the receipt of the first number of a journal intended, under the above title, to appeal especially to the Cavalry of Austria and Germany. The new periodical is published in Vienna under the patronage and approval of the military authorities, and contains on the inside of the cover a goodly list of names of well-known Cavalry officers who have promised their help and countenance. The Kavalleristische Monatshefte is to be devoted to the discussion of all matters connected with the Cavalryman's calling, and it is intended to make a special feature of the chronicling of all kinds of Reitsport.

The first number is full of promise; Feldmarschall-Leutnant Ströhr contributes a short paper entitled, 'Sidelights on Cavalry in the Modern Fight,' wherein he points out that while many complain that the war in Manchuria produced no lessons for the mounted man, yet the need for a real Cavalry was very patent on both sides and especially at and after Mukden; the writer holds that while the old duties of security and information are laid now, as ever, upon the shoulders of the Cavalry, the real use of that arm in modern war will be so to employ its masses as to form an impenetrable screen behind which its own commander may prepare his stroke, or to use them to force the enemy prematurely to disclose his intentions. In 'Schweinschädel und Königgrätz,' General Count von Degenfeld-Schonburg narrates his experiences of those battles in command of the 7th Hussars; Major-General von Nadas, commanding the 8th Cavalry Brigade, deals at some length with the 'Battle Training of Cavalry'; and the well-known writer, Lieut.-General von Pelet-Narbonne, has a paper on 'The Organisation of the Cavalry Division,'

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wherein, however, we seem to recognise many of the arguments, illustrations, and much of the subject matter contained in a lecture given by that officer before the Berlin Military Society and republished this year in the Journal of the Royal United Service Institution.

There are two anonymous papers on 'The Use of Cavalry During the Manœuvres in Silesia'; of this the first and shortest is perhaps the better criticism of the two, the other being more in the nature of a mere narrative of events. The writer draws attention to the high proportion of Cavalry to Infantry at these manœuvres—two squadrons to every three battalions; he points out that the opposing bodies of Cavalry are invariably of equal strength, and suggests that more might be learnt if one Cavalry force were occasionally numerically stronger than the other, and if the actual strength of each were not generally known beforehand. He would have the Cavalry commence work further apart, thus eliminating the present race for the possession of the best ground, whereby the early sparing of the horses is omitted which would be of the first importance at the outset of a Too much is made public in the 'general' and 'special ideas,' and it is suggested that a more realistic touch would be introduced were false intelligence occasionally included in these 'ideas.'

The number contains also several short papers—among others of interest one on 'The Prussian Remount'—there are some notes of a statistical character on the Cavalry of foreign armies; under the head of *Reitsport* there is a short history of our 'Grand National'; there are veterinary notes, book notices, a short story, and finally an announcement of a Prize Essay Competition, on the subject of 'The Lessons to be Learnt from the War in the Far East on the Employment of Cavalry.'

HOW TO TREAT NAIL PUNCTURES OF THE HORSE'S FOOT

By L. VANGES, M.D., V.S., FARGO, N.D.

The following is extracted from an interesting article in the 'Veterinary Journal' in which Dr. Vanges advocates the treatment of punctures of the foot by aseptic methods as in the case of ordinary wounds, and not by poulticing, &c.

Or all the injuries and wounds which we meet in practice, there are certainly none which are more important than those of the foot of the horse.

I am certain that any one of you will agree with me how difficult it sometimes is to explain how it is possible that a simple nail puncture in the frog can produce so much more serious results, or cause a horse to be laid up so much longer than the formidable-looking flesh wounds caused by a barbed-wire cut. And yet such conditions are so often met with in practice, that through their common occurrence, they do not always receive the attention which they certainly deserve.

As the process of healing of wounds of the foot and the conditions by which such healing is modified are identical with those in wounds in general, there seems to be no reason why the principles of modern surgery should not be applicable to the injuries of the foot.

As you all know, the following conditions are essential to the normal process of repair, viz.: 1. Arrest of hæmorrhage. 2. Correct apposition of the parts. 8. Absolute local rest. 4. Absence of foreign bodies and free drainage. 5. Perfect freedom from micro-organisms, asepsis.

CLEANING OUT A NAIL PUNCTURE

In wounds produced by nail puncture, the two conditions last mentioned are of great importance, and on their fulfilment depends the subsequent course of the healing process.

Like all other accidental wounds, those produced by nail punctures must be regarded as infected from the beginning.

If nail punctures were aseptic and could be maintained so, they would but rarely produce serious consequences, and it would matter very little what part of the foot received the traumatism or how deep the puncture, but in too many of our cases we have to face infection and sequelæ following in its wake. For this reason all our efforts in treating this class should be concentrated on the following points: To establish asepsis and maintain it wherever possible, and should infection have taken place to so apply what modern surgery has taught us as to remove, destroy, or overcome the micro-organisms which have gained entrance in the tissues or the effects already produced by them.

It needs not to be pointed out that the earlier those indications are met the better, because only in cases which are presented for treatment immediately after the wound is inflicted may we at all hope to establish aseptic conditions. In such cases the foot involved should be thoroughly cleansed, even before attention is paid to the wound. This may be done by washing and scrubbing with water to which some antiseptic has been added.

This completed, the sole and frog should be trimmed so as to establish a smooth surface and in order to widen the clefts and commissures of the frog and between frogs and bars. This will facilitate the subsequent disinfection of the parts surrounding the wound, which is done by a liberal flushing with a hot solution of mercuric chloride (1 to 2,000) applied by means of a fountain syringe or some other form of irrigator.

After this the wound may be approached without danger of adding to any infection which may have already taken place. In case the foreign body is still present in the wound it should be removed without causing laceration of the tissues, and after its

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removal it should be carefully inspected in 'order' to ascertain if parts of it could possibly have remained in the wound.

The next step consists in widening the canal of the wound for so far as it passes through the horny structures of the foot. This must be done with a narrow hoof knife, which should have been sterilised previously, and should extend to the sensitive structures of the foot, but no further. The resulting wound orifice is funnel-shaped, with its apex resting on the sensitive parts.

DISINFECTING THE WOUND

Assuming that infective material has been carried into the wound by means of the nail, our next step should be aimed at a thorough disinfection of the entire wound canal. If we succeed in this, healing by primary intention will take place, and if we fail we must prepare ourselves to face infection and its possible consequences.

The disinfection of the wound canal is difficult, as it is not always possible to extend the procedure to the bottom of the wound, especially if we have to depend on the syringes commonly in use in veterinary practice.

After trying various syringes and appliances I finally came to use the method which has given me the best results. The apparatus used is a syringe with a thin, flexible, probe-pointed nozzle. The syringe is an all-metal antioxin syringe and the nozzle is made of silver, soft and flexible about one and a half to two mm. in thickness, and which can be attached to the syringe in the same manner as a hypodermic needle.

As disinfecting agents I have used various ones, but obtained, perhaps, the best results with a 5 per cent. solution of carbolic acid in a mixture of one part of glycerine to five parts of water. Another solution which I can recommend is a 1 per cent. Lugol solution with about 10 per cent. of glycerine, although the latter solution has the disadvantage of slowly attacking the silver of the cannula.

After the parts surrounding the wound are disinfected as before mentioned, the cannula, with the syringe attached, is

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gently introduced into the canal and the fluid slowly poured into the wound, taking care to avoid great pressure and allowing the fluid to escape along the sides of the cannula as it is forced from the syringe. Disinfection of the wound must be done thoroughly; the operator should not be hasty in his work, and several syringefuls have to be used before the task is accomplished.

In the cases in which the presence of a foreign body is suspected the cannula also serves the purpose of a probe, which has this advantage over the solid instrument, that the probing can be done with a constant return flow of an antiseptic solution, thereby reducing the danger of mischief produced by forcing septic matter into the depth of the wound.

It is scarcely necessary to say that syringe and cannula are to be thoroughly aseptic.

KEEPING THE WOUND ASEPTIC

After having thus attempted to render the wound and its surroundings aseptic, our next aim should be to maintain it so, and in this effort we usually experience the greatest difficulty. While the foot can be readily enclosed in suitable dressings, and while those dressings can be kept in the desired position without much trouble, their constant contact with the soil, floors, or moisture renders the exclusion of septic matter very difficult.

As long as our patients are kept in clean, dry, and well-bedded stables, there always is a probability of success; but when an animal stands in a place covered with manure and moisture, the ordinary dressings soon soak through and wound infection is sure to follow. For this reason we should always insist that our patients be kept in a clean and dry place.

The method of dressing is the same as used in the treatment of wounds in general. A few layers of sterilised gauze are placed over the wound, this is covered with a thick layer of absorbent cotton, while the whole foot is then enclosed in a layer of oakum, the whole being kept in position by means of a roller bandage. In place of the gauze I have often used simple absorbent cotton which had previously been treated with iodine; and this was

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done as an extra precaution against tetanus, a disease endemic in the locality where I practised. In cases where the dressings are apt to be soiled by moisture I have often placed a layer of oiled muslin under the bandage or have covered the bandage itself with a thick layer of pine tar.

In many cases the bandage was dispensed with and the dressing secured by means of pieces of band iron kept in position by the shoe. This method, however, is not nearly so satisfactory as the former, and was only used when the owner insisted on keeping his horse at work.

As very frequently the wound becomes infected in spite of all our efforts and this infection is not always to be ascertained otherwise than by a local examination, it is well to remove the dressing after forty-eight hours for the purpose of inspecting the wound. If the latter is found to be free of pus, the surrounding parts are again disinfected and the dressing applied as before.

WHY POULTICES ARE BAD

Before concluding, a few words in regard to the use of the poultice may be said. Surgeons have now had sufficient time to learn the value of excluding bacteria from healing wounds. In the modern treatment of wounds, not only are efforts made to inhibit germ life by the use of antiseptics, but the wounds are kept free from substances which may furnish nourishment to bacteria, and, before all, the wounds and everything in connection with them are kept as dry as possible, a surgical principle based upon the fact that moisture is imperative to germ life and growth.

In applying poultices, everything favourable to germ life is being provided: the moisture, nourishment, as well as the optimum temperature and in the great majority of cases the bacteria themselves. In an extensive experience with nail wounds in the horse's foot, in which, to some extent, poultices were in use, as well as the antiseptic treatment, I was led to depend entirely upon the latter and to conclude that in all cases in which poultices were used they did more harm than good.—

(American Veterinary Review, March, 1905.)

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HOW TO TRAIN A POLO PONY

By Captain E. D. Miller

The writer of this article is the well-known expert in training polo ponies, and he here gives the main lines on which training can best be carried out. And what applies to polo ponies applies to a very large extent to troop horses. But he has incidentally some severe criticism to pass on the average horsemanship of Cavalry officers which should not be lost sight of.

THE average pony bought by a soldier with the idea of making it into a polo pony is quiet to ride, or he would not buy it at all; for he knows that it is hard enough to make the quietest hack or hunter into a polo pony without taking on the extra risks and difficulties entailed in converting him from a fighter into a tractable polo pony; and he does not buy a colt that has done nothing, for it will probably mean two years before he gets him to play polo.

The most important quality in a polo pony is a good temper, for this means good manners and almost invariably a good mouth; secondly, good conformation, which means power to carry a fair weight; and thirdly, good breeding, which means pace and pluck. Without these three qualities no pony is worth the trouble of breaking to polo; it is easy to discover the second and the third qualities, but unfortunately many mistakes are made about the first, as it is often impossible to discover the existence of a bad temper till the pony has been well fed for a considerable time, and of course the higher bred the pony is, the more likely is its temper to be upset by rough usage.

It should be possible as a rule when buying a young pony to discover enough about its breeding to enable the purchaser to form a fair opinion as to its being possessed of sufficient pace for polo; and if the man buying the pony is not a good judge himself, he should get the assistance and advice of someone who really knows what he is about before purchasing. A good judge of a pony will tell at once by riding the pony if he can gallop, and by looking at him, if he is of sufficiently good conformation for the job.

We will conclude that our purchaser has been lucky, and that he has supplied himself with a good-looking pony that can go a fair pace, and one that is blessed with an equable disposition; he has got this pony in the month of February and is anxious to begin playing him in regimental games on the first of May, when his education will be completed, and that he may have a fair chance of taking his part in matches by the middle of June.

How should he set about it?

The Cavalry or Artillery officer has a great pull over the other branches of the service and over civilian polo players in that he has a first-class riding school entirely at his disposal whenever he likes. And even a very indifferent horseman can make a pony handy in a riding school.

And now perhaps I may be pardoned for a digression: I think it is a very great pity that Cavalry officers as a class do not interest themselves more in the matter of becoming good horse-Take many regiments at random and out of thirty officers you will be lucky if you find five first-class horsemen, and I believe the chief reason of this to be that the majority of them are not aware of how badly they ride, and nobody takes the trouble to teach them or even to inform them of the fact. It is an object lesson to go and watch a game of polo in the Phœnix Park in Dublin, and see a match between the Irish counties. The majority of the ponies playing have probably never seen a stick or ball six months before, yet the riding is so good that most of the ponies play fairly well, and a good game is the result; hand over these ponies to a regiment, and the ponies would probably be all over the place, and a very poor game would be seen.



Another reason why regiments do not have as many good ponies as they ought to is that officers will not take the trouble to train them. To give a couple of instances. Two or three years ago, in the month of March, I went to a dealer's place hoping to buy some good trained ponies, but found them with one exception too green for my purposes. An officer from a Cavalry regiment went the next day and bought nine ponies. I met him and two of his brother officers in a club in London at about four o'clock one afternoon a month later, and he asked me if I would buy any of the ponies, because none of them were sufficiently trained for regimental purposes. I said 'No, thanks,' and asked him why neither he nor his brother officers had got them handy in the riding school; his reply was that they were kept far too busy soldiering. Yet these had plenty of time to spend their afternoons lounging about a London club in the month of April, while their ponies were exercised or not, as the case might be, by mutton-fisted grooms. Again: I once went to a Cavalry station not 100 miles from London to buy a nice young pony from an Infantry officer; he had trained the pony beautifully, and I bought it. I asked him how the ponies belonging to the Cavalry regiment were getting on, as he had told me that he had broken this pony in the Cavalry riding school. His reply was 'Badly-you see the officers never ride their ponies, they are all ridden by rough-riders the best of whom walks thirteen stone.'

Now our friend who has purchased the nice tractable pony in the month of February won't find that he will get much value out of his mount in May and June if he spends his free afternoons in London clubs, or if he leaves it all to a rough-riding corporal weighing thirteen stone.

Training ponies is hard work, and—if one has not a love for it—often monotonous, so if our friend does not mean to give up a good deal of spare time to improving his horsemanship and training his pony, he had much better leave the green ones alone, and buy an absolutely trained pony when he gets the chance.

But many of our Cavalry officers are poor men who cannot afford to buy trained ponies, and many of them are keen, and it is for them that I give these few hints, in hopes that it may help them to some small extent in getting a lot of fun for very little money; for it must be remembered that a good polo pony is a bank note, and a pony by training often doubles or trebles his value in a few months.

I do not propose in the limits of this article to give any technical details as to the aids and the method of training ponies, for this can all be found in the chapter on training the remount in 'Cavalry Training,' 1904, or in the last edition of my book, 'Modern Polo,' page 108. I merely propose to give a few hints whereby an ordinary horseman can get an ordinary pony handy.

The first requisite in a polo pony is balance, which means that he must go collectedly in all his paces; and our object is to teach our pony to do this with a loose rein.

Instructions

Break the pony at a walk, to carry himself well, to step out smartly by driving him up to the bit, with a pressure of both thighs and knees, so that he walks 'at attention' with an arched neck, playing with the bit.

Ride with two hands, with a long rein, both hands kept perfectly steady, so that when he arches his neck, the bit is not pressing on his mouth.

Teach him to rein back the whole length of the school, with the lightest pressure of both hands on the reins. This may take some time, and the pony should be made to do it in hand first, with no weight on his back.

Passage both ways.

Turn right and left in small circles by feeling the inside rein, and pressing the outside rein on the neck, and applying the outside drawn back leg.

Canter round the school, taking care that the pony always leads on the inside fore and hind legs.

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Start from a standstill into a canter and pull up sharp at the word 'Whoa!' When he will do all this properly we may go on and teach him to canter in the smallest possible circles, do figures of 8, and all the other figures mentioned in the 'Cavalry Drill Book.'

Part of his training every day may be outside the school, first walking and then cantering with stick and ball. Long hacking rides, opening and shutting gates, riding in traffic, all help to train the polo pony, provided the rider is always riding at attention and taking care that everything he does is done with an object. Everything that a pony is taught in the school should be practised, and he should be made perfect at these exercises outside; if it can be done in company so much the better. And there is no reason why two or three officers should not give up a few hours a week to train their ponies together. Ponies can then be taught to ride off, to meet one another, and can be made to do long fast canters together, so that though they gallop along side by side, they get to understand that they are not racing, and so go with their heads loose and do not pull.

The most important matter of all is to remember that all polo ponies must be ridden with slack reins, and that whenever their mouths are touched they must slacken their pace. The reason that reining back is so very important is that it gets the muscles in order, so that they are strong behind and are thus enabled to stop very quickly in a collected manner as soon as they feel a pull on the reins.

If a pony be trained and be made perfectly tractable in this way, it will be found that all he wants is experience at polo to be turned out as the finished article; this, however, is always providing that he does not develop some trick, as pulling, shying off the ball, being afraid of other ponies, or refusing to turn, etc. But in any case if treated in this way he is far more likely to make a polo pony than if this trouble be not taken. And, moreover, there is the extra advantage that the chances are that the pony is improving his master's horsemanship all the time.

NOTES ON LECTURING

The following notes on lecturing may be of interest to officers engaged in instructing their men.

THE Roman law for instruction holds good to-day as in the old times—viz. 'Cito, tuto et jucunde'—'short, sweet and sound.'

The most usual fault in an inexperienced lecturer is that of trying to cram the whole of a big subject—such as 'Cavalry Tactics,' or 'Reconnaissance'—into one lecture. This is a great mistake. Don't try to cover too much ground all at once.

Carefully consider your whole subject, and divide it up into convenient parts, each part forming a separate short lecture, such as will not take more than a quarter of an hour or twenty minutes to deliver.

In preparing your lecture note down what are the main points you want to bring forward in it. Find incidents or battles, &c., which will best give examples or illustrate your points. These should preferably be drawn from the history or experience of your own Regiment, or connected with the neighbourhood, or in some other way of special interest to your men.

In delivering your lecture it will generally be best to describe your incident, battle, or whatever it is, and then to show its lessons, always keeping in view the points which you are trying to bring home to your hearers.

Lecturers are too inclined to go the other way to work, and to give a long, dry dissertation on their subject, with possibly an incident in illustration, as an afterthought, at the end.

This is not the way to catch the attention and interest of your audience. It is often better to give the interesting story first and tag its lessons on afterwards.

Emphasise your point by an apt instance, phrase or joke, such as will make it unforgetable by the men.

Don't preach over your hearers' heads.

- 'Go by the pace of the slowest horse,' and use words which the least intelligent of your men can understand.
- 'Vertical equivalents,' 'Strategical considerations,' &c., are terms which have no meaning for them.

Use diagrams, maps, models, or demonstrations as much as possible. It is far easier to catch the understanding of your audience through the eye than through the ear.

Best of all are lantern slides. These can be made easily and cheaply from photos, sketches, or maps, and used with the school or regimental lantern.

Your lecture should be spoken, not read; though a few written notes can be used as reminders of points to make.

Cultivate change of voice and gesture: a monotonous singsong makes the hearers sleepy.

Be cheerful in your lecturing. It is almost better to be flippant than to be melancholy—provided that you stick to facts.

Indefinite remarks and undecided endings to sentences leave vague ideas on the hearers' minds.

Twenty-one times, the other day, I heard lecturers conclude sentences with the words 'and all that sort of thing.'

Study of Cavalry literature and of Cavalry history gives you plenty of interesting material wherewith to lecture.

The Library at the Cavalry Club is full of interesting unofficial books on Cavalry subjects, such as Scouting, Horsebreaking, Stratagems of War, and experiences of every kind.

At the end of your lecture give a short summary of the points brought out in it. Then question the men and let them question you to ensure that the subject has been properly grasped by them.

Beginners generally feel very shy of lecturing: this is chiefly from want of confidence and practice.

Acting on such hints as the above, it is really an easy art for anybody to acquire, and is not only most useful, but also very interesting when acquired.



RECONNAISSANCE COMPETITION 1906

DURING the autumn an Inter-regimental Reconnaissance Competition was held in England and Ireland for prizes given by the Inspector of Cavalry to each brigade.

The rules governing the competition are appended in case they may be of use for similar practices among mounted troops in the Colonies.

General Baden-Powell desires us to make it known to our Colonial readers that he will be glad to offer similar prizes for such competitions to any groups of three regiments who may care to compete among themselves.

Each regiment would supply one team; the three Commanding Officers or their representatives might form a committee of management to arrange details, nominate umpires, etc.

The distances here given are purposely very short, and should after a little practice be considerably extended.

The winning teams were as follows:

1st Brigade:

5th Lancers under Lieut. C. E. Pym.

2nd Brigade:

7th Dragoon Guards under 2nd Lieut. G. F. Clarke.

3rd Brigade:

3rd Dragoon Guards under Capt. L. Partridge.

4th Brigade:

16th Lancers under Capt. Van der Byl.

Northern Brigade:

Royal Scots Greys under Capt. Sprot.

A team from 'B' Battery, R.H.A., under Lieut. Barham, made a good fight for the prize in the 2nd Brigade, and made a good record in marching some thirty-five miles to the rendezvous on the day previous to the competition, and thirty-five miles back on the day after it.

Most of the reports and sketches sent in were of a very satisfactory quality, some especially so.

The casualties among the horses were very few, and very slight.

The standard of work all round was of a high order.

The umpiring, which involved a good deal of labour, was admirably performed by the officers who undertook it, and the

success which attended the competition was largely due to their co-operation.

The contest was carried out with the greatest keenness by all ranks.

Some very useful reports and suggestions were sent in by umpires and competitors, notably Brigadier-General Bethune, Capt. Collins, East Lancashire Regt., Lieut. McLure, 19th Hussars, Lieut. Stewart Richardson, 11th Hussars, and others. All testified to the practical value of the exercise.

The prize, which was received by each member of the winning team in each brigade, consisted of a Scout's Fleur de Lys badge, with a silver figure of St. George—the Patron Saint of Cavalry—upon it.

On the reverse was inscribed 'For Scouting. From R. S. S. B.-P., 1906.'

RULES FOR RECONNAISSANCE COMPETITION

OBJECT: To attain efficiency in horse-mastership, scouting and despatch-riding, under pressure akin to that of active service.

	Men	Horses
TRAM:	1 Officer	1
	3 Scouts	3
	1 Cyclist	0
	1 Pack horse leader	2
	_	_
	6	6

TASK: To carry out a three days' patrol of, roughly, 25 to 35 miles a day, starting at a certain hour and ending at a given place. Finding way by map.

REPORTS: The Commander of the patrol to report on certain points, and to send in his reports by despatch-rider.


A general idea and the points for his reports will be given to him by the Umpire at starting each day, and the latter will, as a rule, be connected with his halting station; or, if connected with the march, will be of such nature as not to involve delays in marching.

Supplies: Shelter tents, blankets, and cooking utensils to be carried on pack-horse. Bivouac each night. Food and forage to be previously laid down at stations—the patrol being supposed to live on the country. Forage and food may be carried on the horse if desired.

Kit: Field service marching order with revolvers instead of rifles. Regulation saddles.

Course: Triangular or more sided course according to number of teams competing.

Say three teams start—the course will be a triangle of three sides about 25 or 30 miles each between stations A, B, C, and a run in to centre spot D of about 15 miles, thus:



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and go to next station; and thence the following day (or during the night) to the next, and on the final day they go to the third station, i.e., their original starting-point, and thence to D, thus putting in about 40 to 50 miles on the last day.

On the fourth day each team has to go over a jump course of ten fences at D. This is to ensure useful class of horse being employed, and no over-riding on previous day.

Stations should preferably not be at towns or villages.

DESPATCH RIDING: The officers have certain objects to report on each day, assisted by their scouts: they send in their reports on the following day by one of their scouts to D. He remains at D after handing in his report. On the third day they send it forward to D by cyclist, from the last station they reach.

CONDITION: Condition of horses to be tested by vet. officer on arriving at D, and record taken of their temperature, pulse, respiration, soundness, injuries, and general working efficiency, etc.

Umpires at stations also to note the general condition of the horses on arrival and on departure, with power to deduct marks or disqualify for bad condition.

MARKS		
	Total	Total aggregate
Each report.	50	150
Time.—Average pace up to 6 miles per hour. Anything over does not count. Anything under		
loses 5 marks per decimal point below the rate of 6 miles per hour. This includes time taken in sketching or investigating, etc.		100
	,	
Condition of each horse on arrival at D. 30		210
Jumping, each horse (except pack-horse).		90
Cyclist: 1 mark for every 15 minutes in advance		
of his patrol on arrival at D.		

Deductions to be made for breaking any rules or for injuries to horse, etc.

ENEMY: To enforce real scouting a flagged enemy or hostile piquet should be stationed at one or more points on the course. This must be looked out for, and, if possible, avoided and passed by the patrol making a detour out of sight of it. Marks to be deducted according to number of men seen by the enemy's piquet, and their nearness to its position.

UMPIRES: Umpire at each station to time hours of arrival and departure; and to watch for and note irregularities, etc.

Chief umpire and veterinary umpire will be stationed at D.

Officers acting as umpires should not belong to any of the Regiments competing.

Scoring forms should be supplied to the umpires, also a list of kit that should be carried by each competitor; and a list of the horses to the veterinary umpire with a form for reporting on their condition.



PROBLEM No. 3

By Major R. L. Mullens, 2nd Dragoon Guards

It was 7.30 on a May morning, and the South African sun was just piercing the frosty mist, when Captain Jenkins of the Diamond Hussars, as he finished his half-ration breakfast of coffee and biscuit, was interrupted by the Adjutant with a message that the Colonel wished to see him at once.

'Look here, Jenkins,' said the Column Commander, on his reporting at Head-quarters, 'I've got a job for you. A despatch has just arrived from the General to say that they have sent us a convoy of provisions to be at Springfontein Farm about 3 p.m. to-day. You must get to them as quickly as possible so as to reinforce the escort, and bring the convoy into camp. You can take your own squadron, but I can't spare you any more men. You know the direction, for it's where we had that scrap last month when we were out with the Ruby Horse. Of course, as you know, Van Niekerk's commando are not far off, so look out, as he will try and round you up if you give him half a chance; however, he can't have more men than you will have, so shove along, and I shall expect you back about sun-down to-morrow.'

Jenkins, as he turned away to take over his first independent command, tried hastily to recall instances of military history which he hoped might now stand him in good stead, and be applicable to this all-important occasion.

His squadron were soon saddled up and away, and were off due west towards the distant line of kopjies which they had to cross. Captain Jenkins had taken the usual precautions for his advance, and was fortunate to have with his advance party Sergeant Wary, who had done good work all through the war, and was a man of ready resource.

We will now take up the thread of our story by quoting from a letter from Jenkins to his parents, relating the adventure.

'The C.O. was right, for we were only about 8 miles from camp when the scouts on our right flank got in touch with Van Niekerk's commando. After a little long-range firing on both sides, the commando retired in a north-westerly direction up the long rising slope of Boschman's Kranz. You will see the lie of the country from the rough sketch-map that I am seuding. We kept in touch with them till they disappeared over the sky-line. On arriving at the top of the ridge, we were astonished to find that they had utterly vanished. Besides being unable to discover any sign of the Boers through our glasses, the very stony nature of the ground prevented us finding any "spoor" which could show us in which direction they had gone. It was past four o'clock, and I reckoned

we were about 3 miles from the Farm. The question now was whether I should push on to our destination as fast as I could, or try to find the Boers. As daylight was running short, I decided to go for the Farm, though expecting that the Boers were, as usual, fully aware of our errand, and might have a nasty surprise in store for us. As far as could be seen from our position (marked X) at the top of the ridge, the country was quite open between us and the Farm, though we could see a track running along the south foot of the kopjies on the north side of the valley. I seemed to fancy that we had better make straight across country, especially as I happened to notice that the wire fence was apparently uncut, which led me to believe that the Boers must have gone north.

'The slope we had to descend was so steep that we had to lead our horses down, which took some time; but as soon as we were on the flat, I sent off Sergeant Wary with two troops as an advance guard, and followed myself with the others at about half a mile distance. Wary, I noticed, extended one troop in a semi-circular line of scouts, and kept the other in hand.

'I have tried to make clear on the sketch what the situation was when the trouble began. I was riding on at the head of the support when I saw two of the scouts on the extreme right flank of Sergeant Wary's lot galloping in towards him at full speed; and almost immediately there was a tremendous outburst of rifle fire from his right flank. It was a ticklish situation. There we were right in the open, and it was only owing to Wary's prompt action that things turned out as well as they did. It was a hot fight whilst it lasted, but we pulled out all right. The cunning Boers, expecting us to follow the track that led to the Farm, had turned sharp to the north on descending the slope, and had galloped into a deep donga, which we afterwards found ran parallel to the north of the track, and had laid an ambush for us in a small cross donga at A.'

Put yourself in Wary's position, and say what you would have done under these circumstances, and why.

N.B.—The map on opposite page with entrance form on the back duly filled up and signed must be forwarded with solution so as to reach 'The Editor' not later than May 15, 1907.



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Problem No. III.

Open to Non-commissioned Officers of the Mounted Branches of the Regular or Auxiliary Forces at home and abroad.

All Solutions (which should be as short as possible) must be attached to this page with name, rank and address of sender, must be countersigned by an officer, and must reach

THE EDITOR.

'Cavalry Journal,'
Royal United Service Institution,
Whitehall,

London, S.W.,

not later than May 15, 1907.

A Prize of £2. 2s. will be given to each of the first three whose solutions are considered the best.

The Editor's decision will be final.

From		
	Name	
	Rank	Regiment
	Address	
	Countersigned by	

NOTES

CAVALRY TRAINING, 1906

LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR JOHN FRENCH at the close of the drill season issued the following memorandum on the work of the 1st Cavalry Brigade:—

'The work done by the 1st Cavalry Brigade this year has been very useful. I was pleased to see that attention had been paid to the points brought forward in 1904 and 1905. In all these respects there is great improvement. Whilst asking Cavalry officers to perfect their arm in the directions previously indicated, I would here add for their future close attention certain considerations which have been prominently brought forward during this year's work—viz., the tactical employment of the Cavalry, in conjunction with the other arms, on the actual field of battle.

- 'A portion of the work on the Berkshire Downs was devoted to a close reconnaissance of an extensive position, occupied by an enemy. On another occasion a large attacking force of all arms was reconnoitred by the Cavalry of the defence.
- 'Excellent work was done, but the results on both occasions showed clearly how necessary it is for Cavalry officers to have an intimate knowledge of tactics generally. These operations must have brought home to the minds of Cavalry officers what inestimable service they may render to their own Commander-in-Chief by possessing ability to furnish reliable reports, based on highest standard, instinctive knowledge, and perception. One of the principal features of the employment of Cavalry during the Goodwood operations was to deceive the enemy. I believe there is a great future open to them in the practice of this rôle, which is of such vast importance in the present day. But if the most ingenious devices are not thought out in peace time and practised on every available opportunity, there can be no real deception, and I would commend this thought to the careful consideration of Cavalry officers.
- 'As regards personnel and interior economy I have nothing but praise. The riding is excellent and the condition of the horses most satisfactory.'

Lieut.-General Sir Ian Hamilton, in his remarks on the training in his Command during 1906, made the following observations with regard to Cavalry:—

'Compared with foreign Cavalry, the British regiments possess a very distinct advantage in the physique and build of rank and file, who, though possibly a little on the big side from the point of view of their horses, are otherwise exceptionally well equipped by nature to become good riders. Their long limbs and flat thighs



give them in this respect an advantage over some other nations. As a matter of fact, however, the Cavalrymen of at least one other country ride better than the troopers who have worked over Salisbury Plain this summer. It may be urged that the horses of most foreign armies are better trained than our horses, and that a well-broken, mature horse makes good riding, or what passes for such, comparatively easy. But, after all, it is the general average of good riding which, in the long run, trains the horses. A bad rider can ruin a well-trained horse very quickly. Certain foreigners ride more quietly than our men. They seem to have better hands and do not knock their horses about or job them in the mouth. However this may be, the fact that with us man and horse do not work so well together, handicaps our regiments in steadiness on parade, quickness of deployment and cohesion in the charge. As individual horsemen, our troopers do not leave much room for criticism; as parts of a squadron, there are some others who have gone ahead of them. Officers and men show how greatly they have profited by their South African experiences by their highly realistic and effective methods of conducting skirmishing and reconnaissance encounters, whether mounted or on foot. The scouting is also done freely and well, the system and skill by which officers' patrols are inspired being specially commendable.'

'In the 3rd Cavalry Brigade many exercises of a specially instructive character were arranged by Brigadier-General M. Rimington, such as—a despatch riding scheme carried out by each regiment in succession, with the object of testing ability to lay out a line of despatch riders to keep up communication between a fixed post on the west coast with a moving column on the east coast, a scouts competition, a "missing king" competition, and a "drive" on South African lines, in which a young officer and ninety men represented De Wet and his party. Most of the men were rounded up, but "De Wet" got away with a sprained ankle and the loss of his horse. In these exercises, each of which lasted for several days, the troops bivouacked and small parties supported themselves by means of post-cards on the South African "good for" system. At a special camp on a tidal inlet near Bannow, County Wexford, by kind permission of Mr. Boyse, instruction was given in bridging, horse-swimming, rowing, telegraphy, demolition, the use of the crow's nest, and in those kindred arts which increase the Cavalry soldier's usefulness 100 per cent.'

HERTS IMPERIAL YEOMANRY

The Hythe Cup, which is open to teams of eight men per regiment of Imperial Yeomanry, seven shots per man being fired at 200, 500, and 600 yards respectively, with Bisley marking, was won in 1906 by this regiment with a score of 734 (this being an average of 91.6), which is a record score for this competition.

Thirty Yeomanry regiments competed, and the winning score was 42 points higher than that of the team which was second.

The Herts Yeomanry won the Hythe Cup in 1903 with a score of 717, which was up to that time a record for this competition; in 1904 they were second with 692, only one point behind the winners; and in 1905 they were fourth with a score of 701.



RECENT PUBLICATIONS

The October number of the Journal of the Royal United Service Institution contains some interesting information on 'Japanese Army Sanitation and Hygiene,' from an article by Baron K. Takaki, formerly Director of the Medical Bureau of Japan, in the 'Scientific American.' With reference to water, he says :-- 'Extreme indeed were the precautions to supply potable water, and successful because they were extreme. Water was transported in special wagons drawn by four horses. A boiler-cart, drawn by one horse, provided the necessary means of distillation. In addition the men were instructed to boil their drinking water in their provision pans, when they were unable to supply themselves from the boiled-water wagon of the Company. . . . Whenever a stream was resorted to, the men were instructed to take only the water in the centre of the stream, so that the impurities which cling to the bank were avoided. Even this water was boiled. . . . In order to guard against infection as much as possible, the soldiers were made to wash their hands before eating. The drinking of boiled water and the eating only of cooked food made typhoid, dysentery, and cholera almost an impossibility. . . . We established a record of four deaths from bullets to one from disease. In the Spanish-American war fourteen men died of preventable sickness to one man killed on the field of battle.'

Revue de Cavalerie. Paris: September, 1906.—'The Outposts of the Army of Châlons on the Day of Sedan.' 'The Cavalry of To-morrow.' 'The Ottoman Cavalry' (concluded). 'Notes on the 75-mm. Gun and its Regulations.' 'Regarding the Vittel Raid.'

Paris: October, 1906.—'Variations on the Scheme of Manœuvres of the 2nd and 4th Cavalry Divisions.' 'Cure, do not Amputate!' 'Notes on the 75-mm. Gun and its Regulations' (concluded). 'Jean de Gassion, Camp-Master-General of Light Cavalry, Marshal of France' (continued).

Kavalleristische Monatshefte. Vienna: November, 1906.—'Battle Training of Cavalry' (continued). 'Clothing, Equipment, and Armament of Cavalry.' 'The Efficiency of the 7th Cavalry Division at the Silesian Manœuvres.' 'Our Cavalry at the Manœuvres.' 'Schweinschädel and Königgrätz' (continued). 'Foreign Cavalry.' 'The Great French Long-Distance Rides, 1903-05, and their Lessons.' 'Military Veterinary Review.'

Revista Técnica de Infantería y Caballería. Madrid: November 1, 1906.—
'Preparation for Battle.' 'On Military Instruction.' 'Usefulness of Cavalry in Modern Armies' (continued).

November 15, 1906.—'Three-Battalion Regiments.' 'On Military Instruction' (continued). 'Usefulness of Cavalry in Modern Armies' (continued). 'The Self-Education of the Officer and High Command.'

The Journal of the Military Service Institution, United States, has an interesting article in the September-October number 1906, on 'Cavalry and Cannon.'

The October number of the Journal of the United States Cavalry Association contains the Prize Essay, 1905, by Captain E. R. Stuart, Corps of Engineers, on The Federal Cavalry with the Armies in the West, 1861–1865.

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'Lessons of the Russo-Japanese War,' by General de Négrier. Translated with special permission of General de Négrier by Second-Lieutenant E. Louis Spiers, 8th Hussars. Hugh Rees, Ltd. Price 2s. 6d. This handy little book is of much interest owing to General de Négrier's acknowledged position as a military authority, and the importance of the questions with which he deals.

Colonel H. T. Lukin, Commandant-General, Cape Colonial Forces, has issued a 'Manual for Mounted Riflemen,' Cape Colonial Forces, 1906. As the mounted troops of Cape Colony, exclusive of Field Artillery, all come under the general designation of Mounted Riflemen, this manual, which is to be considered the authorised Drill Book, should supply a long-felt want, and lead to increased efficiency. In the preface Mounted Riflemen are defined as 'horsemen trained to fight on foot. They should be good riders and careful horse-masters, capable of carrying out all the duties of Cavalry, except shock action. Under exceptional circumstances Mounted Riflemen may be called upon when mounted to rush a position. They should make a special study of scouting and reconnoitring, and be able to move rapidly across country. Mounted Infantry are Infantry soldiers temporarily mounted on cobs, etc., with a view to placing at the disposal of the G.O.C. a mobile force capable of carrying out Infantry tactics.'

'Lettres à Plok—La Cavalerie depuis 1870.' By Capitaine de Journadre. Price 6s. A series of letters which appeared in the 'Revue de Cavalerie.'

The second edition of 'The Twentieth Century Book on the Horse,' by Sydney Galvaine, is now out. It is not only full of information for owners and breeders of horses, but contains a treatise on polo and the training of polo ponies, which should be of value to all interested in this popular sport.

REGIMENTAL HISTORIES

Colonel Harold Malet has compiled 'The Historical Memoirs of the XVIIIth Hussars.' From their foundation, by Charles Marquess of Drogheda. in 1759. This is a sumptuous volume, full of historical and regimental interest, with many coloured and half-tone illustrations. Published at 18s., by Messrs. Warren & Son, Winchester.

'Historical Record of the 3rd (King's Own) Hussars.' By Major-General R. Blundell. London: Griffith & Sons. This volume is founded on Cannon's history, published in 1847, which was brought down to 1856 by Captain Kauntze, and has been continued up to date with some care by Major-General Blundell. It is extremely well printed and got up, and the illustrations are excellent.

Captain W. T. Willcox, 5th Lancers, is about to produce 'The Historical Records of the 5th (Royal Irish) Lancers' from their foundation as Wynne's Dragoons in 1689 to the present day. It will be profusely illustrated, with coloured plates, maps, etc. Price 42s. net Subscriptions will be received by Messrs. Cox & Co., Charing Cross.



NOTES 121

TIPS FOR SCOUTS

Mr. E. Thompson Seton, the author of 'Lives of the Hunted,' etc., who knows as much as anyone of the scouting of the Red Indians of North America, has given us one or two of their methods of working, which are of interest.

The Indian scout always carries his bow as well as his rifle. With the bow he can easily kill a sentry at twenty-five yards and make no noise. With his rifle, in a game country, he can live on the country as he goes along.

Among the Indians generally, the grey wolf is considered typical of the ideal scout because he sees everything and no one sees him.



A common device of theirs is to carry a cap made of a wolf's scalp with the ears on it. When they have to look over a hill they put this on and pass for a wolf if detected; they then withdraw quickly and no one is surprised at seeing no more of them on going up to the place. If they have no wolf cap with them on such an occasion they stick bunches of grass in their head-band and are thus fairly well disguised as a grass-tussock.

Another plan often adopted by the Indian scout when he thinks that he has been seen is to make a dummy head (of stones, or grass, or clothing, etc.) just in




front of him, hide behind it, crawl away backwards, and leave the dummy to be watched or shot at by the enemy.

The American scout usually carries a lasso, which comes in useful for countless purposes, besides enabling him to catch an enemy's horse or snatch an enemy off his horse at a distance of twenty or thirty feet.

To be really expert with the lasso one must, of course, be brought up with it, but to have sufficient control of it to catch a man or horse is enough for ordinary purposes, and this one can easily acquire in a month by practising half an hour a day. Indeed, some men acquire this much control in a week.

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RE-INSTITUTION OF THE MILITARY SECRETARY'S LEVEE

The Military Secretary to the Secretary of State for War now sees officers on the first and third Wednesdays in each month, between the hours of 11 a.m. and 1 p.m., on matters relating to promotions or appointments which they find it difficult or inconvenient to state in writing. This refers to officers on half-pay, the reserve of officers, officers on leave from abroad, and those officers stationed at home who have written permission to attend from the generals under whom they are serving. Officers should notify beforehand the date on which they will attend, and the nature of their business.

CAVALRY EQUIPMENT

Regiments of Dragoon Guards and Dragoons have ceased to carry the lance on escort duty, at reviews, and other ceremonial parades. The proportion of ten D.P. and ten exercise lances per squadron is retained for recreative purposes.

RIDING-MASTERS AND ADJUTANTS

As riding-masters of Cavalry regiments complete their period of service, no further appointments will be made. Their present duties will thereafter be carried out by regimental adjutants in addition to the duties which the latter now perform. After March 31, 1908, an officer, except under very special circumstances, will not be appointed adjutant of his regiment unless he has qualified at the Cavalry School.

COURSES OF INSTRUCTION, 1907

School of Musketry, Hythe

For Officers and N.C.O.s of the Regular Forces (including Permanent Staff of Auxiliary Forces, not previously qualified):

5th of March to 2nd of April. 3rd of April to 19th of April. 27th of September to 25th of October. 26th of October to 12th of November.

The first period in each bracket indicates the duration of the ordinary course, which will not include the Maxim gun; the second represents the period during which a limited number of Officers and N.C.O.s will under certain conditions undergo special further instruction including the Maxim gun.

For Senior Officers all arms—Regular Forces:

16th of May to 24th of May. 28th of May to 5th of June. 23rd of July to 31st of July.

For Squadron Commanders—Regular Forces—whose qualification bears date earlier than January 1, 1904.

15th of February to 1st of March.

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SCHOOL OF SIGNALLING, ALDERSHOT

For Officers and N.C.O.s—Regular Forces—including Adjutants of Imperial Yeomanry:

13th of February to 12th of April. 22nd of April to 21st of June. 1st of July to 31st of August. 9th of September to 8th of November.

TEMPORARY SCHOOLS OF SIGNALLING

Classes will also be formed at Strensall, Bulford, and the Curragh.

CAVALRY SCHOOL, NETHERAVON

For Cavalry Officers:

1st of August, 1907, to 31st of January, 1908.

For Imperial Yeomanry Officers:

1st of March to 28th of March. 3rd of April to 30th of April. 2nd of May to 29th of May.

For Senior Imperial Yeomanry Officers (not below the rank of Captain):

3rd of June to 17th of June.

For Cavalry N.C.O.s:

1st of January to 31st of August.

For Imperial Yeomanry N.C.O.s:

11th of February to 25th of February. 1st of July to 15th of July.

Mounted Infantry School, Longmoor

1st of January to 31st of March.
1st of April to 30th of June.
1st of July to 30th of September.
1st of October to 31st of December.

BALLOON SCHOOL

For Officers:

30th of September to 16th of November.

SCHOOL OF MILITARY ENGINEERING, CHATHAM

For Cavalry Officers and Cavalry Sergeants:

Course commences about 1st of October.

ARMY VETERINARY SCHOOL, ALDERSHOT

For Officers:

15th of January and 15th of November.

OBITUARY

Many friends both at home and in Australia will sincerely regret Major Malcolm McNeill, who died in October after a long illness.

He received his first commission as lieutenant from the Militia in the 5th (Royal Irish) Lancers in 1883. He served as adjutant 1886-88, when he trans-



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ferred to the 4th Hussars. In 1889-92 he served with the colonial forces as staff officer for Cavalry in New South Wales. In 1892 he was promoted captain in the 4th (Royal Irish) Dragoon Guards, and commanded the Australian Cavalry that visited England for the opening of the Imperial Institute, 1893. From 1895 to 1898 Captain McNeill served as A.D.C. to the Duke of Connaught when commanding at Aldershot. In 1900 he was promoted major, and served as assistant military secretary to the Commander of the Forces in Ireland from 1900 to 1903. About two years ago Major McNeill suffered a severe injury in a hunting accident. From this accident he never quite recovered. He gained a particularly good reputation during his service as a staff officer in Australia, where his loss will be regretted by the colonists who knew him.

Captain George Warwick Hunt, whose death at the age of seventy-three was announced in 'The Times' of October 16 as having taken place at Torquay, was one of the survivors of the charge at Balaclava. 'Jonas' Hunt rode as a cornet in the Light Brigade charge in the then 4th Light Dragoons (Paget's Irregular Horse, as that gallant regiment was irreverently called) at Balaclava in 1854. After leaving the Army, he was well known during the early 'sixties' as a 'straight' rider to hounds, and across 'a country.' He rode as an amateur with success both in this country and in France, in which latter country he resided for many years.

Major George Hamilton Heaviside, formerly of the Queen's Bays and the Inniskilling Dragoons, died in November at Eaton House, Norwich, aged sixty-three.

The Fifth Dragoon Guards and many old friends will have heard with deep regret of the death of Captain William Leetham, late 5th Dragoon Guards, at the early age of forty-two. It seems only the other day that he was successfully piloting his good chaser 'Roman Oak' in Ireland, England and France.

THE PERFORATED PAGES

Several correspondents have asked the reason of the perforation of our pages. It sometimes happens in reading a magazine that one wants to tear out and keep certain illustrations or articles, especially those which are continued in successive numbers; it is with a view to facilitating this that the pages are perforated.

We have decided that in future it will be more convenient to publish the CAVALRY JOURNAL ourselves, and we should therefore be greatly obliged if all subscriptions could be sent direct to

THE EDITOR,

CAVALRY JOURNAL,
Royal United Service Institution,
Whitehall, London, S.W.

Mr. C. Gilbert Wood will continue to give us his valuable assistance as publisher to the trade.

O. LUMLEY, Colonel.

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SPORTING NOTES

RACING

The steeplechase season opened auspiciously at Aldershot with a good meeting on November 28 and 29. The feature of the meeting was the popular success of his Majesty's horse 'Nulli Secundus,' for some weeks the favourite for the Derby, in the Three-Year-Old Hurdle Race. There were eleven starters, and he won by 5 lengths amidst great enthusiasm. Captain R. J. Bentinck won the Camberley Hurdle Race on his own horse Morning Mail, and General Hamilton's b. m. Olive won the Open Military Steeplechase, well ridden by Mr. Burnyeat, R.H.A., Mr. T. Lumley Smith, 21st Lancers, being second on his own horse Alert III.

On the second day there was a record attendance, and sport was interesting. The Past and Present Military Steeplechase was won by Mr. V. T. Eyres, 1st Life Guards, The Tyke II., nicely ridden by Captain Rashbotham, K.D.G.'s; Mr. Christie Miller's Chiretta, with Mr. de Crespigny up, being second; other riders in the race were: Mr. Burnyeat, R.H.A., Mr. E. P. Gundry, Mr. Francis de Tuyll, 18th Hussars, and Captain Stackpoole. The Long Valley Steeplechase was won by Mr. Beauchamp's Celebration, Mr. J. O. Sherrard, R.H.A., being second on his own horse Chinese Labour.

RACING IN INDIA

The Indian racing season commenced with the Poona races, which afforded some good sport. The Yerrowala Plate, a $1\frac{1}{2}$ mile hurdle race, was won by Corrie Roy, a waler; Messrs. Wood and Badger of the 12th Lancers were second with their Irish-bred horse Thomond. A wonderfully good little Arab pony, Bay Middleton, the best for his inches in India, won the Lilliputs, his nearest opponent in the race being in receipt of 46 lbs. On the second day Captain Dent won a hurdle race, Colonel Desaraj Urs, head of the Maharajah of Mysore's Army, being second. On the third day, the biggest race of the meeting, the Western India Stakes, a handicap of Rs. 10,000, was won by that good pony Signorina; although a pony measuring 14.2 hands, she gave weight to all except one horse; she is by Soult, and was probably bred in New Zealand; she has already won the Cooch Behar Cup at Calcutta and the Grand Western Handicap in Bombay, and it is considered possible that she may win the Viceroy's Cup, for which she is entered and fancied.

RACING IN SOUTH AFRICA

The Spring Meeting of the South African Turf Club was very successful. The Metropolitan Handicap, value $\pounds 600$, fell to the Hon. W. Ross's Skipping Boy, by Avington. The South African Grand Steeplechase was won by Clolleen



Dhas, who just beat the Duke of Westminster's Sleep, with Major-General Brooks' Little Joe third. An unfortunate accident occurred to the Duke of Westminster's valuable horse Chicot, well known on the English turf; breaking away from the boy before running it collided with a tree and had to be destroyed.

POLO

Polo is flourishing at Gibraltar, where a Garrison Challenge Cup was this year inaugurated. The final was played on October 15, at the Campamento Ground, between the 2nd Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry (Mr. Edge, Mr. Sanders, Captain Rendall, Captain Dickinson) and H.M.S. 'Drake' (Lieut. Goldie, Captain Kerr, Lieut. Walwyn, Commander Buller). The team from the flagship made a good fight, but the soldiers proved too strong, and finally won by 5 goals to 1.

Mrs. Mark Kerr presented the cup to the winners, who are the first to hold the trophy.

POLO IN INDIA

The final of the Poona Junior Tournament took place between the 34th (Prince Albert Victor's Own) Poona Horse, composed of Mr. B. H. Alderson, Mr. P. F. G. Norbury, Captain W. G. Cooper, and Mr. G. C. Lucas (back), and the 10th Hussars, made up of Mr. F. S. Rose, Mr. W. L. Palmer, Major E. R. A. Shearman, and Captain the Hon. C. B. O. Mitford (back). The contest was close and exciting; in the first period there was no score, in the second the 10th obtained a lead which Major Shearman increased in the third; the fourth period, however, saw the native Cavalry come to the front, and they scored twice in rapid succession, while before the end, a foul being given against the Hussars, the Poona Horse hit through again, thus winning by three goals and two subsidiaries to two goals two subsidiaries.

The final of the Quetta Tournament was between the 37th Lancers (Mr. Benn, Mr. Bruce, Major Talbot, Mr. Lucas) and the 35th Scinde Horse (Mr. Landon, Captain Hislop, Mr. Giles, Lieut.-Colonel Wadeson). The Lancers were superior in almost all respects; they were better mounted and their combination and hitting were excellent; they finally won by eleven goals three subsidiaries to four goals three subsidiaries. Mrs. Smith Dorrien presented the cup to the winners, and General Smith Dorrien congratulated them in a short speech.

The Poona Open Tournament produced some good play. First the 33rd (Queen's Own Light) Cavalry opposed the 34th (Prince Albert Victor's Own) Poona Horse. A close game resulted in a win for the latter. Then the Bhopal Gymkhana opposed the 13th Hussars, the native team proving the winners. Later the Bhopal Gymkhana easily defeated the Poona Horse. A very good game ensued between the 10th Hussars and the Poona Gymkhana, the latter just winning. The final was between the Bhopal and Poona Gymkhanas, the latter beating their opponents by five goals and two subsidiaries to two goals and three subsidiaries. The feature of the tournament was the fine performances of the native players.

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The final of the Secunderabad Inter-Regimental Tournament for General Sir Charles Egerton's Cup was between the 26th Light Cavalry and the 13th Hussars. The teams were: 26th Light Cavalry—Mr. Chaytor, Captain Popham, Mr. Griffith, and Mr. Moir; 13th Hussars—Mr. Steele, Captain Twist, Lieut.-Colonel Wiggin, and Major Taylor, D.S.O. A fast game resulted in a win for the 26th Light Cavalry by four goals and three subsidiaries to three goals and four subsidiaries. Brigadier-General E. O. F. Hamilton presented the cup to the winners.

The Hyderabad Tournament secured an entry of half a dozen teams, but, unfortunately, half scratched, including the 13th Hussars, owing to illness. The famous Golconda team added to their many victories by carrying off the cup. The 26th Light Cavalry made a good fight with them up to half-time, when Captain Keble's pony slipped up, completely knocking out that player for the rest of the game. Thus with only three players opposed to them the Golcondas won easily and were presented with the cup by Mrs. Dunlop.

FOOTBALL

The Cavalry Association Cup is now being played for. In the

FIRST ROUND

The Royal Horse Guards beat King's Dragoon Guards 3-0
The 2nd Life Guards ,, 1st Life Guards 10-0
The 7th Dragoon Guards ,, 20th Hussars 4-1
The 7th Hussars ,, 8th Hussars 1-0
The 18th Hussars ,, Scots Greys 5-2
The 16th Lancers ,, 21st Lancers 2-1

SECOND ROUND

Royal Horse Guards beat 2nd Life Guards 4-2
16th Lancers ,, 5th Lancers 3-0
3rd Dragoon Guards ,, 19th Hussars 5-4
7th Hussars ,, 18th Hussars
7th Dragoon Guards a bye

THIRD ROUND

7th Dragoon Guards beat 16th Lancers 2-0

SEMI-FINAL

Royal Horse Guards v. 3rd Dragoon Guards, at Crewe. 7th Dragoon Guards v. 7th Hussars, in London.

The 3rd Dragoon Guards are the holders, and have won the Cup the last two years. Both they and the 16th Lancers are also through two rounds of the Army Association Cup.

Surgeon-Major Basil Pares, Royal Horse Guards, is the Hon. Secretary of the Cavalry Association Football.



Army Football Association.—The entries for the Army Cup number eighty-one, two in excess of last year. The Hon. Secretary is Captain E. G. Curtis, Ludgershall, Andover. In the preliminary ties in Ireland the 1st East Lancashire Regiment beat the 19th Hussars, and the 3rd Dragoon Guards beat the 4th Royal Fusiliers; at Aldershot the 16th Lancers beat the Royal Engineers and also the 2nd Battalion South Wales Borderers; in the Scottish District the Royal Scots Greys defeated the 2nd Seaforth Highlanders. The ties in the third round will be completed by January 19, 1907.

THE ARMY CUP

At a meeting of officers at the Inns of Court Hotel, a scheme was drafted for the institution of an Army Rugby Union Cup competition. Play will be started as soon as possible. The competition will be under the direct control of a committee of officers from the various regiments, but the assistance of the English Rugby Union will be available when necessary.

The annual Rugby match between the Royal Military College and Royal Military Academy took place at Camberley, and ended in a win for the College by 2 goals and 2 tries to nothing.

Football maintains its popular supremacy as one of the greatest of our national games. The chief topic of interest has been the pronounced success of the South African football team, who, like the New Zealanders last year, may well be congratulated on the result of their tour. The latter only received one defeat, at the hand of Wales: the former, while defeating Wales in the presence of 50,000 spectators, met with two reverses—in their encounter with Scotland, and in their last match against Cardiff, both games being played on grounds little better than a quagmire. One of the most exciting matches was the drawn game with England at the Crystal Palace, but the conditions were most unfavourable from the Colonials' point of view.

It shows what good teams can do by combination with thorough training, and furnishes a lesson to the nation.

BOXING.

The 18th Hussars gave an excellent tournament in November at York. About 1,500 spectators were present and the bouts were good. Captain Bryce Wilson, 5th Lancers, acted as referee, and Captain Cape, 18th Hussars, was timekeeper. The judges were R.Q.M.S. Parsons, 18th Hussars, and Colour-Sergt.-Major Bick, A.S.C. S.S.M. Mordaunt, 18th Hussars, performed the duties of M.C. The chief event was an eight-round contest between 1st Class P.O. Jeffrey, H.M.S. 'Revenge,' and Shoeing-Smith Randall, 18th Hussars; all the eight rounds were fought out—it was a great combat to the finish, when the sailor won on points. The 9st. 6lb. Championship of York was keenly contested by Tim Calpin (the holder) and Private Hassard, 18th Hussars; at the end of six hard-fought rounds, the holder was returned the winner. Several other good contests were fought.



The 21st Lancers also held a successful meeting of their Boxing Club at Aldershot in November. The most interesting event was a ten-round contest between Seaman 'Curley' Watson, middle-weight champion of the Army and Navy, and Private Warner of the 3rd Dragoon Guards. It was a splendid fight fought to the finish, the verdict going to Watson amidst the greatest enthusiasm. Major-General Scobell patronised the proceedings, and Lieut.-Colonel P. C. Kenna, V.C., D.S.O., distributed the prizes.

'Tiger' Smith, late 10th Hussars, has been further distinguishing himself at the National Sporting Club, and is a distinct loss to Army boxing.

On Wednesday, November 28, 1906, the 19th Hussars held another of their popular boxing tournaments in their Riding School at the Curragh.

General Rimington, C.B., and a large number of officers of the garrison were present, besides a large number of N.C.O.s and men from every unit at the Curragh, Newbridge, and Kildare. Accommodation had been provided for about 1,500, and seats were well filled.

A six-round contest between Corporal Edwards (19th Hussars) and Private Ruddick (11th Hussars) produced a very even fight, the former being declared the winner.

Driver Brown (R.F.A.) beat Driver Welsh (R.F.A.) in an eight-round contest. Hard hitting on both sides was the feature of this fight.

Trumpeter Buckingham (19th Hussars) met Private Savage (3rd Dragoon Guards) in a six-round contest. Both men showed capital form. Buckingham just won on points.

In the final of the Novices', Driver Harrison (R.F.A.), who had displayed good form all through, again knocked his man out in the second round, and thus won the competition.

The popular event of the evening was a ten-round contest between Private Berry (11th Hussars) (Feather-Weight Champion Army and Navy 1904-5) and Seaman McDonald (Royal Navy) (Feather-Weight Champion Army and Navy 1906). This was a fine fight all through. Berry had the advantage of McDonald in weight, which told a good deal in the last two rounds, and Berry was declared the winner. Both men received a great ovation.

INTERNATIONAL HORSE SHOW

This event, which takes place next June or July at Brussels, is in reality the great Inter-Cavalry Competition described in our Journal last July; and is open to any Cavalry officers who fancy themselves at long-distance riding and horse-mastership.

RADIOL

For the past year we have heard of wonderful cures of lameness in horses from strains, bruises, swellings, &c., by the use of a new chemical liquid called 'Radiol.' It certainly has remarkable properties, and is now being put on the market and can be obtained from all chemists.

J. W. YARDLEY, Lieut.-Colonet.





Charge of the 5th (Royal Irish) Lancers at Elandslaagte, October 21, 1899.

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Tale offer

Cordial Greetings to our Readers on

St. George's Day

(The Patron Saint of Cavalry)
23rd April, 1907

The Staff

The "Cavalry Journal"

Royal United Service Institution London, S.W.

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MODERN I.

By Major

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VOL. II.—N

THE

CAVALRY JOURNAL

APRIL 1907

MODERN DISCIPLINE AND HOW TO GET IT

By Major-General R. S. S. Baden-Powell, C.B.

Discipline is all-important for efficiency in War, but to meet modern developments in a voluntary, and to large extent Volunteer, Army, the old hard-and-fast regimen is out of date and has been very much dropped.

Some form of discipline is needed in its place. A systematic method of instruction is suggested in a discipline founded on patriotism and self-sacrifice. Some ideas to assist officers in carrying this out are here offered.

THE VITAL NECESSITY FOR DISCIPLINE

EVERY Briton who has played football or polo, or any collective game of the kind, knows the value of discipline in games. A team where any individual plays for himself is bound to be beaten—no matter how good its individual players may be—if it meets another which, even though composed of mediocre players, is ruled by discipline.

And this principle extends to other and greater pursuits than mere games—it is equally true in political or commercial organisations, and, more especially, in the great game of War. In fighting, discipline is half the battle—and history shows us that the harder the fight the more emphatically this fact is brought out.

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France has lately had warnings as to the vital necessity for discipline in her Army if she hopes to hold her own against defeat in war at the hands of a better-disciplined foe.

In reading these warnings it is profitable to read them as if directed at ourselves, and to see where they hit us with our voluntary Army, and where lies the remedy.

General de Négrier, writing in the 'Revue des Deux Mondes' on the subject of reservists, points out the necessity for moral in any army, in agreement with the opinion of Napoleon, as well as of many other authorities, that 'the moral is the strongest factor in war.' And by moral they do not mean what we are lazily inclined to translate as 'moral effect' on your enemy, but the effect on one's own men of a combination of discipline, patriotism, and courage, which goes to make them invincible in battle, and efficient in spite of the fatigues of a campaign. Without this factor all your peace-training, all your equipment, all your numbers, and all your talk are of very little avail.

And such *moral* is practically absent with troops only partially trained when they meet a trained enemy in the field.

'The pretension,' he writes, 'that troops can be improvised has already brought about the ruin of many nations; this error may lead ours to its destruction. The greater number of those who know nothing of war except by study, not unfrequently believe that if the country can produce citizens well trained, well armed and determined to fight, efficient regiments can be formed at the moment of need. There could not be a greater mistake. If without moral such a force will lamentably fail at the first moments of trial. Quite recently even, have we seen this occur. In 1895 the 200th Regiment was formed for the Madagascar Expedition; it was composed of trained and hardy Volunteers, but without moral . . . and some weeks after landing it had perished. . . .

'The moral of troops depends on their determination to win at all costs, upon their confidence in themselves and their leaders. It depends also upon their physical condition. The determina-

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tion to conquer is produced by patriotism and is the result of long moral education. . . . By this education alone can confidence be improvised.'

General de Négrier prefers a young soldier to an old one, because the old one has not the vigour, while he is more of a critic, and hard work comes as a greater strain on his moral. 'This last point is very important, because fatigue tends to lower the moral of troops to an extent that officers who have never made a campaign scarcely suspect. Great fatigue acts disastrously on the moral force. The human organism is most strained by work when it is already tired out. The muscles are then compelled, in order to perform the new work, to make a call upon their reserve of force, and the nervous system in these conditions must play an active part. Then the muscular force, rapidly weakening, causing internal sensation of fatigue, the diminution of excitability brings with it lassitude, and the collapse of moral follows.'

In other words, the men get 'fed up,' as it was called in South Africa, and discipline goes to pieces when most it is wanted.

Manœuvres do not give half the fatigue of actual service, but even there at times men give out or complain.

'Further,' says de Négrier, 'it must not be lost sight of that night operations will become very frequent. To carry out these successfully great cohesion and very high moral are necessary.'

Then in case of danger the instinct of self-preservation urges the individual to flight, and if a few individuals start this in a crowd which is lacking in *moral*, panic becomes general in a moment.

Similarly Captain Driant, after a personal experience of the German methods of training for war, warns his country in his book, 'Vers un nouveau Sedan,' of the wide difference that exists between the French so-called 'tactful' administration of discipline in an army without a head, and the iron discipline and carefully trained patriotism of an organisation regulated under the hand and eye of the Emperor himself in Germany. He

states that he was present lately when M. Jaurès said, in speaking of the possibility of war between France and Germany, that, 'if the French Army were repulsed at first, William II. would still find behind it the French people, who would rise like the Volunteers of 1792.' This remark was received with enthusiastic applause.

Captain Driant could scarcely contain himself, and when his turn came to speak, he said, 'No, M. Jaurès, the militia of your dream will stop nothing; the German Army, which I have just seen, will walk over your Volunteer levy as an engine runs over sheep which have strayed upon the railway. 1792 was long ago. The enthusiasm of that time, even if it existed to-day, which is very doubtful, would no longer paralyse an attack; it is not by raising your hats on your bayonets and shouting that the Volunteers of 1907 will stop an invasion.'

'MORAL' IN GREAT BRITAIN

If such warnings are necessary for France, with her numerous army under obligatory discipline, how much more so are they to us, with our voluntary Army composed of men who have never been taught discipline or patriotism even at school, and one which is so minute that in war a large portion of it will be completed by Volunteers and Reservists, who at present have, comparatively speaking, no real discipline at all? And yet on discipline, in combination with patriotism and courage, hangs our whole chance of success in war.

We must look things squarely in the face and see them as they are, and not deceive ourselves into thinking that we already have these qualities without working for them.

Patriotism and courage are something more than the mere spirit of adventure natural to any young man, which is, after all, the incentive that attracts very many of our Volunteers to take the field when war is on hand—and which without discipline is practically of no use against a trained enemy.



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None of the qualities which go to make moral are necessarily born in a man, but they can without a doubt be developed in him by training and practice.

Patriotism and its accompanying sacrifice of self for country are taught, and taught to some purpose, in the homes and in the schools in Japan and in Germany.

Courage, fortitude, and endurance, in the same way, are generally the result of good instruction, as Vegetius taught long ago when he wrote in 'De Re Militari,' 'Few men are born brave; but many become so through care and force of discipline.'

As regards discipline, it is difficult for the civilian mind fully to grasp the absolute necessity for this virtue, and therefore it is not fully enforced in our schools. And yet, apart from its military value, it is a valuable factor in the civil life of the community, whatever may be its form of government. As stated in the *Times* of December 12 last, even in the most confirmed democracy discipline is an essential feature. 'Democracy presupposes a strong compelling respect for law. However democratic a people may be, if its schools are to prepare for democratic life they can no more be democratised in their government than a man-of-war.'

But little is done as yet in the practical teaching of discipline, patriotism, and fortitude in our schools.

These qualities, as I have suggested, are, nevertheless, essential to the success of an army in the field, even to a greater extent than the training in the use of arms or in manœuvre. They should, therefore, be seriously taught in our Army, by the officers.

How to Inculcate 'Moral'

1. In the first place, a great deal rests with the officer's own personal qualities.

The men will willingly obey an officer whom they know to be thoroughly qualified and superior to themselves in every kind of detail connected with his duties in war.

Once they have this confidence in him the wildest spirits



recognise that their main chance of safety and success lies in carrying out his orders to the letter.

One recognised this fact in the Boer war, when the troopers of certain oversea Colonial Corps, being officered by men no better than themselves as tacticians and merely selected because they had friends or relations in the Government, desired to be relieved of such leaders and to have instead Imperial officers trained to the business; and they did right well under them.

The same feeling exists in all our Forces—whether Regular or Reserve—since they are nowadays composed of a more intelligent class of men than formerly.

It therefore behoves an officer or N.C.O. in the first place to perfect HIMSELF in his work, so that his men (who are quick to see) may have full confidence in his ability to direct them in war; they will then obey, if only for self-interest.

- 2. Then officers must show an example of discipline themselves in all things, and particularly in the abstention from criticism of their seniors, which becomes too common in some clubs and messes, with the result that the same carping spirit soon permeates the N.C.O.s and men, to the detriment of discipline and mutual confidence. All, even the highest, have to subordinate their personal opinions in upholding the principles which, based on collective impersonal opinions, are laid down for the guidance of all.
- 3. Then the men must be instructed by their officers in the qualities which make for a high moral; nor can this instruction begin too early in the soldier's career.

We British officers, as a rule, are shy of showing enthusiasm, even though we may feel it deep below the surface. But is this right where the education of our men is concerned? We must give them their line and show an example.

They come to us as boys, with minds receptive for romance or any influence that we may choose to sow in them, and ready to develop such seeds to full fruit if encouraged by a genuine interest in them.

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In the first place, we ought not to let them sneak into His Majesty's Service merely with a sort of feeling that it is one step better than going into the workhouse; but we should make each individual recruit realise at once that he has made a big move in entering the great brotherhood of soldiers.

See with what solemnity recruits are sworn in on the colours of their regiments in Germany, with the Emperor himself present at this, the great ceremony of their lives! And how in France the regiment has its Salle d'honneur, or museum of war relics and memorials, open to every soldier and his friends to see; where the recruit is taught under the very trophies themselves of the prowess of his predecessors—the makers of that renown of the regiment which it will now be his duty to maintain. Contrast this with the present mean entry of a recruit into a British regiment.

And yet our regiments have histories not less glorious, not less inspiring, than those abroad. The history of our Army is written in the history of its regiments. But we bottle it up in books, and the men only hear occasional driblets of it, doled out incidentally, instead of being baptized and soaked in its glamour from the very first.

That fine old English horse-soldier, Captain John Smith (circa 1600–1630), wrote what might well serve as a text to our instructors to-day: 'Let us so imitate the virtues of our predecessors that we may worthily be their successors.'

Cavalrymen would not do badly if they merely took him as their 'predecessor for imitation' in his virtues of undaunted loyalty, courage, and resourcefulness, and of cheery devotion to duty. (See his life in 'Men of Action' series).

Our recruits do not come to us, as elsewhere, already grounded in discipline and in the pride of country and race. All this has still to be put into them. They are fallow ground for the officer to plough into and cultivate—and the soil is not hard or stony; on the contrary, our present class of decent, fairly intelligent recruit is fully responsive to such teaching. This, indeed, is

evident from the fact that, even without it, they manage to pick up for themselves a very fair idea of military spirit and discipline.

The fault is that this education is so often left to them to carry out for themselves and is not systematically done for them. In those regiments where moral discipline is taught, through the regimental traditions, the effect is very evident: such an outbreak as that at Portsmouth would here be laughably impossible, and the men could be relied on to 'stick it out' in the tightest place on service without fear of white flags being hoisted or even thought of.

COURAGE

The points, then, to be inculcated in the men to give them moral are Courage, Patriotism, and Discipline.

Courage is not universally born in men, but has to a large extent to be cultivated—and can be made.

There is a lack of sensibility among men of low intelligence which often passes for courage; such, no doubt, carried us successfully through many a hard-fought fight in the old days, as at Badajoz, when, after the order to retire had been given, the rank and file still insisted on storming the breach, by which at length they gained the place, though with appalling losses. But with our more sensitive man of the present day a higher training in courage is required, like the Bushido of the Japanese.

Helps, in writing on courage, says: 'The heroic example of other days is in great part the source of courage in each generation, and men walk up composedly to the most perilous enterprises, beckoned onwards by the shadow of the braves that were.'

Plenty of accounts of such enterprises exist in every military library to quote as incentives.

This, then, is a step towards instilling courage in your men; also the practice of risky feats or of missions supposed to be extremely dangerous, such as scouting a hostile camp at night, &c.

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The successful accomplishment of these will do much to develop that self-confidence which eventually becomes courage.

You must teach them that we prepare for war with only one idea—viz. that we are going to kill or be killed in the attempt. War only gives victory or defeat; if we don't push forward to victory we shall be trodden down in defeat. Teach your men the old Zulu war-cry—'If we go forward we die, if we go backward we die—Let us go forward and die.'

As in many other details, show that you expect courageous conduct of your men, and you will get it.

One wants to develop not mere knowledge in the men, but the will to be good soldiers.

PATRIOTISM

The men must be taught that the loss of comfort, the endurance of hardship, unfair treatment and suffering, up to the laying down of life itself, are but details of the self-sacrifice which is expected of soldiers for the good of their country, whether in peace or war.

If they are taught to think this over for themselves beforehand, there is no hesitation about their accepting the position when the crisis comes.

Patriotism, pride of race, and loyalty to their officers can be instilled into the men by teaching them the history of the past, illustrated and confirmed in practice—as it has been, for instance, by the recent exploits of the Japanese in Manchuria.

Teach them of the greatness of our Empire and its various Colonies.* How it was won for the flag by our predecessors; how dangers now threaten their handiwork; and how it is for us

* Great helps to such instruction are: The penny leaslets published by the Empire Day Association, 83 Lancaster Gate, London, W.

Lectures and lantern slides by the League of the Empire, Caxton Hall, Westminster, London, S.W.

Deeds that Won the Empire, by Fitchett.

The Union Jack and How it was Made (1d.), by F. Wintour, 20 St. Dunstan's Road, West Kensington, London.

Map of the British Empire published by the Navy League.



to make ourselves efficient for its protection against its many enemies, within as well as without.

Let the recruit feel, early in his career, that he has really taken a responsible position as one of the protectors of his country. Put his training on a high plane and he will rise to it.

Our instruction needs flavouring with the salt of human feeling. Give him, as soon as possible, a feeling of pride in himself and his corps by showing him off in all the glory of the scarlet and brass. This is too often deferred, by crushing and dreary routine, till the heart has grown sick beneath its shabby covering of khaki.

DISCIPLINE

With patriotism and courage thus inculcated, a groundwork is automatically formed for the establishment of the better form of discipline.

Discipline should spring naturally from a loyal spirit in the man rather than artificially from a repressive spirit in the officer.

At present we have neither the artificial nor the natural form to the full extent that is necessary. We have no longer the iron discipline of Cromwell or of Crauford's Light Division in the Peninsula; that is, repressive discipline with stern punishment for every slip, which, no matter how slight, was at once termed a 'crime.' That system no doubt suited the times and the more animal class of man then in the ranks, but nowadays we find it to be out of date.

We are dealing with a man who volunteers for enlistment, and is better educated and of greater sensibility and independence; and in training him for modern fighting we develop his individuality. Thus a revised form of discipline has become necessary.

This has resulted in the use of 'tact' in dealing with offences. This seems a weak medium course, which neither hits off the Japanese energetic patriotism nor the iron discipline of the German Army, and it does not stand the strain of service.

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What is wanted is rather that the man, having entire confidence in his officer, should cheerfully and habitually subordinate himself to his orders for the good of the whole Service.

As the above-quoted writer to the Times says:

'Law should not be enforced automatically because it is law, and without any understanding on the part of the automaton of the motive which underlies all law and regulation. On the contrary, the youngest children can be made to understand that the law is not an end to itself but the means to an end. Boys can understand. Boys are at any rate reasonable.'

And so are soldiers.

And any officer who has commanded Colonial Volunteer troops can testify how these free and independent spirits become amenable to the strictest discipline directly it is explained and they see the reason for it—viz. that discipline is a means to a great end, and not the end itself.

Nor is it the 'slavery' which agitators would like man to believe. On the contrary, it is a high form of patriotism when a man subordinates himself entirely to the will of his officer, knowing that this is the only way by which his country can achieve success. It is but a game of football on a larger scale, where each player has to play strictly in his place and strictly according to rule; otherwise, without discipline, the whole side must inevitably be defeated.

The Army has aptly been compared with a body in which the General Staff is the brains, the Officers the blood, the N.C.O.s the bones, and the Rank and File the muscle and sinew.

The Japanese are an example of the free and natural growth of discipline with the best results; while the Germans have to cultivate a rather more artificial, but nevertheless very successful, development of it. It will not do for us to be behindhand in this, as we are at present.

Every officer commanding a unit should ask himself to what extent his men are instructed in *moral* for the strain of service, not for mere good behaviour in barracks; and let him set

matters right among his own men at least by taking up this interesting branch of their education to the same extent that he does the others.

SUMMARY

To sum up.

Moral, which is a combination of patriotism, courage, and discipline, is the most important of all qualities to ensure success in war. Without it the best training in the details of soldiering becomes comparatively useless on service.

Its virtues do not come naturally to every man, but can be developed by careful instruction.

The old hard-and-fast form of discipline as it stood has been generally found to be out of date with the more individually independent and intelligent soldier of to-day; but the higher form of discipline which should take its place is not yet generally taught. The men are too often left to pick up *moral* for themselves.

There is great danger in this of the men falling between two stools and getting no discipline of either kind.

Our present recruits as a class are receptive and ripe for sound teaching.

Moreover a considerable proportion of our force for war is composed of Volunteer Auxiliaries, who have so far very little training at all in moral; and yet moral is the hinge on which the whole gate of efficiency hangs.

Therefore some system of instruction in *moral* seems eminently necessary, and these suggestions are offered to officers to help them in taking up more generally and systematically this much-neglected yet all-important branch of training.

SAINT GEORGE, THE PATRON SAINT OF ENGLAND AND OF CHIVALRY

By Major H. G. Purdon, late Loyal North Lancashire Regiment.

EVER since the Crusades St. George has been considered the Patron Saint of England, and in all countries recognised as the Patron Saint of Cavalry, since he was a soldier of the equestrian order, and during his miraculous appearances, when fighting in aid of the Crusader hosts, he is described as being mounted on a white horse, leading celestial squadrons, and clad in shining armour.

The story of St. George is simple. He was born in Cappadocia, of noble parentage, in 803 A.D. His father was a Christian, although a subject of the heathen Emperor Diocletian, in whose service he was often employed, being a soldier by profession. His only son St. George also became a soldier when seventeen years of age, and soon gained a renown as stainless as his honour. Of course his chief adventure, according to the legend, was the combat with the fire-breathing Dragon, when he saved the life of Cleolinda, the beautiful daughter of the King of Selem, on whom the lot had fallen that day to go forth outside the city gates, towards the marsh where the monster waited for his daily meal. It is unnecessary to describe the combat, but in the end the Dragon was brought into the city with St. George's lance through his throat, and there beheaded by the Saint in the market place. Some time after this feat of gallantry St. George returned to his native city, and there found that the

Emperor had issued a proclamation against the Christians, which was posted up in the public places. This St. George tore down and trampled under foot. On this becoming known he was seized by the guards and brought before the proconsul, who had him tortured and put to death.

The first miraculous appearance of St. George seems to have been at the celebrated battle of Dorylæum,* where the Crusaders won the great victory over the Saracens, in Northern Asia Minor, on July 1, 1097. Here, it is stated, 70,000 Crusader horsemen, clad more or less in mail, and containing the best chivalry of Europe, defeated 250,000 Saracens (who fought mounted) commanded by the Sultan, Kilidge-Arslan (the Sword of the Lion). The four great divisions of the Crusaders had assembled some months earlier in Asia Minor, and after capturing the city of Nice, started on their march for Antioch. For some reason they divided their host into two parts; the leading portion, under Bohemond, Robert of Normandy and others, came into collision with the Saracen army on July 1, and soon the battle became general. But, in spite of the most heroic deeds, numbers prevailed, and the Christians were in sore plight when the other portion of their army came to their aid; victory was at length secured, and it is interesting to note that, in feats of arms, none that day surpassed our own Prince Robert of Normandy, son of the Conqueror. Michaud, in his celebrated history of the Crusades, gives a good account of this battle, and he tells us that after the victory the Christian army invoked the names of St. George and St. Demetrius, who had been seen, as they said, fighting in the ranks of the Christians. The old chronicler Raymond of Agiles says: 'A wonderful miracle is reported to have taken place, for it is said two knights of wonderful appearance, and clad in shining armour, went before

[•] In the preface of his work, Gustavus Adolphus, Lieut.-Colonel Dodge, United States Army, quotes a distinguished professor of history, Samuel Willard, LL.D., who, speaking of the battle of Dorylæum, goes so far as to call it 'the greatest of all cavalry battles—greatest that ever was, or ever will be.'





St. George.

FROM A 14th-CENTURY STATUETTE.

By kind permission of Major V. A. Farquhaeson.



"for the faith."

A KNIGHT OF THE 14th CENTURY.

From a Statuette by Captain Adrian Jones.

our army and pressed the enemy in such wise as to leave them no chance of fighting.'

At the great battle of Antioch, in June 1098, when the Christian host was hard pressed, Michaud states: 'At this moment, say the historians, a squadron was seen to descend from the summit of the mountains, preceded by three horsemen clothed in white, and covered in shining armour. "Behold," cried Bishop Adhémar, "the heavenly succour which was promised to you. Heaven declares for the Christians; the holy martyrs, George, Demetrius and Theodore, come to fight for you."

Another historian says: 'There came out of the mountains innumerable armies on white horses, and bearing white harness,' and goes on to say, 'these things are worthy of belief for many of our men beheld them.' Again, at the siege of Jerusalem, when the assault on the south side had failed, and the Christians were discouraged, the historian Michaud says: 'All at once the Crusaders saw a knight appear upon the Mount of Olives, waving his buckler, and giving the Christian army the signal for entering the city. Godfray and Raymond, who perceived him first and at the same time, cried out aloud that St. George was come to the help of the Christians.' And the assailants, taking new courage, after a terrible storm, entered the city, where they put 70,000 to the sword. It appears the Saracens also believed that St. George fought for the Christians, as in a battle fought in Galilee, in 1187, where a small army of Crusaders was annihilated, a Knight of the Temple, mounted on a white horse, performed such incredible prodigies of valour that when he fell the Turks thought they had slain St. George, and approached the body with signs of respect, sharing the remnants of his clothing and the fragments of his arms.

At the celebrated battle of Arsur, between Richard I. and Saladin, in 1191, when the former was trying to restrain the impetuous Knights Hospitallers from charging prematurely, one knight in despair invoked the great warrior saint of the

Crusaders, who perhaps from this period tended to become the patron saint of England, "Oh, St. George! Why dost thou leave us to be destroyed? Christendom perisheth because we strive not against the accursed race." *

On how many fields since then has the battle cry been heard, 'For St. George and Merrie England'? Our archers of famous memory wore his cross on their linen doublets, as did the Knights Templer in the Crusades; and, as all know, England is represented by it on the Union Jack. The St. George Orders of Knighthood are held in high esteem. Our Order of the Garter is an Order of St. George, and the pendant of the collar is a representation of the Saint and the Dragon. It was founded by King Edward III. in 1347 A.D., when St. George was proclaimed 'The Patron Saint of England.' The Order of St. Michael and St. George is another distinguished emblem of honour. The Russian Order of St. George is highly prized, and the Bavarian Order of the same name dates from the twelfth century.

In addition to the foregoing narrative there are very many other legends and traditions, and more than one person seems to have posed in history as the true Saint.

One accepted account says of him that he was of Greek origin, born at Lydda, in the valley of Sharon (celebrated for its roses), on April 23, A.D. 270. He held high military command under the Roman Emperor Diocletian, during whose reign he died, a Christian martyr, at Nicomedia on April 23, 303, and was buried at the place of his birth, Lydda.

Another account, given by Rev. Thomas Salmon, 1704, and followed by the historian Gibbon, shows him to have been born in Cappadocia and made Arian Bishop of Alexandria by Constantine. But for his destruction of an idolatrous temple he was murdered by a mob of heathen and his body burnt.

[•] Quotation from The Crusades, by T. A. Archer and C. L. Kingsford.

Pope Zachary afterwards built a church in his honour in Rome and placed in it the head of the Saint.

Salmon of this writes: 'Strange and miraculous that the body which was burnt entire, and had its ashes scatter'd in the air, should have its head restored. Surely such a man sitting in the temple of God shows himself that he is God by restoring the principal part of a body, after the dissolution of 400 years, to its former consistency.'

Another accredited St. George, and one who had some connection with England, was Bishop George, of Ostia, who came here as Pope Adrian's envoy, in 786, to revive Christianity in England. He landed at Cealtide, in West Mercia—probably Bristol—in the reign of Britbrick, King of the West Saxons. He had a conference with the leading divines of the country, and pointed out the many errors prevalent and the reformations needed in the conduct of religion.

Among other faults he rebuked was that which to some extent still exists—namely, 'improving' horses. He said: 'After a vile manner ye maim your horses: ye slit their noses; ye couple their ears so that ye make them deaf; you might have them without blemish, but you choose rather to make them despicable to all people.'

'There are also among you many that eat horses, which none of the Christians in the East do. Avoid this also. Endeavour to do things that are honourable and according to the will of God.'

From the fact that this Bishop overcame the dragon of heathenism near the Severn, or Sabrina, may have originated the legend that as a knight he rescued the fair Sabra from the dragon; or another view of the allegory is that the fair virgin was the Church of Christ in England, which he gallantly rescued from being overpowered by the dragon of unbelief and heathenism.

In spite of conflicting stories, however, the general character of the Saint stands out as an ideal of the Cavalry spirit of all

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ages, and typical of the chivalrous knight determined to tackle with his good horse and sword any difficulty, no matter how ugly or dangerous, in the fair cause of the right.

The first monument erected to St. George in this country was the Chapel in Oxford Castle in 1071 A.D.

His banner was the Red Cross on a white ground, and the Rose was his flower.

From this origin the rose became the emblem of England in heraldry, and roses are therefore worn by all good Englishmen on St. George's Day, April 28.



One of several reputed tombs of St. George, being a bare stone slab inside a cage. On it lies a picture of the Saint, with a lamp always burning. The oil from this is alleged to be a sure preventive against sickness.

Sent by Colonel HERBERT, Inniskilling Dragoons.

INDIVIDUAL INITIATIVE

By LIEUT. D. OSMUND-WILLIAMS, 19th Hussars

A plea for the better development of the individuality of the Cavalry soldier, by giving him, while yet a recruit, some of the exercises in that line which are at present reserved for trained soldiers.

THERE is nothing that better displays the hall mark of a Cavalry soldier than the power of grasping the situation on the instant. Cavalry is the 'arm of opportunity.' Quickness of thought, prompt action, and readiness to act on one's own initiative are, therefore, essentials to all ranks of the mounted branch.

It is the purpose of this paper to show that, in this particular direction, the present training, though a great advance on that which existed before the war in South Africa, might profitably be still further developed.

Those who have had charge of scouts must have had their eyes opened to the great advantages which would follow an extension of the system thus introduced.

At the present time, owing to the number of scouts being necessarily limited, only a very few men out of each regiment are able to benefit by this training. The work these men have carried out, even during their first year, affords sufficient evidence to show what this training can do, not only in promoting the efficiency of scouting generally, but also in encouraging independent action and, what is most important, self-reliance.

When the order regarding the composition of scouts was first issued the men had to be chosen more or less at random, and, except that they were fair shots and able to read and write, those selected were no more fitted for the position of scouts than a great many others.

Within a short time, however, their progress was apparent, and at the present time (I speak of three regiments at least)

these men, besides being able to use their own initiative when necessary, are competent to carry out any work connected with reconnaissance that can be expected of the Cavalry private.

This all points to the fact that the majority of men in any Cavalry regiment can, with sufficient training, become just as efficient as the present regimental scout.

Those who spend their soldiering continually in contact with the man in the ranks will understand the enormous advantage of having men behind them whom they can trust; that is to say, men whom they can send out on special work and men who, though perhaps only holding the most general instructions, will do what is expected of them.

Unfortunately, not every man is of this stamp. The reason, however, is not far to seek. The man, at any rate, is not to blame. From the moment he enlists and commences his recruit's course he learns only to look to his instructor. Never once is he given the chance of showing what he can do for himself. Even when he takes his place in his squadron, things are much the same. On almost every duty there is either an officer or N.C.O. to whom he looks for orders or advice.

It may be argued, on the other hand, that he gets every encouragement, both during squadron training and manœuvres, to use his common-sense and initiative. Even so the case remains unaltered. He has been in the habit of waiting to be told. From the very beginning he has been brought up on these lines. Habit is everything. As in all cases, there are of course exceptions, but those who know the average private will understand how difficult it is to get him away from a groove he is used to. Troop drill, squadron training, bookwork or lectures, can never alter that feeling of 'I must ask before I act.'

Experience is the best of all training, and mistakes the best teacher. Let the men be put by themselves, with no one to appeal to, where they are compelled to work out everything without being able to ask for advice, and where, by each mistake, they are able to realise what ought to have been done. Then,

and not till then, will it be possible to have men who, when occasion arises, are ready to strike out on their own responsibility without that fatal 'waiting for orders.'

Now, I am fully aware that at the outset I may be asked two questions: first, How is it possible to carry out this sort of training? secondly, If it is possible to do so, would it not be the sure undoing of discipline, drill, and cohesion, so essential to the working of the mass?

The latter can be answered with another question. Are the present scouts one whit less efficient at their troop or squadron work than those who have not been trained as such? As to discipline, does it in any way follow because a man is able to use his head he is unable to obey? On the contrary, he would carry out orders better, not worse.

With regard to the former, it is, of course, out of the question to imagine that each individual can be trained as a competent scout. Time alone would be a sufficient obstacle. Nevertheless, there are certain parts of the present scout's training that present decided advantages in the training of the recruit. For example, the scheme carried out by the scouts of the 3rd Cavalry Brigade in June last year gives an excellent idea of the sort of work alluded to, though, of course, on a far larger and more advanced scale.

The rough idea of this scheme was as follows. An insurrection had broken out in three of the Northern Irish counties. Red, who were acting as part of the insurgent force, were sent some 300 miles south of the border to escort a cart containing treasure. This money had been collected from sympathisers in the south and had been hidden by the Red agents until a favourable opportunity arose for removing it. The Government forces (Blue) had heard of this movement, and were to do their utmost to prevent both escort and cart from returning to the north.

In the scheme Blue consisted of the scouts of two Cavalry regiments, together with some extra mounted men and intantry cyclists, amounting in all to a little over 100 strong. Red, the escort, consisted likewise of the scouts of two Cavalry regiments, about forty strong.

As may be readily imagined, the men showed exceptional keenness and interest throughout the exercise. The very fact of having something real to work for seemed to add considerable zest to the proceedings. One side had to win. There were no half measures. This alone appealed strongly to the combatants. The element of competition was invaluable.

Owing to the necessity of working on such a large scale (for both sides were practically in the dark regarding each other's movements) the majority of the men had to work solely on their own responsibility. In fact in one or two cases some of the men, except for some very general instructions given at the outset, never once received an order of any sort during the whole period of three weeks during which the exercise lasted. These men nevertheless always managed to keep the main idea in view and contributed very materially to the value of the work done.

Now if, after his ordinary course, and before he starts his squadron work, a graduated training on these lines could be given to the recruit, he would commence his soldiering not only capable of finding his way about a country and able to work on his own responsibility, but also with a fair idea of horse-master-ship, map-reading, reporting, and reconnaissance work generally.

Doubtless there are many who may argue that all these subjects belong to what may be called the higher grades of soldiering, and that it would be unwise to begin them until the pupil had thoroughly mastered his troop drill and other preliminaries which constitute the process of 'knocking into shape.'

Objectors should remember, however, that every man must now be able to read and write before enlistment. The abovementioned subjects would not, therefore, be beyond the average present-day recruit. Moreover, it is usually in the earlier stages that the young soldier's keenness is most pronounced. Later on the iron of humdrum is liable to enter into his soul, and he consequently becomes far less malleable and much harder to teach. Absolute reliance upon definite instructions has already become a habit, and such initiative as the individual may originally have had is so effectually smothered that it is very difficult to re-educate it.

Troop and squadron drill should come later. The men would then tackle their squadron work with intelligence and with some idea as to the why and wherefore of things done.

To obtain the best results the individual man must be trusted. The sense of responsibility will alone do more in encouraging the keenness of the average soldier, especially at the beginning of his service, than months of drill with others according to a cut and dried routine.

Against the proposal which I am venturing to advocate it will certainly be objected that it will involve too much time and too much expense.

With reference to the question of time, three to four months, in addition to the ordinary recruit's course, should be sufficient. Surely this could well be spared when it is considered that these few months, besides being the means of sending up the recruit to his squadron with some idea of how to act by himself and of detached work generally, would in all probability save double or even treble that time at some future date. It would also lend a pleasant element of variety to his early training, and thus stimulate instead of damping such keenness as he may possess.

Fixing this training at three or four months would enable two or more courses to be given annually. These could be carried out under the supervision either of the Regimental Scout Master or, if considered more expedient, a special Recruit's Officer. The regimental scouts would also be of great assistance, especially during the earlier part of the course, in taking out and helping those less experienced than themselves.

A report on each man would be handed in on the completion of the course. An accurate regimental register could thus be kept showing how each man shaped on joining his squadron. In the same way all those showing an aptitude for scouting would

be recommended for a further scout's course at a later date. All the doubts and difficulties which now exist in connection with the selection of men suitable for the work would by this means be set at rest.

In the matter of expense there should be little or no difficulty. For each day the men were to be away from barracks rations for both man and horse would be struck off, and ticket vouchers used instead. This would of course entail a slight increase of expenditure, but the excess would be so slight that, even if it could not be covered by the present Regimental Training Grant, a few pounds annually would be sufficient to meet all demands.

What was it that made the Boers, though absolutely untrained, so formidable an enemy? What was it that enabled them to carry on the war as they did? Whatever answers may be given to these questions, they must all be brought to the common denominator of the existence and encouragement of individual initiative.

The war in Manchuria affords another example of the superiority of properly organised 'Guerilla' methods over the principles of the old-fashioned 'wait for the word of command.'

General Ian Hamilton, comparing the Russians with the Japanese, writes: 'Least of all are they (the Russians) endowed with that independence of character and power of acting on their own individual initiative upon which modern war will henceforth make such high demands.'

If we are to learn profitable lessons from recent warfare we should take to heart and endeavour to put into practice the counsels of those best qualified to advise us. That there may be obstacles in the way of the proposals I have put forward an inexperienced subaltern cannot but be conscious. I hope, however, that, such as they are, they will not prove to be insurmountable, and that officers will be encouraged to educate their men in that quality of self-reliance which ought to characterise everyone who calls himself a Cavalry soldier.

THE HORSE'S MIND

By Major N. Birch, R.H.A., Commandant Riding Establishment, Woolwich

'Education' as distinct from mere 'breaking' now forms an important part of the troop-horse's training in the British Cavalry. This article points out the mental capacity of the horse, and how it can be developed with a view to attaining the standard laid down by regulations—viz. 'as active and clever as a hunter, as handy as a polo pony, and as quiet as a shooting pony.'

England has always been behind other European nations in some branches of the equestrian art, and in the past has rather despised foreigners for the time and trouble they bestowed on the higher education of the horse. General von Bernhardi says that 'Anglomaniacs and faddists still seek to exercise an influence the reverse of favourable in this respect.'

France and Italy, to quote only two countries, have long aimed at making the horse's training as perfect and as comprehensive as possible, and whether we approve of what some people call foreign circus tricks or not, no one can say that they make the animal less valuable as a hunter or a charger; in fact the reverse has been found to be the case. At Saumur a troop of highly trained trick horses is shown in the school and then over four miles of stiffish country, and this high standard of excellence can only have been attained by developing the mind as well as the muscles of the animal.

It is not within the scope of this article to discuss the comparative intellectual capacity of our domesticated animals, or to explain, as scientists do, that in the struggle for existence some races of wild animals develop higher mental powers than others, either in pursuit of their prey, or in evading the attacks of their

enemies. Before, however, condemning our horses as less intelligent than our dogs, we should remember that the former spend many hours out of the twenty-four tied up in front of a whitewashed wall, a state of affairs which is not conducive to the development of the brain.

Two sentences in the short preface of Count Eugenio Martinengo Cesaresco's recently published book, 'The Psychology and Training of the Horse,' read as follows:—'People who manage horses usually give little importance to the mind. But the mind is most important, as to command the machine we must first command the mind.' Frankly the book is disappointing, the above quotation being a fair specimen of the author's diction, which has, however, doubtless suffered in translation. The constant repetitions are tedious, but the standpoint is novel and the study painstaking, added to which, literature on the subject of educating the horse's mind is so rare that the book is worth reading on that account alone.

The author takes a low view of the horse's mental capacity; he writes:—'We have learnt the reason why the thunder is caused by the lightning, but the horse cannot attain this. stops at mere association. . . . and erroneously thinks that two things, however associated one is the cause of the other [sic] although it is not.' The calibre of a horse's mind, he says, must be carefully taken into account in administering both punishments and favours, and he quotes the following ancient fable as an instance of wrong association of a favour. A dog bit a man, and the man gave him bread in the hope that the dog would bite him no more. The result was that the dog went about biting people when he was hungry, because he had obtained bread by that means before. As an example of wrong association of punishment the Count tells us of a rider whose horse stopped 'because he ill-treated him in the mouth with his hands.' When the horse stood still he did not punish him, but did. so when the horse moved on again. The animal was thereby taught that 'to stand still was good and to go on was bad.'

The author insists on the training of the mind and body together, which is only possible with individual attention, and points out the danger of hurry; vicious horses are made, he says, by being asked to do certain things without preparatory instruction of a gradual nature; and he adds that many horses merely from seeing that they have once been able to have their own way may become 'intractable and no longer liable to control.' He is a great believer in 'caresses on the eyes and on the occiput,' the effect of which he has found to be magnetic.

Develop the mental qualities of a horse, he writes, and he will become more obedient. This is a point on which all authorities are not in agreement. Captain Hayes says that a high degree of mental (i.e. reasoning) power is not desirable in the animal, because it is apt to make him impatient of control by man,* but mentions the fact that the ancients considered a well-developed brain to be a good point in a horse, an opinion which the writer humbly shares; he has not yet found a hunter endowed with too much intelligence. Baucher, a renowned master of the equestrian art in the middle of the last century. wrote that a Cavalry officer must be able to communicate his thoughts to his charger. General Tweedie, in his exhaustive study of the Arab and his horse, tells us that the former talks to his mount as if he were a human being. It is therefore fair to assume that both Baucher and the Arab credit the horse with rather more than mere mechanical intelligence, and advocate its development.

It is surprising to find further on in Count Martinengo

• His arguments are not entirely convincing: see pages 146, 147, Points of a Horse.

In a previous work, Illustrated Horse Breaking, page 12, the following passage occurs:—

'I have been unable to trace any indication of reasoning power in the horse, whose highest displays of intelligence seem (to me at least) to be the outcome of a tentative or accidental experience. He, like many human beings, appears to lack the ability of acquiring new knowledge by drawing conclusions from that which he already possesses. If I am correct in this statement, association of ideas is therefore the only means by which we are able to teach him.'



Cesaresco's book that he does not advise teaching the horse to do things by word of mouth—in fact he believes it to be impossible. This statement every soldier will question—he knows how quickly horses learn words of command and trumpet calls. In India some years ago, so the story goes, a charger was winning a race, but when nearing the post 'halt' was sounded on the trumpet and he shut up. The astute owner of the second favourite had commissioned a trumpeter to be in readiness, and the ruse succeeded perfectly.

There is a horse at Woolwich now which, if turned loose in the riding-school, will walk, trot, canter, charge, and jump, when told to do so, without the aid of either whip or signal, besides coming to his owner when called. This was all taught by means of the long reins accompanied by the word of command, the reins being dispensed with as soon as the animal had learnt to associate the word with the movement. Every order is given in the same level tone of voice, which goes to disprove Mr. James Fillis's theory that a horse cannot understand the words of an order, but only the tone in which it is spoken. There was no picking and choosing about this horse's parents.

'PRINCESS TRIXIE'

A mare called Trixie, who performed at the Palace Theatre during the months of December and January, furnishes an example of perhaps the highest point of mental development ever reached by a member of the equine race. She can spell, add, subtract, multiply and divide; work a cash register, and pick out coloured rags at the call of the audience from a variegated heap on the stage.

Mr. Barnes, her owner and trainer, is interesting on the subject of her education, and is a firm believer in the intelligence of the horse. His mare, who is three parts Arab, was bred for brains, her dam, sire, and grand-dam having been famous trick performers. From the time Trixie was a filly of three weeks old

she was allowed to run in and out of her master's house in America like a dog, and was the constant companion and playmate of his children; in fact her early life ran along the same pleasant lines as that of her Arab ancestors. She is now twelve years old, and only completed her education two years ago.

Mr. Barnes first conceived the idea of teaching her to spell from his children. They had four alphabet letters printed on large blocks, and the filly learnt to pick up whichever was called for. Inspired by the kindergarten system, after ceaseless effort and unwearying patience, Mr. Barnes taught her to spell almost any word by syllables, showing that she really associates the sound of the word with the letters that form it. This is proved by her occasional lapses into very phonetic or Rooseveltian spelling.

She then learnt the result of every simple combination of multiplication, division, addition, and subtraction up to the numeral nine. Space does not admit of going fully into Mr. Barnes's method of instruction in arithmetic, but the writer was given to understand that it was briefly as follows. He would call out to the mare '8 minus 1, Two,' with emphasis on the last word, and would discontinue saying 'two' when Trixie had learnt to pick up that numeral every time he said '8 minus 1.' Eventually she committed all the combinations to memory.

Teaching the mare to distinguish between colours Mr. Barnes found easier than the foregoing. As soon as the initial difficulty of fixing her attention and of making her 'take notice' at all was overcome, he placed two coloured rags on the ground and taught the mare by voice, at first accompanied by sign, to pick out the one called for, rewarding or punishing her for success or failure. The number of colours was afterwards gradually increased, and Trixie can now indicate the colour of a tie or a lady's hat.

Count Martinengo Cesaresco admits that a horse can be taught to distinguish between red and white, but his method of instruction is rather drastic. He dresses one man in red and another in white, makes the red man beat the horse and the

white man caress him, and naively adds that the horse soon distinguishes the difference in colour.

Mr. Barnes claims for Trixie the brain of a child of six with all its limitations. She will only perform for him, and frequently requires admonition to keep her to business. She has learnt to remember that a deep sigh from her master at her stupidity is the calm before the storm. He never feeds the mare himself, and unless he drives her she is exercised by his groom, of whom she has no opinion whatever, as he is not allowed to correct her.

A committee of experts met in February last with the object of establishing or disposing of the mare's claim to responsive intelligence, her detractors asserting that her feats were performed by means of a trick. She had just recovered from a severe attack of pneumonia, and after tests lasting over an hour and a half she showed such fatigue that the committee released her, and endeavoured to come to a decision. Though a majority was in favour of crediting the mare with responsive intelligence, no understanding could be arrived at, as the remaining members of the committee were strongly adverse to this decision, and the inquiry was adjourned for further examination.

The writer believes in the genuineness of the mare's attainments; if the show were trick-work on the part of the owner, it would perhaps be more wonderful, but would hardly have stood the test of so many performances. Somebody was invariably on the stage with the avowed intention of detecting Mr. Barnes's methods, and no one appears to have done so. Whether Trixie is a freak or not is another question.

MIND TRAINING FOR CAVALRY HORSES

Of what practical use is a spelling horse to a Cavalryman? The answer is, None, but the performance illustrates that it must be possible to teach almost every horse to do many less difficult but more useful things at the word of command, although this should, for obvious reasons, only be a supplement to training the animal by a highly developed system of aids.

Most of the following 'tricks' have already been taught in the Army, but no soldier will deny the desirability of the horse being able to perform them by word of command alone if required.

- 1. Turning, stopping, increasing or decreasing pace. Useful in single combat when the bridle hand or either leg is injured, or when moving across country.
- 2. Lying down or standing still, especially when passed by galloping horses. It is worth mentioning that horses trained in this should be less liable to stampede in camp.
- 8. Coming to the rider when called and following him when he runs.
- 4. Returning to the regiment alone with a message hidden under the saddle; a loose horse is not considered worth a bullet. This last may be impossible, but would be well worth trying. The traveller between Bagdad and the Caspian used to strap his portmanteau across the back of a galloping posthorse, who immediately started off alone for the next station and delivered the baggage safely.

Some critics will say that under the nervous excitement of active service an elaborate education acquired in peace time will forsake the animal, and, further, that owing to casualties in horseflesh few riders will retain their original mounts for sufficient time to put the training into practice. Be this as it may, one asset will always remain: the man in teaching his mount will have learnt patience and self-control, and will have come to love and understand the horse as he never did before, all of which makes for efficiency.

There is an old Eastern saying: 'The horseman's grave is always open.' The higher education of the horse will do more than anything else to disprove the truth of this disheartening proverb.

CAVALRY EXPLOITS

GENERAL LAKE'S PURSUIT OF HOLKAR*

By Major G. F. MacMunn, D.S.O., R.F.A.

The Native Forces at the beginning of the last century—Intrigues of the Mahratta Chiefs—The Grand Army under General Lake—The Battles of Delhi and Laswarree—Holkar's rising and success—The events leading up to the pursuit.

PERHAPS one of the most important, and certainly the most vigorous, of British Cavalry campaigns on record is General Lake's pursuit of Holkar after the defence and relief of Delhi in 1804. Three regiments of H.M. Light Dragoons and three of Native Cavalry, under the personal leading of General Gerald Lake, then Commander-in-Chief in India, pursued that free-booting Mahratta and his celebrated horse day after day, covering 350 miles, of which the last stage was a twenty-one mile march, followed by a thirty-five mile night raid on Holkar's camp, and a further pursuit of twelve miles, making sixty-eight miles in twenty-six hours.

The episode is one worth remembering, not so much for the lessons to be learned as for the glory of the achievement, though the old lesson of 'push' stands out from it, as it stands out in every war since the world began.

MAHRATTA INTRIGUES

In the beginning of the last century, Lord Mornington, afterwards the Marquis Wellesley, known to history as the 'Great

* A detailed account of Lord Lake's campaigns, as well as the other operations of the Mahratta war, is contained in the *Memoirs of the War in India*, by Captain William Thorn, of the 25th Light Dragoons, published in 1818. It is largely from this account that this paper has been compiled.



Marquis, and to his staff as 'The Lord,' had been two years Governor-General of India. On his first landing he had found all India in arms around the British sphere, with large armies and immense artilleries, commanded and trained by foreign officers, of whom the larger number were French. On all sides it was felt that the British must be destroyed or they would destroy all other powers. The French as a government had been driven from India thirty years before, but from Bourbon and the Mauritius had constantly dribbled officers and arms to help the various

states. In 1798 Mysore, with its large French-trained army, had been conquered after the storm of Seringapatam and the death of Tippu, and the rightful Hindu dynasty restored.

The powerful confederacy of Mahratta chiefs, though always quarrelling, were preparing to make common cause against the common enemy. With them were all the numerous leaders of Afghan horse whom the decay of the Moghul Empire had loosed as free companies to live as they pleased on Hindustan. All the



Mahratta chiefs had armies on the European model, with Arab and Afghan corps as a nucleus. Mahdajee Rao Scindiah, the most powerful of them all, had carried the principle of a European army to an immense pitch. Under a Savoyard named De Boigne, an army of fifty regular battalions, with corresponding horse and large corps of artillery, had been created De Boigne had a regular European service, with standing orders, rules for promotion, fixed scales of pay, definite ranks, and a cadet service, in which often the Eurasian children of British officers obtained service. The French element preponderated

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and the drill of the troops was in French. The Doab, a tract of country between the Ganges and the Jumna as big as half a dozen English counties, was handed over to De Boigne, to administer and to support his troops from its revenues. At that time it was spoken of in India as the 'French Province.' Scindiah, too, had a large gun foundry at Agra, presided over by a stray Scotchman, one Sangster, who had equipped De Boigne's force with a well-found artillery.

It is interesting to note the tenacity with which the French held to their failing grip on India, which they did not finally loose till expeditions from India captured their possessions of Mauritius, Bourbon, and Rodrigues, at a time when their privateering could no longer be borne. Long after their actual influence had gone their tradition remained. The Gwalior army of Scindiah destroyed by Lord Gough at Maharajpore and Punniar in 1843, and even Runjeet Singh's army, were largely French-trained and drilled in French, while so late as 1900 the older officers in the Kashmir army could drill their men by French word of command, and that is close on 150 years after the destruction of the French Empire in the East.

It will be remembered how Napoleon Buonaparte had planned with the Tsar of Russia the invasion of India, and in pursuit of this chimera had occupied Egypt, while British missions to Lahore and Kabul were endeavouring to negotiate alliances to frustrate these schemes. The shadow of the Bear on the Indian frontier is no new thing.

In India, the Mahratta chiefs were all carrying on intrigues with the French, and notably Scindiah. De Boigne had left India in 1802, and was closeted with Napoleon on the subject of aiding the Mahrattas, while French cruisers and privateers hovered on the western coast of India.

So it came about that the Great Marquis, determining to save India, despite the Board of Directors, arranged to either checkmate the Mahrattas by subsidiary alliances, or else to crush them, while, to use Lord Kitchener's phrase regarding preparing for serious war, 'we have yet time.'

WAR WITH SCINDIAH AND THE FRENCH

After various attempts at negotiation, and after threatening moves of Mahratta troops, during which the Hyderabad Subsidiary Force (the Secunderabad Brigade of to-day) and a force under General Arthur Wellesley, the Viceroy's brother, had moved to the northern limits of Hyderabad territory, an open rupture occurred with Scindiah, and the Grand Army assembled at Allahabad under General Lake, the Commander-in-Chief.

The Grand Army was to seize the 'French Province' and destroy De Boigne's troops, now commanded by M. Perron. The western armies were to operate against Scindiah, cut the Mahrattas from the coast and from French supplies, and to compete with any other Mahratta chiefs who wanted to join in. Smaller British forces were to act from the coast itself.

In May 1803 General Wellesley entered Poona, and placed our ally the Peishwa on the throne, from which he had been Then followed the three celebrated victories of Sir Arthur Wellesley, the storming of Ahmednagar, the battles of Assaye and Argaum, followed by the capture of Asserghur and Gawilghur, for all of which there are clasps on the old medal given 'To the army of India.' In Hindustan, the Grand Army, which consisted of the 8th, 27th, and 29th Light Dragoons, five regiments of Native Cavalry, H.M.'s 76th Highlanders, and thirteen battalions of Native Infantry, marched north. The first success was the storming of the fortress of Allyghur, followed by the advance on Delhi, and the battle of Delhi, in which a large portion of the French Mahratta force under M. Louis Bourquien (successor to Perron, who had made terms with the British and resigned) were annihilated. By this victory the blind Moghul Emperor Shah Alum, a puppet in the hands of the French officers of Scindiah, was released, and pensioned with a nominal authority to live at Delhi, till the titular Moghul Empire disappeared for ever in the conflagration of the Mutiny.

The battle of Delhi is an interesting one, for the force was

just camping down, after the day's march, a few miles from Delhi, when the outposts were surprised by the advance of the whole Mahratta army. 'D—n those rascally Dragoons,' was the General's comment as he galloped to the front to steady the outposts and retrieve the fault of his patrols, while the Infantry fell in and went bald at the enemy. Several French officers, with their commander, surrendered after the fight. It was after this that the General (after lunch) is said to have kissed, in full durbar, the Begum Somru, widow of Walter Reinhard, nicknamed Sombre, or Somru, as she came to pay her respects to the English, for the sake of her dead English lover, George Thomas, the free lance of Hansi.

Leaving Colonel Ochterlony, the famous 'Lony Ochter,' in command at Delhi, Lake marched south to meet the rest of the French-trained troops, known as the 'Deccan Invincibles,' 9,000 Infantry, 500 horse, and 142 guns. These were crushed at Laswarree after a fight so severe that General Lake said that it was only from the absence of the French officers, who had withdrawn, that he won, with a loss of 172 killed and 652 wounded. This ended the war with Scindiah, whose possessions and status were immensely curtailed by treaty.

WAR WITH HOLKAR

The treaty with Scindiah brings us down to the events which led to the destruction of Holkar after the famous pursuit.

Holkar had held aloof during the war with Scindiah, but, with 80,000 of the lawless soldiery of Central India at his back, could not resist stirring, and invaded Hindustan in April 1804.

On General Lake advancing against him he fell back, pursued for several hundred miles by a force under Colonel Monson, while Lake retired into cantonments. When Monson was sufficiently isolated, Holkar fell on him and chased him back to Agra, with the loss of his guns and equipment and nearly all his force, whence the old ribald bazaar doggerel, 'Ghore par Howdah, Hathi par zin, jaldi baghawat Colonel Monseen (Saddle on elephant, howdah on horse, Colonel Monson fled for his life).'

The Grand Army had gone into cantonments for the rains of 1804, many of the troops billeted in the large Muhammadan tombs round Agra, and General Lake had to reassemble his army and his transport. Early in the autumn, Holkar, exulting in the destruction of Colonel Monson's force, appeared before Muttra with 90,000 men, and leaving his horse to conceal his movements and watch General Lake, he doubled on his course and unexpectedly appeared before the walls of Delhi on October 7. For nine days a small garrison of a few native troops, under Colonel Ochterlony, the Resident, and Colonel Burn, the commandant, held the city walls against 20,000 of Holkar's Infantry with 100 guns.

As soon as he heard of Holkar's move General Lake followed in pursuit, and arrived at Delhi in time to save the garrison. Holkar, disappointed of his object, sent his Infantry and heavy artillery south again to join the Bhurtpur rajah, and himself, in true Mahratta fashion, started on a raiding expedition through the British Doab, at the head of all his mounted troops. If he could not beat the British in the open, it should be fire and sword, rape and torture, and loot in every British province he could get at.


No sooner had Lake information of Holkar's move than he too divided his force. Major-General Fraser, with the Infantry, Artillery, and two regiments of Native Cavalry, were sent after the Mahratta Infantry, and with him went the famous 76th Highlanders. Up to now this regiment had always been with the General, and had borne the brunt of all his battles. As Prince Kraft would call for his boots and his pipe and his corps of Artillery, so when a hill fortress was to be stormed, or an unwavering line of guns and Infantry to be charged, General Lake would order the 76th to the front.

THE PURSUIT

It was now that the famous pursuit by the Cavalry Division commenced. General Lake took into the Doab with him the 8th, 27th, and 29th of H.M. Light Dragoons, his Horse Artillery,

and the 1st, 4th, and 6th Native Cavalry. A reserve brigade of Infantry under Colonel Don followed on his tracks. Holkar himself had had a fair start.

While he had been besieging Delhi, a filibustering body of Sikh horse had entered British territory and surrounded the frontier station of Saharanpur, where the civil magistrate and a small escort were defending themselves. Immediately on



Holkar's disappearance from Delhi, Colonel Burn had marched out with his own battalion and six guns to the rescue. This force had gone as far as Shamlee, when it was surrounded by Holkar and itself besieged. In the meantime General Lake had left Delhi on October 31, and marched ten miles, following to Bagput, 15 miles, the next day. At Bagput they learnt of Colonel Burn's plight, and pushed on next day 30 miles to Candlah, reaching Shamlee on the 3rd in time to see Holkar's dust in the distance. The force here halted a day to straighten

out the affairs of the hard pressed garrison, and square accounts with local abettors of the Mahrattas, and started off on November 5 for the long dogged pursuit. Day in, day out, twenty to thirty miles a day, the enemy always a march to a march and a half ahead, and the advance guard constantly skirmishing with smaller parties, the flank guards with local chiefs. Now and again the force would tarry a few hours en route to batter in the gates of some mud fort whose garrison had fired on them. The Doab was then a lawless tract, every man for himself and none for the peasant and his land, while the British rule was too recent to have cleared out the reiving baron and the masterless man. Fortunately the crops were nearly ripe, there was plenty of good forage in the high Bajari stalks, and water was no difficulty.

It is interesting to imagine a Cavalry force of those days, the Dragoons in the old English leather helmet, black, but none the worse sun protection for that, the men in white breeches, little jackets with a very short tail, and probably half-boots. The General himself was scrupulously turned out, with a wide-brimmed cocked hat turned down on the sunny side, stock and choker, waistcoat and sash, and crimson cut-away jacket: an elderly man but as hard as nails, a martinet but much beloved, with a reputation, like Lord Gough nearly half a century later, for an unfailing faith in the bayonet. Like Lord Gough, his men pulled him through, when he should have waited for his guns, only too glad to follow when dash always brought victory, and rarely stopped to count the cost. In the East 'Encore l'audace et toujours l'audace ' has always commanded success. Unfortunately, the pitcher went to the well once too often, and the next year found the British pulled up before a nut that was too hard for even General Lake's hard fist to crack. He was forced to retire from before the fortress of Bhurtpur, with a loss of over three thousand men, and it was not till twenty years later that Lord Combermere, the Stapylton-Cotton of Peninsula Cavalry fame, took the place. That, however, is another story, and we must return to General Lake at the head of his dragoons, and his galloper guns bounding

over the tussocs of rough rye-grass, in full cry after Holkar, damning everyone that their horses could not fly.


For ten long marches more did that Cavalry division press on, always skirmishing, with the Mahratta always on the never-never horizon, or atop the next butt. Fortunately for the Doab, the raiders had been so handsomely hustled, that beyond burning everything that came in their path, and carrying off such maids as were worth the bother, not much harm was done.

But it is a long lane that has no turning, and at last, on the fifteenth of November, after a march of twenty-one miles to Allygunge, definite information was received that Holkar, with all his force, had settled down for the night at Furruckabad, 85 miles further on.

The information was definite and certain, and there was an opportunity for a coup, so at 9 P.M. the General turned out his force in silence, leaving his camp standing. As the men were parading, the encouraging news was received of a victory gained by General Fraser over Holkar's Infantry at Deig, below the fortress of that name, under the guns of which they had taken shelter. The Mahrattas lost 2,000 men and 87 guns, and the British 643, including 5 British officers killed and 17 wounded. Unfortunately, the General himself was mortally wounded, and Colonel Monson succeeding to the command, had the satisfaction of recovering his own guns. To the news, then, of this crowning victory, General Lake and his troopers swung off into the night. The moon was up and the night cool, and Major Salkeld, the D.A.Q.M.G. and intelligence officer, obtained several reports en route which spoke of Holkar's force indulging in a night's rest in fancied security.

As the first glimmer of day was breaking the leading patrols came on the enemy's camp, seeing the horses picketed and the men sleeping by them. The Horse Artillery were brought up, and immediately opened on the sleeping camp, and in the confusion that followed the discharge the 8th Dragoons charged into the camp, and the other regiments coming up in succession





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followed. The only untoward occurrence during the march had been the inexplicable explosion of an ammunition wagon, which, however, though heard by Holkar himself, was mistaken by him for the morning gun at the not far distant cantonment of Futtyghur.

The Cavalry attack met with little resistance; the enemy, panic-stricken, fled in every direction. Here and there men stood in clumps with pike and matchlock, and Arabs and Afghans sold their lives for sheer lust of fighting, but even isolated resistance was short, and many, whose horses had stampeded, had concealed themselves in trees to be shot down or speared at leisure. Holkar himself had been awake all night, and had been among the first to make for the open. After seeing a nautch the night before, he had on retiring been greeted with the same news of the battle of Deig as the British, and keeping the news to himself had spent a sleepless night. Prior to the attack, sixty thousand horse were said to be in Holkar's camp. Three thousand were killed that morning, and Holkar never succeeded in rallying more than thirty thousand again. The British loss was two dragoons killed, and some twenty of all ranks wounded, with seventy-five horses. The attack had been a timely one in other ways, for the day before, the outlying portion of Futtyghur cantonment had been burned, and the few European officials driven into a small fort, which the Mahrattas would probably have stormed the next morning. Many of the Pathan or Afghan colony at Furruckabad, then a colony a hundred years old, had joined Holkar and were killed in the night attack.

The British pursued the fugitives for close on fourteen miles without coming up with Holkar himself, who never drew rein till he had crossed the Calini river, eighteen miles from Furruckabad on the Mainpuri road.

On November 17, the British again followed on his tracks, arriving at Mainpuri cantonment on the 22nd. Holkar had passed by this place on the day after his flight with such of his Cavalry as had rallied, and immediately commenced burning the

British houses and Government buildings, the inhabitants taking refuge in the gaol, which was defended by three companies of Militia and one gun. On Skinner's Horse coming up, however, in pursuit, the Mahrattas made off again.

Holkar himself succeeded in joining his broken Infantry in the fortress of Deig, and General Lake and his Cavalry rejoined the Infantry at Muttra, where they waited for a siege train before tackling that almost impregnable stronghold.

It is interesting to note that they did not get their medals till 1850, nearly fifty years after. Of the five regiments of Light Dragoons, the 8th, 19th, 25th, 27th, and 29th, that took part in Lord Lake's and General Wellesley's campaigns, the 8th only has preserved unbroken existence, while most of the Native Cavalry and Infantry of the Grand Army deliberately wiped out their records in the Great Mutiny. It is the British Infantry and the Company's Artillery and Infantry that chiefly retain the records.

THE CAVALRY SCHOOL STAFF RIDE

Communicated by Brigadier-General E. C. Bethune, C.B., General Staff, Southern Command

THE following account of a somewhat novel Cavalry Staff Tour which took place in the Southern Command in January 1907 may interest our readers.

The tour took place in connection with the final examination of the officers of the Cavalry School at Netheravon, and it differed from the ordinary paper Staff tour in that on both sides actual troops representing the forces were employed. In fact it was a compromise between a Staff tour and extended Field Manœuvres.


The general idea of the scheme was as follows:—

England had been invaded and landings had been effected at Weston-super-Mare and Bournemouth, command of the sea having been temporarily gained by the enemy. An English Division of all arms was assembled at Tidworth on Salisbury Plain, and a second Division composed of second line troops was mobilising at the same place. Convoys were going out all over the country to collect supplies, and small parties of Militia and Volunteers were coming in daily from the surrounding districts to join the colours. To represent this force two battalions of the Infantry Brigade quartered at Tidworth formed the first Division. A battery of Field Artillery from Bulford represented the Artillery of the Division. A Cavalry Brigade, which was also supposed to be at Tidworth, was represented by eight officers from the Cavalry School with sixteen N.C.O.s. Detachments from an Infantry regiment in garrison were railed out to various

points in a westerly, south-westerly, and southerly direction, with orders to march to Tidworth under service conditions and endeavour to join their Headquarters without being captured. To represent the convoys, companies of Army Service Corps with empty wagons proceeded to various points about thirty miles distant from Tidworth, with orders to load up with stores and return. Each of these convoys had a suitable flag escort. The object of the Red Commander (British) was to discover the strength of the landing forces, their intentions, and generally to keep in touch with the advancing troops. It was essential to the Red Commander's plans to get early information as to where a landing in strength had taken place, and which landing was merely a feint, or whether landings in strength had been effected at both places. Meanwhile, he kept his Division concentrated at Tidworth, holding the line of the Avon from Enford to Bulford, thence east to Kimpton. These outposts were represented by In order to gain information seven officers' real Infantry. patrols, each consisting of one officer and two N.C.O.s, were sent out to discover what they could of the enemy's movements. Their movements are shown on the attached sketch.

The object of the Blue Commander was to gain as soon as possible information as to where the British Army was concentrated; to discover its strength and seize supplies, which were to be collected at Weston-super-Mare and Bournemouth. He landed one Cavalry Brigade, represented by eight officers, sixteen N.C.O.s, with flags representing the Brigade at Weston-super-Mare. The main landing was effected at Bournemouth, covered by a second Cavalry Brigade, represented by eight officers, sixteen N.C.O.s and flags. The Infantry Division was represented by a company of Infantry railed to Bournemouth from Tidworth. The Blue Commander despatched officers' patrols from Weston-super-Mare and Bournemouth with orders to find out all they could of the enemy's dispositions, to report on the supplies available, and to gain touch as quickly as possible with the other landing force. These patrols were supported by contact

squadrons followed by the remainder of the Cavalry Brigades. Their movements are also shown on the accompanying sketch.



Operations commenced at 9 A.M. on the 21st instant and were to continue until 12 noon on the 24th without cessation. Officers,

N.C.O.s, and men had to live on the country, being given a daily allowance for horse and man. No billets were asked for except for the A.S.C. companies and the company of Infantry at Bournemouth. The remainder of the troops slept and fed where they could.

Elaborate arrangements were made for reporting the destruction of telegraphs by troops on either side. If a party was in possession of a telegraph for half an hour without being opposed by equal or superior forces they could claim to have destroyed the line, and immediately reported the fact to the Chief Director, who notified the opposite commander of its destruction, and the number of hours that it would take to repair it by means of a Field Company of Engineers. It was also ruled that troops in possession of a telegraph line for five minutes could claim to have damaged it, but could not effect more damage than could be repaired in half an hour by Cavalry pioneers. Notices that the line was interrupted were posted up at all available telegraph offices on the line, and until communication was restored messages had to be sent round by circuitous routes. This arrangement was found to work fairly well, but there was a practical difficulty in informing officers in sufficient time of the fact that the telegraphic communication was interrupted, and the arrangement will probably not be adopted in future tours in this Command. Six umpires were detailed in motor-cars, but they found a difficulty in arriving at the scene of action at the proper time. future tours we shall try and arrange for the umpires to accompany formed bodies of troops; they will then be available when Possibly, too, flying umpires to supervise distant required. patrols may also be detailed.

On the whole the scheme worked very well, and all officers and N.C.O.s showed the utmost keenness. But there was a tendency in some cases for patrols to play hide and seek with each other instead of attempting to get through and obtain information of the enemy's formed bodies.

The parties started on a triangle of roughly about sixty miles



side, so that each side would have thirty miles to go before getting in touch with the enemy supposing each covered the same distance. The first information of the enemy on the Red Side arrived at 5.40 P.M. on the 21st from Frome, reporting a patrol of the enemy near that place. At 7 P.M. on the 22nd, definite information was obtained that nothing but Cavalry had landed at Weston-super-Mare. But the patrols to the southward had failed to pierce the Cavalry screen of the Blue Force in the direction of Bournemouth, and consequently no definite information of the Infantry was received. On the 23rd, however, by 12 noon the situation was clear, and the Red Commander was in full possession of information of the movements of the enemy. On the Blue Side, by 6.40 P.M. on the 22nd officers' patrols located the flanks of the main position covering Tidworth, and on the 28rd the Commander of the Blue Side was arranging a concentration with a view to an attack on that day. Owing to the sudden frost which set in with a strong east wind, it was not considered advisable to have the troops out on the 24th, consequently the tour was brought to a conclusion on the evening of the 23rd. The patrols on both sides showed great enterprise, one especially on the Red Side getting behind the Cavalry Brigade coming from Weston-super-Mare and destroying the wire connecting them with that place. He then went on in a southerly direction and destroyed telegraphic communication between Bristol and Bournemouth. Each officer during the tour executed a road report, a report on a railway station with a view to embarking troops, and a report on a village with regard to its supplies, making arrangements for the transport of them to Tidworth or Bournemouth.

Uniform was worn by all taking part in the tour, the Red Side being distinguished by white hat-bands.

One or two young Cavalry officers in charge of patrols showed distinctly Sherlock Holmesian wit and astuteness during the tour. One in particular hid himself behind the counter in a small village post office while various important wires were

being written by one of the adversaries. No sooner had the sender left the office than the officer emerged from his hidingplace and confiscated (in theory) all the wires, substituting bogus ones to confuse the enemy. No hand-to-hand fighting or capturing of horses was allowed during the tour, but patrols captured were noted as prisoners and allowed to proceed on their way. After an interval these patrols started again under fresh conditions, so as not to lose the benefit of the experience by being rendered neutral for the rest of the tour. Cavalry patrols were armed with revolver and sword but no rifle; Infantry parties had ten rounds of blank ammunition per man. Most of the Infantry detachments and convoys coming in were reported by patrols, but only one convoy was captured. The horses on returning to camp at the conclusion of the tour were carefully inspected by the Chief Director and two veterinary officers. It is gratifying to be able to state that out of seventy-five horses employed there was not a single case of bit injury, sore back, gall, or overreach, and although the weather was extremely inclement and the horses had in some cases covered over 150 miles, they all came in fit and well. One horse was injured in the box proceeding to the rendezvous, but the wound was sewn up and he came through his three days' trial none the worse. One officer's charger had an acute attack of rheumatism, and had to be sent home by rail on the first day. These were the only two casualties. this shows that every care was taken in saddling, fitting of bits and general management of the horses, which speaks exceedingly well for the horse-management of the officers and N.C.O.s employed, and also testifies to the high standard of horsemanship now prevailing in the British Cavalry at home, as the N.C.O.s had only joined the previous week from their regiments, bringing their horses with them.

SCOUTING NOTES

By Major G. Reynolds, D.S.O., 3rd Dragoon Guards

Though written early in the South African War, these notes convey much useful information on practical scouting by one who had done it. Since that time scouting has become a regular branch of training in the cavalry, and an establishment of trained scouts, officers and men, has been set up in each regiment.

To the man with sporting instincts, what can excel scouting as a sport? Better far than all the big game shooting, for the scout is stalking a quarry of equal intelligence, and probably being stalked in return. Then life hangs in the balance, the weakest must go to the wall, and the success or failure of one's own comrades may depend on what information he acquires. And what keen satisfaction if he can outwit his enemy and become the means of a success to his side. From my personal experience, I know that the training of scouts is no very arduous task. A scout is born, not made, and there is plenty of the right stuff in every regiment, which only needs instruction. Once started, and the course of training decided on, and put on a sound footing, men get very keen about it, and will soon pick up the sketching, tracking and reporting part of the business.

It is astonishing the number of men in a regiment who will make really good and intelligent scouts. Look for the sporting men (most soldiers are fond of sport), the gamekeeper, poacher class, the man who always has a couple of lurchers at his heels. The comic singer, the man interested in theatricals, almost invariably makes a good scout, also the man with a keen sense of humour. Their wits are sharp, and one can generally appeal to their intelligence in some way or another. The best scouts in

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my regiment were undoubtedly drawn from the sporting and 'low comedian' sections, and I found that both in peace times and on service they could 'ruffle' for themselves, and did not require to be tied up with instructions. No scout can do any good if bound too tightly with orders.

A scout must be able to look after his horse as well as himself. He must find food for his horse and himself somehow or somewhere. There must be no such word as 'cannot' with him.

A scout's horse requires almost as careful selection as the scout. He must be sound and hardy, not too big (14.2 is big enough), handy and quick over any ground. Grey horses should not be used, though they can be dyed with permanganate of potash to a sort of khaki colour. A horse that can fend for himself, like his rider, is essential. He must pick up his food when and where he can get the opportunity. This is not so hard as it sounds. I have frequently been out a week and more at a time with no rations or forage, and have always done both myself and horses right well; but the horse must be prepared to eat anything that comes his way, and something can-and mustalways be forthcoming if required. Frequent watering and offsaddling will keep a horse going for an extraordinary length of time if he will only pick the grass every time he gets the chance. That is why nothing can beat the South African pony—at any rate, in his own land. Mounted on this stamp of pony, carefully looked after, the scout need never fear being run down by his enemy. Neighing horses are useless.

All scouts' horses should be taught to lie down, and must take to water at once if required. Almost all horses will swim in any desired direction if properly handled when being taught. An intelligent horse will often discern a movement in the distance which the scout may not have noticed.

Scouting is, undoubtedly, an art. It cannot be taught entirely. It will come natural to some, while others, with all the keenness and hard work in the world, will never be thoroughly successful.

Scouting is best done in pairs, working quite independently of other pairs. No rules can be laid down as to the way these pairs are to work so as to get information required. I find that generally something turns up to give the desired information if one only waits patiently for it. Most men are in too great a hurry to shove along, when by keeping still they would probably see more. They are inclined to forget that they are themselves being watched as a rule. If one has only the patience to lie quiet for an hour or so something is pretty sure to show—if it is there. A good plan is for one pair—or one man of a pair—to move about some distance off to either flank, while the other remains hidden to watch. A movement of the enemy is sure to be seen then.

In scouting a hill or ridge, which you have reason to believe is occupied, but of which you cannot make sure, it is sound for one scout to ride suddenly towards the other; they halt and watch the hill carefully; then, as if they had seen someone, they turn and, separating, retire at a smart pace. This will generally elicit a shot from some too-eager rifleman, and the information is gained. I have often tried this and found it answer very well.

A scout must take many risks if he means to get valuable information. He cannot always make sure of a line of retreat. He may be watched from a distance, and an attempt made to cut him off. I found that, by separating and making a long détour, one could generally keep edging out of the enemy's way till darkness fell, after which one ought not to be caught, if one has an eye for a country and is sure of the direction of camp.

Scouts will often be thirty to forty miles from their main body, and must stay out till definite information is secured. They will frequently halt for the night in the enemy's country, so must be careful as to their bivouac. As they may be watched, they should not halt for the night till some time after dark. To light a fire and then move quietly away in another direction is sound.

Do not lie up in a house-kraal or clump of trees where the enemy would be likely to look for you.

Move off again before daybreak, and take up a position where you can see without being seen. The early morning is the time for watching movements—of Boers, at all events. I suppose movements of European bodies of troops would be very similar to our own. I have several times lay hidden, within a few hundred yards of a British column, and watched them; my reason for not showing myself, unless I had information to give, being, that it was long odds on my being fired on.

Two scouts of the 5th Dragoon Guards, Corpl. Chamberlain and Pte. Anderson, after some very good scouting feats were eventually captured by the Boers, actually in their laager. But the men still kept their eyes and ears open, and when they were put into jail the former made a sketch and report showing numbers in the commandoes, and position and number of their guns and laagers near Vryheid. He bribed a native employed in the prison to take these to Dundee. Rather a risky venture, but it came off all right, and the native turned up at Dundee with the information. Both these men were first-class scouts, knew how to look after themselves and their horses, and did excellent work.

I found that scouting at night in the South African War was most useful. In the earlier days of the war the Boers evidently did not expect us to be abroad at night. If they did they kept a most indifferent watch. On several occasions at night I crept to within a few yards of their laager, retiring before dawn to take up a position and verify, at daybreak, what I had only been able to conjecture in the dark.

One could write a large volume on scouting, but I do not feel qualified to write as an authority on the subject. What I have written is merely a rambling account of my own ideas and experiences; but if it should prove an argument—however slight—in favour of the most useful and necessary part of the education of the cavalry soldier, I shall at least have done something useful.


AN EARLY SYSTEM OF SIGNALLING

Contributions d'un militaire, No. 11. Sur l'organisation des télégrapheurs à cheval et à pied pour le Service de campagne. Printed in modern Greek and French. London, 1825.

A CERTAIN interest must always attach to pioneer work of any kind, and therefore a few lines upon a forgotten pamphlet of more than eighty years ago may not be ill-bestowed. Though published anonymously, the authorship was afterwards avowed by the late General Perronet Thompson, one of that small band of 'Military Radicals' of the early nineteenth century who would fain have carried into military matters the same progressive spirit which was transforming civil life. Captain Thompson, as he then was, had served in the Peninsular War with the famous 14th Light Dragoons, and in India with the 17th Light Dragoons; and though after his return to England in 1823 he threw himself into literary and political life, he never lost his interest in military subjects. His heart went out to 'oppressed nationalities,' especially when they took up arms, thus enlisting his sympathies both as a soldier and a Liberal. The Greek struggle for independence, therefore, could not fail to call forth his sympathies, and he attested his good will by the contribution of over two hundred saddles—a substantial donation from an officer of Light Dragoons.

With the same hope of serving the cause of Greece, he put forth, at his own expense, two pamphlets in parallel columns of modern Greek and French, 'neither the Greek nor the French,' as he modestly says, 'being vouchable for the very best of their kinds.'





The first of these pamphlets is on Cavalry Outposts, and is known to us only in a French reprint; the second is that now under consideration, setting forth a system devised by the author for flag signalling. 'This system,' he wrote in the Westminster Review for July, 1834, 'after being first duly deposited in the catacombs of the Quartermaster-General's office, has been pretty widely circulated in France, and is understood to have attracted some attention in Sweden.'

In the same article he remarks that 'a telegrapher on horse or on foot will probably at some future time be as indispensable an adjunct to an officer of a certain rank, as ever was an orderly . . . and if the telegraphers are practicable, why should not all orderlies be telegraphers?'

Truly a prophetic Reviewer!

The pamphlet itself consists of thirty-two pages, and is made up much in the style of the soldier's 'small book' of a few years ago. The equipment of the telegrapher and the method of signalling are indicated in the accompanying plate; the actual apparatus required being a lance 16 feet long, a red pennon 5 feet long, and some flags 3 feet square with parallel bands of red and white, and blue and yellow. The telegrapher was further provided with a copy of the pamphlet, a note-book and pencil, and, thus equipped, he could hoist any one of the 847 messages enumerated.

A pleasing touch we notice is that the equivalent for 14, the author's old regiment, is 'Marchez au Galop.' Certainly eighty years ago there were at least some Light Dragoons more seriously minded than the rollicking, thoughtless beings described by Charles Lever, and it only remains to add that this particular specimen later in life constructed, by the aid of mathematics alone, an Enharmonic organ 'founded on the principle of the duplicity of the Dissonances' which may still be seen in the South Kensington Museum.

THE NEW ORGANISATION FOR FIELD SERVICE

Deals shortly with five Principles of Organisation—and concludes with a reference to the Organisation of the Expeditionary Force, illustrating these principles.

ORGANISATION

In the *Times* of January 14, 1907, a Special Army Order was published embodying the New Army Scheme, under the heading 'Organisation of the Regular Field Army in the United Kingdom.' In the January number of the Journal of the Royal United Service Institution a communiqué entitled 'Some Notes on Organisation with Special Reference to Preparation for War' was published. For a comprehensive appreciation of the Army Order we recommend a careful perusal of the latter article, which will repay anyone, be he soldier or civilian. We quote some extracts which may more particularly appeal to the Mounted Branches.

The meaning of the word 'Organisation' is dealt with in the opening section.

PRINCIPLES OF ORGANISATION

The next section deals with the Principles of Organisation, assuming that re-organisation in Military matters should follow definite principles, instead of leaving it to unaided evolution.

Several principles are enumerated, which afford different standpoints from which to consider Military Organisation.

The first principle selected, is that a clear idea must be formed of the object, to attain which the organism exists or is to be created.



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On the one hand we find France, Germany, Switzerland, and Japan keeping constantly in mind the principal object for which their forces are desired, and organising them accordingly.

On the other hand we have, until recently, attached too little importance to this principle, even as regards our Regular Army, and we have almost entirely neglected it with regard to our Auxiliary Forces.

It is no doubt true that the conditions of our Empire preclude the possibility of our stating the purpose for which the Army exists or the conditions under which it will take the field in such precise terms as is possible for Germany, France, Switzerland, or Japan. We may have to fight in any part of the globe, in any climate, in civilised, closely populated countries, across waterless deserts, or through wild, mountainous districts. No particular organisation of the Army can be expected to suit all these varied conditions, and it is urged by some that we should in consequence leave matters in a vague and indeterminate, or as they are pleased to call it, an elastic state. But unfortunately for this contention, success in war depends on complete preparation in peace time, and this preparation includes the accumulation of equipment in precise quantities for units whose exact war strength in men and horses must be known to all concerned.

In the case of the Auxiliary Forces, the neglect of the principle we are considering has been even more marked. In the past we can trace no 'purpose' in our methods of dealing with them, except, perhaps, what may be understood by the words 'Home Defence.'

The plans of operation for home defence have in every case been framed to suit the existing strength and condition of the Auxiliary Forces. They have been dependent on the composition of the forces, instead of (as should have been the case) the forces being organised to suit the requirements. If, however, for 'Home Defence' we substitute 'Imperial Defence' we at once have a basis of purpose common to all the services of

the Crown, and from which the purpose of each can be determined with due regard to the part to be played by the others, whether for home defence or for service abroad.

SUFFICIENCY OF MATERIAL

The next principle discussed is Sufficiency of Material. In England the amount of manhood material which is available cannot be predetermined—it can only be estimated by a system of averages.

In the case of the Auxiliary Forces, although we know their exact strength, we cannot even estimate the number of those on whom we can rely for service oversea in defence of Imperial interests. We cannot tell for the purposes of war organisation what the number will be, even approximately, whom we are to organise into military formations, for whom we are to provide higher commanders, staffs, transport, equipment, &c.

PROPORTION OF PARTS

Having determined the purpose to be attained, and the amount of material available, attention is next drawn to the third principle: Proportion of Parts.

No organism is complete unless each of its component parts or lesser organisms is also complete, and the mind must accustom itself to comprehend the whole body, and not some parts only.

The expression 'whole body' implies a body that is complete in itself and capable of independent action. Under the Army Corps system a division was not self-contained. It only formed a part of the Army Corps, which with its complement of Corps Troops represented the smallest independent military organism, the division being but a limb of the body. Recent military policy has been directed towards abolishing the Army Corps and making the division an independent fighting body, self-contained and self-supporting (for a time) in itself.



RELATION OF PARTS

The fourth principle considered is Relation of Parts. Each part must be organised not only to perform its own functions, but to assist the others in their duties, and to contribute through them, as well as by itself, to the common object, in furtherance of which each part must be ready, if necessary, to think of others more than of itself. This co-operation is emphatically enjoined on the combatant services; but it is a principle which should extend throughout the whole force. Unselfishness and loyalty to the common good are as necessary in matters of organisation as on the field of battle.

NECESSITY FOR CENTRAL CONTROL

The last principle dealt with is Necessity for Central Control. However carefully a particular body may have been organised, it is incomplete and ineffective without a directing and controlling power. The extent to which this power should be centralised is a matter of organisation. To enable the functions of command to be exercised efficiently and rapidly, commanders of all grades, except the very lowest, are provided with assistants to supply them with information, receive and transmit orders, &c. The means thus supplied is represented in a military organism by what is commonly called 'Staff'—of which the Chief of the Staff and a Squadron Sergeant-major are types at either end of the long chain of command. According to our ideas, the essential difference between 'Command' and 'Staff' seems to lie in the fact that responsibility attaches to the former, but not to the latter.

THE ORGANISATION OF THE FIELD FORCE

The concluding section, which we give almost in extenso, refers to the recent Army Order on the Field Organisation of the Regular Field Army, and is of particular interest to Cavalry:—

The leading features of the organisation are:—

1. The increase of harmony in the relationship of the component parts of the expeditionary force.

- 2. The strategical freedom attained by the independent Cavalry.
- 8. The establishment of the division as the only independent fighting unit.
- 4. The modifications, principally in Artillery and Engineer units, necessitated by recent experience and improved material.
- 'Our organisation pre-supposes normal conditions, i.e. the conditions under which the great military Powers of Western Europe might conduct a campaign, and it is from this point of view alone that the organisation should be considered in the first instance. It follows, therefore, that we must suppose that the whole force is put into the field, and the purpose of the expeditionary force will, under those conditions, be to hold its own, possibly with the assistance of an ally, against the military forces of a European Power.

INDEPENDENT CAVALRY DIVISION

'For this purpose the Cavalry must be prepared to defeat the enemy's Cavalry whenever and wherever they are met, so that the enemy may be deprived of the power of gaining information and interfering with the movements of the main body or of preventing our Cavalry from doing the same with regard to the enemy. Hitherto our Cavalry brigades have had the double duty of strategical exploration and protection of the main body; but it has been felt this unduly limits the strategical employment of the Cavalry, and that it was necessary to introduce an intermediate force to free the Cavalry for their more important duties by providing for the efficient security of the divisions. At the same time, this freedom called for greater mobility on the part of the Cavalry brigades, now combined into a Cavalry division.

COVERING CAVALRY

'A separation of the Mounted Infantry from the Cavalry brigades and their formation, with two spare Cavalry regiments, into security brigades meets both these requirements. The



demand for Cavalry mobility is greatest on the occasion of their engaging the main body of the hostile Cavalry, and the organisation is that which is considered most suitable for this supreme moment. It will be seen that the brigades are composed solely of Cavalry regiments, and that the R.H.A. are shown as divisional troops. Apart, however, from the question of whether the Ammunition column might or might not hamper the Cavalry brigadier in his movements at such a moment, it seems that the Horse Artillery can at this time give more effective support to the Cavalry division if they are united under the orders of the divisional commander than if they were distributed to the brigades under circumstances which might occasion the masking of the fire of some of the batteries. There is, however, nothing to prevent the divisional commander from detaching single batteries, with a proportion of the Ammunition column, to individual Cavalry brigades during the earlier stage of reconnaissance, and the Horse Artillery organisation has been arranged so as to make this possible. be quoted as an example of the importance of the principle of the relation of parts, previously referred to. It is only by taking a broad view of the purpose of the whole organism that we can differentiate between the claims of the subordinate parts.

THE COMMANDER

'Partial reference has already been made to the independence of the division, but the full significance of this feature of the new organisation may not at once be appreciated. The Army Corps commander has disappeared, and the divisional commander has taken his place as the tactical commander, with direct power to influence the immediate progress of the fight. The divisions, being independent, and some 50 per cent. larger than before, must be regarded as small Army Corps, acting at a greater distance from each other than formerly, and covering a larger front. They are strategical units in the hands of the Army commander, who will usually be at a considerable distance from

some of his divisions, and connected with them by wireless and cable telegraphy. He disposes of the Mounted Infantry brigades as security troops in advance of the divisions, but as regards the divisions themselves, he has none of the tactical functions of the former Army Corps commander, and for this reason no combatant force, other than the Mounted Infantry brigades, is included in the Army troops. The battalion of Infantry and two squadrons of Yeomanry are only for escort duties. With the full expeditionary force in the field, he would have the Cavalry division, six divisions, two Mounted Infantry brigades, and the remainder of Army troops under his command. It is possible that under certain strategical conditions the Army commander might wish to reduce the number of commands which he himself directs by grouping two or more of the divisions under one hand. For this purpose an intermediate subordinate headquarters is provided to control these divisions, leaving the other divisions directly under the Army commander; but this headquarters would not be mobilised unless the whole Expeditionary Force were to be put in the field.

ARTILLERY

'The new organisation includes all the changes which have been approved in consequence of recent war experience and improved equipment. These changes affect all arms, and they can best be understood by a close study of War Establishments, every detail of which has been reviewed with the greatest care. The most important of these changes are, however, to be found in the Artillery and Engineer arms.

'Judging from recent war experience in Manchuria and South Africa, the Infantry attach greater importance than ever to the support of artillery fire, both in attack and defence. Not only is there justification for an increase of the number of guns, but it is also recognised that a combination of different classes of artillery fire will produce results eminently favourable to the action of the Infantry. The shrapnel of flat-trajectoried field guns, the search-



ing power of field howitzers, combined with the possible closer approach of the Infantry under their steep descending fire, and the powerful shell of the Heavy Artillery, afford the means of producing greater effect, in the hands of a skilful commander, if employed in conjunction with each other, than if they are treated separately. The allotment to the divisions of every nature of ordnance, except that of horse artillery, gives to the divisional commander the opportunity of using this enhanced effect to the fullest extent which the tactical conditions admit of, and to the greatest advantage, as a whole, of the division for whose action he alone is responsible.' . . . 'Army headquarters now have two cable, two wireless, and two air-line telegraph companies, each division has its own telegraph company, while two are allotted permanently for line of communication work. field companies will, however, be expected to do more work than hitherto, especially in connection with the construction of all the bridges that may be required for the Army. The actual equipment, except a small quantity for minor crossings, is kept well in rear in two trains, so as not to hamper the marching columns when not immediately required. This is in conformity with a general policy, which has been applied to the whole Army. The inordinate amount of transport which formerly accompanied the troops tended to interfere with their mobility so seriously that their value as fighting bodies was considerably impaired. Transport has accordingly been reduced, so that the front line troops now only carry with them what is essential for fighting efficiency and health, and to render them independent in these respects for a short period of about a fortnight. All else is put further back in the line of march, its distance in number of days of march from the front depending on the frequency and probability of its being required.'

EDUCATION IN RELATION TO THE ARMY

By SIR GEORGE ARTHUR, Bart., late 2nd Life Guards

Extracted and summarised from a Paper read at the Royal United Service Institution, February 20, 1907, stating the importance of education for officers and men for modern war.

LORD WOLSELEY, making the most of his opportunities, was one of the first modern commanders to appreciate, and to inculcate on his subordinates, the value of *individual initiative*. To him was largely due an altered conception of soldiering, which took shape in numerous reforms, all tending to show the soldier, whether officer or private, that he has other work to do than merely to carry out parade movements.

On the present state of education for officers, a well-known Cavalry commander writes to me: 'The needs of the day demand, and the authorities have insisted, that the individual officer should attain a certain standard of military education. He lectures to his men, during the training season, practically on four days a week. He sets them schemes which he has to correct himself, and he is expected during the winter season either to write an essay on some military subject or military topic of the day, or to compose a series of lectures which in the future he will have to deliver to his men. . . . To obtain higher employment as a Staff officer, a Staff College certificate is now necessary. But a poor man is practically debarred from obtaining a Staff College certificate, as the State provides no courses of instruction which an officer can attend in order to pass this examination.'



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On the educational standard of the private soldier the same authority says that, with recruits already better educated than was formerly the case, and with a very much better mode of education in the Army, one finds the trained soldiers of the present day a long way superior in point of educational standard to those of fifteen years ago. The men are not so 'bear-led' as they used to be. If anything has to be done, it is not necessary to send a N.C.O. with the men to see it done. On manœuvres men are sent either singly, or two or three together, to ride forty or fifty miles and shift for themselves on the road. The results have been excellent, so that one can safely say that the soldier of five or six years' service of to-day is not only highly educated but highly trained.*

• Since my lecture was delivered I have received the following interesting letter from an officer who has made Scouting a special study. He has written it to illustrate the training given to the New Soldier. I append it as also illustrating the spirit which animates the New Officer. The sketch-plan here reproduced was selected at haphazard from a number executed by a class of N.C.O.'s who, for a fortnight only, had been under instruction:—

'The problem presented to me was how best to use the three weeks at my disposal for practical training, and I came to the conclusion that we should probably get better results by not aiming too high, but rather by giving a good grounding, which should serve the soldier as a standard of reference for future occasions. A few lectures prefaced the course, of which two were on the theoretical use of scouts as a body, and their organisation as such. The remainder were technical, and applied to scouts as individuals.

'The practical course, extending over three weeks (and some 1,800 square miles), consisted in training in the following subjects:—(1) Finding way by map, compass, or landmarks; following or "hitting off" a body of men by tracking and inquiry; (2) observation of all important points, carrying same in memory, and reporting on paper; (3) reporting swiftly, shortly, accurately, and to the point; the usual special Reports were of course included; (4) conveying reports and messages, and keeping in touch unobserved with other bodies; (5) rapid sketching of a route or position, clear enough for anyone in a hurry to use; (6) deductions from observations.


'Lectures were given on the work done, and corrections hinted at. The men worked always in pairs, and received no assistance from anyone during the day. Five times a week the camp was moved, and one N.C.O. (not a scout) was made responsible for all the camping and foraging arrangements. Forage and food were bought by him at the village nearest to the camping place, and the tariff worked out at 2s. 7d. per diem per man and horse, and included shoeing, fuel,

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The following numbers of first, second, and third class certificates severally held by three Cavalry regiments, which have

and all extras. So I think one may fairly assume that the N.C.O. learned something of organisation in that respect. For myself, I did nothing except sit and correct the tasks, attempting sometimes to waylay the scouts at different points on their route, just to see how they were doing things.

'The correction and appreciation of work done seemed to me to be the important thing. I never tried much to store the man with "knowledge" which



he could only imperfectly understand, and which would be sure to be misapplied, or at least to reappear in a tangled and incoherent form. I endeavoured, rather, by continually setting fresh problems in front of the man, and by indicating only the lines of a possible solution, to stimulate his imagination and increase his resource, hoping that in this resource he would find a surer weapon than in the knowledge of formulæ.'



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some 250 recruits of under a year's service, are indicative of an unmistakable educational advance-in-line:—

				1st Regt.		2nd Regt.	3rd Regt.
First class					24	25	20
Second class			•		166	163	160
Third class .			•		255	150	212
Failed or were unexamined					_	95	40

EDUCATION OF THE SOLDIER

The Army has a direct interest in the efficiency of national education. There is an absolute necessity, from the Army's point of view, of some measure of compulsion being brought to bear on the youth of the poorer classes to attend evening continuation schools on a certain number of evenings—say two—per week.

In default of securing already well-educated recruits, there remains the expedient of educating the soldiers after they have joined. The efforts made in this direction, and originating with the Army itself, have met with encouraging success—a success wholly due to the disinterested zeal of the regimental officers, to the conscientious painstaking of the schoolmasters, and to the strenuous efforts at self-improvement among the men themselves.

The school instruction now being given to soldier pupils is of very high quality. The papers for first-class certificates will in future show a marked improvement on those set heretofore. For instance, a definite period of history will have to be studied. A very valuable but hitherto wholly neglected method of interesting a soldier in general history is to teach him the historical records of his own regiment.* An education of a thorough character is now open to almost every man in the Army—an education which should go far to enhance his value hereafter as a citizen, and the War Office has at last issued

[•] I may mention, however, a brilliant exception which occurred the other day, when a Cavalry sergeant was able to set right an error made by a military expert writing in a military magazine as to the part played by the Scots Greys at the battle of Blenheim.

instructions to the various military commands on the technical teaching to be given to soldiers to fit them for civil life.

OBJECT OF EDUCATING THE SOLDIER

The one paramount object of securing a high standard of general education in the soldier is, of course, the development of his intelligence as a fighting man. Doubtless the cultivation of thinking power must not be allowed to undermine discipline. Obedience, unquestioning and unwavering, must always stand first in the list of soldierly virtues. But it does not suffer by being based on the intelligent conviction that superior knowledge can rightly claim to be obeyed. Over and over again it has been shown, and notably during the great retreats which every army has had at some time to undertake, that the blind, mechanical discipline born of tyranny and bred in ignorance breaks down badly in a tight place, while the discipline which is the product of perfect confidence in the leader can be put to almost any human test. On the other hand, a knowledge of human nature is essential for officers and N.C.O.'s to acquire that power of being tolerant without being slack which gives them the reputation with their subordinates of being good men to serve under and good men to follow.

In these days, and under the changed conditions of modern warfare, it is before all else needful to secure a mental training which shall fit men for acting individually and shall teach them self-reliance. It is essential to know how to learn before knowing what to learn. The Army wants, both in its officers and in its men, minds that have formed the habit of quick and concentrated attention, that have acquired an interest and a pleasure in mental occupation, that have become thoroughly alert and wideawake, that have expanded the circle of their personal observation, and have thereby gained a sturdy independence of thought.

It has been said that a dead uniformity of thought prevails in every class of the community. The masses of our people are



run through the mill of the schools, but they are not taught to think. This fault lies at the root of our national shortcomings. It may yet work disaster unless combated in time. And it is at school, if anywhere, that this great battle has to be fought out. There are happily signs in the Army of a great intellectual awakening. England may yet find that her Army has laid her under a new obligation—that it has re-discovered and re-affirmed the fundamental truth underlying all education worthy of the name.

One of the principal efforts recently made by authority to promote thinking power in the Army is the institution of a General Staff. Its formation was greeted with profound and enthusiastic approval by all who are jealous for the prestige of the Army. But to whatever high point of perfection may have been, or may still be, brought the directing brain-power of the Staff, it is still of paramount importance that the nervous system of the Army should be braced to its work. Beyond all question, the education of the regimental officer is the keystone of the arch of military efficiency. The young officer of to-day certainly does not eat the bread of idleness. He works hard at his profession, and is often keenly interested in cognate scientific So with the senior officers, to whose minds the subjects. question of their men's improved education seems to be constantly present.

EDUCATION OF OFFICERS

As to the details of officers' education, one would like it to be possible so to open the door of the Army as to draw into it the best brains from Oxford and Cambridge. You cannot expect men who, after three years' strenuous study, have competed successfully in the great intellectual arena, to submit to being accounted three years junior in the service to their less gifted contemporaries in age.

Again, as to languages, a thorough knowledge of French and German is surely essential for a scientific officer. Apart from

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prospects of professional advancement, the more an officer has accustomed himself to study some foreign tongues, the easier he will find it to pick up others, in the event of his having to deal Once more, the study of general history as with natives. distinct from military history is of paramount importance. The officer of to-day enjoys the special advantage of being able to place himself—as regards the British Army—under the extraordinarily competent guidance of Mr. Fortescue, an acknowledged expert no less in unravelling the tangle of politics than in illustrating the art of war. In the process of the extension of our Empire, junior officers may be called upon to administer newly acquired tracts of territory under the protection of the British flag. They cannot be adequately equipped for such a task unless they can bring to bear upon it some knowledge of the great story of British colonisation.

It is indisputable that the complete education of an officer must include teaching him how to teach others. There the British officer is at a disadvantage as compared with his foreign confrère. Before a man comes under the observation of his eventual leader, he has either been sent to a recruits' depôt, or been broken-in in the recruits' class in barracks. It is all the more to the credit of the modern officer that, in spite of this system, he seems every day to be better and better acquainted, and more and more in touch, with the character and promise of proficiency exhibited by his men. The existence of a like sympathy and co-operation between the staff officer and the regimental officer is as important as it is between the latter and the man whom he has to instruct and to lead. It is one of the highest functions of the British officer to utilise to the best national advantage the splendid material which is abundantly and incessantly placed in his hands.

THE LONG-DISTANCE RIDE OF THE JAPANESE FIRST CAVALRY BRIGADE

A Lecture given at the Military Club, Tokyo, December 21, 1906, by Lieutenant Iida, commander of one of the competing squads. Translated from the February number of the 'Kaikosha Kiji' (Officers' Club Journal) by Captain E. F. Calthrop, R.F.A.

An interesting description of a test of endurance for men and horses, carried out by patrols of Japanese Cavalry. The distance of 371 miles was covered in 108 hours (average); that is, the average distance per diem was 78 miles, the average rate $5\cdot15$ miles an hour.

REGULATIONS FOR THE RIDE, DISTANCE, NATURE OF COUNTRY

THE regulations issued by the headquarters of the First Cavalry Brigade in the middle of August were, mainly, as follows:—

The Guards, 18th and 14th Cavalry Regiments, will each send two scouting parties.

Each party will consist of one officer and nine N.C.O.s and men.

No Australian horses will be ridden.

Course.—Those starting east will leave Tokyo or Narashino, going by Mito, Shirakawa, Utsunomiya, Takasaki, and home. Those starting west will go the reverse way.

In every twenty-four hours over six hours' continuous rest will be taken.

At Mito, Shirakawa, Utsunomiya, and Takasaki, examining posts will be established to examine the condition of men and horses. Two hours' halt will be made at each of these places.

November 5 is appointed for the start.



The distance as measured by the brigade headquarters is 608 kilomètres, or 152 ri (371 miles). Between Tokyo and Mito the country is undulating, with a ferry-crossing over the Tonegawa; between Mito and Shirakawa there is a hill over 4 ri (10 miles) in length (including ascent and descent); between Shirakawa and Utsunomiya, in the plain of Nasunogahara, the country is undulating; from Utsunomiya through Takasaki to Tokyo the course is practically level, and there is nothing to affect the rate of travel.

One subject for investigation was, therefore, to ascertain whether it was more advantageous to have the more arduous portion at the outset or the end of the ride.

CHOICE OF MOUNTS

Age.—Three horses, 8, 9, and 10 years old respectively, were comparatively most knocked up, both during and after the ride. Three horses from 11 to 12 showed the most staying power, and quickly recovered from their fatigue. Four horses from 13 to 14, with one special exception, gave no trouble. From this it appears that, between the ages of 8 and 14, 11 and 12 year olds possess the most staying power.

Build.—A horse with a heavy head was done up after about 30 ri (73 miles), and, in spite of watchfulness on the part of the rider, came down twice, and finally had to be left behind on account of laminitis and exhaustion.

Flesh and Condition.—As time and other reasons prevented the horses from eating their proper feed during the ride, it was necessary to select horses that were naturally good feeders and had plenty of flesh.

PREPARATORY TRAINING

The object of preparatory training was to test the staying power of the horses and the amount that they could be ridden; to increase their speed and power of endurance; and to accustom the riders to their mounts.



Number of Days.—The longest period hitherto devoted to preparatory training was sixty days; the shortest, over three weeks. As the result of an experience while with the 9th Regiment, immediately the regimental field exercises at Narashino were over, for the remaining fifteen days the party was trained by itself, not, however, without interruptions. Eight horses that were selected proved satisfactory, but of four that were changed during this time, one had to be left at Kumagai on account of laminitis, while another developed heart trouble, from which it has not yet recovered.

It is of great importance that not only well-built and daily exercised troop horses should be taken, but, for a fast ride of 150 ri (366 miles), it is necessary to have at least two weeks' preliminary training.

PLAN OF THE TRAINING

During the three weeks' field exercises at Narashino, although the pace was not fixed, at any rate the horses were being ridden over four hours a day. From the commencement of the preliminary training—fifteen days before the start—the time in the saddle was gradually increased from three hours a day up to the ninth day before the start, when half the party rode 15 ri (36 miles) a day, and 20 ri (48 miles) the following day. From thenceforward the time and pace was gradually diminished until the day before the start, when there was an hour's walking exercise, with riders up. On the day of the start all were in excellent condition.

To make the riders hard, for about a week before the ride they practised running at night; and three days before the start they doubled for forty-five minutes without stopping.

FORAGE RATION

For about three weeks before the ride the daily feeds were: barley, 3 sho * (about $6\frac{1}{2}$ lbs.); oats, 3 sho (about 6 lbs.); hay,

• 1 sho = 1 quart 1.17 pint.

1 kwamme *; salt, 5 mommé. † Two weeks before three carrots were added to each feed.

At that time the troop ration was 6 sho (about 12 lbs.) of oats; but as it was thought that there would be a difficulty in getting oats on the road, a half-ration of barley was given in order to accustom the horses to this diet.

SHOEING

One horse that had been shod a week before the start required reshoeing at Utsunomiya, as the shoes had worn down. Another horse that was shod the day before the ride went lame, as too much had been taken off the foot, and another horse had to take its place at a moment's notice. Timely shoeing, not too early and not too late (the latter leading to unforeseen breakdowns at the start), is of importance. Also, shortly before the ride, when the horses are being rested, the feet should be carefully shod by thoroughly experienced shoeing-smiths. The report on long-distance rides at home and abroad, entitled 'Endurance and Speed,' issued to the 9th Cavalry Regiment by the Cavalry School, was consulted.

The only maps used were the General Survey, scale 1: 200,000. The pace to be gentle at first, gradually increasing.

THE RIDE

Equipment and Saddlery.—Each rider carried the arms of his rank: carbine, revolver, and sword. On the horse, saddle-bag, wallets, picketing halter, and cloak, also stable-bag (for cleaning materials).

To prevent saddle-galls I had two saddle-blankets, folded in four. I carried no big bit or picketing halter, only using a bridoon bit.

Stores carried.—Veterinary medicines: tincture of camphor, creolin, tincture of iodine, boric powder; bandages, flannel,

 $^{+ 1 \}text{ momm\'e} = 2.1164 \text{ drams}.$



^{• 1} kwamme = 8.2673 lbs.

brandy, and some 'kombu' (a sort of seaweed). For the use of the men, 'seishintan' pills (a patent medicine) and 'katsuobushi' (dried fish steaks, used for flavouring). Owing to the weight of the cloak when wet, I provided myself with oil-paper, which I only used once, on the day of our arrival.

Three 'Odawara' lanterns (made of paper) and one portable electric lamp were also carried.

WEIGHT ON THE HORSES

According to measurements taken the day before, the average weight of a rider, fully equipped, was 18 kwan 800 mommé (about * 70 kilos); the total weight of the saddlery averaged 8 kwan († 30 kilos). The average weight carried by each horse was, therefore, 26 kwan 800 mommé (about ‡ 100 kilos). If we compare this weight with the average weight of the horses ridden, 102 kwan 900 mommé, the proportion is 3.84:1, or over $\frac{1}{4}$; the highest average being 3.5:1.

ORDER OF MARCH

Although called scouting parties, they had nothing to fear from an enemy, and, in the order adopted, convenience of marching, speed and supervision were the only considerations. The party marched in single file, with the fastest and strongest horse in front. The party leader was either in the centre or rear, except at night or over intricate country, when he took the lead.

Bodies of troops require over ten minutes' halt for watering; but with small scouting parties this is merely an unnecessary waste of time. I usually led the horses at a walk for five minutes before watering, watered, and after three or four minutes' march broke into a trot.

I watered in small quantities at intervals of from one hour to two and a half hours, and, when it could be obtained, there was

^{• 11} stone = 154.28 lbs. † 4 stone 10 lbs. = 66.12 lbs. ‡ 15 stone 10 lbs. = 220.4 lbs.

nothing better than 'rice water' (the water in which rice is washed before boiling).

LEADING HORSES

The total time during which the horses were led was fifteen hours, or for over 86 kilomètres (58 miles). Leading relieved the horse of an 18-kwan burden, and not only, if continued, restores the horse's energies, but is a rest for the rider after a long time in the saddle. But doubling the men in order to keep up the pace is, on the contrary, more exhausting, and does not tend to relieve the horse. We led only on special occasions, as when very cold or when crossing difficult country at night, etc.

Horses' Condition.—On the first day (start at noon) we were moving for only nine hours and thirty minutes. There was no sign of exhaustion, and they fed well. On the second day, after passing Mito the horses began to show fatigue. That night some were somewhat off their feed, and the following morning, before starting, a good many horses did not drink on account of the cold.

The horses were led over the 4 ri (10 miles) mountain road and gained in energy; but on the new road, covered with small stones, before reaching Shiraga they began to sweat and blow heavily.

On the fourth day, after passing through Utsunomiya, owing to the forced pace and the long time we had been going, we had to use our spurs between Ashikaga and Isesaki in order to get the horses into a trot, and they barely responded.

That night we only had three hours and ten minutes' rest at Isesaki. In less than ten minutes after leaving the horses again became distressed, and at Takasaki one horse was entirely off his feed, while another developed a strange gait; but we kept them going, intending to lead right into Tokyo. Owing to the pace, which was greater than was really necessary, the horse that was off his feed fell out at Kumagai, and the other damaged the valve of the heart, and has not yet recovered. When the

remainder arrived they were pouring with sweat and rain, and the heavy breathing and bowed heads showed their distress.

As a rule, at the start in the morning the horses were without spirits; but the latter rose with the sun, to decrease gradually during the day. The fastest pace could be got out of them in the morning and evening, as the horses responded more readily and did not perspire.

CONDITION OF THE RIDERS

The men all showed the greatest keenness, and the way in which they obeyed all orders, looked after their horses, spoke and acted, was most praiseworthy. But as their average night's rest was less than one and a half hour, they began to feel the want of sleep, and when walking at night most of them slept on their horses' backs. In spite of the loose seat that this entailed there were no saddle-galls.

Owing to lack of sleep, the glare of the sun, and the dust, the eyes of more than half were inflamed—a fact which shows the need for carrying coloured glasses.

On the first and fourth nights we were practically in the open. Most of the horses were tied to trees, the saddle-blankets being thrown over their backs. On the second night a hastily constructed stable sufficed to keep off the dew. On the third night they were perfectly stabled in an inn.

CARE OF THE HORSES

Immediately on halting for the six hours' rest the horses were given a little water, legs washed in hot water and rubbed for about twenty minutes, saddles taken off, back and rest of the body groomed for about fifteen minutes, and blankets put on. Tincture of camphor was then rubbed on the legs, and in order to keep up circulation, and as a guard against rope-galls, fetlocks and hocks were bandaged with flannel. The following morning they were groomed for about thirty minutes, the legs especially being well rubbed.



Special Treatment.—In cases of inflammation of the foot (due to pressure of the heel of the shoe on the frog), as it was found that immersion in cold water for twenty or thirty minutes did more harm than good, camphor was applied on the road, and on reaching the halting-place a waraji (straw sandal) was soaked in water and bound round the foot with oil-paper. On taking this off the following morning the fever had quite gone.

My own horse went lame for the first time six hours before reaching Utsunomiya. I frequently dismounted and led. After discovering that it was due to swelling of the near fetlock, at the next watering-place I rubbed the joint with cold water and put on some camphor. One hour after passing through Utsunomiya it ceased to throw its weight on the right side and the lameness disappeared.

As the study of the method of feeding is extremely imperfect, the horses all lost flesh. My methods of feeding were as follows:—At the long halt, after the horses had been attended to, they were given 4 sho $(8\frac{3}{4} \text{ lbs.})$ of barley and 1 sho $(8\cdot17 \text{ pints})$ of 'fu' (a sort of bran), mixed with salt and carrots, and 1 kwamme $(8\frac{1}{4} \text{ lbs.})$ of hay.

The following morning, about one hour before starting, the above feed had practically all gone, and another feed of 1 sho was given. After starting, the horses were led at a walk for at least thirty minutes in order to allow them to digest their feed.

At each examining station 1 sho of barley or oats, 1 sho of bran, and hay were ordered by telegram to be ready immediately on arrival.

When leading, carrots, grass, and water-grown rice were frequently given. The horse that was left at Kumagai, as it was off its feed, was given, after we left Utsunomiya, two or three eggs in every feed.

The other scouting parties divided their forage into smaller quantities and fed more frequently, and if this does not take much more time, it is probably a better method.

MISCELLANEOUS.

Watering-bags and cleaning gear only add to the weight, and there is no necessity to carry them.

Lanterns.—A larger one is required, as a small one easily catches light. The light of a portable electric lamp is too feeble to even read a map by. On the third night, in taking a short cut—8 ri—across the plain of Nasuno, there was no moon, no houses, no passengers, and only just enough light to read a compass. Our progress was a matter of some difficulty.

Subsequent Condition.—As a result of the examination of the nine horses that came in at 8.43 p.m. on November 9, only one was not fit for ordinary duty. That night, after having been groomed by fatigue men for about $1\frac{1}{2}$ hour, they were given 5 go * of oats, 1 sho of bran, salt, and 1 kwan 500 mommé (12\frac{1}{4} lbs.) of hay each, and the same feed the following morning. For exercise they were led quietly. For three or four days they usually lay down, except when feeding or at exercise. After the sixth day they were ridden at exercise, and from the thirteenth day went into ordinary work.

The average weight lost on the ride was 11 kwan 700 mommé (96 $\frac{1}{2}$ lbs.), the largest decrease being 17 kwan 200 mommé (142 lbs.). A week after the ride they had put on an average of 10 kwan (82 $\frac{1}{2}$ lbs.), and three weeks later were only, on an average, 400 mommé (8 $\frac{1}{2}$ lbs.) below their former weight. At this moment they appear to have quite regained it.

The cause of this large loss of weight was due to insufficient preliminary training, the necessity for a forced speed, and lack of food and water.

CONCLUSION.

Since that Cavalry enthusiast, the Prussian Emperor William the First, carried out a long-distance Cavalry ride, in 1842, several thousands have taken place in different parts of the world; but

^{* 1} go=1 sho=3.17 pints.



this is the first occasion, that we have heard of, on which so long a distance as 608 kilos (371 miles) has actually been covered.

Further, the plan of having squads of 10 men, instead of independent riders, may be said to be a step in advance.

The time I took to traverse this distance, from start to finish, was 104 hours 48 minutes (or 58 minutes longer than I planned). Deducting rests, long and short, time taken in crossing the ferry, etc., the time on the move was 71 hours 33 minutes (or 8 hours and 27 minutes longer than in the programme). The average distance covered per day was 32 ri (78 miles); the average rate per hour on the move was a little under 8 kilos 300 metres (5·15 miles). Although the programmes of the various parties show a difference of time of 30 hours, between the actual time taken by the fastest party (104 hours) and the slowest (112 hours) there is only a difference of 8 hours.

It may be taken, therefore, that the Japanese horse of to-day requires at least $4\frac{1}{2}$ days to do 150 ri (346 miles), and it is a question how many days further this rate could be continued. Still, I think that if the horse that was left behind had been regarded as hopeless earlier in the ride, the last day and a half would have been accomplished without difficulty.

Even should the scheme of creating a Cavalry division in Japan take effect, the Japanese Cavalry will still not be comparable in numbers with possible antagonists. To make up for this lack of numbers every encouragement should be given to the improvement of the breed of horses and the holding of exercises of this kind. In so doing the study of questions of endurance and speed will be promoted, and, what is also so necessary, individual self-confidence will be acquired.

NEW FUNCTIONS FOR CAVALRY

(Translated from the Internationale Revue über die gesamten Armeen und Flotten)

Some journals have recently announced that there is a disposition in France to increase the Field Artillery to the detriment of the Cavalry.

The numerical superiority in Artillery which Germany will enjoy with regard to France when the rearmament of that branch of the service with long-recoiling guns will be completed in the former country, causes a very natural apprehension in the latter. As, in France, nothing which may be of advantage to national defence has hitherto been neglected, it may be predicted that, in the near future, the Field Artillery will be increased in such a manner as to keep pace with that of Germany. Whether that increase will be carried out to the prejudice of the Cavalry is a question not easy of solution. It remains to be seen whether budgetary or military considerations will prevail.

General Pédoya, formerly commanding the 16th French Army Corps, a well known military writer, is of opinion that the Artillery should be increased by weakening the Cavalry, and explains his point of view in a pamphlet entitled 'The Cavalry in the Russo-Japanese War and in the Future.' The author endeavours to demonstrate, relying on the experiences of that war, that owing to the increasing power of modern fire-arms Cavalry can no longer anticipate any success against the two other arms, that is to say against Infantry and Artillery, and that consequently Cavalry can no longer be relied upon to bring a battle to a decisive issue. In addition, says the General,

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Cavalry will extricate itself more readily in small units than in larger masses, when scouting in a future war between France and Germany, because the two armies, once concentrated, will find themselves relatively close to one another, and there will no longer be sufficient space available to allow for strategic scouting by corps and divisions of Cavalry. For all these reasons, the author concludes, it is to be hoped that France may increase her Field Artillery to the detriment of her Cavalry, whilst Germany with her extended frontiers would do well, he considers, to preserve a strong Cavalry in the future.

It is not our intention to investigate how the French solve this question of the reduction of their Cavalry. What we desire to lay special stress upon is the above-mentioned opinion of General Pédoya, affirming that an eventual diminution of Cavalry in Germany, in imitation of what may happen in France, could only have baneful results for the former of those Powers. The geographical position of Germany, in the centre of Europe, always necessitates the contemplation of the possibility of a war on two fronts, and therefore account must also be taken of the Russian Cavalry, which, as is known, is in considerable numbers in Poland, ready to cross the German frontier.

And even outside the eventual necessity for Germany to be able to maintain a war on two fronts, we are of opinion that that country must possess a strong Cavalry, and not only that country alone, but every other country as well, in spite of the increased power of fire action, and the diminution of the zone of exploration in advance of the front of two armies.

It is precisely the power of fire action which will permit of the employment of Cavalry in the future. Every innovation, both ordinary and military, is always susceptible of various applications. In this order of ideas, Cavalry, without descending to the rank of a Mounted Infantry, could and should, as supplementary to shock action and action with the *arme blanche*, take advantage of the power of modern fire action, which threatens to deprive it of a portion of its former importance. Provided with long-range carbines, with machine guns and Field Artillery, Cavalry divisions will become troops capable of being used in two ways: they may repair, for dismounted action, to places where Infantry and the bulk of the Field Artillery cannot reach quickly enough; and they will also be able to attack with the arme blanche.

Formidable modern armies prevent, by their size alone, the decisive intervention of large Cavalry units in the battle; the great efficacy of fire action is merely secondary from this point of view. The piercing of the front, already become most difficult nowadays for Infantry, will no longer be possible for Cavalry except in rare cases. On the other hand the immense lines of battle have become all the more vulnerable; this is especially the case in rear of the army, where the roads followed by the ammunition, the food supply, etc., form a species of arteries of the army, in this gigantic organisation. There a strong Cavalry, which has first overthrown the hostile Cavalry, will find new duties, the fulfilment of which may have as decisive an influence on the issue of the battles as the commissions they formerly carried out in the front.

Finally, even admitting that at the commencement of an eventual war between France and Germany, and on account of the millions of men put in the field, the scouting rôle of masses of Cavalry will have more modest proportions than when armies facing one another had a greater liberty of movement, the situation entirely changes from the first decisive actions. Then the distances between the vanquisher and the vanquished will at once increase, and a new mission, the pursuit, is then imposed on them, over and above that of scouting; in the same way the enemy's Cavalry will have a new duty, that of protecting the retreat. Such functions, however, cannot be successfully carried out except by powerful masses of Cavalry.

Woe, too, to the army which has an inferior Cavalry! In order to hope for success in a future war one must not only be as strong as the enemy, but must be even stronger.

AUSTRIAN VIEWS ON CAVALRY WORK

Under the title of 'Modern Cavalry,' Major Alfred Yull, of the 1st Regiment of Hussars of the Austro-Hungarian Army, contributes to Dansers Armee-Zeitung the substance of a lecture recently delivered by him at the Military Institute at Buda-Pesth.

The lecturer commences by pointing out that the bulk of the military literature of the day is chiefly concerned with Infantry questions, either of themselves or in their relation to Artillery, while little or nothing is written about the Cavalry. In regard to this he reminds us that even in pure reconnaissance—the special work of the mounted arm—the Cavalryman must often overstep the bounds of his own particular domain. A cool grasp of a difficult situation is only possible to him who has so schooled himself as to be ready for all that may befall, prepared to do the right thing at the right moment.

In the old days he was considered a good Cavalryman who could manage his horse and handle his arms; to-day he must have acquired very special knowledge: he must bring to the conduct of every operation much thought; he must be prudent, and must yet be able to decide in a moment upon a matter for which hours of consideration would not be too much.

RECONNAISSANCE

Junior officers and non-commissioned officers are responsible in the first instance for reconnaissance; these should thoroughly understand the duties, powers and limitations of the other arms; they must have a sound grasp of the general situation, a quick eye for country, must be map-readers, and should be able to make a brief and correct verbal report of all that

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they have seen, heard and done. They must be horsemen in every sense of the word, perfectly at home in the most difficult country possible. Major Yull has much to say about the superior officers upon whom devolves the duty of issuing the orders for the work to be done in the field; they should be men who have themselves had personal experience of reconnaissance duty, so that when ticklish work is on hand they must not expect impossibilities, since by so doing they will not only fail to get what they want but will create among their subordinates a feeling of loss of confidence in them and in themselves which must prejudicially affect future work.

The author sketches the sort of man the trooper must be who is employed on reconnaissance, and who must return with the intelligence so hardly obtained, and awaited perhaps with feverish impatience. He should thoroughly understand the contents of the report he carries, so that he may be able verbally to give its tenour should the paper be lost or destroyed or taken from him. He must be a perfect horseman, a master of his weapons, able to find his way about country, and with a keen perception of all military situations which may arise. The author has something to say as to the care which the despatch rider must take of his mount, so as to know how to get the most out of it, when and how to spare it, and when, if necessary, to sacrifice it.

CAVALRY ACTION

Major Yull states his settled conviction that 'die Krone des Dienstes zu Pferde bildet den Angriff mit der blanken Waffe' ('the crown of Cavalry work is the attack with the steel weapon'), and that no matter what the weapon may be with which the opponent is armed, opportunity to charge home must and will come to the Cavalry leader who has made a real study of his arm and who is imbued with the true Cavalry spirit; at the same time a Cavalry which knows well how to make use of its firearms possesses a sound support in the offensive. The

author here cites a number of instances in modern war where dismounted Cavalry has been successful against superior numbers.

He then shows how the firearm first came to the aid of the sword or lance in the character of a purely defensive weapon, but that by degrees the rifle or carbine has been used more and more in the offensive action of Cavalry; that then there came a brief period when an idea prevailed that the firearm might become the all in all, whence followed the notion that well-trained Infantry, put upon horses, might at times be able entirely to take the place of Cavalry. To prove the falseness of this view the author recounts the various duties which must fall to Cavalry in the field, reminds us of all that has been achieved by Cavalry in the past, and asks whether all this can be done by other than thoroughly trained Cavalry; for indeed, he says, with Cavalry there can be no medium—it must be either good or bad.

INDIVIDUAL TRAINING

The only proof of the quality of Cavalry, says the author, is that obtained on active service, consequently all that we can do during peace is to strain every end and exhaust every means to obtain the very highest development of the individual qualities of all ranks, since success will follow, not only upon the individuality of the leader, but upon that of every single trooper. Leaders are mostly made, few are born, but even born leaders cannot make the best use of their talents if they have never studied how to employ them. The dream of the Cavalryman must ever be the combat, hand to hand and man to man; but still he must know and feel that when this joy is withheld from him, he possesses in his rifle or carbine a weapon which will make him respected from afar. A Cavalry that has been trained to the utmost limit of its individual physical powers, and which can use its knowledge with prudence and its powers without stint, will be able to command success over all the other arms.

A NEGLECTED WARNING IN RUSSIA

Some extracts showing that the result of inefficient teaching in the true Cavalry spirit was clearly foreshadowed by two English writers many years ago.

SIR JOHN FRENCH, in his introduction to 'Cavalry in Future Wars,' writes: 'That the Cavalry on both sides in the recent war did not distinguish themselves or their arm is an undoubted fact. . . . The cause of failure on the Russian side. . . . They were devoid of real Cavalry training, they thought of nothing but getting off their horses and shooting; hence they lamentably failed in enterprises which demanded, before all, a display of the highest form of Cavalry spirit.'

General Kuropatkin, in his history of the Russo-Japanese War, speaking of the Cavalry at the battle of Mukden, says: 'There was no combination, and most of the detachments of Cavalry remained inactive, refusing to separate themselves from the Infantry.'

We give below some extracts from the writings of two well-known English authorities, which show that the above result was clearly foreseen.

In 1888 Colonel Maurice (now Major-General Sir Frederick Maurice, K.C.B.) published a book entitled 'The Balance of Military Power in Europe.' Speaking of the Russian Cavalry he says:—

'The Russian Cavalry of all classes have recently been converted into a sort of imitation of the Mounted Rifles who constituted the Cavalry of the American War. The Cossacks are not trained Infantry soldiers in any sense of the term. They are not



men accustomed from childhood to the use of rifles as were the American marksmen. They are as unlike highly effective Mounted Infantry as it is possible for men to be. Yet Sir Charles * would impress on his readers the belief that there is no kind of doubt as to their superiority to all Cavalry which trusts chiefly to the proper weapon of the true Cavalry soldier—the arme blanche. There is no country in Europe from which decisive authority may not be quoted against him on the other side. . . . Von Moltke, in a letter which may be read in the "Revue Militaire de l'Étranger," pronounced a strong opinion that only want of more perfect handling prevented the German Cavalry during the 1870 campaign from producing even greater results on the field of battle than they actually did, great as The Germans continually at their those results were. manœuvres practise their Cavalry in surprise charges with the arme blanche. . . . The Austrian Cavalry leaders—and they are among the best in Europe—all take the view that the change which has been made in Russian Cavalry has ruined its efficiency, and would like few things so well as to lead their men against those motley riding footmen, who are neither in any shape fish, flesh, nor good red herring. French opinion, whether as expressed in the masterly papers which have appeared in their "conferences" in the "Revue Militaire" and in the "Journal des Sciences Militaires," or as shown by their actual Cavalry training, is on the same side.

'But the most effective exposure of all of the weaknesses of the present Russian Cavalry has come from a Russian pen. . . .

'Colonel Baïkov shows that not only is the present system contrary to all sound principle, but that it is hopelessly unsuited to the habits and traditions of the Russian Cavalry itself. Further, he takes the history of the use of the Russian Cavalry during the 1877–78 campaign, and declares that they were then employed chiefly in service on foot; so used, he declares, that they were not able even to stop convoys.'

^{*} Sir Charles Dilke, 'Present Position of European Politics.'



Take, again, another book, 'Letters on Tactics and Organisation' by 'A True Reformer,' also published in 1888, and we find the following:—

'The most recent Russian regulation for the instruction of Cavalry in dismounted duties, dated 1884, lays down clearly that the charge (mounted) is the prime raison d'être of Cavalry, and that a dismounted combat is only to be undertaken when the nature of the ground and circumstances render its adoption the only plan by which the mission of Cavalry can be fulfilled. This principle, interpreted liberally, as it would be in a country where the nature and duties of Cavalry are well understood, would leave nothing to be desired; but according to Colonel Baïkov, of the Russian General Staff, the true character of the arm is so little understood, that the slightest inequality of ground, or the existence of anything which can be made out to be 'unfavourable circumstances' causes the Cavalry at once to draw rein and have recourse to their carbines. . . . The Russian Cavalry started for the Balkans holding as an axiom "that in the face of the breechloader Cavalry is helpless," ignoring the truth of the maxim so steadfastly held by Souvaroff—"the arm itself is nothing, it is the man who stands behind it"; a principle, by the way, that we of all nations should take most to heart. Starting with this fixed idea, it was only natural that the record of the Russian Horse during this campaign should be one of continual failure. . . . Since the war, matters have not improved. It has become, in fact, quite the exception in the manœuvres to see two bodies of Cavalry charge.'

GERMAN CAVALRY AND THE LESSONS OF THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR

Précis of an article from the Militär Wochenblatt, entitled: 'What lessons are to be drawn by Cavalry from the Russo-Japanese War?'

THE writer ('J') begins by pointing out that the recent discussion in the French press, for and against the reduction of the thirteen Cuirassier Regiments and the employment of their men and horses in the augmentation of the Artillery, arose from the idea that the experience of the late war in Manchuria tended to prove the diminishing value of Cavalry in war—an idea which is entirely opposed to those which obtain in other armies. Even in Japan every effort is being made, not only to create fresh Cavalry divisions and so increase the strength of this arm, but in the reorganisation of the Remount Department it is to be noticed that Japan intends also to improve the stamp of her troop-horses. Germany too causes her Cavalry to keep pace with the growth of her army, and shows no signs of permitting any lowering of the proportion of the mounted to the other arms. The writer at the same time admits that there are not wanting many people who declare that the rôle of Cavalry is now greatly restricted, and that the time has gone by when it can play a really important part in war.

The author prefaces his remarks on the Cavalry lessons of the war in Manchuria by the admission that, of all arms, the Cavalry on both sides is the one which remained most in the background. The chief reason for this he finds in the conditions of the *terrain* in Manchuria—the pathless mountains in the East; the thickly populated and cultivated country on the



Scha-ho and about Mukden; the ground heavy from the rains in summer and autumn, and snow and ice bound in winter-time; also in the entrenched positions where the armies remained for months at a time. In all the varying conditions there were insuperable obstacles such as would scarcely be met with in any European theatre of war, and yet in spite of them all the Cavalry on either side was able, to some extent, to perform what was expected of it.

The Russian Cavalry, numerically strong, was made up almost exclusively of Cossacks, and it is curious to note how greatly these troops have been over-rated even by those who were supposed to know the Russian army well. The reason of their deterioration the author finds in the change in the people themselves, who from being a nation of horsemen, inured for generations to war, have now become an agricultural—even an industrial—folk, while retaining the dulness of intelligence which unfits them in these days for the work of Cavalry. Men like Rennenkampf could do nothing with them, and while many of their leaders were hardly up to the standard of the modern Cavalry commander, it must be said that the Cossacks as Cavalry were a failure.

With each Infantry division of the Japanese army there were three squadrons of Cavalry, in addition to two independent Cavalry brigades which, at the time of the battle of Mukden, had been united in a Cavalry division of twenty-four squadrons. The total of the Japanese Cavalry was not above seventy squadrons, or less than half the strength of the Russian Cavalry. The Japanese Cavalryman had, however, been very carefully trained, the commanders teaching their men that they must make up by great dash for all their natural disadvantages; and certainly immense improvement was apparent in the Japanese Cavalry since the days of the war with China in 1894–95. The writer then quotes the favourable opinions expressed by a British officer who witnessed a Cavalry attack by the Japanese squadrons in 1900, and of an American captain who attended the Japanese

Cavalry manœuvres just before the outbreak of the late war. Here, however, the Japanese Cavalry met but an indifferent opponent; there were no Cavalry combats as at Königgrätz in '66 and Vionville in '70—nothing more than isolated actions. There was seldom any attack upon Infantry or guns, while 'die Schlachtenreiterei fiel völlig aus,' although the Japanese Cavalry certainly lost an opportunity of playing the rôle of the pursuer after Mukden. But in reconnaissance and in dismounted work the Japanese were at least the equals and often greatly the superiors of their adversaries. In reconnaissance the high intelligence of officers and men was very noticeable, as also their initiative and keenness. Dismounted they worked on patrol, or thrust themselves into the fire-fight with the other arms. For dismounted work the Japanese Cavalry showed itself specially adapted, and achieved great things, and yet that the Japanese military authorities do not regard this as the supreme duty of the arm is showed by the projected increase in the number of squadrons, the higher training now demanded, and the intention of improving the remounts.

As after the war in South Africa, so during and after that in Manchuria, did the idea arise that in the future Cavalry will but seldom fight mounted; but wiser counsels are now prevailing, and men are coming round to the conviction that in modern war a numerous and exceptionally well-trained Cavalry is more than ever needed.

The author quotes from many of the circulars, memoranda, and instructions which were issued by Kuropatkin to his Cavalry during the campaign, notifying the lines upon which he wished that arm to work. At first he impressed upon his Cavalry commanders that the Russian superiority in mounted men should be sufficient utterly to destroy the Japanese Cavalry and thus render future reconnaissance a work of no difficulty. Later, the Russian Commander-in-Chief complains bitterly how badly he is served by his Cavalry; how they have never brought him intelligence of the movements or strength of the enemy; how

they cling to the skirts of the Infantry; how often they are 'held up' by insignificant bodies of Japanese Infantry.

The writer gives several instances of the inactive part played by the Russian Cavalry throughout the war, and discusses at some length Mischtschenko's raid round the Japanese left wing early in January 1905, approving of the general idea of the operation, but finding no little fault with its execution. The mobility of the force was greatly restricted, however, in the first instance by the weather, and secondly by the large amount of transport which accompanied the squadrons. Again, instead of making straight with his whole force for the country about Daschitsaw-Kaitschow, establishing himself there and making serious inroads upon the railway and lines of communication, the Commander merely moved upon Inkow-a harbour of no special value in winter-time-and sent officers' patrols to effect mere temporary interruptions of the railway line. The Cavalry were lucky to get away as easily as they did, 'and the whole operation was a failure through the want of judgment, clumsy leading, bad training of the Cavalry and their utter inability to fight dismounted.'

At Mukden, Kuropatkin sent his best Cavalry leader, Rennenkampf, to the eastern wing among the snow-covered hills, whereas the western plain was, without doubt, the strategic flank. On this occasion too, the Russian Cavalry was badly handled, was broken up into small bodies, and was invariably inferior to the Japanese horsemen, who, without performing anything dashing, which their numerical weakness prevented, on every occasion did all that was asked of them. They frequently fought dismounted, and held back the Russian Cavalry, who believed they were opposed by Infantry; on more than one occasion they did not hesitate to engage dismounted the Russian Infantry when it was necessary to break through in search of information. A comparison between the numerous Cossack Cavalry and the weak Japanese mounted force proves that initiative, intelligence, and dash are the foundation of all real



performance. The true spirit which is contained in the arm, and which quickens the leading, must produce results. Numbers of course must always play their part, which can be seen from the limitations of the Japanese Cavalry.

The experience of the war goes to show that faults and deficiencies among the Cavalry destroyed the work of the whole arm, but it shows us also that war in our day cannot be waged The demands made nowadays on all arms without Cavalry. are heavier than ever, and are not least heavy upon the Cavalry. Smokeless powder and the long range of modern weapons have added to the difficulty of reconnaissance, and a higher training than ever is required of the mounted man. He must fight mounted in order to drive off the enemy's Cavalry; he must be able too to fight on foot; and this last offers special difficulties to the Cavalry soldier-led horses, small ammunition allowance, the difficulty of replenishment, in some armies the Cavalryman's equipment and dress. But there will be constant dismounted work, while the charge will come but rarely. Dismounted work must then be practised: the use of ground, fire control, rifle practice at decisive ranges—all these make for success. increase the fire-power of Cavalry, machine guns should be attached, in the proportion of two detachments to each division. These must, however, possess extreme mobility, and all the personnel of these detachments must be mounted.

The late war teaches, as clearly as possible, that strategic and tactical reconnaissance is the first duty of Cavalry, and in its performance every item of the Cavalryman's training must be brought into play. It is not too much to say that no arm requires so high a training, so varied a military education as the Cavalry; but with all this it must possess the true *Reitergeist* and be ready at all times to ride down the opposing Cavalry. In the leader the ready acceptance of responsibility and the spirit of enterprise must be cultivated to the same extent as the self-sacrifice of the men who follow him.

THE ROYAL ARTILLERY RIDING ESTABLISHMENT.

By LIEUTENANT W. L. KIRBY, R.H.A.

In December 1802 there was published a general order which led to the formation of the Royal Artillery Riding Establishment in January 1803. The order was to the following effect: 'Captain Quist is appointed Riding Master to the Horse Establishment of the Ordnance, and will enter upon this appointment on January 1, 1803. Captain Quist will have the superintendence and charge of the Riding House and everything belonging to it.'

In accordance with the above order, men were attached to the corps of drivers under the name of Riders, for the purpose of carrying out the duties of a Riding Establishment. In 1806 the Riding Establishment was formed as a separate body from the corps of drivers, and has since remained so.

The first superintendent, Captain (afterwards Colonel) Quist, died at Plumstead in 1820, and is buried in the churchyard at that place.

There is preserved in the R. A. Institution a copy of the 'Horse Drill' written by Quist, and presumably used by him during his superintendence of the Riding Establishment.

In 1898 the office of superintendent was abolished, and from that date the Riding Establishment became a major's command, whereas the superintendent had usually been a lieutenant-colonel.

The duties of the R.A.R.E., as constituted at the present day, may be divided into two heads:—

- 1. The training of rough-riders.
- 2. The instruction in equitation of the cadets at the Royal Military Academy.

Under the present régime there are always under instruction two rough-riders' classes, each composed of 16 N.C.O.'s, who undergo an eight months' course. At the end of this period, with the exception of backward cases, the N.C.O.'s return to their batteries fit to undertake the duty of training the remount and also the recruit.

The teaching of the Woolwich cadet to ride has been carried on at the 'Riding Troop' continuously since its formation. Amongst others, the Prince Imperial was taught to ride there whilst a cadet at the R.M.A. His autographed photo was presented by him to the Riding Establishment on his departure from Woolwich, and now holds a place of honour in the 'Troop' office.

The Woolwich cadet during his first term receives no riding lessons; during his second term he receives two lessons of one hour each per week. For the third term the number of lessons is increased to four per week, and in his fourth and final term the cadet receives five lessons every week.


The crest of the troop, in the accompanying illustration, is an interesting one. The horse, which is doing what is technically called in French riding schools 'la courbette,' is attached by a chain to the riding-school pillars. These pillars, which stand about eight feet high and are padded with leather, are still made use of in the French riding establishment at Saumur, but, to the best of the writer's belief, are not to be found in any English military riding school. The lower portion of the crest is a part of the old gunner crest.

The other illustrations are photographs of two prints in the Royal Artillery Riding Establishment dated 1817, and show respectively the position of the mounted soldier with and without stirrups, as taught at that period.





CAPTAIN QUIST, ~
Was appointed Riding Master to
the Horse Establishment & Ordnance
IS JANUARY 1803.



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'CAVALRY IN FUTURE WARS' *

In our last number we gave the introduction to this book by General Sir John French, K.C.M.G. We now give a concise *résumé* of the book itself, by Brigadier-General E. H. Allenby, C.B., Commanding 4th Cavalry Brigade.

In the Introduction we find these words: 'The Arm must be educated up to a readiness to act, to come to close quarters in co-operation with the other Arms.'

It is hoped that the short and uncritical summary here presented may turn the minds of our readers to a study of the original work, in pursuance of the idea so admirably worded.

General von Bernhardi looks at his subject from a Continental point of view. He can say that Cavalry, 'as a standing branch of the Army, is always ready to march and operate, whilst the other portions of the Army are still occupied with their mobilisation.' But though some details may not universally apply, the principles he sets forth are adaptable to all circumstances.

How Modern Conditions affect Cavalry

The influence of recent progress, e.g. firearms, communications, size of armies, National spirit, is broadly discussed.

The conclusion is reached that 'Cavalry has been driven out of its former place of honour on the battle-fields of the plains.'

But reconnaissance and screening have grown in importance. So the strategical value of Cavalry is greater than ever it was.

THE STRATEGICAL USE OF CAVALRY IN WAR

Mobility is the first condition of strategical efficiency. The prime essential is a sufficient number of good horses and suitable

• By H.E. Lieut.-General Frederick von Bernhardi; translated by Charles Sydney Goldman. (John Murray.)

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training of horse and man. Tactical independence is ensured by adequate conditions of supply and proper equipment.

Raids, at the outbreak of war, are discouraged. Unless we have great numbers, the local and temporary harm inflicted is outweighed by the permanent loss to our own Cavalry.

It is when the main bodies of the enemy are ready for operations that 'important and possible' tasks can be given to our Cavalry. Then, in full strength, it proceeds to ascertain the enemy's movements.

Intelligence and security are distinct duties; seldom to be combined.

Intelligence must be fought for; therefore, concentration is necessary. Protection, alone, entails extension.

However, screening duties cannot be carried out unless the opponent is driven off his ground. Therefore, 'The duty of the Cavalry must be to seek to bring about collision with that of the enemy,' in order to gain superiority at the outset.

During the further course of the war, raids against the enemy's lines of communication may be called for; or our own Cavalry may have to defeat such projects.

Raids depend, for success, on rapidity, adequate strength, fresh horses, mobile supply.

Cavalry, to fulfil its chief duties, must be employed in force. Therefore, detachments must be economised. 'As much Cavalry as possible is to be organised for strategical independence, and as little as is expedient retained for the Infantry divisions.'

The weaker the Army is in Cavalry, the more sparingly should that Arm be used for secondary purposes.

Cyclists will usefully supplement the Divisional Cavalry.

To beat the enemy's Cavalry out of the field, and, later, to deal with Infantry detachments or an insurgent population, great concentration of Cavalry is required. Even Cavalry Corps are contemplated.

For such large bodies there can be laid down no conventional formations—such as that in three lines—nor any hard-and-fast rules.



It is not necessary that the large units be permanently grouped. The supreme commander must group his Cavalry according to requirements; so that 'forces may not remain unutilised in one place whilst they may be most urgently required in another.'

Only general principles can be laid down for the strategical employment of Cavalry.

Normal formations are deprecated.

Briefly, every strategical operation requires a certain extension; but the combat itself demands concentration.

If the duty is to secure and screen, extension and sub-division ensue.

Even in reconnaissance extension may be necessary, when lengthy obstacles are to be overcome; or, in open country, circumstances may dictate it. Thus, after the battle of Gravelotte (August 18, 1870), a wide area was swept, to ascertain whether MacMahon was marching N.E. or not. 'To attempt such tasks with patrols alone is unadvisable, for these always require a certain tactical force behind them.'

Still, the enemy, too, will have a screen. To be able to tear this aside it will generally be best, in opposition to the principles laid down for mere security, to keep concentrated in groups or masses, the necessary extension in breadth being obtained by reconnoiting patrols.

Tactically, concentration guarantees success. Strategically, it allows greater freedom of manœuvre. But every principle has its limitations. Expediency is the only law.

All detachments should report to headquarters, and, to ensure combination, should inform adjacent columns. But the Cavalry fight is so rapid that, even with the best system of communication, intelligence will arrive after the event. Therefore 'Any attempt to concentrate strategically against an enemy in movement without at some point fighting to gain time must be dismissed as illusory.' In such cases 'We must not hesitate to take to the rifle.'

With a view to co-operation between columns it is important to march to the sound of the guns. These, therefore, must not be permitted to fire without good cause.

The General must, himself, judge where the chief weight of his mission lies. He must assume responsibility; and, to spare his troops the excessive exertions resulting from changes of strategical direction, he must 'exercise such prevision that he can never be overtaken by circumstances.'

The Cavalry leader should endeavour to see with his own eyes, and 'base his designs on first-hand evidence.' But this will not suffice without a practically organised system of reconnaissance, which must be supplemented by an equally practical system of security.

'Both security and reconnaissance, in so far as both depend on patrols, will only work successfully when they are based on a thoroughly systematised method of procedure.'

Reconnoitring patrols regulate their movements by those of the enemy.

Security patrols choose their positions with reference to the force they cover.

The reconnoitring patrols will be 'divided from the first into strategical and tactical patrols, according as to whether they are intended to find the enemy's main Army or to beat his Cavalry.'

Strategical patrols ride through the opposing screen to locate the marching columns. It is wrong to say to them, 'Keep in touch with the enemy.' They must be given a time limit, and their reliefs should start before that limit has expired; otherwise we use up our officers rapidly, and perhaps ineffectually.

The tactical patrols, which, through lack of officers, will often be led by non-commissioned officers, have the enemy's Cavalry as their object. They will have to fight and drive back the opposing patrols. They, too, will be relieved at intervals.

For permanent tactical observation of a yet distant foe whole squadrons may be used. These form a 'patrol reserve and collecting station for information.'



As the Armies approach, the large bodies of Cavalry draw off to the flanks. 'In front of the Armies, reconnaissance now falls to the divisional Cavalry,' strategically and tactically.

The independent Cavalry still reconnoitres to the adversary's flanks and rear, if the hostile Cavalry has already been beaten. If it has not been beaten, a decision must be attempted; reconnaissance being left to strong patrols, who, at this stage, must not avoid the enemy.

Reconnaissance cannot ensure safety. There will be 'strategical patrols far in advance, tactical patrols and security patrols, which latter, when the main body is halted, become the standing outposts.' But when independent Cavalry is moving, the tactical reconnoitring patrols lessen the need for security patrols.

Detached patrols will have to send in their reports by several men. Only closely supported patrols can use the despatch rider before the opposing Cavalry is beaten.

The reconnoitring squadrons will be connected with the main body by carefully disposed relays and collecting stations. In periods of rapid movement, too much is not to be expected from telegraph equipment.

Cyclists will be used to carry all messages to the rear, where roads exist; for 'No Cavalry soldier should be allowed to ride to the rear without pressing circumstances.'

The lie of the roads must decide which groups are to report direct to headquarters.

STRATEGY. THE PEACE TRAINING

The real duties of Cavalry in war, those pertaining to the independent Cavalry, are difficult to practise in peace time.

However, one subject, 'which lies at the bottom of all Cavalry undertakings,' can be taught systematically; that is, the conduct of patrols combined with the principles of scouting.

The individuality of the man must be developed, and the education of the non-commissioned officer be systematically undertaken.

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The practical exercises of the squadron must be based on the requirements of war on a large scale. 'The combined action of Cavalry with companies, battalions and regiments has no importance at all.'

Training for war can only be achieved by strategical exercises of large and changing units. In these, the conditions of mobilisation are to be insisted on, or we learn to underestimate the difficulties of real war.

But permanent organisation of divisions in peace time is not recommended, as it is apt to produce rigidity of drill and manœuvre.

THE TACTICAL USE OF CAVALRY IN WAR

Though dismounted action has grown in importance, 'upon the battle-field the actual collision of Cavalry masses remains the predominant factor.'

The right use of 'cold steel' depends on the leader; but great results can only be gained by 'numerically formidable masses,' thoroughly trained, which must be directed against such forces of the enemy as are, at the time and place, sufficiently important. 'Single squadrons, regiments or brigades hardly count in the scale of a great decision.'

The leader should be well to the front before the attack, to see for himself. He should not charge, in person, until he puts in his last reserve; and, even then, not if there are any dispersed troops to be rallied. But he must judge when to break rules and lead personally.

In the attack, great independence must be granted to the subordinate leaders; and forms of evolution should be simple and clear.

Signals and bugle calls cannot be widely used. Verbal transmission of orders is the only safe means; therefore the movements prescribed by Regulations are to be elementary, generally applicable, and such as require few words of com-



mand. Fixed evolutions are harmful. Principles alone are essential.

Discarding fixed formations; for example, the 'three line' convention; the commander arranges his units in adequate depth. His subordinates have the free handling of their commands, and his mind is unhampered by stereotyped formations based on numbers or organisations liable to vary. He chooses the 'momentarily most favourable form of attack.'

The adoption of 'outer lines' gives access to the enemy's flanks and line of retreat.

When there is time the assault by wings is recommended—from some such formation as the 'double column.'

On the battle-field, the Cavalry must range forward and to the flank, with a constant view to the offensive. So, it is best placed to accept the 'inevitable challenge of the enemy's Cavalry.'

The 'Cavalry duel' is a necessity. 'It is only the defeat of the enemy's horse which can open the door for further successful action against his other troops.'

Rapid rallying is necessary for pursuit.

Self-sacrifice is insisted on; but 'one should never allow oneself to be induced to undertake charges in which the probable losses bear no reasonable proportion to the possible results.'

The leader must have a 'complete intellectual command of the situation,' keeping clearly in mind the strategical possibilities and the geographical conditions.

TACTICS. THE PEACE TRAINING

'The foundation of all sound tactical training will remain now, as ever, the school of the squadron.'

In drilling the squadron, paces must be so practised as to become mechanical. Forms of movement and attack, executed in any direction, and rapid rallying, must be practised until their application becomes instinctive.

The cardinal points in attacking are 'Utmost speed consistent



with closely locked files against Cavalry, a natural extended gallop against Infantry or Artillery.'

With regiments and larger bodies the available forces should be grouped by Wings. The regimental 'Double Column' is preferred to the 'Line of squadron columns.'

A valuable list of Tactical Principles is given (pp. 231-235).

Commanders must be thoroughly trained in handling masses with certainty and precision; therefore all Brigades should be given 'an annual opportunity of exercising as part of the higher units.'

DISMOUNTED ACTION IN WAR

Though hitherto the firearm in the hands of Cavalry has been restricted practically to the Defence, it will hereafter be often a weapon of attack—e.g. to break down resistance in reconnaissance and strategical pursuits.

It is only in the fire-fight that it is possible to discontinue an attack at will, to resume it at another point.

Cavalry must not shrink from 'An obstinate fight on foot.' Time or expediency will often forbid the employment of its mobility to circumvent points of resistance. The fire of Horse Artillery will not suffice to clear the road. 'Even a determined Cavalry will have to make use of its firearms almost every day.'

The offensive is all-important, even on foot. Cavalry must be able to attack exactly like Infantry; but, for this, powerful support by Artillery is indispensable.

It is pointed out that, so long as the Cavalry masses are in front of the Army, they can be freely supplied with Horse batteries; so, too, after a victory or defeat.

In the attack, the ultimate purpose has to be remembered. Therefore the horses must follow the men, one man being left with every four horses. This 'mobile' form of attack can only be abandoned when, by force of circumstance, a strong mounted reserve is desirable; or when the number of rifles will, otherwise, be insufficient.



On the defensive, a greater proportion of men may be dismounted; thus allowing a larger mounted reserve, from other units, to be used for a possible pursuit.

When ground favours, and when the intention is only to harass, led horses may be close up; but, usually, a prolonged fire-action implies a prolonged separation from them.

'A fire-action, once accepted, must be carried out to the end; unless the arrival of fresh troops on the flank makes its interruption possible.' The horses must be screened by ground or by a mounted reserve.

The duties of the mounted reserve are discussed; and the attack and defence of localities are carefully considered.

DISMOUNTED ACTION—THE PEACE TRAINING

Training for dismounted action should be as 'thorough and earnest' as for mounted action.

Special importance is attached to field-firing based on sound tactical schemes.

Practice in large bodies—Regiments, Brigades, and Divisions—is not to be neglected.

We shall only be fit to 'meet the changed conditions of War when the superior officers in their inspections attach as much importance to the combat dismounted as they now do to the fight in the saddle.'

HORSE ARTILLERY IN WAR

A bold employment of the Horse Artillery is advocated. It should be sent 'well out in front of the Cavalry,' to anticipate the hostile batteries, protection being ensured by mounted detachments.

In the mounted attack its effect can be but transient; and, though important, not decisive.

The chief *rôle* of Horse Artillery with Cavalry is in support of dismounted action, both in attack and defence.

THE HORSE

The supply of trained horses will be a great difficulty; but raw horses are useless in War. Hence the value of a depôt squadron, for training horses as well as recruits.

Horses cannot be broken in by 'short cuts.'

Individual training and individual inspection of both horse and man are enjoined.

The essential requirement is that the horse shall be made absolutely obedient to the rider.

The question of feeding, in Peace and War, is gone into somewhat minutely.

The advantage of an annual rest for horses is suggested.

On service the horse needs rest, especially at night, even more than the soldier; therefore, bivouacs should not be resorted to if shelter is available.

Even on the field of battle, the horse must have water, food, and some rest.

- 'In normal conditions, demands should not be made upon Cavalry which would be justified only in moments of a crisis.'
- 'Cavalry which has been properly nursed will be capable of exertions far beyond what could be expected of troops less thoughtfully managed.'

THE HIGHER EDUCATION OF THE OFFICER

Everything depends upon the leader. 'A comprehensive military education and at least a general grasp of the principles of the Higher Strategy are essential for every reconnoitring officer.'

A high standard of horsemanship is indispensable. The remainder must be acquired in the daily training of the men, in Field Service duties, manœuvres and cavalry exercises, supplemented by war games and staff tours.

'A STAFF OFFICER'S SCRAP-BOOK'*

THE interest which was aroused by General Hamilton's first volume will be more than sustained by the second instalment, which has just appeared, of his account of all that he witnessed and learnt with the First Army under Kuroki.

The writer gives us a rare insight into the working of the Japanese Staff and of the respective qualifications demanded of the Commander and Staff Officer. We learn how little the Japanese soldiers are influenced by the personality of their leaders, and how the old feudal feeling has produced a respect for officers only as a caste, and not as individuals; we are told, and reading we believe, that the extraordinary modesty of the Japanese in every hour of their success is really due to the pride which refused for one moment to believe that they could possibly It is noteworthy and interesting to find that General Hamilton holds that had the Russians possessed a magnetic, brilliant, adored commander—one like Skobeleff—the Japanese might have found that 'there is an element in Western warfare which they have not yet been called upon to count'; while there is, too, significance in the opinion of a Japanese Colonel who said that 'Russia, above all nations, should have provided herself with a long-service, voluntarily enlisted army, and in that case we should have encountered a very different type of fighting man in our different battles.'

Sir Ian Hamilton pays a soldierly tribute to the bravery of both combatants, but of the Japanese he tells us that theirs 'is not precisely a counterpart of Western valour'; there is 'more conscious self-sacrifice; less Berserker joy of battle and longing to do some glorious deed. . . . The faces of the two races'

[•] Vol. II. By Sir Ian Hamilton, K.C.B. London: Edward Arnold. 1907.

(British and Japanese) 'as they advance to the attack wear very different expressions.'

The Cavalryman who turns over the pages of this book in search of 'lessons' will gather from a glance at Captain Vincent's most excellent sketches that the First Army could have had but little use for Cavalry; as he reads his impressions will be confirmed—'a wild jungle of peaks, ridges, and ravines. It was a sort of country suitable for very young men or wild goats.' A country where field guns could not move until roads had first been made; where infantry could often only clamber on hands and knees; 'endless ranges of mountains,' and in the valleys 'kaoliung crops from eight to ten feet high.' But all the same there appears to have been at times and on both sides a lack of initiative, as on September 3 at the battle of Liaoyang, where the Japanese Cavalry accomplished nothing against the Russian right, while the passage of the river by the 12th Japanese Division was watched by small parties of Russian Cavalry without firing a shot, although there was a convenient valley by which an enterprising commander might have made a dash upon the bridges. At Penchiho, however, on the extreme Japanese right, at the battle of the Shaho, the 2nd Japanese Cavalry Brigade was used in a manner and at a moment possible only to the mounted arm, and successfully relieved a dangerous pressure at a moment of great tension. That the very partial employment of Cavalry with the First Army has not been accepted as an argument in disfavour of that arm, is proved by the statement that the Japanese War Commission has recommended the formation of eight divisions of Cavalry, the establishment of Government horse farms, and the purchase of large numbers of horses in England, France, Germany, and Austria.

And what of the lessons of the war? Sir Ian Hamilton would seem to have come to the same conclusion as was voiced by Sir John French at Aldershot at the close of Col. Haldane's lecture on the war in Manchuria—'that we may become less jealous and egotistical, and more loyal and disinterested towards our own brother-officers. This is the great lesson of the war.'

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RECENT PUBLICATIONS

'THE JOURNAL OF THE UNITED STATES CAVALRY ASSOCIATION'

January 1907.—' Machine Guns in the Russian Army during the Campaign in Manchuria.' The conclusions drawn by Lieut.-Colonel Macomb should be of interest to the mounted branches:—

- 1. The machine gun played a useful but not a great part in the war.
- 2. Two thousand yards was the limit of its effective battle range.
- 3. It could not contend against artillery.
- 4. Its average power is equivalent to about fifty riflemen.
- 5. It is not a trustworthy weapon when used singly, and as a general rule should never be so employed.
- 6. Its most valuable quality is that it supplies a means of suddenly and unexpectedly increasing the volume of fire without overcrowding the firing line, thus greatly extending the scope and flexibility of the fire action.
- 7. Its greatest physical and moral effect is produced when it is employed suddenly against massed troops, such as infantry in close order, artillery limbered, cavalry mounted, or in enfilading lines of any kind. It is, in general, impossible to foresee when and where such opportunities will arise. Hence the best organisation is that which distributes the machine guns among the fighting units so as to take instant advantage of an opportunity without making a good target for the enemy, the smallest permissible machine-gun unit being a detachment of two guns.
- 8. Machine guns should not be kept in the firing line, but held in reserve until the opportune moment arrives. They should on no account be permitted to fritter away their ammunition in doing work belonging to the firing line or which can better be done by specially detailed sharpshooters. The commander of a unit will fight his men with redoubled confidence if he feels that, at a critical moment, he has in hand an easily controllable means of instantly increasing his volume of fire by a company or more.
- 9. When the commander of a superior unit foresees that to accomplish certain results it is advisable to mass the guns, the small detachments may be united by his order and under his direction. There should be on the staff of every such chief an officer capable of taking command of the combined detachments. He should be a trained mitrailleur.
- 10. The value of the machine gun in defensive positions, covering defiles and the like, has been generally admitted. In reality it is equally valuable on the offensive or defensive to an active moving force which knows how to use it.



'The German Manœuvres.'—Lieut. Gordon Johnston of the (Cavalry) Signal Corps makes the following observations:—

As to their Cavalry in general, their mount is excellent, their equipment is good and serviceable, the horses are beautifully trained and the men well disciplined. They travel fast and cover great distances. I followed their Cavalry division many miles and never saw a horseshoe cast on the road, nor any part of horse or trooper equipment lost.

'I noticed particularly the use of the double rein with which they are equipped, and did not observe any confusion of the reins or that the trooper had any difficulty in handling them under any conditions. As their right hand is always occupied by the lance, they never use it on the reins, except in shifting them. In fact, the men carried their hands well down with a good feel of the snaffle and a light one of the curb.

'Although I saw many charges and counter-charges, mêlées and races in pursuit, I never saw a single horse bolt or become unmanageable, and there were ninety-five squadrons in the field in almost contant use.

'The use of fire action was very limited. I saw only one instance in which troopers were dismounted, and heard of no other. They charged constantly with the lance, and may be counted upon to do so often and boldly.'

'The Fort Riley Camp of Instruction, 1906.'—Lieut. Edward Davis, Eleventh Cavalry, gives a full account of the work carried out and details of the various departments concerned, with notes on new inventions, equipment, etc. His comments on Cavalry work are instructive and contain some useful lessons:—

Of great interest to cavalrymen was the 'Cavalry Screen' exercise, said to be the first attempt in this country to carry out such an extended exercise since the Civil War. The screen was designed to cover a front of ten miles, and consisted of twenty-five troops in all, with Signal and Hospital Corps detachments. Considering the difficulty met in shape of barbed-wire fences and private lands, after the troops left the reservation boundary, this was a fairly successful demonstration of the cavalry screen.

Another interesting feature was the work of the Horse Artillery in conjunction with the Cavalry. An accomplished Artilleryman, detailed to observe this feature, remarked that most 'Blue' and 'Brown' commanders neglected to keep in touch with their Artillery commanders, leaving them without information as to the commander's general plan of action, and unable, therefore, to contribute in full measure to the success of the operation. He advanced a remedy for this fault, recommending that the senior Artillery officers accompany the commander, thus keeping in touch at all times with the reports from the entire field of action, and being able to advise as to the use of the Artillery, the actual placing and operation of the guns being left, in the meantime, with his subordinates. He cautioned against the tendency of commanders to divide their Artillery, prematurely or without urgent necessity, and disapproved the rushing of Artillery into exposed positions early in the action, remarking in this connection, 'The proper use of the Artillery is as a support for the Cavalry, and not as a screen for its movements.' The mobility of the Horse Artillery in the manœuvres may best be described by quoting from the remarks of one of the battery commanders, who said in reporting on one of the Cavalry actions: 'When once the action began events moved at such a rapid rate that it was impossible for me to note the exact time at which the battery engaged the enemy. * * * The guns were placed in position at a gallop, the horses being exposed not more than forty seconds.'

The acquisition of the new rifle by the Cavalry caused the appearance of a variety of experimental methods of packing the saddle. Most Cavalry commanders expressed themselves as not being quite satisfied with any of the new distributions of equipment on the saddle, deeming still further experiment a great necessity. The man who can devise a method of carrying the new rifle with comfort and handiness for the soldier and with perfect equalisation of weight on the saddle will prove himself a great benefactor to the Cavalry.

'LE SPECTATEUR MILITAIRE'

General Pédoya has an article (to be continued) in the February number on 'The Cavalry in the Russo-Japanese War.' The memories of 1812 gave rise to the impression that the redoubtable Cossacks would sweep all before them, as in the past, more especially as the mounted forces of Japan were so numerically insufficient, and their employment had hitherto been regarded as a military question of secondary importance. During the whole war the Japanese Cavalry never rose above fifty squadrons, or about 8,000 men. What was not to be expected from the innumerable Cavalry of Russia in such circumstances, and under leaders like Michtchenko, Rennenkampf, Grekow and Samsonoff? Look at the results—General Pédoya traces the sorry tale through the various events and battles. At Moukden, the last great battle of the war, the Russian Cavalry was at that time at the zenith of its numerical strength, yet it neither fulfilled its proper rôle, before, during, or after that disastrous battle.

KAVALLERISTISCHE MONATSHEFTE

Since we reviewed the opening number of the new Austrian Cavalry Journal in our last issue we have received three more numbers—those for December, January and February—and find that the new publication more than maintains the high standard of interest and excellence upon which we have previously A capital paper on the 'Swedish Cavalry' runs through the December and January issues, and from this it would seem that if the Swedish cavalryman undergoes a training which, even to Continental ideas, is very brief, he is at any rate drawn from an excellent agricultural class, has been used to horses all his life, while he is also of an exceptionally high order of intelligence. In an article on 'Mounted Infantry,' Rittmeister von Mengerssen, of the 14th Hussars, enunciates ideas which, if not revolutionary, go at any rate much further than does the most fanatical supporter of Mounted Infantry in this country. With us the tendency was-at one time-to turn our Cavalry into Mounted Infantry; von Mengerssen would reverse the process and make the mounted infantry soldier into a cavalryman, place a sword in his hand, and teach him the mounted attack. As might be expected, these views have not been ventilated without evoking a reply, which appears in the February number. The December number contains a short paper on the packs of hounds maintained, partly at Government expense, for the benefit of the ten regiments of Honved



Hussars; there is, too, a brief description of the Bulgarian Cavalry, showing what can be done with a people who are not naturally horsemen, who themselves breed nothing bigger than a hill pony, and whose country is, for the most part too mountainous for Cavalry movements.

In the January number Major-General von Gemmingsen, commanding the 5th Cavalry Brigade, writes on the supreme value of 'initiative' among Cavalry officers, while a brother-brigadier, von Maltzahn, draws attention to the need for increased practice in the movement of mounted bodies by night, contending that the worse the climatic conditions and the more intense the darkness, the more valuable for active-service training is the experience to be gleaned from such exercises. Another officer in discussing 'the Cavalry fire-fight on a large scale,' considers at some length the Russian raid upon the railway line about Inkow during the war in Manchuria. Short papers on the Cavalry of foreign armies appear to be rather a happy feature of the Austrian Cavalry Journal—'Horsebreeding and Horse-supply in the Italian Army' is to be found in the January number, while 'The Cavalry Training of French Officers' is discussed in that for February. Some of the articles in the February number are perhaps of less general interest to the foreigner than are others, but there is a very stirring account of the part taken in the great Cavalry charge at Mars la Tour by the Seydlitz Cuirassiers from a contemporary letter by one of the survivors; it is full of the echo of the tumult of the charge, of 'the trampling and the hum.' paper on 'Cavalry on Outpost' will repay perusal. Each number contains some useful veterinary hints and notes for those who are at any time engaged in the dual occupation of purchasing at once their own horses—and their own experience.

It would greatly assist reference if the management of this Journal would give page numbers in the 'table of contents' of each number.

BLACKWOOD'S MAGAZINE

The January number contains an article on Seydlitz, every line of which is full of example to the many Cavalry officers in our own Army who have all the energy, all the capacity, and all the natural dispositions which should make them worthy rivals of this great Cavalry leader. Those who would like to learn more of this remarkable man than can be condensed in a magazine article will find two books in the Cavalry Club Library to help them—'Life of Seydlitz,' by Capt. R. N. Lumley, 2nd Life Guards, 1852, and 'Vie de Seydlitz,' translated by Delaclause, Paris, 1869.

'One of the most distinguished officers in our own Service has said that 'the hunting man is already more than a half-made soldier,' and in every country, at all times, the best soldiers have ever shown themselves the most devoted sportsmen. Seydlitz was no exception. All his brief moments of leisure were given to the chase, his horses were the best that could be procured, his hounds were as good as his horses, and he expected all the young officers of his regiment to be as keen as himself.'



'HINTS ON HORSES'

Major H. P. Young, late 4th Bombay Cavalry, has published a useful little book entitled 'Hints on Horses,' with short notes on Camels and pack animals, also a few practical suggestions on the training of Polo ponies, and players, and some useful Farm hints.

Chapter I. contains many useful 'tips' on buying a horse, and on its conformation.

Stable management is well dealt with in Chapter II., also Long Distance Riding.—'On service it may fall to your lot to carry important dispatches—railroads and telegraph lines cut, and the message must reach its destination. These long-distance rides were tried one year in the Bombay Cavalry, and as I had to conduct one I offer the lesson I learnt. (Poona to Malegaon viâ Ahmednagar.) The distance set was 184 miles; the strength of the party one officer and six men, with one horse each; the distance was done in $60\frac{1}{2}$ hours, the horses carried over 13 st.

- '1. Choose horses from seven to nine years old.
- '2. Choose horses with good feet and good constitutions and that are known to be good feeders.
 - '3. Reject any horse that stumbles in his walk; this is very important.
 - '4. The horses require no training, but they must be in hard condition.
 - '5. Reject horses that are liable to girth galling, etc.'

Chapter III. on Shoeing and Foot diseases.

'No. 4 nail means 1,000 nails weigh 4 lbs., No. 5 nail means 1,000 nails weigh 5 lbs.'

Chapter IV. Diseases and injuries.

Chapter V. Cleaning brown harness and saddlery, etc.

The author concludes with some useful notes on horse-breaking, and suggestions on the training of Polo ponies, also showing how, by good management, a regiment or club can have perfect ponies for the big tournament at little expense.

'OUR SONGLESS ARMY'

Under this heading, Surgeon General G. J. H. Evatt, C.B., has published a short pamphlet proposing to develop the singing of marching songs, part songs, choral societies, etc., by the soldiers of our regular or auxiliary forces. In support of the proposal a collection of opinions of many distinguished soldiers and musicians is given.

'WITH MOUNTED INFANTRY IN TIBET'

By Brevet Major W. J. Ottley, 34th Sikh Pioneers. London: Smith, Elder & Co., 1906.

A pleasant account of the campaign, especially with reference to the deeds of the very serviceable little body of Mounted Infantry which formed so important a unit in the Tibet expeditionary force.

It is perhaps to be regretted, considering the few opportunities which the Indian Cavalry have of seeing active service, compared with the other two arms,

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that it was not found convenient to detail a couple of squadrons of a good shooting Cavalry corps for the mounted work of the expedition.

'MILITARY PANORAMA DRAWING IN THREE LESSONS,' ETC.

By Capt. R. F. Pearson, 'The Buffs.' Published by Gale & Polden, Aldershot, price 1s. 6d. (net). This should be a very useful little book to those who aspire to produce intelligible panorama sketches, now that the close reconnaissance of a position is acknowledged to be so increasingly difficult. It is very concise, and is illustrated by diagrams.

'MILITARY SKETCHING AND MAP READING FOR N.C.O.s AND MEN'

By Capt. R. F. Legge, The Leinster Regiment, published by Gale & Polden, Aldershot, price 1s. 6d., is a clear and concise work written with the idea of assisting N.C.O.s and men who are keen on sketching, to master the details which are usually dealt with by Instructors, Squadron Officers, etc., in their lectures.

'WAR WITH DISEASE'

By Frederick F. Maccabe, M.B. etc. Published by Baillière, Tindall & Cox, 8 Henrietta Street, London. A second edition of this useful book has recently been issued, which contains an additional lecture on 'Health and Fitness.' The hints therein complete the knowledge which everyone should possess if he wishes to keep healthy and fit during life, and are especially useful to officers instructing their men in personal hygiene.

'THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR'

Compiled by the General Staff, War Office. Part 1. (1s. 6d. Wyman.) The first part deals with the events leading to the war, the strength of the belligerents, the theatre of war, and the operations up to and including the battle of the Ya-lu, with five maps, three of which illustrate this battle.

All available information, with the exception of such matter as it has been considered necessary to withhold, has been utilised. Criticism has been excluded.

A very clear account of the operations is given; and as the book is likely to be the only authoritative one in English for some years to come, it is recommended to the notice of officers, especially those who have promotion examinations before them.

'QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS FOR CAVALRY,' ETC.

By Major C. H. Anderson-Pelham, Lincolnshire Imperial Yeomanry (late 12th Lancers). Published by Gale & Polden, Aldershot, price 9d.

A fourth edition revised from official books has just been issued and comes out most opportunely for the forthcoming Yeomanry Trainings, where officers and N.C.O.s will find it of great assistance in instructing their men.



A SUGGESTION ON THE QUESTION OF STATION VETERINARY HOSPITALS, ETC.

By Major G. K. Ansell, Brigade-Major 3rd Cavalry Brigade.

A STATION VETERINARY HOSPITAL, to form the nucleus of a Field Veterinary Hospital, has been organised in some stations.

To each is attached a staff of N.C.O.s and men of the Army Veterinary Corps who deal with any horse requiring treatment whilst the regimental and squadron farriers have no longer any practice in dressing injuries.

Let us think out and discuss this question, making war efficiency our sole objective.

- 1. What are our requirements in this direction?
- (a) A good standard of horsemastership amongst squadron and troop leaders, assisted by the squadron farriers.
 - (b) A system of Field Veterinary Hospitals.
- With (a) we shall be able to keep our horses alive and at work much longer than with officers and squadron farriers unpractised in the art of horse-mastership.
- With (b) those horses temporarily disabled can be collected together and properly treated instead of being dragged about behind their regiments.
- 2. We require, therefore, to find the peace organisation most likely to conduce to the above.
 - (a) Did our old system fulfil all we required in this matter?
- No. There were no Station Veterinary Hospitals established in peace which could be automatically developed into Field Veterinary Hospitals in war; and these latter cannot be suddenly improvised when war comes.
 - (b) On the other hand, does our present system do this?
- No. Though providing the organisation for Field Veterinary Hospitals in peace, it aims at the same time a direct and deliberate blow at horsemastership amongst the combatant officers in the Cavalry and their squadron farriers.

At present, if a horse goes sick or requires the simplest treatment, it is taken out of the hands of the squadron commander and his farriers, who have no further responsibility in the matter until the horse is returned to them cured.

Possibly this is better for the horse at the moment, but it will not conduce to obtaining and keeping up to a good standard of horsemastership.

However well the combatant officers and farriers may be taught, their instruction will be nothing but theory: practice will be denied them. And, in

war, when the veterinary surgeon may be overworked or unavailable on the spot, the horses must suffer to the detriment of the field army as a whole, and consequently to our national interests.

3 If neither of the above systems conduces to what we want, what will meet the case?

The squadron commander to be given the task of looking after his horses, treating on his own responsibility any minor case which he may decide he can deal with, and sending the others to the Station Veterinary Hospital.

This is nothing more than what a horse owner in civil life does, and is what our squadron commanders will have to do in war.

Against it there is the argument that a horse or two may occasionally in peace be so wrongly treated as to be lost. But what does this matter, compared with the thousands who will be thrown away in war by combatant officers incompetent as regards horsemastership? And squadron commanders are almost bound to be incompetent in this matter if they are acknowledged so in peace, and given no responsibility in the treatment of their horses.

As stated above, the present system aims a direct blow at horsemastership. It forms a prop for an ignorant squadron commander to lean upon. Surely we can set ourselves to act up to a higher ideal than this.

Our squadron commanders in war will constantly not only have the lives of their horses but also of their men in their hands. And we shall certainly never bring them up to a standard to fit them for such responsibility, if in peace we are afraid to allow them to treat the minor ailments of the horses in their squadrons.

Put the responsibility on the squadron commander as to whether he can treat each sick horse or not, and any case beyond him he will send to the Station Veterinary Hospital.

For those he decides he can treat, give him a small allowance of dressings and drugs, or money in lieu.

This system could be worked absolutely under the supervision of the Army Veterinary Corps, who should make more inspections than they do now, and come more in touch with the combatant officer than the present system allows them to.

In this way it would strengthen rather than weaken the position of the army veterinary surgeon.

Whilst not only raising the standard of horsemastership amongst Cavalry officers it will also indirectly raise that of horsemanship; since, by its adoption, those Cavalry officers who take their pleasures on foot, both in winter and summer, and who never get on a horse except when they are obliged to, and who, in consequence, have no real love or sympathy with a horse in their natures (there are, unfortunately, few regiments in our Service without the names of some such 'horse soldiers' appearing on their lists), will have a better chance of being left behind, or pushed completely out of the race than they have now.

NOTES

HOW TO TRAIN A POLO PONY

WE have received a spirited protest from Colonel Peyton, 15th Hussars, against the imputations conveyed in Captain Miller's article on the above subject in the January Cavalry Journal regarding the horsemanship of some Cavalry officers.

While fully sympathising with Colonel Peyton we are convinced that the writer of the article was not impelled by any carping spirit, but rather by a sense of duty, as with a man who, when he thinks there is the slightest sign of a leak in a vessel, draws attention to it before the mischief goes too far—and often gets sworn at for his pains.

It is generally a good thing, though it may not always be a pleasing thing, to see ourselves as others see us.

THE SCOTS GREYS AT BLENHEIM

In response to our query as to the correctness of the statement that the Scots Greys attacked on foot at Blenheim, we have received a number of replies, all showing conclusively that such attack did not take place there, but that it occurred some six weeks earlier at Schellenburg, on the Danube.

The mistake occurred in the title of the picture; and there were also two minor errors in the picture itself, viz.:—

Brigadier-General Rowe led the Scots Fusiliers, and not the Scots Greys.

The Greys did not wear the headdress assigned to them in that scene.

The replies have been so good and complete that it is almost impossible to assign the prize to any one competitor on the merits of the papers sent in. We have therefore decided to give it to the reply which was first received, being that of the junior of those who were good enough to write, and hope that this may meet with the approval of the other competitors.

The winner of the 2l. 2s. is, therefore:—

Sergeant H. N. Forbes, 5th Lancers.

The papers sent by the following were very highly commended :-

Lieutenant and Quartermaster Laughton, 21st Lancers.

Major Wilcox, 3rd Hussars.

Lieutenant B. E. Sargeaunt, 22nd Middlesex V.R.C.

Major H. G. Purdon, late Loyal North Lancashire Regiment.



BREAD AS A FOOD FOR HORSES

Colonel J. A. Nunn, C.I.E., D.S.O., A.V.D., P.V.O. in India, writes:-

In parts of the Continent bread is the ordinary food for horses, and is preferred to grain by many owners, as it is said to have a higher feeding value. It was used in England in the Middle Ages; indeed, one of the grievances against Richard II. was that he granted monopolies for the baking and sale of horse-bread in London and other cities to his favourites.

In the Austrian Tyrol it is the staple food of the diligence horse, and few animals work harder or work better. It is made of a mixture of oats and rye, baked in the autumn and stored for use, when it becomes hard as a stone, but it is eaten freely, and relished. The loaves are the usual long-shaped ones seen on the Continent, and when used are cut up into slices.

From time to time interesting experiments have been made, with the object of increasing the feeding value, by adding molasses and the refuse from sugar factories to the bread. Some experiments lately carried out in Belgium with bread made of oats and molasses, baked by steam, proved very satisfactory, both from a nourishing and an economical point of view. It was also noticed that with the introduction of horse-bread, fever in the feet and other inflammatory diseases greatly diminished.

A compressed food that is more portable than grain is badly wanted in the English Cavalry as an *emergency* ration, but for this purpose only, not as a *substitute* for hay and oats.

The number of patent horse and cattle foods on the market is simply legion, and many, according to the proprietors, will do anything. During the South African war there were some remarkable stories as to the various uses to which such articles could be put, one gentleman, a brickmaker by profession, being the owner of a compound that not only superseded hay and oats altogether, but would, at the same time, prevent snake-bite and sea-sickness, not only in beast, but man.

Certain trials with compressed food have been made in England, it is true, but in a very perfunctory manner, and usually it has been condemned beforehand. In the Russian Army, some years ago, a biscuit was introduced with a hole in the centre, by which a number could be strung together. They were well reported on at the time, but whether anything more was ever heard of them I am not now in a position to say. There was no sugar in the composition of these biscuits, as its commercial value as a feeding-stuff for animals was not then realised.

While mentioning sugar, I may say that for some time past I have abandoned the practice of giving gruel at roadside inns to my own horses when returning home after hunting, and substitute a handful of brown sugar in half a bucketful of chilled water. Properly made, gruel from well-boiled linseed or oat meal cannot be beaten; but the ordinary public-house compound, made of raw wheat flour stirred up in tepid water, is, in my opinion, an abomination. The system being exhausted, the raw starch grains are not properly digested, and act as an irritant, and I am certain are accountable for many cases of colic, indigestion, and fever in the feet. I find the sugar acts as a 'pick-me-up,' and horses come home better on it than gruel.

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On the Continent, sugar is daily coming more into use as a horse food, and, contrary to the general opinion held in England, it has been found by experience that fast work can be done on it. In the long-distance rides that are practised in the French Army the horses get sugar while in training, and a detailed account of some of them will be found in a work by M. Ed. Curot, Veterinary Surgeon to the Paris General Omnibus Company, 'L'alimentation du Cheval.'

A NEW EQUIPMENT

Mr. Roger Pocock gives us some account of the equipment which has been adopted for the Legion of Frontiersmen.

For headdress the choice lay between the two types of slouch hat worn by cowboys—flat-brim and soft-brim stetsons; and we adopted both, as each command prefers. The important part is the bootlace, tied behind the head, which lets plenty of air into the crown and prevents the hat from blowing off. The eyes are perfectly sheltered without blinkers.

To prevent sunstroke, which comes from exposing the base of the skull, and to keep off flies, we adopted our customary scarf round the neck—a light silk handkerchief, colour varying with the command.

A shirt, being closed down the front and at the wrists, is warmer than double its weight of tunic. It is readily washed. When weathered it takes on protective shades of colouring. It adapts itself to a varying amount of underwear, according to the weather. It allows a man to ride supple.

Our mountain commands in British Columbia are adopting duck overalls and field boots; but those in England have chosen gear which the men possess—breeches, brown leggings and highlows. Our men provide their own kit, and this saves expense.

The English spur has a sharp rowel, which limits its use to mere punishment. Our men prefer the American cowboy spur, with its large rowel and blunt points, as more merciful. It has uses in gentle guidance and encouragement; but its main value is that, locked in a string girth, it enables a man to take cover behind the body and neck of his horse.

We are concerned to do away with shoulder bandoliers, straps, and other constraints upon the lungs. To this end we have adopted a cartridge-belt resting on the left hip and slanting loose down to the right thigh, where the revolver is carried. The holster is open, to provide for quick drawing and prevent sand and dust from lodging. We have in the Royal North-West Mounted Police of Canada found that sidearms of this type, weighing eight pounds, can be carried continually for 168 hours without serious galling, whereas if worn tight the belt would disable a man in a day. The occasion of this test was a week on provost guard. When we have need of a rain-cloak the poncho will probably be adopted. Queensland uses a Turkish towel on the horse's back to keep the saddle blanket clean for use at night. This is a good sweat-pad, ventilating the skin and easily washed. The clean blanket under the saddle saves a deal of transport.

From the frontier point of view the English saddle is the worst, except, possibly, that of the Cossacks. About weight we care little, provided we get distribution of weight over not less than four square feet of horse. As we never



jump, we hate polished leather, and like a greasy grip. So far the Australian stock saddle is good. But the less one gets tired and stiff, the more ease one can give to the horse; and here begin the special merits of the American cowboy saddle. The model is derived from the days of plate armour, when men rode the Great Horse, and the pattern, modified in Mexico, was perfected by American cowboys. Thanks to the high cantle and the steel horn, which gives purchase for roping and hauling, the saddle is a capital ambulance, enabling wounded men to ride out of action. The wooden stirrup, saving the feet from thorn, also from burning or freezing in harsh climates, hangs perfectly steady, so that one may mount quick in emergencies. The rider can carry a dismounted man on each stirrup, No. 1 grasping the horn, and No. 2 grabbing the wrist of No. 1. Each horse can be used to take three whole men or one wounded man out of action.

A plain snaffle with single rein completes our equipment.

AUTOMOBILE ARTILLERY

That armoured cars will play a prominent part in future wars is generally recognised, but at present there does not seem to be any satisfactory four-wheeled limber for moving guns.

In Germany, several experiments with automatic guns on armoured cars are known to have been made, but the results have been kept entirely secret.

In Austria, last year an armoured car was produced which carried a gun mounted in a hooded barbette. This car was constructed to be used on roads or across country. Its speed was 30 miles per hour on the former, and from 21 to 24 miles over pasture or crops.

In France, the firm of 'C. G. V.' have manufactured a car, it is supposed for the Russian Government, which is armoured and carries an automatic Hotchkiss gun mounted in a recoiling turret. The car weighs 3 tons and is of 30 h.p.; the speed is 24 miles per hour. It is specially designed to cross bad ground and ploughed land.

In the United States, Captain Dayton's 'automobile fort' has been tried and given satisfaction. Its chief property is that the armour of the 'fort' can be extended to form a screen, 30 feet long, which is intended to form a shelter for men digging trenches, etc., or building a bridge.

THE IDEAL CAVALRY GENERAL

Dr. Miller Maguire, writing in the 'United Service Magazine' in January on 'The British Army under Wellington,' quotes the following from Foy's 'Guerre de la Péninsule,' Vol. I., on the qualities of Cavalry officers:—

'Cavalry officers of the type of Ney, who was one of the best Cavalry officers of France before he displayed his talents on a wider sphere, were widely distributed in the armies of the Republic. And we have seen, in the same year, at the head of the squadrons of the Empire, Murat, Lassalle, Kellerman, Montbrun, and other very able men, skilled in the art of starting and directing the terrible tempests of Cavalry—procella equestris, to use the fine phrase of Scripture. After the qualities necessary for a Commander-in-Chief the



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most sublime talent in war is that of a General of Cavalry. Even if you possess the most rapid coup d'œil and vigour of resolution, more sudden than a racer at a gallop, it is nothing if you have not the vigour of youth, good eyes, a resounding voice, the strength of an athlete, and the agility of a centaur. Above all, it is necessary that Heaven should have lavishly endowed you with that precious gift which nothing can replace, and of which it is not so liberal as is commonly supposed—bravery.'

AUSTRALIA-A STAFF RIDE

The Commonwealth Military Forces of Queensland held a staff ride in the locality of Rockhampton towards the end of last year. Lieut.-Colonel H. G. Chauvel, C.M.G., directed operations, assisted by Major E. C. Haag, 18th Hussars. Great interest was shown by all officers in the exercises, and the orders and reports were very creditable, though in some cases they might have been more concise. 'If there is in an order a single word the omission of which would make no difference to the meaning, the order is too long.' A great deal of work was fitted into the two days, which was all the time that could be allotted for the ride, and the result should do much to create military thought and promote efficiency.

REMOUNT TRAINING

A competition was held at the Curragh in January amongst the regiments of the Third Cavalry Brigade, which demonstrated the efficiency with which young horses can be trained in a comparatively brief period. The intention of the competition, to display a horse thoroughly trained all round, and not merely effective for the purpose of trick riding, was highly successful.

Marks were awarded for (a) balance and riding-school work, passaging and fighting; (b) handiness, and being well under control when extended, galloping at speed; (c) amenability to being handled in the stable and outside; and (d) general appearance and turnout. The following awards were made: 1st, Army horse No. 46,221; rider, Private J. Palmer, 11th Hussars; a silver watch was awarded to Private Palmer, who also received a tablet to hang over the horse in his stable, recording that he is the best trained animal in the three regiments for his year. 2nd, Army horse No. 47,292; rider, Private Ullathorne, 19th Hussars; Private Ullathorne was awarded a bronze watch. Honourably mentioned, Army horse No. 46,224; rider, Corporal Gawood, 11th Hussars; Corporal Gawood was also awarded a bronze watch.

THE ARMY RIFLE ASSOCIATION

In the Queen Victoria's Cup (at home) the 19th Hussars, stationed at the Curragh, were ninth with a score of 701.

The 14th Hussars won the Duke of Connaught's Cup with a score of 371. The Inniskilling Dragoons were fourth, and the 5th Lancers next.

The 20th Hussars were seventh in Young Soldiers' Cup, scoring 640 points.

For the Inter-Squadron match (at home) A squadron 16th Lancers was first with a score of 466; while C Squadron 2nd Dragoon Guards, with a score of 459, were victorious abroad.



MOVES

The programme of intended reliefs between stations in the United Kingdom, the Colonies, and India during the year 1907-8 (subject to such modifications as may from time to time be necessary) will be as follows:—

Unit			From					То	
				Household Cava	BY				
lst Life Guards .				Windsor .				. 1	Hyde Park
Royal Horse Guards		•	•	Hyde Park .		•	•		Windsor
				CAVALRY OF THE I	INE				
lst Dragoon Guards	•			Hounslow .					India
Brd Hussars	•		•	India	•	•	•	•	South Africa
2nd Dragoon Guards				South Africa				•	Hounslow
2nd Dragoons				Edinburgh .			•		Bulford
5th Lancers				Aldershot .			•		York
18th Hussars				York					Curragh
19th Hussars				Curragh .					Norwich
7th Hussars				Norwich .		•	•	•	Aldershot
			1	ROYAL HORSE ARTU	LERY	7			
13th Brigade				Woolwich .			•		South Africa
12th Brigade				South Africa.					India
th Brigade				India					Woolwich
H' Battery				Dorchester .					Bristol
K' Battery				Christchurch					Trowbridge
C' Battery				Woolwich .					Christchurch
B' Battery				Woolwich .			•		Canterbury

IMPERIAL YEOMANRY TRAINING, 1906

Out of an establishment of 1,538 officers, 2,146 sergeants and 23,606 men, 1,078 officers, 1,864 sergeants and 20,212 men attended training and were passed as efficient. In the matter of horses, 10,273 were the property of officers and men, 11,361 were hired for the purpose of training, and 477 were Government property, making a total of 22,111.

HISTORICAL RECORDS

The Historical Records of the 7th (Princess Royal's) Dragoon Guards are being re-written, and will be brought out quarterly in the Regimental Journal.

The Officer Commanding would be much obliged for any material to assist him in compiling this history.

Help from anyone in possession of private letters or other documents relating in any way to the regiment, or photographs of portraits of officers who have belonged to the regiment, will be gratefully accepted and the greatest care taken of them.

Letters should be addressed to

The Officer Commanding,
7th Dragoon Guards,
Cavalry Barracks,
Canterbury.



THE IMPERIAL YEOMANRY—ANNUAL TRAINING, 1907

Regiment	Place of Training	Dates
Ayrshire	. Ayr	June 5 to June 20
Bedfordshire	. Shorneliffe	May 18 to May 80
Berks	. Easthampstead Park, Bracknell .	July 9 to July 27
Buckinghamshire	. Stowe Park, Bucks	May 7 to May 24
Cheshire	. Delamere	May 14 to June 1
Denbighshire	. Cotton Hall, Denbigh	May 28 to June 1
Derbyshire	. Aston-on-Trent	May 14 to May, 31
Devon, Royal 1st	. Woodbury Common	May 14 to May 31
Devon, Royal North	. Martinhoe Common, N. Devon .	May 28 to June 1
Dorset	. Wincombe Park, Shaftesbury .	May 18 to May 30
Essex	North Weald	May 24 to June 8
Fifeshire and Forfarshire	. Annsmuir, Ladybank	June 15 to June 8
Glamorganshire	. Penally	May 28 to June 1
Gloucestershire	. Piercefield Park, Chepstow (Mon.)	May 15 to June 1
Hampshire	. Near Ringwood	May 18 to May 81
Herts	. Luton Hoo	May 16 to June 2
Ireland, North of	Currech	June 21 to July 8
Ireland, South of	Curragh	June 4 to June 21
Kent, Royal East	. Folkestone	May 25 to June 9
Kent, West	. Cobham Park	May 17 to June 1
King's Colonials	. Churn	July 27 to Aug. 11
Lanarkshire	. Scrogton, Douglas West	June 6 to June 21
Lanarkshire (Queen's Own Roys	l Stobs	June 12 to June 2
Glasgow)		
Duke of Lancaster's Own	. Caerwys, Flint	June 11 to June 2
Lancashire Hussars	Delamere	July 10 to July 26
Leicestershire	1 8 4	May 17 to June 1
Lincolnshire	Belton Park	May 23 to June 7
London, City of	Shorncliffe	July 26 to Aug. 10
London, 2nd County of	Churn	July 21 to Aug. 5
London, 3rd County of	Brighton	July 27 to Aug. 11
Lothians and Berwick	. Hedderwick, Dunbar	July 18 to July 28
Lovat's Scouts	Cothill, near Brodie	June 14 to June 2
Middlesex	Churn	July 26 to Aug. 10
Montgomeryshire	. Welshpool	May 22 to June 8
Norfolk	Sheringham	May 29 to June 18
Northamptonshire	Rockingham Park.	May 17 to June 1
Northumberland	. Walwick Grange	June 7 to June 22
Nottinghamshire (Sherwood Ranger) Retford.	May 22 to June 8
Nottinghamshire (South Nottinghan	Clifton Pastures	May 28 to June 14
shire Hussars)	- Chieon Passures	may so so sume 1
Oxfordshire	. Thame	May 15 to June 1
Pembroke	Penally	May 21 to June 7
Scottish Horse	Dunkeld and Blair Athol	June 15 to June 80
	Demandana Diair Atnoi	
Shropshire	Pontesbury	May 14 to May 81
Somerset, North	. Priddy, near Wells	May 18 to May 81
Somerset, West	. Woodbury	May 13 to May 30
Staffordshire	. Trentham Park	May 14 to May 29
Suffolk	Beccles	May 18 to May 80
Surrey	. Milford	Aug. 8 to Aug. 18
Sussex	. Shoreham	May 24 to June 8
Warwickshire	. Warwick Park	May 16 to May 31
Westmorland and Cumberland .	. Lowther Park, Penrith	May 1 to May 18
Wiltshire, Royal	. Warminster	May 13 to May 30
Worcestershire	. Croome Park	
Yorkshire Hussars	. Harrogate	May 16 to June 1
Yorkshire Dragoons	. Doncaster	June 2 to June 17
Forkshire, East Riding of	. Scarborough	June 7 to June 22

N.B.—The foregoing statement must be considered as provisional and subject to alteration.

OBITUARY

The sudden death of Colonel Edward McSwiney, C.B., F.R.G.S., came as a shock to his comrades and many friends in the Army. Colonel McSwiney at the time of his death was commanding a brigade of the 3rd (Lahore) Division, at Umballa. He was posted in 1883 to the 3rd Cavalry, Hyderabad Contingent. With this regiment he served through the Burma campaign of 1886-88, gaining a mention in despatches and the Distinguished Service Order, besides the medal and clasps. From 1891 to 1897 he was constantly engaged, either on Staff duties or special service, first as an attaché at Army Headquarters, Simla, then as a Deputy-Assistant Quartermaster-General for Intelligence. In 1894 he again saw service, this time on the Waziristan frontier, as intelligence officer to the field force. For his services in the Tirah campaign he was again mentioned in despatches, received the medal and clasps, and a brevet lieutenant-colonelcy. He went to China with the expeditionary force, and returned to India, a brevet colonel, to command the 20th Horse. In 1903 he was made a Companion of the Bath, and he had only taken up his present appointment as a brigadier in April last. He was a fine soldier and sportsman, whom the Indian Army can ill afford to lose.

Major John Hatfield Brooks, late 19th Hussars, died in his eighty-third year on February 17. His first appointment was to the 1st Bengal Cavalry, then at Muttra. In the year he joined he was present with his regiment at Maharajpur, and received the bronze decoration for this engagement. Three years later he was engaged in the Sutlej campaign, and was present at the battle of Aliwal. During the struggle for the conquest of the Punjab in 1848-49 he saw most of the hard fighting, and was present at the passage of the Chenab and the battles of Chilianwala and Gujerat. During the Mutiny Captain Brooks served for the most part in Northern Bengal with the Gurkha Auxiliaries. He was present with the Sarun Field Force at the affair at Sonepur, and, while in charge of the Gurakhnath Regiment, so distinguished himself at Phulpur and subsequently at Amorah that he received a brevet majority. In 1861 Major Brooks exchanged from the Indian Army into the 19th Hussars, and retired two years later.

'THE CAVALRY JOURNAL'


We have left over, a few copies of the First Volume of the CAVALRY JOURNAL (first four numbers, January to October 1906), bound up in white forril cloth, price 10s. Apply to Editor.

O. Lumley, Colonel.

IMPORTANT

The Staff of the Journal is very limited, and it is therefore necessary for all officers who obtain their Journals direct from the Managing Editor to report any alteration of rank or address immediately, as it is quite impossible to follow up the stations of individual officers: every effort will, however, be made to trace the moves of regiments.





SPORTING NOTES

RACING

THE Grand Military Meeting took place at Sandown Park on March 1 and 2. It was, as usual, a most sporting and popular function. Considering the little practice in race-riding that soldiers are now able to avail themselves of, the riding was remarkably good. In France the military authorities not only encourage but provide horses and teach officers the art of race-riding. To be a successful jockey a man must not only be a fine horseman but must be thoroughly fit and have a cool head; it is therefore quite in accordance with the true Cavalry spirit that racing should, as far as possible, be stimulated in soldiers. But to return to this meeting. On the first day the feature was the success of Mr. C. Bewicke (Scots Guards), who rode no less than three winners, securing the coveted Gold Cup on Old Fairyhouse, followed by his second string Bonar. Colonel Sir Peter Walker's All Aboard won the Past and Present Steeplechase, ridden by Mr. A. Fitzgerald; in this race Captain C. R. Terrot gave a good exhibition of horsemanship; his horse pecking badly at a fence, the bridle came over its head, but whilst continuing the race he cleverly replaced it. On the second day Mr. C. Bewicke was again expected to win three races, but luck was against him. The chief race was won by Mr. L. E. G. Oates's Gabriel II., well ridden by Captain R. de Crespigny, who also rode the winner of the Tally Ho Steeplechase.

RACING IN INDIA

The Army Cup was run for at Lucknow, and for the second year in succession was won by Messrs. R. B. Wood and Badger of the 12th Lancers. The weights for this race are on a welter scale, the amateur getting a 7 lb. allowance. A field of fifteen went to the post. Messrs. Wood and Badger's candidate Dilerjung, an Arab, with a professional up, started a hot favourite, but only won a desperate race by a head; Mr. E. W. Williams, who rode his own pony Pasha, was second; with Captain J. H. M. Davie's Arab pony, Lomond, ridden by Mr. Deane, third. A good feature of the Cup race was the number of amateurs that donned silk; they were, besides Mr. Williams and Mr. Deane, Captain F. Barrett, 15th Hussars, Mr. Elgee, Hon. D. J. G. Bingham, Mr. Passey, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Jeffrey, Mr. Holden, and Mr. Beatty. This is as it should be, and we should like to hear of the Army Cup being confined to soldier riders.

The race for the Viceroy's Cup was decided at Calcutta as usual on December 27. There were eleven runners: Saloon, a country-bred, was made favourite and led for a mile and a half, but failed to stay, the race being won by the Hon.



Mr. Apcar's Fitzgrafton, with the same owner's Mallard second, and Mr. Maxwell's The Master third. Their Excellencies Lord and Lady Minto, with a distinguished company, also numerous Maharajahs with their suites, were present in state.

A field of nine runners started for the Indian Grand National, which was run for as usual at Tollygunge, Calcutta, on January 1. It was a good race, won by Mr. Apcar's Seclusion, a dead heat for second. The fences were extremely small, which may have accounted for the great number of falls during the two days' racing. Captain Holden's Lord Harry, owner up, won the Hunters' Steeplechase, and on the second day the same horse carried off the chief event, the Tollygunge Handicap Steeplechase, under the welter weight of 13 stone.

On the first day of the Calcutta second meeting, Fitzgrafton, the Viceroy's Cup winner, again won the chief race, the King's Plate. For the most important sprint race, the Metropolitan Plate of six furlongs, Messrs. Wood and Badger, 12th Lancers, brought off a coup by winning with Sir Ernest Cassel's old horse Sermon. Colonel Stisted won the Scurry Handicap with First Bell.

POINT-TO-POINT RACES

The Cavalry School opened the season's point-to-point races with a meeting at Penton, near Andover. The Earl of Portsmouth, Under Secretary of State for War, Major-General R. S. S. Baden-Powell, C.B., Brigadier-General E. C. Bethune, C.B., and a distinguished company witnessed some capital races.

The Light-weight Challenge Cup, presented by Major-General Baden-Powell, was won by Mr. Pollock's Python, ridden by the Hon. R. Bruce, 11th Hussars. The Heavy-weight Challenge Cup was won by Mr. Norman Neill, 19th Hussars, on his own horse Napoleon, and the Open Hunt Race by the Hon. R. Bruce on Mr. Woodroffe's Master Darnley.

The Royal Horse Guards held their meeting over a lovely hunting country near Kineton, in the Warwickshire country. Lord Willoughby de Broke acted as starter, Mr. Basil Hanbury as clerk of the scales, and Major Drage as judge. Fourteen started, and Captain Harold Brassey, on his own horse Delight, won, with Lord Alastair Innes-Ker on Castle Bir, second; and Lord Anglesey's Circassian, Lord Herbert riding, third.

The Shorncliffe Drag Hunt races took place at Brabourne. Results.—Lightweight race: Colonel Whatman's (20th Hussars) Shy Lady. Heavy-weight race: Major Lawrence's (14th Hussars) Heatherside. Open race: Mr. S. C. Wells's Venture.

The Brigade of Guards races were held with the Pytchley Hunt, at Hopping Hill, Lamport. The Challenge Cup was won by Mr. Whaley's (Coldstream Guards) Nicator; the Open Steeplechase by Mr. J. E. Stevens's Apollo; and the Military Steeplechase by Captain Kennard's Clear the Way, Captain Crespigny riding.

The Royal Welsh Fusiliers had capital races at Sherborne, in the Vine Country, with large entries and close finishes. Results.—Red Dragon Aldershot



Cup: Mr. E. H. Beddington's (16th Lancers) Chitral (owner). Nine runners. Red Dragon Cup: Major C. M. Dobell's Longmoor Lass (owner). Twelve runners. Red Dragon Open Welter Race: Mr. J. O. Murphy's Stage Manager (owner). Twenty runners. Red Dragon Open Light-weight race: Captain Campbell's (16th Lancers) Playfair (owner). Twenty-four runners. Red Dragon Challenge race: Captain W. G. Renton's (K.D.G.) George (owner). Eighteen runners.

The 20th Hussars held their races near Folkestone. Light-weight Steeple-chase: Colonel Whatman's Shy Lady. Open Race Sweepstakes: Mr. L. Winan's Discovery II. Regimental Challenge Cup: Major Edwards's Decima. Heavy-weight Sweepstakes: Mr. Browne's Sweep.

The Mounted Infantry meeting was held near Winchfield, in Hampshire. There were large fields and good sport was witnessed. Results.—Heavy-weight Cup: Mr. D. Y. Watt's (King's Regiment) Donegal (owner). Light-weight Cup: Major Angus McNeill's (Seaforth Highlanders) Stargazer II. (owner). Open Race: Mr. D. Y. Watt's Lawless (owner).

POLO.—THE 'RECENT FORM LIST FOR 1907'

This list is compiled by the Hurlingham Polo Committee at the beginning of each polo season of those players at present in England who are considered on recent form too strong to be allowed to compete unrestrictedly in certain tournaments. Last year there were twenty-six on the list, this year the number is twenty-four. Mr. Buckmaster, the three Millers, the three Nickalls, the Irish quartette, Messrs. Rotherham, Watt, O'Hara, and O'Reilly, Captains Hardress Lloyd, Herbert Wilson, and Jenner, Messrs. Gill, Freake, Scott-Robson, Rawlinson, and Foxhall Keene, the Hon. Aubrey Hastings, and the Duke of Roxburghe are the old 'choices.' The three promotions to the list are Mr. M. L. Lakin, 11th Hussars, Captain Matthew-Lannowe, 4th Dragoon Guards, and Mr. R. Grenfell.

The London Polo Clubs have already published their preliminary programmes for 1907, the season commencing May 1. Dates are fixed for a great number of matches with regiments and soldiers past and present. The finals of the Inter-Regimental Tournament are down to take place at Hurlingham, July 3 to 6. The enterprising Ranelagh Club has, during the winter months, added a fourth polo ground. The date of Aldershot Cup Day has been fixed for July 4; this is to enable soldiers in town for the Inter-Regimental to take part, and so save another journey and additional leave from the outlying stations.

A club called the 'Brighton and County' has been formed to play in Preston Park, Brighton, on the ground used by the 20th Hussars for the past two years and formerly by the Inniskillings, which the Mayor and Corporation have generously placed at its disposal. It is hoped that it will supply a long-felt want in Sussex.

A Cannes Polo Club has also been instituted, of which the Duc de Guiche is president, with the Duke of Westminster, the Earl of Shrewsbury, and the Earl



of Harrington as playing members, and Captain Miller as manager. A good fullsized ground at the racecourse, close to the golf club, has been placed at the disposal of the committee by the Cannes Municipality. It is proposed to commence the season of Polo 'de la Côte d'Azur' about January 16 next year and to continue until the beginning of April.

INTER-REGIMENTAL POLO TOURNAMENT

Unfortunately, Major Stanley Barry has had to resign the secretaryship of the Inter-Regimental Polo Tournament. Major W. A. Tilney (17th Lancers) has taken it over. All communications should be addressed to the latter at Horse Guards, Whitehall, S.W.

POLO ABROAD

India.—The final for the Meerut Tournament between the 17th Lancers' 'A' team and the Meerut Gymkhana was won by the former.

The final for the Neeumuch Tournament was between the Bhopal Lancers and Beausoleil, the former winning.

The Narainsingh Challenge Cup took place at Lucknow the end of November. For the final, the 1st Dragoons' 'B' team, represented by Mr. H. A. Tompkinson, Captains Lord C. Fitzmaurice and T. P. Goodman, Mr. H. McL. Lambert (back), played the 2nd Lancers, comprising Lieuts. H. G. Salkeld, K. Robertson, H. C. S. Ward, and Captain E. Knowles, D.S.O. (back). The Royals won by 8 goals and 3 subs. to 2 subs. Having won the Cup thrice in succession, they become permanent holders of it. After the game it was presented to them by Lady Elliot.

The Connell Cup Tournament at Allahabad resulted in the 4th Cavalry, represented by Lieuts. V. P. B. Williams, A. E. Harene, G. L. Farran, and R. Johnston, defeating the 24th Punjabis. Lady Stanley presented them with the Cup, Sir James La Touche, the Lieutenant-Governor, congratulating both teams.

The final for the Novices' Cup at the Madras Polo Tournament was between the 30th Lancers and Government House, the former winning easily. Lady Lawley presented them with the Cup.

The Polo Tournament for the Tradesmen's Cup was held at Rawul Pindi. Five teams entered. The final proved an exciting game between the 11th Lancers and the 10th Hussars' 'A' team, which the former won and thus secured the Cup.

The Punjab Tournament took place at Meean Meer the end of December. The final lay between the 10th Hussars and the 12th Cavalry, the former winning by 11 goals 7 subs. to 2 goals 2 subs. At the conclusion, Sir William Clarke congratulated both teams, and Lady Clarke presented the trophy to the winners. The teams were:—10th Hussars: Captain Hon. E. Meade, Mr. Palmes, Major Vaughan, and Mr. Palmer. 12th Cavalry: Mr. Wilson, Captain Hesketh, Lieut.-Colonel Smith, and Captain Baird.



The Hyderabad Contingent Cup final at Secunderabad, between the 30th Lancers and 20th Deccan Horse, resulted in a win for the former.

In the final of the Venugopal Tournament, at Madras, the celebrated Golcondas opposed the 30th Lancers (Gordon's Horse), and won easily by a huge score.

The Indian Polo Association Cup final at Calcutta was between the Calcutta Club 'A' team and the 12th Lancers. The former won by 6 goals 3 subs. to 1 goal 2 subs.

A big Polo Tournament was held at Agra in honour of the visit of the Amir of Afghanistan. It was regretted that the fine Golconda team from Hyderabad did not come, but being Deccan Mahomedans they are not of the same caste as Afghan Mahomedans. There was, however, a good entry, and some splendid games were witnessed by the Viceroy, the Amir, Lord Kitchener, Sir John Hewitt, Sir Francis Maclean, the Maharajahs of Gwalior and Bikanir, the young Nawab of Bhopal, several other princes, and a distinguished company. The final was a grand game between the 15th Hussars and the Central Indian Horse, which the former won by 5 goals and 9 subsidiaries to 2 goals. The 15th Hussars were represented by Mr. Charrington, Captain Pilkington, Captain Barrett, and Captain Livingstone-Learmonth. Lady Minto presented them with the Cup.

The final in the Native Cavalry Polo Tournament, at Umballa, was between the 10th Duke of Cambridge's Own Lancers (Hodson's Horse) and the 26th (Prince of Wales's Own) Light Cavalry. A close game resulted, the latter finally riding off the winners.

FOOTBALL

THE CAVALRY CUP

The semi-final for the Cup between the 3rd Dragoon Guards (the holders) and the Royal Horse Guards took place at Crewe on January 16, and resulted in a win for the former by 2 goals to 1.

The other semi-final between the 7th Dragoon Guards and 7th Hussars took place at Fulham. At full time the score was 1 goal all; an extra half-hour was played, and although both teams struggled with rare determination to gain the winning goal, neither succeeded, and the match had to be replayed. This match also took place at Fulham, with the result that the 7th Dragoon Guards gained a hollow victory over the 7th Hussars by 5 goals to 1. Latchford, the centre forward, was responsible for no less than 4 goals.

The 3rd Dragoon Guards then came over from the Curragh to play the final with the 7th Dragoon Guards: they were too good for the Black Horse, and eventually won by 7 goals to 1. This is the third year in succession that the 3rd Dragoon Guards have carried off the Cup.

The Rugby Union very kindly presented a Cup this year for an Army Rugby Competition. Ten entries were received, viz., Royal Scots Greys, King's Dragoon Guards, 3rd Dragoon Guards, 7th Dragoon Guards,

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R.E. Depôt and District, R.E. Training Battalion, 23rd Brigade R.F.A., 1st Welsh Regiment, 2nd West Riding Regiment, A.S.C., Aldershot. In the semi-finals the 2nd West Riding Regiment beat the 2nd West Yorkshire Regiment, and the R.E. Training Battalion beat the R.E. Depôt Battalion. The final lies between the 2nd West Ridings and the R.E. Training Battalion.

There was a big entry for the Army Association Cup this season. The 3rd Dragoon Guards made a bold bid for it, but were at last knocked out, and the final is left between the 2nd Bedfordshire Regiment and the Depôt Battalion Royal Engineers (the holders).

The match between the Army and Navy took place on March 16 on the Chelsea Ground. It was a hard, well-fought game, resulting in a tie of one goal each. The Prince and Princess of Wales with Prince Edward and Prince Albert of Wales honoured the match with their presence.

A match, under Rugby Union Rules, also took place at Queen's Club, between officers of the Navy and Army. It was a close thing, the Navy winning by 15 points to 14 points, and they were certainly the best team.

FOOTBALL ABROAD

The final for the Madras Cup, which ended in a draw last year between the Calcutta Football Club and 1st Battalion West Riding Regiment, was replayed on the Minto Fête Ground in February and resulted in a win for the West Ridings.

The Minto Cup, open to all India, received forty-one entries, so it was arranged to play off in divisions, the winner of each division to play in the finals at Calcutta. The final of the Lahore division, played at Umballa, resulted in a fine match between the 12th Lancers and the Gloucestershire Regiment. When time was called there was no score, so extra time was played, when the Gloucesters scored a goal and so qualified for the finals.

CRICKET

At Rawul Pindi the 1st Royal West Surrey Regiment played the 10th Hussars in the Jamsjee Challenge Cricket Competition and won by ten wickets.

RACQUETS

There was a good entry of twelve couples for the Military Doubles Championship. The final tie of the competition was between the 1st Life Guards (Captain the Hon. F. E. Guest and Mr. J. J. Astor) and the 4th Battalion King's Royal Rifles (Major S. F. Mott and Mr. G. T. Lee). The latter, who have been runners-up for the last two years, were the favourites; but the 1st Life Guards, playing a splendid game, defeated them by four games to love. This left the Life Guards the right to play the holders, the 2nd Battalion Highland Light Infantry (Messrs. Balfour Bryant, M.V.O., and Bramwell Davis), for the Cup. It resulted in a fine match; the Life Guards made a great fight, but were eventually defeated by four games to two. The Highland Light Infantry thus won the Cup for the seventh



consecutive year, and it was presented to them by Sir William Hart Dyke, President of Prince's Club, where the matches as usual were kindly allowed to take place.

The final match for the Military Singles Championship was also played at Prince's Club between Mr. Balfour Bryant, 2nd Battalion Highland Light Infantry, and Captain W. L. Foster, R.H.A., the former winning by three games. A close match was anticipated and all the games were well contested.

BOXING

The 18th Hussars gave another of their popular boxing contests at the York Cavalry Barracks on January 30. A capital programme had been arranged by Sergt.-Major Mordaunt, and some real good boxing was witnessed by a crowded 'house' of military and civilians. The principal event was the second meeting of First-class Petty-officer Jeffrey, middle-weight champion of the Navy, and Shoeing-Smith Randall, 18th Hussars, middle-weight champion of Yorkshire. At their former meeting in November the seaman won on points after boxing eight rounds. On the present occasion there was not a great deal in it until the fourth round, when Jeffrey got home on the point with a full arm-swing and floored his opponent, who was counted out.

Another interesting contest was between Private Daly, 18th Hussars, light-weight champion of Yorkshire, and Lance-Corporal Morgan, 8th Hussars, light-weight champion of the Army and Navy. During the seventh round Lance-Corporal Morgan gave up owing to Daly's forcing tactics. There were many other good contests, which included an amusing exhibition by Sergt. Major Mordaunt's two diminutive sons.

On the same evening the annual competitions, open to all regiments of the camp, took place at the Garrison Gymnasium, Shorncliffe, when there was a very large attendance. The arrangements were carried out by Sergt.-Major Brown and the Gymnasium Staff. Some fine boxing contests were witnessed and also some good wrestling.

A number of contests were held at the Barracks Gymnasium, Canterbury, on January 31, under the patronage of Brigadier-General the Hon. J. Byng, M.V.O. Many good bouts were fought and a clever exhibition of Ju Jitsu was given by Sergt.-Major Norris and Sergt.-Major Hunter, of the Aldershot Gymnasium Staff. At the close of the evening the prizes were distributed to the successful competitors by Colonel Thompson, commanding 7th Dragoon Guards.

The 7th Dragoon Guards at Canterbury and the 18th Hussars at York have also recently held capital tournaments, and there is no doubt that boxing is very popular amongst soldiers.

At the National Sporting Club a match was arranged to take place on February 24 between Gunner Moir, late R.A., and 'Tiger' Smith, late 10th Hussars, the conditions being to box twenty rounds for the Heavy-weight Championship of England and £200 aside, in addition to a purse put up by the Club amounting to £350. Moir was the holder of the title, which he retained by decisively defeating the 'Tiger.'



A very successful Boxing Competition was held by the Second Cavalry Brigade in the Garrison Gymnasium, Canterbury, on March 21.

For the four events there were thirty-two entries involving twenty-seven fights, not counting byes.

Major F. R. Lawrence, D.S.O., was referee, while Lieutenant Watson, 7th Dragoon Guards, and Lieutenant Lee, 'The Buffs,' acted as judges, and Mr. Chapman was timekeeper.

Owing to an unavoidable delay in publication this month the following sporting events have also come to our notice:—

BOXING

The 18th Hussars held their last tournament of a most successful season on March 27. The Officers' three-round contest between Lieuts. Holdsworth and Gore Langton was won by the latter. In a ten-round contest Harry Smith, of West Hartlepool, beat 1st Class P.O. Jeffrey ('Revenge'), the middle-weight champion of the Navy, and there were many other exciting contests.

The National Sporting Club, which includes many Naval and Military officers, in order to further encourage boxing by sailors and soldiers, has decided to devote three nights—viz. Thursday and Friday, April 25 and 26, and Monday, April 29—to a boxing tournament on a large scale, open to men of all ranks in the Navy and the Army. This—which will, of course, be decided at the National—will, we may mention, in no way interfere with the championships decided annually at Aldershot in September. On the contrary, the suggestion has met with the cordial approval of all the chief officers in command, and bearing in mind the popularity of boxing with both Services, and the large number of men always anxious to take the ring, the tournament should furnish some highly interesting sport. The weights will be 9st. 4lb., 10st., 11st. 4lb., and catch-weight.

Capital entries have already been received.

FOOTBALL

ARMY RUGBY CUP

Although this competition was launched rather late in the season, the attempt to make an interest for the Rugby game in the ranks has met with great success. Many officers long ago were convinced that much good might be wrought by the introduction of the spirit of 'Rugger' into the sports of the men; the Rugby Football Union came to the aid of the officers, not only in giving a handsome challenge cup, but by granting a dispensation to those whose disabilities arose through their having had in some form or other intercourse with the Northern Union. The rules of the competition limit the number of officers in any team to eight, the idea being that the men shall always have a good show in the matches. The Rugby Union in fostering the game in the Services is playing a strong card in its policy of real amateurism for sport, and the early success of this Army Cup is only one of many signs showing the extension of Rugby all through the Kingdom.



As previously mentioned in these notes, the final tie for the Cup lay between the 2nd West Ridings and the Royal Engineers' Training Battalion. The former, eighteen months ago, were acclaimed indisputable champions of India, but the Engineers were expected to furnish a good game. The match took place at Aldershot in a hurricane wind and drizzling rain. While the Engineers were superior in 'scrum' work, the Ridings held the advantage in the open, and, after a hard-fought game, they won by one goal to nil. At the close of the match, General Sir John French handed over the Cup to the winners.

THE ARMY ASSOCIATION CUP

The final, between the Depôt Battalion, Royal Engineers, and the 2nd Bedfordshire Regiment, also took place at Aldershot in delightful weather, before fully 16,000 spectators. The Prince and Princess of Wales again honoured a Service match with their presence, and the Princess of Wales presented the Cup and medals to the Royal Engineers, who won by three goals to love. Last year the Royal Engineers were successful as the 'Depôt and District Battalion'; this year, for the purpose of the competition, the two were separated, but the ability to secure victory still remained.

RACQUETS

The Amateur Doubles Championship took place at Queen's Club this month, soldier players being well to the fore. Eight pairs entered. The final tie rested between Captain Foster, D.S.O., R.H.A, and his brother, Mr. B. S. Foster, and Lieuts. Balfour Bryant and Bramwell Davis of the 2nd Highland Light Infantry. The former finally won by four games to one. This is the third time that two brothers of this family have won the championship.

POLO

The Indian Inter-Regimental Tournament took place at Meerut in March. The results were as follows:—

The 15th Hussars beat the 1st Royal Dragoons.

The 10th Hussars beat the 17th Lancers after a very even game.

The Royal Welsh Fusiliers beat the Rifle Brigade.

The 12th Lancers beat the 6th Dragoon Guards (Carabiniers).

(Captain Heseltine having met with an accident steeplechasing, was unable to play for the Carabiniers.)

The 7th Hussars easily beat the Royal Welsh Fusiliers.

The 10th Hussars beat the 12th Lancers.

In the final the 10th Hussars defeated the 15th Hussars, and so gallantly won the much-coveted Cup. The victorious players were Hon. A. Annesley, Mr W. E. Palmes, Major J. Vaughan, Mr. W. L. Palmer (back). The 10th, ever celebrated at Polo, are undoubtedly keeping up their reputation with such a young team of players.

The final of the Native Cavalry Tournament was played at Umballa between the 26th Cavalry and the 10th Lancers; after a level well-fought game, the 26th won by three goals and three subsidiaries to three goals and one subsidiary.



The following is an interesting letter on Indian Polo from 'Manipuri' to the Sportsman:—

'I fully expect that within the next few weeks the announcement will be made that the Hurlingham and Indian Polo Association's rules have been brought into line. This will be with the exception of certain local rules rendered necessary by the conditions in India. It nearly came about a few years ago, when Major Fasken, who was then in India, asked the I.P.A. to adopt the Hurlingham rules. In the Indian mail papers to hand last week the following occurs in the report of the annual meeting of the Indian Polo Association held at Meerut:

"That 14·1 be the limit of ponies, that the period of play be changed from five minutes' actual play to seven minutes all in, and in the case of the goal-posts that they be widened by double distance; the seven-and-a-half minutes' chukker be continued till first goal is obtained; and that no player be allowed to play with his left hand; that the I.P.A. penalty for a dangerous foul shall remain as at present; and that, with the above exceptions, the Hurlingham rules be adopted."

It will be seen that the exceptions are those matters governed largely by conditions of climate. Thus it would never be possible in India to have the full ten minutes' chukker as in England. The pace sustained for so long would be too killing on players and ponies. Some people seem to think that the I.P.A. will eventually raise the pony height from 14.1 hands to 14.2 hands as in England, but I do not agree with them. An advocate of such a change, I believe, is Captain Godfrey Heseltine, of the Carabiniers, who two years ago played in London for the Old Cantabs, and is now on the Governor of Madras's staff. The substitution of 14.2 hands for 14.1 hands as the standard height would mean putting the handy, wear-and-tear Arab out of the game, and poloists in India could not afford to lose the pony. For it should not be overlooked that the Arab pony is at his best about 14 hands, and that above 14.1 hands he loses character. Therefore, I think, the I.P.A. will not legislate further in the matter of pony height. Does the widening of the distance between goal-posts imply that the subsidiary is doomed? I hope so, because it is the most ridiculous thing in Indian polo. The scoring should be regulated by goals and goals only. Some years ago, Captain E. D. Miller very well summed up subsidiary goals when he wrote: "Subsidiary goals are a premium on bad goal shooting." I notice that the 10th Hussars, who won the Inter-Regimental Tournament in India last month, won their match in the first round against the 17th Lancers by a margin of subsidiaries, and their match in the semi-finals against the 12th Lancers also by a similar margin. Each of the sides scored an equal number of goals, but the winners, the 10th Hussars, happened to shoot nearer the outside of the goal-posts than did their opponents. The I.P.A. should certainly banish subsidiaries for

I may state that in the final of the Inter-Regimental tourney, the 10th Hussars beat the 15th Hussars by five goals to four goals and three subsidiaries. This was a notable result. The "15th" had won in the years 1902, 1903, 1904, and 1905, while last year the 9th Lancers were successful. It was no surprise to find the "15th" in the final again, for their polo fame is well known, and they were, moreover, well mounted. Their players were Mr. Charrington, Hon. Y. D. Bingham, Captain F. Barrett, and Captain Livingstone-Learmonth. In the first round



they beat the 1st Royals, and in the semi-finals gave a tremendous licking to the Welsh Fusiliers by fifteen goals and one subsidiary to a goal and a subsidiary. Meanwhile the 10th Hussars had beaten the 17th Lancers, and in the semi-finals they met the 12th Lancers—Mr. R. Wood, Major Clifton Brown, Major Reynolds, and Major Hobson. I really think the Lancers ought to have won, as close on time, when the scores were even, they had a penalty shot close to goal awarded. A goal seemed certain, but in the excitement the shot went wide, and, as stated, the Hussars won by three goals and ten subsidiaries to three goals and three subsidiaries. Those who played in the winning team were: Hon. A. Annesley, Mr. Palmes, Major Vaughan, and Mr. Palmer. They played a strong game in the final against the 15th Hussars, and secured the Cup on their merits.'

RACING

Punchestown Races took place on April 9 and 10, and was the usual sporting social function. Soldiers were much to the fore both in riding and entertaining. The Irish Military Hunters' race on the first day produced ten runners. It was won by Capt. W. A. Pallin's Wild Fox III. (owner), with Mr. W. Barber Starkey's Tipperary Lad II. (Mr. F. G. Forsyth) second, and Capt. G. Franks' Red Feathers (owner) third. Capt. Pallin also rode the winner of the Kildare Hunt Cup. The veteran, but still champion, horseman Mr. Harry Beasley rode a most promising young horse, Shanganah Park, to victory in the Maiden Plate. On the second day Mr. Harry Beasley rode His Majesty's horse Flaxman second for the Conyngham Cup. The Irish Grand Military was won by Capt. Gibson's (Inniskilling Dragoons) Swindler (owner), Hon. A. H. Ruthven's Hackaway (owner) second, Capt. A. H. Harrison's Johnstown (Capt. Stackpole) third; there were nine starters.

The Royal Artillery Meeting at Aldershot produced some good sport. The Gold Cup was won by Mr. R. K. McGillycuddy's Irish Wisdom, owner up. The Open Steeplechase was won by Capt. R. J. Bentinck's Amethyst, on whom his owner rode a fine race.

In South Africa, at a recent meeting at Bloemfontein, Sir Hamilton Goold Adams carried off two races.

POINT TO POINT RACES

The 19th Hussars held their meeting at Ladytown, Co. Kildare. There were twenty-two starters for the Regimental race; heavy weights 14st., light weights 12st. Mr. F. D. Alexander's Sweldon (owner) was first of the heavy weights, and Capt. A. W. Parson's Arabella (Capt. G. D. Franks) first of the light weights.

The Alexandra Cup, presented by the Regiment to members of the Kildare Hunt, secured nine starters, and was won by Mr. Berry's Seabreeze (Capt. Hayes).

The meeting of the Royal Artillery (Aldershot Command) was held at Hawthorn Hill. Capt. J. C. Livingstone-Learmonth, riding splendidly, won both the Light and Welter races on his own horses. The team race between officers of the 5th, 16th, and 21st Lancers produced nineteen starters. Colonel Campbell (16th Lancers) was the winner, with Colonel Gough (16th Lancers) second, and Mr. Cunard (5th Lancers) third, the Cup being won by the 16th.



The Staff College also held their races near Hawthorn Hill in the presence of a large company, which included Prince Christian and Lord Roberts.

Results.—Heavy Weight Race: Major H. McMicking's (Royal Scots) Grass-hopper (owner) 1.

Light Weight Race: Capt. Hamilton Grace's (Durham Light Infantry) Anora (Capt. H. C. Bickford, 6th Dragoon Guards) 1.

Soldiers' Race: Mr. G. F. H. Brooke's (16th Lancers) Peggy Royston (owner) 1.

The 8th Hussars' races took place near Colchester. The Regimental Heavy Weight Race was won by Capt. Sir C. Lowther on his own horse, Miss Tite; twelve ran. The Regimental Light Weight Challenge Cup was won by Mr. Blakiston Houston's Scandal II.; twelve ran. Open Race: Mr. L. R. Carr's Warwick; seventeen ran. Chargers' Race: Mr. Blakiston Houston's Scotcher; sixteen ran.

The 2nd Life Guards had their meeting in conjunction with the Fitzwilliam Hunt near Peterborough. The Heavy Weight Race was won by Mr. C. N. Newton's Irish Poplin (Mr. Newton) and the Light Weight Race by Capt. H. S. Ashton's Frederick Charles (owner).

The King's Dragoon Guards held their race with the Greenford Drag Hunt at Northolt. There were ten starters, and a close race resulted in a victory for Mr. D. Clifton Brown on his horse Owston Wood.

HORSE SHOW

The International Horse Show to be held at Olympia on June 7 and the following days has received gratifying promises of support from both America and the Continent.

A PATENT DETACHABLE HOOF-PAD

Mr. B. P. Gray, of 43 Summer Road, Birmingham, has patented a new kind of rubber hoof-pad, which seems suitable for riding-horses, especially polo ponies, preventing slipping and jar on baked ground. It can easily and quickly be put on or removed, so need only be used when required, and should, therefore, wear longer than ordinary pads, besides being more economical.

We shall be glad to receive any sporting contributions from mounted branches of our Army at home and abroad.

J. WATKINS YARDLEY, Lieut.-Colonel.

16th (The Queen's) LANCERS
IN
SOUTH AFRICA.
By MAJOR C. M. DIXON.



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THE

CAVALRY JOURNAL

JULY 1907

CAVALRY: ITS POSSIBILITIES AND LIMITATIONS

By Major G. de S. Barrow, 4th Cavalry, Indian Army

The paramount necessity of a good leader—Examples of the effective employment of Cavalry in Masses—Boldness not recklessness—Strategical employment of Cavalry.

CAVALRY is an instrument forged to perform a certain work. In the lack of a clear perception of what that work really is, lies the reason of four-fifths of those failures which from time to time have caused people to hold it in little esteem and to look on it in fact as an expensive luxury of only secondary importance in the real business of war. It must be admitted that there is some justification for the superficial observer who holds this view. Sometimes we see it playing the most decisive rôle in the theatre of war, and at other times we see it little more than as an encumbrance and an object of anxiety to the Commander and Commissariat officer. We then naturally try to find out why this is so.

The fact is the handling of Cavalry is an art. A bad painter will not be able to paint a good picture, no matter how excellent the brushes and paints with which we provide him. On the other hand, the good painter will be able to turn out something worth

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looking at with even very indifferent tools. So it is with Cavalry: you may have a perfectly trained and drilled body of horsemen, but in the hands of a man who, however able, is not endowed with the power to use Cavalry aright it will effect very little, while a comparatively inferior force of Cavalry, directed by the man who possesses the *real* gift, will work wonders.

Now, we have all heard Cavalry spoken of as the strategic arm. Do we all know what this means? Having gone through a large section of English military literature, I am bound to confess I have come across no one of our military writers who seems to have any very clear conception about it. Others may have been more fortunate than I; but the fact remains that very few at the outside have been able to give us an idea of the part the Cavalry has really played in our wars of the past. The horsemen are often shown on the canvas, it is true, but only apparently for the purpose of adding a dash of colour; they are never allowed to be one of the essential features of the picture. The reason for this appears to me to be clear. Demand creates a supply; we are not a military nation in the true sense of the word, consequently the histories of our wars are written for the most part by civilian amateurs, and, however entertaining their productions may be, they write for the public and not for the soldier. They do not go below the surface. They show us the play and not the machinery at the back. This is all very well for the people in the stalls and pit who come to be amused, but it is not sufficient for the professional who wants to see how the scenes are really worked. There are exceptions of course-Napier, for instance, whose 'History of the Peninsular War' is the magnificent work of a professional soldier. In his pages we might hope to find evidence of the true working of Cavalry, but even here we are disappointed, because in this instance there are few, if any, occasions of the real strategic employment of the mounted arm, though it teems with instances of its decisive employment in battle.

It is the misfortune of our army, from a soldier's point of view, that it is to a great extent employed on the duties of a glorified police. It has to carry out many minor campaigns, brilliant in themselves no doubt, but still only little episodes in the History of our Empire. Never since the days of Napoleon, just 100 years ago, have we really had the threat of invasion brought home to us. The result is we have lost a proper perspective of war. Nevertheless the danger is always present, more now perhaps than ever, and there are some among us who may find ourselves some day actually fighting for the very existence of our Empire.

The result of this constant engagement in small wars has got us into the habit of thinking of war from a narrow point of view.

You may wonder what all this has to do with the subject of this paper. It has this much to do with it, that the constant employment of our Cavalry in small wars and its almost universal relegation in English Military Histories to a subordinate position constitutes one of its great limitations, for you can only get the full value out of a thing when you know what its possibilities are.


Now, the result of all that I have just been describing is that we deal with Squadrons and Regiments when we should be thinking of brigades: divisions of Cavalry are pageants arranged only for Royal visits or to impress Eastern potentates, and Cavalry Corps are things almost beyond our imagination. And yet it is the employment of masses of Cavalry which has led to some of the most signal successes of war.

CAVALRY IN MASSES

I will give a few instances to illustrate this, and will begin with a very far back example, for the additional purpose of showing that what the mechanical weapons are with which the troops are armed has really quite a secondary importance and does not affect the main issues.

We often hear of Hannibal's great victories over the Romans, but it is not generally so well known that in nearly all these victories it was the Cavalry that struck the final decisive blow, and that Hannibal, in his turn, was defeated at the battle of Zama by the Roman Horse.

Hannibal was, during the first three years of his career, a Cavalry man—the Commander of the Carthaginian Cavalry. I have little doubt that this experience fired him with the Cavalry spirit and had much to do with the decisive part he made his mounted troops play in most of his campaigns and battles. Here is one example.



At the famous battle of Cannæ the Carthaginians drew up with their back to the River Aufidius. The Romans were opposite to them. The Romans attacked the Carthaginian centre at the salient and drove it back till it formed a re-entrant, and then the Carthaginian wings closed inwards. Meanwhile the Carthaginian Cavalry, under a fine leader named Hasdrubal Maharbel, having defeated first the Roman Cavalry proper and then the allied cavalry, turned on the rear of the Roman Infantry which was already engaged, and the result was annihilation for the Romans. It is calculated that 50,000 to 60,000 of the Roman Army alone fell on that day. It is well to think of these numbers of killed when one hears people talk nowadays of the deadliness of modern weapons. Wars were always more sanguinary in those days than they are now, mainly for psychological reasons which we need not here discuss. It is also interesting to note that the Carthaginian Cavalry were able to charge and overthrow two hostile bodies of horse and yet to retain sufficient cohesion

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
to fall on the Infantry with decisive effect, showing signs thereby of a high state of training and discipline.

At the battle of Zama the tables were reversed, and again by the action of the Cavalry. On this occasion, owing to the impossibility of getting reinforcements from Carthage, Hannibal had to fight with a very inferior army and a much diminished force of undisciplined horsemen. The result was that the Roman Cavalry soon chased the Carthaginian Horse off the field, and then turned and charged the Carthaginian Infantry in rear and This Infantry had till then been fighting the on the flanks. Roman legions with a certain measure of success, but this was They broke and were practically too much for them. annihilated. This victory of the Romans, in which their Cavalry played so important a part, caused the downfall of Carthage. Again we see the Cavalry charging first Cavalry and then Infantry with unimpaired force and cohesion—an example of training and discipline carried down to us through twenty centuries.

So much for Cavalry and what it could do 2,000 years ago.

Now, I must pass straight away over several hundreds of years down to 1794; and here I pause to touch on one or two incidents where British Cavalry were largely concerned, but which are not generally so well known as they might be-Villers en Cauchies and Cateau Cambrai. They are both briefly alluded to in Maude's excellent work on Cavalry: and in Evelyn Wood's 'Achievements of Cavalry' there is a description of the former; but the latter is not, as far as I know, fully described in any English book unless it be in Fortescue's 'History of the British Army.' I take the following account mainly from a lecture given by that gifted author at the Cavalry School, Netheravon, and have myself been over the ground where the action took place. In 1794 we were fighting, having the Austrians as our allies against the French in Flanders. A column of French 80,000 strong, under a General Chappuis, acting as part of a

combined movement against the line of the allies, attacked that portion of it which was being held by the Duke of York's troops. Favoured by a dense fog, they drove the Duke of York back from a line of villages, Inchy, Beaumont, Troisvilles, and Bertry.



They then proceeded to reform behind the ridge on which those villages are situated in order to continue their hitherto victorious attack. 'At this moment the fog lifted, and the Duke of York perceived that Chappuis' left flank was in the air. He therefore made a great demonstration against the French front, sent a few light troops to check and harass their right, and summoned all his Cavalry to his own right, forming them unseen in a fold of the ground between Inchy and Bethencourt, a village to the westward of Inchy. This force, although it numbered nineteen squadrons, did not really total more than 2,000 sabres. whole of this mounted body moved off under the command of General Otto, who advanced with great skill and caution, taking every advantage of the undulating ground to conceal his move-Some French Cavalry were first encountered and immediately overthrown. Then the last rise of ground was reached and the squadrons saw their foe before them. Over 20,000 Infantry drawn up with their guns in order of battle, all serenely facing towards east and in happy ignorance of the storm

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just about to burst on them from the north. There was no hesitation; with wild cheers the whole of the squadrons galloped down upon the left flank and rear of the French. The French guns hastily wheeled round to meet the attack, opened a furious fire of grape and the Infantry as furious a fire of musketry. But without any appreciable effect.

'In a very few minutes the whole mass of the French was broken up and flying in confusion to the south, the sabres hewing mercilessly amongst them.' And I would ask you to note that in this case it mattered very little what the French were armed with. In their close and deep formations the weapons they had, with their horse-stopping bullets, were probably more deadly even than magazine rifles and more extended formations would have been. It was a matter of seconds only. The whole thing was a surprise which might take place to-day as well as it did in the year 1794; and Cavalry, properly handled and led, put to flight intact infantry and artillery ten times its own strength.

UBIQUITOUS CAVALRY

I will now take another example from Fortescue to show that Cavalry can also play the rôle of the 'handy man' and carry out, on emergency, duties altogether foreign to those for which it is originally trained.

In the summer of 1795 the negroes in the West Indies were in revolt, and in Jamaica there seemed to be a prospect of thousands of slaves revolting under the leadership of Maroons. These Maroons were a most troublesome lot of people and very difficult to deal with. They were descended from runaway slaves of the time when the Spaniards owned Jamaica, and who had taken refuge in the wildest and most inaccessible parts of the island. They had been a peril and a nuisance to Jamaica for over a century. They were excellent shots, knew the forest by heart, had a peculiar code of horn signals for communicating with each other, and lastly had possession of some almost

impregnable mountain strongholds. The Governor of Jamaica tried to limit the power of the Maroons by drawing a cordon all This proved quite ineffective, as they walked round them. through the cordon whenever they pleased. There were only about 200 of them, and yet they were a constant and irritating gall which always threatened to become an open and dangerous The Governor, a military man, having failed to settle the difficulty himself, a cavalry Colonel, Walpole, of the 18th Light Dragoons, came forward and offered to beat the Maroons at their own game. Although there were three Infantry regiments in Jamaica at the time, he selected, quite naturally, being himself a Cavalry man full of faith in his own arm, a Squadron of 17th Lancers, set to work to train them, and then led them against the Maroons, whom he defeated on their own ground.

This was a brilliant little bit of foot work carried out by a portion of a regiment which had always been famous for its dash and go in the saddle, and showing that to be good horsemen and riders does not mean that the Cavalry soldier cannot also fight, when occasion demands, on foot, and both through dense forest and over big mountains.

I may also mention that when on the voyage to Jamaica a squadron of this same regiment, the 17th Lancers, actually did duty as marines on board ship!

When a youth has been taught how to march and ride; how to be a horseman, to groom and break in a horse, and to be an intelligent scout; when he has learnt to do these things properly, it is comparatively easy to teach him the other parts of a soldier's trade. For to handle a horse is not easy, it requires knowledge, patience, tact, activity, and experience and often considerable nerve and coolness. When all these qualities have been developed in him to the necessary degree to become a skilful horse soldier, he should be able within a very short time to answer any demand which may be made of him, as a soldier, however varied and however different from his primary rôle as a Cavalry man.

CAVALRY AND STRATEGY

Now let us move on a hundred years or so, and at the same time leave the region of tactics for that of strategy.

Every one knows the story of Ulm, and how Napoleon suddenly marched his army across from the shores of the English Channel to the Rhine and Main and thence to the middle Danube, isolating Mack at Ulm from the Russians and Austrians who were hurrying forward to his support, and forcing him eventually to surrender with the bulk of his army of 80,000 But the pages of English military writers give a very inadequate explanation of how this result was achieved. The impression generally conveyed is that the Austrian General Mack sat like a mole in a hole and let Napoleon quietly surround him, and that when the latter's arrangements were completed he gave Mack a prod which woke him from a profound sleep to the fact that he was hopelessly circumvented, with nothing for him but resignedly to surrender. In fact, Mack is usually shown as a hopeless idiot. Now, on the contrary, Mack was a very able man, who by his ability had risen from the ranks to the top of the tree in the most aristocratic and casteprejudiced army in the world. No ordinary man could have done this. No, Mack was no fool, and it detracts enormously from Napoleon's merit in beating him to suppose that he was.

Mack was thrust forward in advance of the principal forces of the Russians and Austrians, and it was Napoleon's object to keep him there till his main columns had time to arrive and interpose themselves between the hostile armies. How did Napoleon arrange for this? He pushed the bulk of his Cavalry, consisting of two Cuirassier and four Dragoon divisions, or 20,000 men in all—and think of it, we who occasionally see a brigade of 1,400 men—20,000 horsemen all collected under one man, Murat—he pushed this mass of Cavalry into the passes of the Black Forest frontally against Mack, who was thereby deceived into the belief that the bulk of the French armies

was coming from the same direction, and who therefore held on to Ulm too long and discovered only too late that his positions had been turned.

It had been Napoleon's intention originally for the Cavalry to continue its movement and debouch eventually from the Black Forest into the valley of the Danube, but this plan was subsequently modified owing to difficulties of supply, country, &c., and having succeeded in his first duty of deceiving Mack it was next employed as a Great Flank Guard supported by Infantry. It then coasted along the north of the Black Forest to the left bank of the Danube, forming an impenetrable veil behind which Mack never succeeded in penetrating till his fate was sealed. Mark that it was the massed Cavalry which Napoleon used as his tool and on the handling of which the whole strategy of that wonderful campaign depended. Count von Wartenburg says of the employment of Cavalry in this campaign: 'It may be considered masterly. It is indeed a characteristic, uniformly noticeable in the strategy of all the greatest generals, that they knew how to utilise their Cavalry to the best advantage. For it is this arm, designed for a wide field and rapidity of movement, which requires superior officers of exceptionally large grasp and quick resolution.'

Space forbids me to deal with Napoleon's employment of Cavalry in any other of his campaigns, but we find in almost all of them the same big way of employing it strategically. Also in the business of reconnaissance—no 'petits paquets' as the French say, but everything on a large scale. For instance in 1807, the campaign of Eylau, we find him sending forward Murat's Cavalry Corps of 9,000 men, 'to clear up the situation,' as he himself expresses it.

But, however boldly Napoleon used his Cavalry, he did not use it recklessly; he held it too valuable for that. In 1806, for example, the Cavalry was held to a short day's march in front of the Infantry Corps, and never really 'let go.' The reason of this was that Napoleon was nervous of the reputation of the

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Prussian Cavalry, and he did not want to run any risks of his own being smashed up before the decisive battles of the campaign had been fought. Immediately after the battles of Jena and Auerstadt, however, he let slip the leash, and the Cavalry under Murat kept the enemy on the run, never allowed them a moment's breathing time, hunted them through the fortresses of Magdeburg, Stettin, and Lubeck, which he captured, and in doing all this covered 500 miles, in 24 days. Never were the fruits of victory more thoroughly garnered. This marvellous and energetic pursuit brought Prussia broken to the feet of Napoleon.

In order to show that this strategic employment of Cavalry did not belong to one time or to one man only, I will hurry on to another period—the Civil War in America. On April 30, 1862, Jackson was facing Banks, who had a considerable numerical superiority over him. It was Jackson's plan to leave the Luray Valley, unite with Johnson and fall on Milroy, and in order to carry this out it was necessary to get a fair start of Banks. For this purpose Jackson left his Cavalry under Ashby in front of Banks. Ashby was not content with forming a passive screen; on the 29th he made a demonstration in force, and the next day he attacked the hostile Cavalry vigorously and drove it back on Banks' Camps. In short Ashby did his work so well that Jackson was enabled to carry out his retirement without molestation, and without the Federals being able to gain any idea of where he had gone to. This is a good example of a general obtaining 'freedom of manœuvre' behind the cover of his Cavalry.

The next campaign in which Cavalry was used with great effect was that of 1870. In this case the German Cavalry was formed for the most part in divisions, and these divisions were attached to the various army corps. In this position they found themselves tied by the leg and their horizon narrowed to the immediate requirements of their own particular corps. There was no mass of Cavalry formed for the exclusive use of the

Army Commanders, much less for that of the Supreme Command. Consequently Moltke had no instrument of exploration in his hand, and was often very much more in the dark as to the French movements than he need have been. But in spite of this the services rendered by the German mounted troops in this war were noteworthy, so much so that for many years it was the custom to look on their employment as a model. Close investigation, however, in which, to their credit it may be said, the Germans themselves have been to the fore, has established the fact that the German Cavalry, on the whole, was indifferently worked by the higher staffs. And yet, in spite of this, it did render at times signal services. It was able to do this because the handling of the French Cavalry was still worse, or, one might almost say, it was not utilised at all.

The whole employment of the German Cavalry in the 1870 war forms a most interesting study, and one which has strengthened my belief in the necessity of a proper national appreciation of the vital importance of the employment of masses of trained horsemen in what the French call 'La Grande Guerre.' I say 'national appreciation,' because if the nation does not appreciate it you will never get the money for the training and upkeep of the requisite number of horsemen.

If the German Cavalry, faultily handled, could achieve so much, what great services could not the French Cavalry have rendered if they had been employed as they should and might have been, had not the Napoleonic teachings been forgotten?

They could at least have neutralised the action of the German Uhlans; and if, on the other hand, the German Cavalry, badly managed, could do so much, what great things might they not have done if they had been massed under the control of the Commander-in-Chief?

We see from what has been said, and from the historical examples quoted, that both in ancient and modern times, on the fields of battle and strategy, mounted and on foot, throughout

all the changes and improvement of weapons, in every imaginable phase and variety of war, Cavalry rightly used and understood has taken a most decisive part. And if unlimited space were at one's disposal it would be easy to show, what it has only been possible to briefly suggest, that the degree of usefulness of Cavalry depends in the first and foremost place on the power and ability of the Commander-in-Chief to wield it. In 1870 this ability was conspicuous by its absence; and this owing, probably, not to any want of knowledge by that great strategist and student of war, Von Moltke, but because his was not an independent voice, and public opinion and aristocratic influences were too strong for him to combat successfully. Civilian Governments, public opinion, and ignorance fetter the action of all great soldiers at every turn, unless they are free agents such as Frederic the Great and Napoleon, and even they were often hampered by want of money.

This is why the influence of Cavalry is so often spasmodic. It requires the master's touch. This is its greatest, one may say its only, limitation. You may say: But what about mountainous countries; what can Cavalry do there? Well, nations do not meet to decide their fates in mountainous countries. Great wars are, by the very nature of things, wars of masses, and these can only be fought out in comparatively open and fertile countries, where those masses can subsist. The great battlefields of Europe are to be found in Champagne, the plains of Italy and Southern Germany, and the flat and gently undulating 'paysage' of Belgium and the Netherlands—the cockpit of Europe; in America in the lovely fields and valleys of Virginia—and in the East in the great level stretches of Hindustan and of Manchuria. Great armies have passed over mountain chains to be sure, but only to descend, as soon as possible, into the plains for the purposes of manœuvring and fighting.

There is, therefore, practically no limitation to what Cavalry can perform in war, provided there is the brain which knows how to use it. And its horizon is widened rather than narrowed by

the modern rifle, because, possessed of that weapon, it is self-contained and independent.

Are we to draw from this the inference that we are to sit down and wait for the inspired genius to arise who is to direct us to the achievement of great results? No! certainly not. In the first place we must not be led into the idea that, because Cavalry requires the man to use it with full effect, any sort of Cavalry will do. The higher the training of man and horse the more perfect the instrument; and the better the tool in his hand the better the work will the workman turn out. Here is what Von Pelet Narbonne, a German writer of repute, has recently said on the subject: 'In regard to organisation, we must cling to the important axiom that effective work in the first line cannot be expected of Landwehr Cavalry. The same may be said of Line Cavalry, when, through a too high percentage of registered horses, they acquire something of the character of Landwehr Cavalry'words which clearly indicate that no 'second class' Cavalry will do, that horses as well as men must be highly trained; and are a note of warning to those who think you can keep an Empire with village riflemen and hastily collected mounted corps from anywhere. And in the second place—and this is the chief moral of my tale—it is realised now, and the fact has been proved both in 1870 and recently in Manchuria, that a high class of training all round, an intelligent and methodically trained staff and corps of officers, educated and practised to the point where decentralisation, the root of all real efficiency, can be freely worked, goes far, very far indeed, to remedy mediocrity in the chief command. Bearing this in mind, it is the business of every cavalry man to do his little all for our Empire so as to arrive, by study, thought, and work, at a proper appreciation of what the possibilities and proper employment of our arm consist. When we have all done this we shall have done much towards overcoming that one great barrier which has so often set a limit to the usefulness of Cavalry.

THE MOUNTED MEN OF NEW ZEALAND, PAST AND PRESENT

By Colonel J. M. Babington, C.B., C.M.G.

The writer gives some account of the action of Mounted troops in the last century, gradually leading up to the development of the present highly efficient Mounted Rifle Corps.

The first settlers found New Zealand in possession of the Maoris, a warlike and adventurous race, who had in previous times invaded and occupied the country. The Maoris in their turn realised that the advent of the pakeha (foreigner) was likely to interfere with many of their customs and pastimes (intertribal wars, etc.), and hence arose conflict between the two races.

In 1845 the settlers were at war with the natives, but, owing, doubtless, to dense bush and the roadless nature of the country, the employment of mounted troops was precluded. In 'Our Antipodes' Colonel Munday tells us: 'The troops returned from the bush-fighting with clothes and accourrements shredded by the rough underwood'; evidently no place for mounted men.

In 1860, however, when the Maori troubles again broke out, we find that mounted troops were employed to great advantage. These troops were named 'Volunteer Cavalry,' or 'Yeomanry Cavalry,' and there was also a 'Defence Force Cavalry.' The men were armed with sword and carbine, and were instructed by N.C.O.s, who, for the most part, had served in Cavalry regiments.

On February 23, 1864, we find two troops of Cavalry under Colonel Nixon (formerly of the 39th Regiment) fighting at Rangiaohia. Colonel Nixon was mortally wounded, and in a Maori account of that fight we read: 'Then the troops poured out of the camp and came at us. They drove us at the point of the bayonet to a swamp. Here we rallied and had another fight, but two bodies of Cavalry, one on each side of the troops on foot, charged us, and one party of Cavalry came at us in a cornfield. Then we had a bad time of it, and were cut down with the sword right and left.' Here we have evidence that the original mounted troops in the Colony were used as Cavalry.

Again, it is stated in Gudgeon's 'Defenders of New Zealand' that after the disaster of the Gate Pa the Mounted Colonial Defence Force, with portions of the 68th, 43rd, and 1st Waikato Regiments, attacked the enemy's trenches. The Mounted Force was first 'dismounted, and flanked the left, until relieved by a company of the 68th. The fight lasted three hours, when the trenches were carried by a charge.' Before this the mounted men had evidently resumed their rôle of Cavalry, for we read: 'In charging across the rifle-pits Captain Turner's horse fell with him into the earthworks, but he soon remounted. The natives fought well, meeting the bayonet with their spears. Several acts of individual bravery were displayed in this engagement and mentioned in Colonel Greer's despatches. One was omitted where a Maori at close quarters was in the act of shooting an Artillery sergeant, when Sergeant Charles, of the Mounted Defence Force, rode at him and cut the back of his hand clean off, thereby saving the life of the Artilleryman. This affair is interesting as showing that the mounted troops could act both as Mounted Rifles or Cavalry.

To quote again, from McDonald's 'Maori History': 'The next fight we had with this Commander (General Cameron) was between Papawhero, Patea, and Kakaramea. The army of the pakeha was on the line of march to somewhere, but just as they filed through the sandhills and drew near to a small swamp they were attacked by the Pakakohe tribe. The Pakakohe, however, were defeated, and nearly annihilated. It was a brave but very foolish affair for their chiefs to lead their men (about one

hundred) to attack in broad daylight about one thousand, who were wide-awake and on the line of march, especially when they had over one hundred Cavalry with them. The result ought to have been foreseen. The Pakakohe were horribly beaten, and lost sixty of their best men—cut down by the troopers—for nothing. It was like the charge we read of made at Balaklava-"a brave but foolish affair." This charge gave the Maoris a wholesome dread of Cavalry, for in the 'Maori History' the narrator (after a redoubt had been abandoned by the English troops and the road left clear for an advance) says: 'They suspected a design and pondered over this, though why everything had been left clear for us to advance as it were with impunity our leaders and priests could not make out. The Cavalry, too, were in Wanganui, and our experience of these men, before whom the brave Pakakohe tribe went down the time they attacked General Cameron on his line of march at Patea, had not been forgotten by us.' It is thus evident that the first mounted troops in New Zealand were armed, drilled, and fought as Cavalry.

In the South Island the first mounted corps enrolled was the Canterbury Yeomanry Cavalry, now the senior mounted corps in the Colony, and to one of its original members—Lieut.-Colonel Slater, V.D., an able and zealous officer, I am indebted for the information concerning the early history of New Zealand's mounted men. Other Mounted Corps sprang into being, but as a rule had a short existence.

The first Volunteer Act came into force on January 1, 1866. By this Act 'Cavalry' Corps were to receive an annual allowance not exceeding £3. In the regulations made under the Act mounted corps were called 'Light Horse Volunteers,' and in the certificate of efficiency the commanding officer and adjutant had to certify that the trooper rode well, possessed a competent knowledge of the sword exercise and dismounted and mounted troop drill, as laid down in the Cavalry Regulations.

In 1883 new Volunteer Regulations were issued, and in them VOL. II.—No. 7.

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mounted men were designated 'Cavalry Volunteers' instead of 'Light Horse Volunteers.' All Mounted Corps, with one exception, continued as Cavalry till 1892.

For some few years Mounted Rifles were looked on with disfavour by the old Cavalry Corps, there being a feeling that they were but Mounted Infantry; but this has been lived down, and now all Mounted Corps, however named, are Mounted Rifles. For some time these corps were designated Mounted Infantry, and were formed in companies and battalions, but their organisation is now by squadrons and regiments.

It cannot be too much impressed on such men that they are not Infantry mounted, and the words of Lord Wolseley on this subject should always be borne in mind. He says: 'In all epochs the Horse have very naturally thought themselves superior to the Foot. A name has often much to do with the fighting value of soldiers, and if a man is proud of the official designation given to his arm of the Service, no one but an idiot, who had to get hard work out of that arm, would use any other, no matter how technically wrong such a title might be. You cannot make the Cavalry soldier or the Mounted soldier, whatever may be his functions in war, think too highly of himself. His training teaches him that he belongs, as it were, to the aristocracy of the Army, and that his work, always to the front, is the most important, and places him in a position far above that of what the Indian sowar terms the "Peidal Wallah."' The pride in his arm, too, should be especially fostered in those troops which are composed of young volunteers.

The outbreak of the South African War created an outburst of military enthusiasm in New Zealand which those who did not witness it cannot realise. Ten contingents were prepared and despatched to South Africa, and, had they been required, many more would have followed. In connection with this, too, it must be remembered that the population of New Zealand—men, women, and children—was then under 860,000. Corps sprang up like mushrooms all over the country, and New Zealand

showed itself to be Imperial to the backbone, and determined to uphold the integrity and the honour of the Empire.

It was thought, by those best qualified to judge, that on the conclusion of peace the war fever would abate; but, far from that being the case, the strength of the Volunteer Force is to-day greater than at any previous time, showing that in New Zealand, at any rate, the martial spirit is innate, and not of the transient nature it has, unfortunately, proved itself to be in some other countries.

It is not within the sphere of this article to review the part New Zealanders played in the South African War. Suffice it to say that their services were at all times eagerly sought for by British commanders, and that they at all times worthily upheld the honour of the land from which they came.

There are at present fourteen regiments of Mounted Riflemen in New Zealand; these are distributed throughout the North and South Islands, and recruiting is carried on over practically large areas. The men are for the most part of excellent material, and in the country corps—which largely predominate—this is pre-eminently the case. These latter corps are almost entirely composed of men who have ridden from childhood, are accustomed to hard work, and who, having had to think and act for themselves, have acquired that independence which, when intelligently dealt with, produces the most valuable fighting-man. All that is required is leisure for instruction. With both officers and men there is the strongest desire to become efficient; this excellent spirit, too, pervades the whole of the defensive forces of the Colony.

The annual training of the Mounted Rifle Corps consists of eighteen parades, or one week's training in camp and six parades; four dismounted parades must also be carried out. In addition to this an annual course of musketry is carried out, at which each man fires 120 rounds at target practice and 60 rounds at field firing. A large amount of private practice also takes place. Easter manœuvres are held annually. These were formerly more

or less of a picnic, at which little work was done; but in 1902 a change in this was effected, and since then useful work has been performed at these concentrations. That such a limited amount of training cannot produce a really efficient fighting force is evident; more camp training is required, and the (so to speak) 'desultory' parades now carried out should be abandoned. Insufficient, however, as the present course of annual training is, a very few months' instruction would enable the mounted men of New Zealand to take their place with regular troops in the field.

Corps are for the most part serviceably, though not showily, mounted; the men are armed with the Imperial service rifle and bayonet, and equipped with a serviceable bandolier equipment carrying 150 rounds. The saddlery is in most corps the property of the men; much of it would have to be replaced before they took the field.

It would considerably enhance the value of regiments were they armed with the sword; without it much of the value of mounted men is lost. We have seen how effective, from every point of view, physically and morally, the sword proved to be in the early wars in New Zealand, even in the hands of men whose training in its use could have been far from complete, and we know from history how much the arme blanche is feared, especially by the dismounted man. South Africa, too, proved no exception to this, and the British Cavalry lost half their value when their swords were, as was done in some instances, withdrawn. In the pursuit, too, where the best opportunity for inflicting punishment is afforded, but little damage is done with the rifle, especially against mounted men; it is only by inflicting severe losses in killed and wounded that real ascendency is gained in war.

At a very small cost of time and money a most valuable fighting force of from 6,000 to 8,000 mounted men would readily be forthcoming in New Zealand, and, so long as the type of man there remains as it is to-day, it will be found, no matter where such a force might be placed, that in their case 'the workman is worthy of his hire.'



FATHERS OF THE INDIAN CAVALRY JAMES SKINNER

By Colonel H. W. Pearse, D.S.O.

His early years, and training—Experiences with Sindhia's Forces—How he joined Lake, and originated 'Skinner's Horse'

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL JAMES SKINNER, of Skinner's Horse, was generally regarded in his day as the father of the old Indian Irregular Cavalry; and as, owing to the vicissitudes of the Indian Army, his famous regiment, now styled the 1st Duke of York's Own Lancers (Skinner's Horse), is the senior of the native Cavalry units, Skinner seems to have a fair claim to the title of 'father of the Indian Cavalry.'

Skinner held a unique position in the Indian world of his day, in the India of Wellesley, Lake, and Hastings—in the period, in fact, when English rule was substituting itself throughout the vast region then known as Hindustan for that of the various princes and adventurers who during fifty years at least had contended for the mastery of the Moghul Empire; and a brief sketch of the career and character of one who, from very humble beginnings, rose to be one of the most widely known and highly esteemed Anglo-Indians of the first half of the nineteenth century, may be found interesting.

EARLY LIFE

Skinner was born in 1778, the son of a Scottish subaltern of the Company's service and of a native lady, the daughter of a Rajput landowner in the Mirzapur district. Skinner had two brothers and three sisters, and the six children were well brought up: the sisters all marrying officers of the Company's service; and, of the sons, the eldest becoming a sailor and the two younger soldiers of fortune. James Skinner entered on his adventurous career at a very early age. When he was seventeen. his father, finding it difficult to provide for his large family, bound him apprentice to a printer of Calcutta, and after three days the boy, finding his calling uncongenial, ran away to shift for himself on a working capital of sixpence. Had the title then been invented, young Skinner might have been called 'little friend of all the world'; and when, after six days, his capital ran out, he earned a livelihood about the Calcutta bazaars, carrying loads or pulling the drill for native carpenters at a wage of threepence a day. Search was presently made for the truant, and he was found by a servant of his sister, Mrs. Templeton, and set to work at copying papers in a lawyer's office. This was even worse than printing; but happily, after three months of drudgery, Skinner's godfather came to the rescue. This was William Burn, afterwards a general officer and the defender of Delhi against Holkar. Burn, finding the boy bent on being a soldier, gave him three hundred rupees and sent him up country, in April 1795, to join his father at Cawnpore, where Burn was also stationed.

WITH THE MAHRATTA FORCES

Owing to his mixed blood, Skinner could not obtain a commission in the Company's service; but Burn presently furnished him with a letter of introduction to General De Boigne, the Savoyard soldier of fortune who then commanded the powerful army which he had raised and trained for the Mahratta prince, Sindhia. De Boigne, whose Indian career ended shortly afterwards, gave young Skinner an ensign's commission, with pay at a hundred and fifty rupees a month, in a battalion commanded by a Captain Pohlmann and stationed at Muttra.

Skinner was now fairly started in life, and active service soon came to whet his thirst for glory. The Mahrattas and Rajputs were fighting for the spoils of Hindustan, and Skinner soon obtained a varied experience of war in Bundelkhand, serving in two general engagements and at the capture of five or six forts. In these operations he immediately made his mark as a bold leader.

In 1796, Skinner, still only a lad of eighteen, served at the battle of Chandkhori, near Gwalior, when the force which he accompanied was defeated with severe loss by the Rajput army. Skinner showed great gallantry in the subsequent retreat, bringing in the guns of the rear-guard in safety. For this feat he was rewarded by General Perron, the successor of De Boigne, with promotion to the rank of lieutenant, with pay at two hundred rupees a month.

During the following four years Skinner was incessantly on active service with the Mahratta army, and established among the fighting men of Hindustan a reputation for courage, skill, and generosity which ever afterwards made it easy for him to call together at short notice as many soldiers as his employers might desire to engage. This power of Skinner's was frequently put to the test in his after-life. Hindustan in 1800 swarmed with masterless soldiers, Pathans, Arabs, Persians, Rajputs, and others; and any commander with a reputation for enterprise and justice could quickly raise an army.

At the battle of Malpura, in April 1800, Skinner, who was then serving with the Cavalry, led a charge and captured a field battery commanded by an old native officer, whose life he saved by a prompt and decided intervention—for capture in Indian battles was usually followed by death in the old days. The native officer had held a command at the battle of Buxar in 1764, and told the story of his rescue by Skinner to Lord William Bentinck in 1882. He was then over a hundred years old, but retained the erectness of youth, a fine martial appearance, and unimpaired faculties. He recalled with great animation Skinner's courage and humanity, but the latter, whose modesty was his strongest characteristic, makes no mention of the incident in his Memoirs.

After the battle of Malpura, Skinner, with the enterprise of youth and the instincts of the true soldier of fortune, entered the



camp of the defeated Rajput army, and in the tent of the Raja of Jaipur he obtained loot the description of which makes one's mouth water even in these moral days: 'two golden idols with diamond eyes, and odd trinkets to the value of two thousand rupees,' not to mention 'a brass fish, with two chowries hanging to it, like moustachios.' This trophy proved to be the greatest prize of all, for it was 'the fish of dignities,' an imperial ensign of honour conferred by the Moghul emperors on their chief tributaries. Skinner presented it to the Mahratta general, who in return commended him for his services and gave him a handsome reward.

After this, Skinner, though but twenty-two years of age, was placed in command of a mixed force with which he was despatched to Central India in order to assist the Raja of Karaoli, an ally of Sindhia. The end of this campaign was disastrous, the Karaoli army falling to pieces and Skinner and his small force being eventually deserted by their untrustworthy allies and surrounded by six thousand enemies. The young commander now showed his quality. Drawing up the survivors of the Infantry battalion which formed the bulk of his detachment, Skinner addressed them in spirited terms, such as appeal to the chivalrous feeling of Indian soldiers, telling them that they could die but once, and exhorting them to fight to the last and to fall like brave soldiers. After a stubborn resistance Skinner was brought down with a desperate wound, and the remnants of his unfortunate force were destroyed. Skinner lay for two days and two nights on the field, surrounded by the dead and dying, suffering the tortures of thirst, the burning heat of day, and the cruel cold of night. Such were his agonies of body and mind that on the second night Skinner vowed that if he survived he would never go soldiering again, and that, if he lived to recover, he would build a church to the God of his white father. Skinner's life was saved by the generosity of an old man and woman of low caste, who on the third day brought food and water to the surviving wounded, and he was subsequently tended and finally

set at liberty by his chivalrous Rajput enemies. Skinner sent the old outcaste couple who had saved his life a present of a thousand rupees and a message to the woman that he considered her in the light of a mother. The whole story of Skinner's adventures during the great anarchy which preceded the destruction of the Mahratta armies by Generals Lake and Arthur Wellesley is of vivid interest, and these brief passages may call attention to a little-known period of history which well repays study. Suffice it to say that into a period of eight years Skinner crowded an amount of hard fighting and adventure which has rarely been surpassed by the experience of any soldier.

In 1803 came the end of the European adventurers of Hindustan, for Lord Wellesley had determined to put a period to the intolerable unrest of India in the only way possible, and his armies advanced in August of that year to deal with the great hosts, disciplined and undisciplined, possessed by the confederated Mahratta princes.

Joins the British Service

All British subjects in the service of the native States were now ordered by proclamation to join the British service; and although Skinner, for one, felt that he owed England no allegiance (for he had not been permitted to enter the Company's army) and was ready to serve Perron, he was soon forced to quit the Mahrattas. The story has often been told. Lake's army advanced from Cawnpore, and, at the end of August 1803, easily scattered Perron's Cavalry outside the fortress of Aligarh. Perron, a stout soldier, endeavoured to rally his troopers; and Skinner, although he had been discharged from the Mahratta service on the previous day, offered his assistance. 'No,' said Perron, 'all is over. These fellows have behaved badly; do not ruin yourself. Go over to the English; it is all up with us.' Skinner persisted, but Perron repulsed him and rode off, saying, 'Good-bye, Monsieur Skinner. No trust, no trust!' 'Then you may go to the devil!' roared Skinner after him, and then, following Perron's advice,

went into General Lake's camp and surrendered. Lake received Skinner with great kindness, and on September 4 took him to witness the assault on the great fortress of Aligarh, supposed all over India to be impregnable. Aligarh fell after a stubborn resistance, but for a considerable time the issue was in doubt. Lake, from his post at the covering battery, watched the struggle with great anxiety, until the outer gateway was burst open and the survivors of the storming party, with a great shout, rushed in. Lake's countenance changed in a moment from anxiety to joy, and he called out with the greatest delight, 'The fort is ours,' and, turning to Skinner, asked what he thought of European fighting. Skinner replied that no forts in Hindustan could stand against it, a verdict unhappily to be reversed at Bhartpur two years later.

'Skinner's Horse'

Skinner accompanied Lake's army to Delhi, and when, after the battle before that city, on September 11, 1803, 2,000 of Perron's Hindustani horse came over to the English, Skinner received command of them. General Lake left the choice of a commander to the men themselves, and, seeing Skinner with Lake's staff, the troopers with one voice shouted for 'Sikander Sahib,' this being the corruption of his name by which he was known to them. Such was the entry into the British service of the famous Skinner's Horse, whose wild troopers faithfully followed the leader of their choice till the day of his death, thirty-eight years later.


The story of Skinner's services with his 'yellow boys,' as his corps was called from the colour of their uniform, cannot be told at length in the space available in these pages. In accordance with the stipulation under which he entered the British service, Skinner was not called upon to take the field against his old master Sindhia; but he performed notable work in Lake's campaign against Holkar in 1804. Skinner's Horse shared in Lake's famous pursuit of Holkar from Delhi to Fatehgarh, when

LIEUT.-COLONEL
JAMES SKINNER, C.B.

Skinner's Irregular Horse.

Now 1st Duke of York's Own Lancers (Skinner's Horse).





the Infantry and baggage covered 825 miles by the map in eighteen days, and the Cavalry and Horse Artillery travelled considerably farther, covering on an average twenty-five miles a day during the last fourteen marches.

At Fatehgarh Holkar's force was surprised after a long night march, and scattered in every direction. Skinner's Horse were kept in reserve, and, immediately after the action, were launched in pursuit. With the mixture of daring and cunning which made Skinner the model light horseman that he was, he, with no more than 600 of his sowars, hunted Holkar right back to his starting-point in the West, marching from forty to fifty miles a day until he had driven Holkar over the Jumna, near Muttra. 'In this hard seven days' march,' wrote Skinner, 'we had no provisions but what the fields afforded, and neither tents nor bazaar with us. The horses were never unsaddled, and we rested with the halter in our hands all night, having frequently to change our ground two or three times during the night to avoid a surprise from Holkar.' For this feat Lake highly praised Skinner and his men, telling the latter that their services should never be forgotten, and giving Skinner a horse with silver trappings. He also ordered Skinner to recruit his corps to 1,700 men, for he should soon require their services again.

Another notable feat in which Skinner shared was the somewhat similar pursuit of Amir Khan, the Pathan soldier of fortune, whose army was interfering with Lake's siege operations at Bhartpur in February 1805. Regardless of his perilous position, Lake detached his Cavalry, under General Smith, who pursued Amir Khan's large force over a distance of 700 miles in forty-four days, traversing Oudh and Rohilkhand to the foot of the Himalayas and back to Bhartpur.

Skinner completed his services to Lake by accompanying him in the final pursuit of Holkar until the submission of the latter in the heart of the Punjab.

Enough has perhaps been written to indicate what Skinner was as a soldier, what was his training, and of what nature were his

achievements. As a leader of native Cavalry he has probably never been excelled.

Not less admirable and exceptional was his private character. During a long life he attained wealth and rank, and, what he valued most of all, the respect and affection of many distinguished men. Among these were Lord Lake, Sir John Malcolm, Lord Metcalfe, Lord Minto, the Marquis of Hastings, Lord Combernere, and Lord William Bentinck, who all showed him the warmest and most enduring friendship. Skinner, however, never lost the remarkable modesty which has already been mentioned. It is said that to the end of his life an old iron spoon was placed on his breakfast table every morning to remind him of his humble origin and early struggles. In fulfilment of his vow to raise a church to the God of his father, he built the church of St. James at Delhi at a cost of £20,000, and, in his humility, desired that when he died he might be buried under the doorway sill, so that all persons entering might trample on 'the chief of sinners.' The church still stands, and the cross which surmounted it formed a target for Mahomedan marksmen in the Mutiny of 1857. Skinner was rewarded for his services with the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel and the Order of the Bath, and he also received a grant of land, which under his good management became very valuable. He died in December 1841, and was buried in great state hard by the church which he had built at Delhi. His coffin was escorted from his property near Hansi, by the whole of his corps; and, four miles outside Delhi, the procession was met by all the English civilians and officers stationed in the capital and by a great concourse of natives; and so the veteran was escorted to his restingplace. 'None of the Emperors of Hindustan,' said the natives, 'were ever brought into Delhi in such state as Sikander Sahib.'*

• Since his death Skinner's Horse have served at the second and successful siege of Bhartpur, in the first and second Afghan wars, and in China; but their services under Lord Lake are not commemorated on their standards. Their present roll of officers includes the names of His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales, Colonel-in-Chief; of His Highness the reigning Maharaja Sindhia of Gwalior, honorary Colonel; and of honorary Lieutenant S. E. Skinner, the representative of the family of 'Old Sikander.'



AMERICAN CAVALRY

By 'EQUES'

The enormous expansion of Cavalry during the war between the North and South, and the varying material which met this need—The advantages gained by the Confederates owing to good leaders, and concentration of large bodies under one Command—The questionable value of tradition as a moral factor—Although frequently fighting dismounted, the importance of mounted action became more fully recognised as the war continued.

ONE may almost say, no Cavalry existed in America before the Civil War. There were only five regiments of regular Cavalry, an infinitesimal proportion considering the vast armies that were eventually employed. And during peace these regular regiments were never brigaded—indeed, they very seldom had a chance of even regimental drill, for they were scattered by squadrons along the western frontier against the Indians.

These men, however, had a very fair amount of discipline and cohesion. In addition to this they were good scouts—quick-witted, capable of looking after themselves, both tactically and from the point of view of their own and their horses' health and comfort.

Practically the whole of these regular regiments remained loyal to the Federal Government; and they formed a valuable model for the untrained levies that had to be raised.

Of the officers, however, many, belonging to the Southern States, went with their States.

In the matter of organisation, it does not seem that enough use was made by the Federals of these regular regiments. They were kept apart as regular regiments, and many other Volunteer Cavalry regiments were raised with ignorant and



untrained officers, N.C.O.s, and men—largely, perhaps, because the enthusiastic men who raised these regiments liked to command them.

But it seems to me that it would have been better to break up these regular regiments (or, rather, expand them), making each squadron (or perhaps even a troop) the nucleus round which to build up the new Volunteer Cavalry, and making many of the old regulars into N.C.O.s for the new force.

This is a question we may well study, for we are faced with a somewhat similar problem, and have to think how we can best get our second-line army to expand into line with our firstline army in case of necessity.

One writer says: 'It was impossible to instruct Cavalry properly before putting it in the field, and whole regiments of exquisite greenness were sent into Virginian mud in winter, there to try to learn in a few weeks, without a teacher, except hard knocks, what in Europe in the best schools years only can accomplish.'

As for equipment, the Federal Government, richer and with more resources than the South, was lavish to its Cavalry. The Northern trooper generally had sabre, breech-loading carbine, and revolver—besides saddlebags, cloaks, picketing-gear, &c. In fact, as the same writer previously quoted says: 'The most difficult thing a recruit had to do when ready for the march was to get into or out of the saddle—and a derrick sometimes would not have been a bad thing.'

Except for the small nucleus of regular Cavalry, the Federals were at first at a great disadvantage with the Confederates—at least in the eastern zone of operations. In the West, on the Mississippi and in Missouri, the Federals, largely enlisted from the backwoodsmen and hunters of the West, were well able to hold their own.

But in the East it was not so. There were very few men who could either ride or shoot, or use anything except a yard-measure. To quote: 'What can be expected from a stocking-

manufacturer or a linen-weaver, who considers the horse a wild beast, who looks on one as his greatest enemy against whom he must struggle for his life?'

In the South the men were accustomed to ride and to shoot; there were always lots of them to be found who knew the by-paths and forest tracks; they knew how to look after their horses; they were able to draw on a very good class for their officers—gentlemen of property, who had always led active outdoor lives, and were accustomed to command.

But in the matter of equipment the Southerners were severely handicapped.

The men furnished their own horses and saddles. The several counties raised their own troops, but they had the greatest difficulty in arming them. Everything was deficient.

Breech-loading carbines were only to be got in limited quantities—never more than enough to arm one, or perhaps two, squadrons per regiment. The deficiency was generally made up with Enfield rifles (muzzle-loaders).

Horseshoes and nails were another great difficulty with the Confederates. It was not an uncommon sight to see a Cavalryman with the hoofs of a dead horse, which he had cut off for the sake of the shoes, hanging from his saddle. One of the excuses made by Robertson for his roundabout route to rejoin the army at Gettysburg was the necessity of avoiding turnpikes, because they wore out the horseshoes!

The best arms and equipment which the South possessed they got from their cousins of the North; and Henderson, I think, tells an amusing story of the Federal Infantry advancing to the assault at Fredericksburg, and the Southerners shouting out, 'Come along, I want that pair of boots!'

But one branch of the Southern Cavalry organisation was bad.

To quote from 'The Campaigns of Stuart's Cavalry': 'At the beginning of the war, the Confederate Government, charged as it was with the creation of an army, felt itself unable to

provide horses. . . . With the Cavalry that was enrolled the Government made a contract, the substance of which was that the men should supply and own their horses, at a valuation, and that the Government would feed and shoe the horses. If the horse was killed the Government paid, and the man had to furnish another horse.'

That the Government should have adopted such a policy at the beginning was a misfortune; that it should have adhered to it to the very end was a calamity, against which no amount of zeal could successfully contend. The greatest evil of the system was that whenever a man was dismounted, it was necessary to send him home to procure a remount. Men were often absent thirty to sixty days. Before Chancellorsville, Fitz Lee's brigade, which should never have been less than 2,500 sabres, was reduced to less than 800.

A somewhat similar system, though of course greatly modified, exists in India, and it is a point which must be watched.

'As the war went on, the Southern Cavalry became better armed, largely from captured weapons, but their fine well-bred horses went, and in 1864 they were not as well mounted as their opponents. Their granaries were laid waste, and a general decline set in.'

As for the distribution of the Cavalry, the line that is now drawn by scientific study between the service of security and that of exploration was not so clearly, if at all, marked or understood in 1861. There was no such division of duties among the Cavalry on either side—such as telling off Divisional Cavalry, Corps Cavalry, &c.—to provide security for the troops, and keeping the rest for Independent Cavalry, to provide information for the chief.

This lack of having small bodies of Cavalry attached to Infantry Brigades and Divisions, and working closely with them, was often the cause of the Infantry falling into unpleasant surprises, especially during the course of an action.



But the Confederates from the early stages grasped the more essential principles of how to employ their Cavalry, and kept them very much concentrated in large bodies acting under the command of one man.

The Confederate Cavalry in consequence always met the Northerners in greatly superior force, and naturally always defeated them, thus greatly increasing their dash and enterprise.

Their leaders were excellent. Such a body of leaders as the Southern Cavalry possessed has never been equalled by any army since Napoleon. How different was their spirit from that of the German Cavalry leaders in 1870! The Americans never hesitated to ride into the heart of the enemy's country for thirty to fifty miles, and right behind the enemy, whatever the country was like.

On the other hand, the Federal Cavalry were not put under one command, nor were they concentrated, or ever employed on independent missions to seek the enemy, and gain information. They went to the other extreme, and for the first two years were mostly attached to Infantry Brigades—Divisions and Corps, in more or less small bodies. They were employed either as orderlies and escorts to baggage, or on constant piquet duty in the neighbourhood of the Infantry. The Infantry commanders were greedy to have as large a force of Cavalry attached to them as they could, and then they used it up in unnecessary and useless work.

The result of all this was great demoralisation and discouragement in the Cavalry arm.

Hooker's joke, 'Who ever saw a dead Cavalryman?' was a great source of amusement in the Federal Army; but later on, in the first day of Gettysburg, when Buford's Cavalry delayed a whole Confederate division for two hours, the dead lay thick enough; as well as at Brandy Station and the four days' fighting round Aldie. Younger leaders were learning their duties, the troopers were getting educated to their work, and the Federal commanders were beginning to understand their Cavalry.

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The Cavalry of the Army of the Potomac were reorganised and placed under command of Pleasanton, with three Divisions under him, commanded by Gregg, Buford, and Kilpatrick—a force of about 10,000 Cavalry.

The fight at Brandy Station—where the Federals, for about the first time, placed their full force of Cavalry on the field, in opposition to Stuart—was more or less a drawn battle, but it raised the *morale* of the Federals enormously, for it showed them that they were at least the equals of the Southern Cavalry. And from this date on they never again assumed the *rôle* of inferiors, and the balance gradually altered in their favour till we see the effects of the leadership of Sheridan—young, bold, determined, active, and a most skilful tactician.

TACTICS

The two opposing forces of Cavalry were practically all fresh levies. They entered on the campaign with none of the traditions or the prejudices of regular European Cavalry regiments.

'Military history should not be searched to provide patterns to be copied mechanically, but only examples to stimulate independent thought.'

Tradition may sometimes be a valuable moral factor, but it often has a very evil effect on soldiers.

When tradition clings to the forms and 'the letter' of former times—to the exact methods of one's forefathers—it usually leads to cramped stereotyped ideas.

Tradition is only of value when it holds on to the *spirit* of one's ancestors, and learns to apply that same *spirit* to the methods and progress of the modern age.

The spirit that animated the American Cavalry seems to have been the fighting spirit—the spirit that will dare.

One can only think—and, I may say, hope—that it was in the blood.



One hears a good deal of the Cavalry spirit nowadays, and it is asserted by even great authorities that if Cavalry learn to fight on foot they will lose their dash—in fact their courage. The American Cavalry give an effective answer to this argument.

No Cavalry were such determined fighters as the Americans, and the capacity for fighting is as developed in a good foot soldier as in a good horse soldier. At first they almost invariably fought on foot.

But it is possible to attack on foot as well as mounted, and it is possible to be dashing and full of the offensive when dismounted as well as on a horse, for by giving more self-reliance it improves the 'dash' and encourages the spirit of enterprise.

Who would dare to accuse Ashby's Cavalry under Jackson of being slow, unenterprising, wanting in dash or courage, and yet they almost always fought dismounted.

The truth is that if the Cavalry are brave and are fighters, and if they are led with enterprise and resolution, to fight on foot, when circumstances demand it, should not impair their value for mounted action when the proper moment for it comes.

But, as time went on, the American Cavalry began to see the value of mounted action, and they charged resolutely home constantly. In fact, their Cavalry charges on Infantry were more frequent and more successful than the charges of the Germans in 1870.

Henderson has written a good deal about this in the article, 'The American Civil War,' in 'Science of War.' He doubts the capacity of their Cavalry to manœuvre rapidly in mass, and with the exactness that is necessary when large numbers are concerned.

There is no doubt that this is so; but there is no reason, if they had had a little training in pure Cavalry *drill*, and had seen the necessity of it, that they could not have arrived very soon at quite sufficient skill in drill to enable them to meet European Cavalry in the open.

HORSE GRENADIERS

By LIEUT.-COLONEL R. M. HOLDEN
4th Battalion The Cameronians (Scottish Rifles)

This article gives a history of the use of hand-grenades from the sixteenth century, with some interesting regimental details, notably of the Household Cavalry and Scots Greys, who were originally Horse Grenadiers.

THE frequent use of hand-grenades in the recent Russo-Japanese war has attracted considerable attention to a method of warfare which was once common in the British and in other European armies. The hand-grenade is generally associated with the infantry pure and simple; but, just as there are few arts practised by the foot soldier with which the mounted man is not more or less familiar, we shall find that in bygone days the horse soldier was perhaps as much an adept in the use of the hand-grenade as his comrade the infantry man.

EARLY INSTANCES OF THE USE OF THE GRENADE

The grenade, grenado, or explosive shell, is simply a development of, and an improvement upon, the more ancient missile known as a bomb which was in use at a very early period. As early as 1472, in a book published in Latin at Basle, Vulturius describes the bomb as a brazen ball filled with powder and fired out of a cannon; and this shell was long accepted as the prototype of the bomb. It is more probable, however, that it was merely a shell filled with some igniting composition for setting fire to buildings and so forth. The bomb, on the other hand, was an explosive which, like its successor the grenade, on bursting



scattered its fragments in all directions, breaking and destroying everything around it. The most reliable authorities incline to the belief that grenades were invented in Spain in the sixteenth century during the reign of Francis I. They are known to have been used in 1562 at the siege of Rouen, where, according to the memoirs of Castelnau, the Count de Rendan was killed by one. In Daniel's 'Histoire de la Milice Française' we read of their employment with some success in 1581 at the siege of Vakdendonck in the Low Countries.

The first evidence which I have found of the use of actual hand-grenades is in 1601, at the siege of Ostend, where the defenders are said by Sir Francis Vere to have had a 'great store of hand-grenadoes.' They were simply small shells kindled by a fuse, and thrown by the hand. Ward again in his 'Animadversions of Warre,' published in 1639, speaks of hand-grenadoes. They were not, however, in general use. The fact is they required careful and experienced handling, and were generally fought shy of. Nathaniel Nye, master gunner of the City of Worcester, in his 'Art of Gunnery,' published in 1647, says that the soldiers of his day were loth 'to meddle with the hand-grenadoes, the using of them being somewhat dangerous.' Anyone who, as a boy, has experienced the sensation of a large squib going off in his hand may perhaps imagine that the effect of a 3-lb. shell filled with powder indulging in the same caprice was not altogether a pleasant sensation.

GRENADIERS TRAINED BY THE FRENCH

It seems to have occurred first to the French to select and specially train men for the important duty of throwing these hand-grenades. In 1667 Louis XIV. called for volunteers to act as grenadiers, and four of them were added to each company of the Régiment du Roi. These men were formed into a company in 1670, which I take to be the first introduction of a grenadier company into any army. Marshal Puységur, in his 'Art de la Guerre,' says that these French grenadiers carried their grenades

in large pouches, and that they were equipped with small hatchets for cutting down palisades and other obstacles. Three years later, namely in 1673, we read of the Duke of Marlborough, then a young officer in the French service, being wounded at the siege of Maestricht, while, at the head of his company of French Grenadiers, planting the banner of France on the breach. In 1677 the French King extended the system when he formed the company or troop of 'grenadiers à cheval,' which consisted of one hundred and thirty men, under specially selected officers. Their equipment comprised a fuzil, sword, pistol, and a pouch of grenades; and here we have probably the first instance on record of horse grenadiers.

GRENADIERS IN THE BRITISH ARMY

The first introduction of grenadiers into the British Army was in March 1677, when ten men of the Scots Guards in Edinburgh were selected for training under Slezer, a German engineer. In the following year the system was extended by the addition of complete troops of grenadiers to the Life Guards, and complete companies of grenadiers to the eight senior foot regiments in the service, except, curiously enough, the Scots Guards, the first regiment in which the experiment had been tried, and to which regiment a grenadier company was not added till four years later.

The Life Guards in 1678 consisted of three troops, or what would now be called regiments—His Majesty's Own or the King's Troop, the Duke of York's Troop, and the Queen's Troop. To the first was added one captain, two lieutenants, three sergeants, three corporals, two drummers, two hautboys, and eighty gentlemen privates; and to each of the Duke of York's and Queen's Troops, one captain, two lieutenants, two sergeants, two corporals, two hautboys, and sixty gentlemen privates. These three troops were called Horse Grenadier Guards. They were disbanded on January 1, 1680, but revived in 1683 and soon became the élite of the Household Cavalry,

being generally selected for the personal escort of the Sovereign, and attending His Majesty in his walks, and being very much en évidence on all occasions of court ceremony. One of their first appearances in public was at the King's review on Hounslow Heath in June 1678, where they attracted much attention. Their clothing was similar to that of the companies of foot grenadiers. The ordinary Life Guards to which they were attached wore broad-brimmed plumed cavalier hats, but their grenadier troops wore at first peculiar fur caps made conical to enable the men the easier to sling their firelocks over their shoulders. These caps, made with coped crowns, were not unlike those of the Turkish Janizaries, and were designed to give an appearance of ferocity which it was hoped might strike terror into their enemies. Evelyn, in his Memoirs, tells us that 'some had long hoods hanging down behind, as we picture fools, their clothing being likewise pybald, yellow and red.' We read of their looped clothes in the old grenadier song:

> Whene'er we are commanded to storm the palisades, Our leaders march with fuzils, and we with hand-grenades; We throw them from the glacis about the enemy's ears, Sing tow row row row row for the British Grenadiers.

> Then let us fill a bumper and drink a health to those Who carry caps and pouches and wear the louped clothes; May they and their commanders live happy all their years, With a tow row row row row for the British Grenadiers.

The Dress Regulations of September 1, 1684, give the uniform of the grenadiers. It is also described in an account of the coronation of James II., reproduced in Hamilton's 'History of the Grenadier Guards.' That of the Horse Grenadier Guards must have been very handsome. The coats of the three troops were red, faced with blue, green, and yellow respectively; those of the drummers and hautboys, not unlike the State clothing still worn by the band and trumpeters of the Household Cavalry, were made of rich velvet trimmed with silver and silver lace, the breast and back being embroidered with the King's cypher.

The equipment of a horse grenadier was heavy. Each grenade alone weighed between three and four pounds, and three were delivered to each man on service. Hence they were entrusted to the tallest and fittest men who might reasonably be expected to throw them farthest. In addition to his pouch of grenades, the grenadier carried a fuzil or firelock, ammunition for his fuzil in a cartridge box, a bayonet or dagger, made to screw into the muzzle of the piece, a sword, and a small hand-hatchet for hewing down palisades and other obstacles. The grenadiers generally were a magnificent body of men, and had some reason to be proud of themselves. We may gather this from the persuasive eloquence of Sergeant Kite in the play of The Recruiting Officer, written at the end of the seventeenth century by George Farquhar, himself once a soldier: 'Gentlemen, I don't beat my drums here to ensnare or inveigle any man; for you must know, gentlemen, that I am a man of honour; besides, I don't beat up for common soldiers; no! I list only grenadiers -grenadiers, gentlemen. Pray, gentlemen, observe this cap; this is the cap of honour; it dubs a man a gentleman in the drawing of a trigger, and he that has the good fortune to be born six feet high was born to be a gentleman. Sir, will you give me leave to try this cap upon your head?' The gentlemen of the Horse Grenadier Guards were, however, of a far superior class, socially and otherwise. They were gentlemen by birth, purchased their appointments as grenadiers, and paid a large sum for the privilege. In the army they ranked with the gentlemen of the Life Guards, and before the Royal Horse Guards and the rest of the army.

I take it that, in the first instance at all events, horse grenadiers were more of the nature of mounted infantry than Cavalry. They were practically the mounted infantry troops or companies of the Life Guards, for they drilled chiefly as infantry, and their principal rôle was that of the foot soldier. They drilled and marched to the drum and hautboy of the infantry, and not to the sound of the Cavalry trumpet. Their principal arm was

the long fuzil, an infantry weapon of the latest type. They did sentry-go on foot at the Royal palaces, and accompanied the King in his walks on foot.

BRITISH DRAGOONS

In speaking of horse grenadiers mention must not be omitted of Dragoons, a branch of the service which about the same time established a permanent footing in the Army. The Dragoon, like his predecessor in Cromwell's New Model Army, was the outcome of the ambition of every great commander from the earliest times, viz. the creation of a force, distinct from 'horse' and 'foot,' yet combining the shock tactics of the one with the fire power of the other. When it was thought that a destructive missile had been found in the hand-grenade, the authorities very naturally issued it to the Dragoons, whose equipment, as laid down in the regulations of February 21, 1687, included long muskets and bayonets, grenade pouches, and hammer hatchets. The Dragoon, of course, turned out a failure, and for the same reason that the horse grenadier was doomed to failure, viz. that the military authorities failed to differentiate between the horse soldier and the foot soldier. We have the highest authority for the ruling that no man can serve two masters—'he will hold to the one and despise the other,' which is exactly what happened in the case of the Horse Grenadier Guards and the Dragoons. The Cavalry soldier may very properly be taught to fight on foot with the rifle when occasion requires; but if he is too much separated from his horse and compelled to closely imitate the drill and tactics of the foot soldier, he will inevitably lose the élan, the dash, and the spirit by which the Cavalryman should be actuated. On the other hand, the foot soldier, the mounted infantryman, may be occasionally put on a horse, camel, bicycle, or motor, for more rapid locomotion to the place where he can with the greatest effect use his rifle; but if he is regularly associated with horses, as was the case with the horse grenadier and the Dragoon, of whose equipment the horse formed a permanent part, he will in time neglect and despise the rôle of the humble foot soldier.

The Horse Grenadier Guards, in other respects, had a brilliant career. Their services up to the end of the seventeenth century include the Monmouth Rebellion of 1685, the campaign under William III. in Ireland, including the battle of the Boyne, and the campaigns in Flanders in 1692-97. But my reading of history reveals no instance of brilliant distinction on their part in the capacity of grenadiers or even mounted infantry, although they occasionally dismounted, as at Steinkerk in 1692, where they charged on foot.

In 1693 the three troops of Horse Grenadier Guards were formed into one troop; in 1702 a second troop of Horse Grenadier Guards was raised in Edinburgh and added to the Scots Life Guards. It came to England in 1709. The two troops continued to maintain their position as the élite of the Household Cavalry, being invariably selected for escorts on all occasions of pomp and ceremony. Similarly in the infantry the grenadier companies were the 'flash' companies of their regiments, and, long after the hand-grenade fell into disuse, continued to be chosen for forlorn hopes and perilous enterprises, and acted frequently as the light infantry of the Army. Indeed, the spirit of the grenadier was fitly exemplified in the motto which he wore on the front of his cap 'Nec aspera terrent.'

By the middle of the eighteenth century the hand-grenade had practically ceased to be used by the Horse Grenadier Guards and the Dragoon regiments, although both for some years later continued to drill on foot: the grenadier companies of the foot regiments, however, still used them on occasions. On the commencement of the War of the Austrian Succession we find the two troops of Horse Grenadier Guards drawing lots with the Life Guards for the coveted honour of foreign service. The 2nd or Scots troop drew one of the lucky numbers, and served with distinction at Dettingen in 1743, where they made use of their sabres in true Cavalry style. Again at Fontenoy in 1745 they

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A HORSE GRENADIER.

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did good service, and covered the retreat of the army. By this time they had so far discarded their rôle of Mounted Infantry as to be looked upon as the finest Heavy Cavalry in Europe. They still, however, wore the distinctive head-dress of the grenadier, so familiar to us in Hogarth's famous 'March of the Guards to Finchley.' In 1775 an ominous change took place when the drummers and hautboys of the Horse Grenadier Guards were replaced by Cavalry trumpeters. The final dissolution of the Horse Grenadier Guards was effected on June 25, 1788, when the 1st troop was merged in the present 1st Life Guards, the 2nd or Scots troop lost its identity in the 2nd Life Guards, and both troops were disbanded. A contemporary account records that not a single one of the rank and file would condescend to enlist in an inferior regiment. Those who did not transfer to the Life Guards received with their discharge the money they originally paid for their appointments—one hundred guineas. The officers were granted full pay for life.

But the horse grenadier was not extinct, for the Royal Scots Greys, a grenadier regiment, still existed. Whether the regiment was raised as grenadiers, or was created so for subsequent distinguished service, is uncertain. Francis Grose, in his 'Military Antiquities,' suggests that it received the distinction, with the old 5th Royal Irish Dragoons, for brilliant conduct at Ramillies. This I venture to doubt. I cannot find that the 5th were ever grenadiers, or ever wore the distinctive head-dress of that branch of the service. In an official book of coloured plates of the uniforms of the Army in 1742, preserved in the British Museum, the Horse Grenadier Guards and the Greys are shown wearing the grenadier cap, and the 5th the hat common to the rest of the Cavalry. The Greys have ever since retained the distinctive head-dress of Grenadiers, and they are now the sole representatives of the old Horse Grenadiers. The Household Cavalry appeared in grenadier caps at the coronation of George IV. and continued to wear them for some years. About the same time the Life Guards adopted the red and

blue cords now worn on the shoulder belts of the 1st and 2nd Regiments respectively, which, it may not be generally known, originated in the flask strings formerly seen on the pouch belts of the old Horse Grenadier Guards.

INSTANCES OF THE USE OF THE GRENADE

It only remains to add that the hand-grenade, though rarely used, has never been quite discarded. It was used by the French at Trafalgar, and by both sides during the Peninsular War. It was used by the garrison of Lucknow during the Indian Mutiny; General McLeod Innes, V.C., told me that he remembered Lieut. Grant, in the Indian Mutiny, being killed by one bursting in his hand. The Turks used the hand-grenade in their war with Russia. I remember reading an account of the engagement in the Shipka Pass on September 17, 1877, when they scaled the rocks in large numbers, hurling hand-grenades among the Russians and driving their companies out of the front trenches. And we have all read of their revival in the recent Russo-Japanese War. For years past they have been manufactured in England and are kept in store in the great Arsenals. It may not be generally known that the official 'Instruction in Military Engineering' gives, or did give till lately, the grenade drill as practised by the Royal Engineers, who alone continue to use it. The hand-grenade is there described as a small spherical shell, intended to be thrown by hand. It weighs three pounds, and when loaded can be thrown on level ground about twentyfive yards by a strong man. With our experience of its recent use in warfare and the popularity of mounted infantry, it requires but a limited imagination to conceive the revival of the horse grenadier.

KELLERMANN'S CHARGE AT MARENGO

By Major-General J. C. Russell

'Never say die till you're dead,' the Cavalryman's motto: and it was well borne out in this great fight in which Napoleon's Cavalry came in to render invaluable assistance to the Infantry, and turned their defeat into victory at a critical moment of the battle, when all seemed lost.—ED.

THE strategical combinations, hazardous as they were, that preceded and led up to the battle of Marengo were brilliantly conceived and executed by Napoleon, but probably in none of the great battles that he fought were his tactical arrangements less worthy of a great captain, never was an army commanded by him so near defeat without being actually defeated, and never was final victory obtained by such a narrow chance.


THE EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE BATTLE

The First Consul had, with the so-called army of reserve, crossed the Alps in May 1800, and had thrown himself on the communications of Melas, the Austrian Commander-in-Chief, who had been pressing Suchet towards the frontiers of France while the Austrian General Ott was besieging Genoa. Melas turned to face the unexpected enemy, leaving a force to contain Suchet, and calling upon Ott to join him with the least possible delay. Napoleon advanced towards Milan, where he was to be joined by General Moncey, who had been sent to Italy from Moreau's army with 20,000 men by way of the St. Gothard. Milan was occupied, and, in the further advance across the Po, General Ott's force was defeated by the French vanguard under Lannes at Montebello. On June 13th Napoleon arrived at San Giuliano on the border of the plain of Marengo. Nothing was



seen of the Austrians, and, when the village of Marengo was found to be only feebly occupied by a rearguard which gave way at once, Napoleon became convinced that Melas with his army had given him the slip and had passed by one of his flanks, probably his left. He therefore detached Desaix with Boudet's and Monnier's divisions towards Rivalta with a view to securing his communications, a movement that, weakening the French army for a time, gravely imperilled it in the very possible event of battle. But he had been mistaken, and it would certainly appear that he had been ill-served by his scouting Cavalry and his intelligence officers, for he did not even know that the Bormida was bridged in three places. It was not till late on the 18th that he received this information and learned also that Melas was in strength under the fortress of Alessandria, prepared to offer battle. His army was more numerous than that of Napoleon in Infantry and Artillery, and, his Cavalry being superior both in strength and training, the open country near Marengo was all in their favour.

When the First Consul was at last awakened to the intentions of his enemy, he fixed his headquarters at Torre di Garofalo and began to make his somewhat tardy dispositions, the principal one of which was the despatch of an urgent summons to Desaix to rejoin him with the utmost speed. On the morning of the 14th, Victor's two divisions were in front occupying the village of Marengo and with their right extended towards Castel Ceriolo, which was nearly two miles distant. The left flank of this line was supported by Kellermann's Heavy Cavalry brigade (2nd, 6th, and 20th Regiments, all at a very weak strength), about 800 sabres, to which was temporarily attached the 8th Dragoons. In rear of Victor's force were two divisions under Lannes, and on their right was a brigade of Cavalry under Champeaux. whole force on which Napoleon could count, including Desaix's corps, was under thirty thousand men. To this army was to be opposed nearly forty thousand Austrians, including six or seven thousand Cavalry.



THE EARLY STAGES OF THE BATTLE

At daybreak on June 14, Melas crossed the Bormida by three bridges, and at once prepared to advance against Marengo and the village of Castel Ceriolo. By 8 A.M. the Austrians had deployed under cover of their artillery fire, and Victor's position was heavily attacked. His front was covered by a small stream, the Fontanone, whose channel, though not wide, was deep and muddy, forming a serious obstacle to the passage of all arms, and he stubbornly held his ground for a time. On the Austrian right a strong force of their Cavalry succeeded, defiling one by one under cover of some trees, in crossing the Fontanone undetected and forming with the intention of falling upon Victor's flank. Kellermann, however, was prepared to check them, and ordered the 8th Dragoons to charge, retaining his own brigade in support. The 8th drove in the enemy's first line but were repulsed by the second line, and were in their turn thrust back on the Heavy Cavalry. As soon as his front was cleared, Kellermann charged with his brigade, from all accounts in frontal attack, and led his three regiments with such impetuous vigour that the two lines of Austrian Cavalry were completely pulverised and thrown back into the Fontanone. As an Austrian authority says: 'These scattered Dragoons hurled themselves in disorder and at full speed into the watercourse, which was very deep. Men and horses fell pell-mell into it. Those who did not lose their lives in this terrible catastrophe were sabred or taken prisoners. were fortunate enough to reach the other side.'

As the day advanced, the Austrian superiority in numbers began to make itself felt. The carnage on both sides was ghastly, but the French had no sufficient supports to make good their losses. About 10 a.m., Napoleon himself came up to the front with the Consular Guard 1,200 strong, Monnier's division, which had been hurriedly sent back by Desaix, and two regiments of Cavalry, and placed these fresh troops on the right of Lannes towards Castel Ceriolo. But the French were in sore

straits at every point—Victor's corps d'armée was completely broken and was falling back on San Giuliano. It still here and there offered some resistance, but with little success in its disordered efforts. Kellermann's brigade, although it had suffered heavily from the unceasing Artillery fire, was, however, still in perfect order and steadily covered Victor's flank, retiring in successive échelons and from time to time turning to charge the Austrians when they pressed too close on the retreating Infantry, nor, during the long day's fighting, did it allow a single prisoner to be taken. But the most fatal feature of the French discomfiture was that Napoleon's army was on the point of being cut in two, part of it being forced to retire towards Sale and the Po, while the rest was being pushed in the direction of Tortona. The French had nearly lost all hope, and Melas thought that the victory was gained. So convinced indeed was the Austrian General of his success that, carrying as he did the burden of eighty years and having been slightly wounded, he yielded to intense fatigue and returned to Alessandria, leaving General Zach, his Chief of the Staff, to strike the final blow and to carry on a pursuit.

About 3 P.M. Napoleon's army was extended more or less diagonally across the plain of Marengo from San Giuliano in the direction of Castel Ceriolo. Victor's corps was for the time quite broken and was sheltering itself behind San Giuliano. To its right and somewhat advanced was Lannes, whose battalions had suffered severely but still held together. Still further in advance on the same flank were Monnier's division and the Consular Guard. All felt in greater or less degree the bitterness of defeat. All believed there was but small hope that defeat would not soon be turned into irretrievable disaster.

Confident of victory, Zach was pressing forward with the whole Austrian army, but, in their elation at their apparent complete success, both the General and his soldiers conducted themselves with a carelessness which invited discomfiture. In front a column of 6,000 Infantry, its left flank protected by six

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squadrons of Cavalry, was hurrying along the chaussée from Marengo to San Giuliano, eager to give the coup de grâce to Victor's corps, but there were no supports nearer than about three quarters of a mile. At that distance came another column of Infantry of about equal strength flanked by twelve squadrons, and still further to the rear was advancing the main body of the Austrian army in straggling detachments, extending across the plain from west to east with, on its extreme left, a powerful force of 2,000 Cavalry. Still it was not alone the defects in their tactical dispositions that marked the overweening imprudence of the Austrians' forward movement, but the wild relaxation of discipline and cohesion in their ranks. As a French authority says: 'les troupes marchaient presque à la débandade.' The men quitted their battalions to plunder the dead, and the officers fell out to exchange mutual congratulations. They were in no case to meet a sudden emergency, and when least expected the emergency came upon them.

Desaix had arrived, preceding by a few minutes Boudet's division, which by forced marching he had been able to bring to the battlefield before all was lost. In hurried consultation with the First Consul and Marmont, but on his initiative, a battery of 18 guns was collected by Marmont and placed in position to fire upon the leading column of the enemy and check it until Boudet's division had formed for action. Kept concealed until the Austrian column was almost within musket-shot, the effect of the storm of grape poured by these guns, when they were unmasked, upon the Austrian column, was all that Desaix had desired. The enemy, so suddenly struck, hesitated from front to rear, and before they could recover themselves, Boudet's division was upon them in fierce bayonet attack and the leading battalions fell back in confusion. But the French success was only partial, and it was dearly purchased, for the gallant Desaix fell dead, a bullet through his heart. The great Austrian column, though staggered, was by no means forced to give way, and, by virtue of its numbers, opposed such a resistance to the French Infantry that Boudet's men made upon it no decisive impression, in fact, fatigued with long and rapid marching, the vigour of their assault began to die away.

THE CHARGE

But the most extraordinary and dramatic event was now to take place, astounding in the small means by which it was accomplished, in its immediate military results, and in the great political developments to which it gave the first impetus. The whole Cavalry of Napoleon had, on the arrival of Boudet's division, been formed close to the Infantry under cover of trees and vineyards. Kellermann's brigade, to which were attached two and a half squadrons of the 1st and 8th Dragoons, was on the right of Boudet; more to the north-east were the Chasseurs à cheval of the Consular Guard, and the brigade of General Champeaux was in support on the Tortona road. Murat was in command of the whole, but he does not seem during that day to have taken any prominent part in the action of the arm of the service with which his name is generally The trials of the day had pressed heavily on the identified. Cavalry, and Kellermann's brigade had especially suffered severely. It has been seen that in the morning it was 800 strong; in the afternoon, including the attached squadrons, it only counted 400 sabres. Marmont's Artillery then had prepared the way for Boudet's attack, and Boudet's men had hurled themselves gallantly on the enemy's column, giving it a decided check, but themselves beginning to waver when their first energy was exhausted. Kellermann had closely watched the phases of the action and saw that the moment had come when he could effectually intervene. He moved his men rapidly to the front through the trees and vines which had hitherto concealed them, passed Marmont's guns, and held on his course until he was on the left flank of the Austrians, then, wheeling to the left, charged with the utmost vigour and determination on the enemy, his regiments cutting their way through the intervals in the column

and throwing the whole into complete disorder. Entirely crushed by the unexpected and terrible assault, 3,000 men laid down their arms and Zach himself was taken prisoner by a French trooper. The leading column being disposed of, Kellermann turned against the six squadrons of Cavalry that had flanked it (somewhat lethargically to all appearance) and easily scattered them; then, being joined by the Chasseurs of the Consular Guard under Bessières, he threw his brigade on the 2,000 Cavalry who have been noted as being on the left of the Austrian main body. These were driven back and eventually found themselves striving to cover the retreat of a defeated army. To return to the moment of the decisive charge. As soon as Boudet saw what Kellermann had done he renewed the efforts of his division and now carried all before him. The spirit of the whole French army was restored and from right to left there was a general cry of 'Forward.' Even Victor's divisions regained confidence, and all, Infantry, Cavalry, and Artillery, surged in waves across the plain, eager to make up for their ill-success earlier in the day. The Austrians, despite the stubborn resistance which they offered wherever they found a rallying point, and despite the gallant charges of their Cavalry, were forced to abandon the ground that they had gained since the morning, and the French divisions crossed in less than an hour the plain which they had disputed so long and so tenaciously. Marengo was again assaulted and carried, and it was only the existence of a strong tête de pont that enabled the shattered Austrian army to recross the bridges over the Bormida. Everybody knows the rest. Melas, in despair, demanded to treat and signed the famous convention of Alessandria, which not only had the effect of expelling the Austrians from Lombardy but above all confirmed the power of Napoleon, increased his prestige and put him on the high road towards the Consulate for life and eventually the Empire.

The most convincing appreciation of Kellermann's great charge at Marengo was written by Marmont, a soldier whose opinion cannot be gainsaid. 'Everything happened under my

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own eyes and close to me. If the charge had been made three minutes later, our guns would have been taken or forced to retire, and then perhaps, being no longer exposed to a battery firing grape, the enemy's column would have been more able to receive cavalry. It would probably have been the same if the charge had been made before the guns fired their salvo. required the precise combination to ensure a success so complete, and it must be allowed, so unexpected. Never did fortune intervene in a manner more decisive, never did a General show more coup d'æil, more energy, more appreciation of opportunity than Kellermann on this occasion. He had been placed under the orders of Desaix, who had instructed him to watch the movements of the troops and to charge when he saw the enemy in disorder and the occasion favourable. With the eye of genius, however, he recognised the pressure of circumstances, for it was when the disorder commenced among ourselves and not among the enemy that he charged, and carried out his resolution with incomparable vigour.'

Many lessons may be drawn from the incidents of the battle of Marengo, but they are all fairly obvious and need not be considered here. One remark may be permitted, however. It was not the least extraordinary point in connection with Kellermann's extraordinary charge that it was executed late in the afternoon by a brigade which had been in the most active employment since daybreak, which had already made several charges, and had lost more than half its numbers in killed and wounded. The horses must have been good, in the best of condition, and the admirably disciplined men must have been actuated by the highest spirit.

MACHINE GUNS WITH CAVALRY

By CAPT. R. V. K. APPLIN, D.S.O., 14th (King's) Hussars

The general recognition in modern armies of the necessity of Machine Guns—German organization and regulations for Machine Guns with Cavalry—The question of mobility.

'The Germans have resolutely entered on the road of attaching Machine Guns to Cavalry, and they seem thus to understand the modern combination of fire and shock tactics. To the Machine Gun, the fire action,—to the man—the horseman, the moral action—so much the more easy and productive of results,—as the machine is the more powerful.'—Chief of 11 Bureau, French General Staff.

THE value of Machine Guns with Cavalry has been recognized by all the Great Powers, and it may be interesting to glance at the different methods adopted in other armies for the tactical employment of this arm in conjunction with Cavalry, and to suggest how our own system may be improved to meet the requirements of modern war.

THE 'BATTERY' SYSTEM

With scarcely an exception the Great Powers have adopted the 'battery' system for their Machine Guns, and have organized them into units of four to eight guns each. The advantages of this system have been universally recognised. It enables the units to be trained in peace on sound tactical principles for the support of the arm to which they are attached, it trains the subordinate leaders in co-operating on definite lines for the attainment of the common object, and ensures a sound system of instruction and consequent knowledge of fire tactics, which is essential for the efficient handling of the guns, whether acting together or singly.



In war the advantage of having the Machine Guns of a unit under the command of a senior officer, who has made their tactical employment his study, and has trained them in peace, and knows the value and capabilities of each man under his command, is obvious.

From the Regimental Subaltern and his one or two guns, left entirely to his own resources in peace time, we can hardly expect a high standard of tactical training, while the Officer Commanding a regiment or brigade will feel little confidence in the support of his Machine Guns under such circumstances, and they may even be a cause of anxiety.

THE GERMAN ORGANIZATION

Germany has organized her Machine Guns in 'sections' of six guns, sub-divided into 'divisions' of two guns each, and has attached a 'section' to each Cavalry Division for manœuvres.

They are used with the independent Cavalry to break down resistance during reconnaissance, and to hold points and cover retirements, so as to enable the Cavalry to perform its proper rôle, and do away with the necessity for dismounted action as far as possible. The 'Provisional Regulations for Machine Gun* Detachments' of 1904 are very thorough, and contain no fewer than 261 paragraphs. A few extracts may be interesting:—

- 'Machine Guns enable commanders to develop at fixed points the maximum volume of Infantry fire on the smallest front.
- 'Machine Gun Detachments can, at all times and under all conditions, confidently await the attacks of hostile Cavalry.
- 'For the correct manœuvring of Machine Guns it is necessary to possess a clear knowledge of the general situation—of the aims of the Commander, and of the state of the action. The disposal of the Machine Gun Detachments rests, therefore, directly with the superior Commander.

^{*} To avoid confusion, the word 'Detachment' is used for six guns. The word 'section' for two guns, as in our Service.



'Machine Guns attached to independent Cavalry must be used to increase the power of Cavalry, mounted and dismounted, and on the offensive or defensive. The duties that will fall on Machine Guns in this service demand great mobility and the strictest fire discipline. The Commander of the independent Cavalry will make all decisions regarding the employment of Machine Guns. He communicates all his plans of action to the Machine Gun Commander, and provides him further with special orders concerning the first entry into action of the Machine Guns.

'On reconnaissance duty with Cavalry, Machine Guns will be most frequently employed in breaking down the resistance of the enemy at small posts or defiles which they have occupied, or *vice versâ*, to stiffen the opposition made by the Cavalry at such points.

'On such an occasion even the assistance of a single section (i.e., two guns), with its ammunition wagon, will be of use to its Cavalry.

'In the advance of Cavalry against Cavalry, the Machine Gun Detachments must take up their positions as soon as possible, so as to support the first deployment, and then the attack of the Cavalry. A position will be selected most advantageously well to the front and to a flank of the advancing Cavalry, since from there a continuation of fire is rendered possible up to the moment almost of the "Charge"; and at the same time an outflanking movement of the enemy is prevented on that side.

'During the fight, the Detachment Commander will have to act on his own responsibility according to the state of the action. He must not wait for orders, and must always watch the Cavalry engagement. He must use every opportunity to join in the issue at stake, and make preparations for decisive action in case of either a successful or an unsuccessful termination of the struggle In the event of a favourable issue of the action, it will be his duty to follow the beaten Cavalry with his fire and



to prevent him offering further resistance. In the event of an unsuccessful issue he will have to decide in good time whether it is right to remain in his position or to withdraw to a covering position.'

It will be seen from the foregoing that Germany takes a very serious view of the utility of Machine Guns with Cavalry, and when it is remembered that no less than 100,000 rounds of ball cartridge and 100,000 rounds of blank are issued annually to each Detachment for training purposes, there can be little doubt that they aim at a very high standard of efficiency.

There are seventeen Detachments of six guns each on the peace establishment.

The German guns claim to go anywhere that Infantry can go, and to be able to keep up with Cavalry. They are mounted on a ratchwork on steel sleighs, the runners of which fit into grooves on a galloping gun-carriage with limber like a light Horse Artillery carriage. A clamp enables the sleighs to be instantly detached from the carriage, and the guns can then be pulled or carried into position over any ground.

The ratchwork is adjustable to three heights:—viz. 1' 6", 2' 6" and 3' 6", so that the gun can be used lying down or to fire over cover of different heights. The guns can also be fired from the carriages by unlimbering in the usual way.

Three ammunition wagons with 87,000 rounds accompany each section of two guns.

Notes from Other Countries

The Russians organize their Machine Guns in 'Companies' of eight guns each, having ninety-five officers and men with carriage mounting, or 119 officers and men with fifty-six horses with tripods (pack transport).

During the late war, however, guns were often attached to units as in our Service.

Switzerland has four Companies of eight guns, each subdivided into sections of two guns. They are exclusively attached to Cavalry and are carried on pack horses, the whole detachment being mounted. Their Regulations state that the guns are intended to enable Cavalry to resist other arms, to cover their flanks, and to act by surprise.

Austria since 1904 has adopted a Machine Gun for use with Cavalry, and has issued Regulations. They state that Machine Guns should always be used in pairs and never singly, on account of the liability of a single gun to 'stick.' They should operate from cover and act by surprise, and should never engage other Machine Guns or Artillery, except the latter at close range. They are particularly useful with the advanced guard. They enable Cavalry to intervene at all stages of the fight.

The Egyptian Artillery have a Machine Gun battery of Maxims and a section of Rexer guns. They detach sections as may be required for temporary use with other arms, but under trained officers and worked by trained detachments.

To sum up:—the general opinion on the Continent seems to be that Machine Guns will enable Cavalry to utilize fire action while retaining their mobility, and that they may be used with decisive effect in the Cavalry fight.

Conclusions

We have now reached the question how our own organization and training can be improved to meet modern requirements.

It would seem essential in the first place that our Machine Guns should be organized into 'batteries' in peace time and trained under a senior officer in combined effort for the support of Cavalry in war; and it must be admitted that such organization and training would vastly increase the efficiency of Machine Gun sections, while it would in no way prevent them from being employed as at present with their own Regiment.

Two Machine Guns should be issued to each Regiment of Cavalry. Where a Regiment is brigaded with others, the six guns would form a 'battery' or 'detachment' under the command of a Field Officer, who would be solely responsible for their training and efficiency and who would command them at Manœuvres and on Service. There would be little or no difficulty in this, as Signallers are trained and commanded on similar lines under the Divisional Signalling Officer at present, and the system answers well.

The fallacy which exists in certain quarters in India that Machine Guns hinder Cavalry on account of being less mobile, is entirely due to the want of a proper method of transport. It is obvious that an Infantry pattern gun on a mule-pack saddle is wholly unsuitable for use on a troop horse, and that if horses so equipped are galloped with Cavalry, they are liable to 'go' in the loins.

The Swiss have used a pack-mounted Machine Gun with their Cavalry successfully for years. With a suitable saddle and a light tripod gun, there is nothing to prevent us from doing the same.

To sum up, given a suitable mounting capable of great mobility, of a pattern that can be used from behind cover lying down, each Regiment having its own two guns, a Brigade will have six, and a Division twenty-four guns. The Cavalry General thus has a splendid reserve in his hands for use at the critical moment of the fight: as mobile as his Cavalry, in fire effect more powerful than Infantry, having the enormous advantage of occupying in action the smallest possible front, and being practically invisible, while capable of hurling a storm of some 10,000 bullets a minute with the maximum of accuracy and concentration.

WITH A SQUADRON OF CAVALRY AT THE JHANSI CAMP OF EXERCISE

By CAPTAIN R. E. T. Hogg, Central India Horse

The writer brings to notice several points which occurred during manœuvres, which are frequently overlooked by young Cavalry officers, also some points which the commanders of mixed forces would do well to note, especially the evil results of splitting up Cavalry unnecessarily.


One frequently hears the remark that there is nothing to be learnt from peace manœuvres, or that what one learns is of no practical value in the field. That impossible situations often occur on field days is indisputable; nevertheless, leaving out what is unreal, there remains a great deal from which valuable lessons may be learnt. One of the chief elements of success lies in having so profited by a study of one's own or someone else's experience as never to be at a loss how to deal with any emergency which presents itself; to be able to apply to it intuitively the knowledge which has been accumulated. A mere book knowledge is useless. A true appreciation, which has become part of oneself, of the fundamental principles which should govern one's line of action in given cases is necessary.

The following notes were made at a camp of exercise at Jhansi during the past cold weather, and are intended to set forth in plain language some of the situations in which an officer in command of a squadron of Cavalry may find himself in the course of manœuvres, and, with some modifications, presumably of active service also.

THE PURSUIT OF INFANTRY RETIRING IN GOOD ORDER

 $egin{aligned} Retiring force & (Red) & ext{No. 1 Battalion} \ 2 & ext{troops Cavalry} \ & ext{No. 2 Battalion} \ & ext{Pursuing force (Blue)} & ext{No. 3 Battalion} \ & ext{2 squadrons Cavalry} \end{aligned}$

No Artillery were available to take part in the operations.



Red force holding line of hills marked 1901, their position being unknown to Blue force. Line of retirement viâ Garhia to Camp Hill.

Blue force assembled near fourth milestone E. of road.

The orders issued to the Cavalry by Blue commander were to reconnoitre enemy's position and report his dispositions, numbers, and extent of front, and further to hang on the flanks of the retiring Infantry, to delay his retirement, and enable the Blue Infantry to come up.

The reconnaissance of hill 1901 and its northern prolongation was carried out by patrols, who had to dismount and advance on foot to obtain their information. The Blue Cavalry commander decided to reconnoitre and turn the enemy's right flank himself with his two squadrons, and moved off from the point of assembly in a S.-W. direction with the gap S. of hill 1901 as his first objective. His right flank guard tried to obtain possession of knoll 'A,' but was denied by the enemy: similarly, the advance guard was heavily fired on from the gap. In each instance the Cavalry commander used his flank and advance guards as pivots, and, manœuvring further south, found the neck opposite Bilaura unoccupied and took his Cavalry over. The enemy were then seen retiring towards Garhia village, and the Blue Cavalry commander decided on the kopjes N. of Bilaura as his next objective. Forging ahead without adequate advance and flank guards, the squadrons came under heavy rifle fire at close range from the enemy's Cavalry who were already in possession, and would have lost heavily.

Here was an instance of the danger of acting on preconceived notions. The Cavalry commander had made up his mind without previous reconnaissance that the kopjes were not held, and neglected to take proper precautions to cover his advance. An advance guard in this case, however small, having drawn the enemy's fire, might then have engaged him dismounted, while the main body, manœuvring on this pivot, made a still further detour to get round the enemy's flank.

The next position taken up by the Blue Cavalry was along the banks of the river from B to B. Here they were admirably posted on the flanks or directly on the line of retreat of the enemy's Infantry, who were retiring on both sides of Garhia village. The fire action which ensued would in all probability have brought the retirement to a standstill, or at any rate have delayed it sufficiently to enable the pursuing Infantry to arrive. The retirement, however, continued (one of the unreal conditions of peace manœuvres), and the Blue Cavalry took up successive positions on the enemy's flank, and with dismounted fire harassed the retreating Infantry, forcing them to keep deployed, and checking them at every favourable position.

The points to be noticed in connection with these latter operations are:—

- (1) On several occasions small bodies of Cavalry charged the retreating Infantry. The true rôle of Cavalry in the circumstances was to stick to the flanks, take up successive fire positions, and trust to dismounted fire.
- (2) The importance of concealment. Infantry alone are incapable of scouting far to the front or flanks, and a sudden outburst of fire from well-concealed Cavalry at short range contains the important element of surprise. Horses must be carefully hidden away behind trees or in folds of the ground: men behind cover must not move about.
- (3) The value of a highly mobile force of Cavalry which can also fight dismounted.

The Cavalry rôle in this connection is indeed a most important one; given equal marching powers and a short start, Infantry unaided will never catch up Infantry which is retiring. It is the business of Cavalry, by making use of their superior mobility and their ability to take Infantry on at their own game, so to hamper the movements of the enemy that time is gained for the pursuing Infantry to arrive and bring about a decisive engagement.

NECESSITY OF ALLOWING SQUADRON COMMANDER A FREE HAND

In carrying out these duties, which will generally involve a wide turning movement and temporary loss of touch with Headquarters, the squadron commander should be allowed a fairly free hand. In illustration of this we may take the case of a Red force executing a retirement pursued by a Blue force; the Blue commander gave definite orders to his Cavalry to work round a flank and seize certain kopjes barring the supposed line of retreat. The kopjes were duly seized, but reconnaissance and personal observation proved that the line of retreat lay a mile away, and hence loss of time and needless fatigue for men and

horses resulted before the mistake could be rectified. It would have been sounder if the initial orders had acquainted the squadron commander with the general situation and the results to be striven for, leaving him to work out details. This, moreover, would have been in accordance with Sect. 3, para. 18, Combined Training.

It will frequently happen that a squadron commander may find himself in an isolated position, out of touch and communication with the rest of his own force. A study of the country will disclose to him many features of ground not shown on the map, which open up unthought of possibilities. He must now rapidly turn over in his mind his information regarding the positions and movements of the different forces and the rôle his orders have assigned to him, and decide on his course of action. general orders are not clear beyond the possibility of error, the chances are that his deductions will be wrong. Or supposing, as in the example quoted above, his orders have tied him down to a certain course of action, he may find the preconceived notions of the enemy's movements to be falsified by his own observation and information received. He must then take upon himself the responsibility of departing from the letter of his orders. This, as already shown, may result in loss of time and avoidable fatigue to men and horses.

NECESSITY FOR LIMITING DETACHMENTS

It is extraordinary how rapidly a squadron is depleted by the numerous necessary detachments that have to be made—e.g., patrols, scouts, signallers, orderlies, &c.; and once these are lost sight of it is very difficult, in fact almost impossible, to collect them again for some important stroke when every man is of vital importance.

It is often the case, too, that men are frittered away quite unnecessarily; half a dozen men, for example, are detailed for patrol work when a little forethought would show that three only are necessary; or a troop, perhaps, is attached to an



infantry outpost section, when a few orderlies only would suffice.

Not one man over and above what is absolutely necessary should be detached from a squadron.

In illustration of the evil results of splitting up a squadron of Cavalry unnecessarily, I may quote an instance in which one squadron was acting with a force of Infantry (Red) holding an outpost line. The enemy's force was composed of an equal strength of Infantry and three squadrons of Cavalry (Blue).

The orders received by the Red squadron commander were roughly as follows: '... to detach one troop to report to officer commanding No. 1 Section of the outpost line, and one troop to officer commanding No. 2 Section. The remainder to act as independent Cavalry, to discover the whereabouts and direction of advance of the enemy, to guard the left flank of the Infantry against any turning movement, and to deny various distant kopjes to the enemy's Cavalry.'

Now the outpost line occupied a strong defensive position with a good field of view; the right flank rested on an impassable obstacle, and might be considered safe; the two forces were only three miles apart. After two troops had been detached as ordered to the two outpost sections, one troop alone remained to carry out the various duties of scouting and protection mentioned in orders, being opposed by three concentrated squadrons of hostile Cavalry. The duties assigned to the Red Cavalry were actually beyond their powers, but with a complete squadron something might have been done. The mistake made was in unnecessarily splitting up the small available force into smaller scattered units, which were incapable of any useful independent effort, and which could not be readily reunited. The correct solution of the problem undoubtedly was to reconnoitre with a few small patrols, keeping the remainder of the squadron intact in a position of readiness to guard the left flank and to strike a decisive blow when opportunity offered.

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SUGGESTED TRAINING FOR SCOUTS

The prize given by General Baden-Powell to the last class at the Cavalry School at Netheravon has been won by Captain G. A. Weir, 3rd Dragoon Guards. It was offered for the best suggestion for a practical system of teaching the elements of scouting in regiments at home stations.

Several other competitors sent in essays of considerable value, notably Lieuts. R. Oppenheim, 4th Dragoon Guards; A. E. Woods, 8th Hussars; E. Beddington, 16th Lancers; S. Armitage, 7th Dragoon Guards; B. Howard-Vyse, Royal Horse Guards; A. Pollok, 7th Hussars; J. Holdsworth, The Bays; L. Owston, 3rd Dragoon Guards; N. Neill, 19th Hussars.

We append Captain Weir's essay, together with some interesting points suggested in others.

SUGGESTION FOR THE TRAINING OF SCOUTS

By CAPTAIN G. A. WEIR, 3rd Dragoon Guards

I am working on the supposition that the would-be scout comes to the scout-master with at least five years' service to run, and possesses as far as possible the necessary qualifications—physical, mental, and moral.

The first question a scout-master has to consider is how much time he has at his disposal for actual elementary training. Allowing two out of the five years for elementary training, we find that he has none too much, considering the number of subjects he has to teach.

From the fifty-two weeks in each year he will probably have to make the following deductions: furlough six weeks (allowing an extra fortnight); musketry three weeks; brigade training, camp of exercise, and manœuvres six weeks; scouting scheme two weeks, and possibly squadron training three weeks; making a total of twenty weeks, which only leaves thirty-two, or, omitting squadron training, thirty-five weeks at his disposal.



At the beginning of the year the scout-master should write out a list of all the subjects he intends to teach (and he will find it a long one), and then roughly draw up a programme for each week. In doing this the following points should be kept in mind:—

- 1. Begin at the beginning, and make sure that your men are well grounded.
 - 2. Vary your programme as much as possible.
 - 3. Make your lessons progressive.
 - 4. Give up a week to revision at least once in two months.
- 5. Don't overwork your men or they will get stale: they will 'play up' all the better on manœuvres if you don't work them too hard at other times. Remember they get no extra pay for scouting.

The following is a type of a week's programme such as might be used during the first two years' training:—

_	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Frid ay	Saturday
Morning .	Tracking	Reporting	Hunting	Map- reading	Tactical scheme	Training horses
Afternoon	Signalling Judging distance			Signalling Judging distance	Signalling Judging distance	
Evening .	Lecture on re- porting	Criticism on reports		Lecture on tactics Explain scheme	Criticism on scheme	

I shall not attempt to give a list of what the scout ought to be taught, but offer a few remarks on the following points:—

Lecturing.—Never more than half an hour—Explain and talk, don't stand up and lecture—discuss the question with the men—one point is enough for an evening—make the men take notes and offer suggestions—ask and answer questions—always lecture on what you are going to practise next day. If lecturing on reporting, give them a model report of your own to study.

Criticising.—Have all work done in the field handed in at once; allow no 'fair copies.' This gives you time to correct it

before evening. Mark all work carefully—explain to each man his mistakes—never be sarcastic—keep a frame in the scouts' room for the best report and sketch of the week.

Map-reading and Sketching.—Teach the elementary theory in the barrack room; contours are important, but only enough should be taught to enable the men to convert angle of slope to gradient; don't bother with V.I. and H.E.: if they understand the general idea it is enough. They should be able to make scales.

Take them out for rides, and keep stopping and making them show you where you are, and point out hills, villages, &c., on the map. You can't do too much of this.

Give a route and make them take it in turns to act as guide. They must, at first, always have their maps open in their hands.

Rough eye-sketches are all the scout has time to make, and they require much practice. Here comes in the importance of judging distance.

Let the men enlarge a small scale map and fill in detail on the ground; or correct old maps. Let them watch you do one or two sketches and explain how you do it. Teach landscape sketching with pencils of different shades; after copying a few sketches indoors, men soon begin to pick it up, even if they can't draw much.

Signalling and judging distance.—Both require constant practice. The system of teaching judging distance in vogue at Hythe has excellent results.

Tracking.—The elements can be taught on a mud 'tracking ground.'

If every scout-master kept a record of the measurement of all tracks and the relative position of the fore and hind feet, when using the tracking ground, and sent them to someone in tabulated form, a very useful guide to elementary tracking could be brought out. Most books and plates at present published only give a general idea of the paces, and do not attempt to distinguish between the various breeds of horses, though the



tracks of a thoroughbred and a common horse differ considerably. A rule for calculating the number of horses that have passed, by counting the hoof-marks in a yard, might also be found. I always count the number of tracks in a yard and divide by two, to get the number of horses, but my experience is very small, and I am not sure that this rule always works.

When training men first let them track large parties and gradually reduce the numbers. It is easier to track across country than on the roads.

Reading Signs.—These are fully dealt with in 'Aids to Scouting.'

Training in Observation and Memory.—A good indoor lesson is to play at the game taught by the old man in the bazaar in 'Kim.'

Tactics.—In doing a tactical scheme try to get a squadron leader to form an enemy for you.

All scouts should know the Time and Space Table in 'Combined Training.' They should understand outposts, so that they can make a pretty shrewd guess as to where the enemy are likely to put theirs. They should be able to form a good idea of what he will do under given circumstances.

A modification of the 'War Game' can be used for indoor instruction.

Long-distance Rides.—A scout should know how to ride fifty miles a day for a week on end. Also how to do fifty miles in as short a time as possible. He should never sit on his horse at a walk. Slow trot and lead covers a lot of ground fairly rapidly. He should learn how to change the diagonal on which he comes down when trotting, and not always trot on the same diagonal, as most men do.

Hunting.—Teaches a man to find his way across a country. It is excellent practice to come home and mark on the map the line you have followed during a hunt.

Last Three Years.—Two years' training should make a man fairly proficient in elementary scouting, and although during the

last three years of his service he must be given plenty of practice at his out-of-door work, some of the afternoons and evenings might be devoted to teaching languages, telegraphing, or learning to drive a motor. The first of these has not, so far as I have seen, been mentioned in any articles on training the soldier for civil employment. But surely a linguist could find employment with Cook's or some other touring agency, and would be of the greatest use in a Continental war if he was already a trained scout.

IDEAS FROM OTHER ESSAYS

An officer must himself know everything that he wants to teach. He must himself be an adept at stalking, tracking, swimming his horse, finding his way, sketching, working by night, and so on, before he can instil the elements into others.

A first-class scout should be exempted by Army Order from guards, fatigues, &c.

[In fact most of the writers urge the importance of giving special privileges regimentally to scouts in order to make it worth their while to go through the hard training necessary to make them really efficient as such.]

A special school of instruction for scout-masters is much wanted.

One scheme suggested is that N.C.O.s and men selected as likely to make scouts should be sent to a scouts school for their instruction in the elementary knowledge, and should afterwards receive their finishing at the hands of the regimental scoutmaster.

Regiments might arrange among themselves to temporarily exchange scouts, and thus give the scouts fresh country to work over without extra expense of billeting, &c.

Give the scouts inaccurate maps of the country, which they are to correct if they find them wrong.

If a regimental prize were given annually to the scout who has his horse in the best condition under pretty severe tests, a

great step would be effected in horsemastership—which is one of the important qualifications for a scout.

Once a pupil is bored it is impossible to teach him anything; therefore, begin with the interesting points, and give lots of variety, especially in the early lessons.

Ride out with your patrol. Show them some spot and give a small tactical scheme as to the presence of enemy there. Ride back yourself a mile or two and let them bring in their information to you. Then, if necessary, return to the spot for 'powwow' and criticism.

Woodcraft should be taught to scouts to show them how animals conceal themselves both in movement and at rest; also so that they can distinguish between the ordinary calls of birds and animals and those of alarm.

To practise the sense of hearing and seeing by night, post some sentries armed with rifle and blank-cartridge, who must stand up or walk about their post. Send out others to act as hostile scouts to stalk and kill them. [One writer suggests arming one man per patrol with an axe for this purpose!] If a sentry hears or sees anything he fires a shot. All scouts must then halt and lie down, till the signal is given to carry on. The umpire goes to the sentry who fired and asks him in which direction the enemy's scout lies: if correct, the sentry wins. If the stalker can creep up within fifteen paces of the sentry he deposits his handkerchief or other article on the ground at the point which he reached and creeps away again. When at a safe distance, in a new direction, he makes a noise or attracts attention so as to induce the sentry to fire. When the umpire comes to investigate, he can claim to have killed the sentry in the first instance.

Long patrols of one young scout with an old one are good practical training: followed by a long patrol of two young scouts together: and finally by a young scout entirely 'on his own.' Should be competitive as far as possible, to compensate for the hard and tedious work involved.



CAVALRY ORGANISATION: A SUGGESTION

By Major C. B. Bulkeley Johnson, Scots Greys

The prospects which lie before our Cavalry in a European war, and how these might be improved by reducing the numbers and increasing the quality.

Whilst putting forward with all diffidence the arguments and suggestions in the following article, I think I may venture to say that I am as much imbued with the true Cavalry spirit as most Cavalrymen, and that I am fully conscious of the glorious deeds performed by the Cavalry in the past, and of the possibility of their repetition even under modern conditions, under leaders of decision and dash.

Soldiers are naturally, from their very training, true conservatives, especially those who, having passed a great number of years in the service, have now opportunities of putting into practice those ideals which have been inculcated into them from their earliest moments.

These, then, will look with unequivocal condemnation on any radical change which will force them to lay aside the ideals and prevent them from trying the methods by which, from the opportunity, they may possibly achieve great things. For this reason most tactical changes are slow and are generally only reluctantly consummated when the absolute necessity of them is shown by the lesson of the last campaign. The nation which has thought out these changes for itself, before the rough teaching of necessity compels it, is generally the one that is successful.

We were the first to perceive the need to adopt radical changes in the Infantry formations owing to the improvements in armaments, and we are the first to have a suspicion that, as



regards the Cavalry also, the training of a bygone day will not suit the requirements of the future.

Let us put our house in order, and, as we are indisputably at an overwhelming disadvantage as regards numbers in comparison with any other first-class Power, let us endeavour to counteract this disadvantage and possibly turn the scale in our favour.

It seems to me in the recent strenuous arguments on Cavalry Tactics that those who uphold the time-honoured shock tactics and the so-called Mounted Infantry advocates have both missed the point so far as it concerns our Army. It may be worth while for the Continental armies, with their masses of Cavalry, to train them to meet the opposing Cavalry knee to knee, and to hold the theory that a mass of horsemen, launched at the critical moment, may by sheer dash override all opposition and possibly influence the result of a battle. But let us look at our case. Our reserves of men will be almost exhausted in filling up the present regiments to war strength; a reserve of horses does not exist. At the most we shall be able, after supplying the various corps troops, to place in the field one division, while a large percentage of our horses are either above or below the serviceable age. attempt to improve this is met by the answer 'no money.' It may be urged that we shall not enter into a campaign without allies, but this hardly affects the situation, as our force must be self-contained and the proportion of Cavalry to Infantry is less than that maintained by other armies. Let us see if we cannot with the resources at our disposal evolve a system by which we shall minimise the disadvantage under which we at present labour.

Before the South African War our own Cavalry, looked at by modern eyes, was comparatively untrained, except in drill, the culminating point of which was the charge. Advanced screens of men, miscalled scouts, stereotyped advanced and rear guards and outposts, constituted the remainder of the training, but the main effort was concentrated on steady drill. Since then great improvements have been introduced, so that to-day it may be well said that the British Cavalry is far the best as regards quality in Europe. But there we end.

The main idea to-day is still shock tactics, whether to meet and overcome the opposing Cavalry or to be thrown by the general-in-chief into the battle as opportunity offers. This is where I urge that a complete change be made.

Constituted as it is, the Cavalry arm is most costly to train and keep, while it does not exist in sufficient numbers to bring about results commensurate to the expense.

If it is to be employed as now laid down, it may well be that its losses during the first stages of a war may be so great as seriously to compromise the fate of an army taught to rely on it.

It may therefore be summed up that by following the lead of Continental armies, we shall probably consign our Cavalry to practical destruction or inglorious inactivity.

In the only two wars of any magnitude during recent years there have been lessons to those who will read.

Before the commencement of actual hostilities in the South African War, Cavalry leaders, even those with a previous knowledge of the country and of the conditions of warfare in it, were confident that their arm, which at that time would have looked with contempt at the tactics adopted at a later date, would have great scope in all its functions.

The first attempt in Natal was disastrous to the regiment concerned. The subsequent failures were put down to a variety of causes—such as insufficient training of men and officers, bad horsemastership, unfitness of the horses, unsuitability of the country, and the unique and unorthodox tactics of the enemy.

These things undoubtedly aggravated matters, but the real bar to success lay in the last.

None knew better than the Boers of their inferiority when hand to hand with Regular Cavalry, and none dreaded an encounter more; while such was the success of the tactics

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adopted to avoid any chance of this, that during the whole war there were only two or three occasions for the use of the arme blanche.

The system of scouting met with much the same want of success. As a rule the only intelligence gained was that certain ground was occupied or not, but whether by ten or a thousand could not be told, while the lives of many promising young officers and men were thrown away in endeavouring vainly to ascertain more.

The more or less Mounted Infantry tactics which were adopted by the Cavalry leaders after the relief of Kimberley with great success and cheerfulness were regarded purely as a temporary expedient necessary only against an exceptional enemy in an exceptional country. On the cessation of hostilities a return was at once made to the orthodox training with such modifications as even the most bigoted perceived were of advantage.

Again, before the Russo-Japanese War the large number of their Cavalry and of the Cossacks, up till then considered the beau ideal of light horsemen, was reckoned as a great asset to the Russians in summing up pros and cons.

On the other hand, the smallness of the numbers and poorness of quality of the Japanese Cavalry was held to be a corresponding disadvantage.

What was the result? Did the Russian Cavalry achieve great things? Did they keep their Generals posted with sufficient information on which to base plans, or inform General Kuropatkin of the great turning movement? Did they keep the Japanese in a constant state of qui vive and alarm? Did they destroy the Japanese Cavalry?

Most emphatically, No! On the contrary, they were able to achieve practically nothing.

The Japanese worked out their plans and rested secure behind an impenetrable screen of Infantry. They were kept fully informed of the Russian movements by the Intelligence Department, and although perhaps want of good Cavalry may have handicapped them somewhat, they were still able to achieve results which have astounded the whole world.

Thus the history of war, like other history, repeats itself. It has been the unfailing rule that the methods of any nation overwhelmingly victorious have eventually been copied by others and so improved upon and elaborated in times of peace that all thought on military matters becomes firmly fixed in a groove. All at once, to the surprise of the world, some great military power has collapsed like a house of cards before an army which has adopted new methods peculiar to its circumstances or a new school of thought under the guidance of a great genius. The Boers and Japanese would seem to have tumbled down the Cavalry house of cards.

The most bigoted of the Cavalry to-day will read no lessons in the last two wars. The South African War they dismiss as exceptional, while in the Russo-Japanese War they look with contempt on the Russian Cavalry generals and their want of energy. But are they right?

The accounts of the attachés to the Russian Army do not bear this out. By these the Russian Cavalry, although not perfect, was, according to its lights, self-sacrificing and enterprising. Their fault lay in the fact that they had trained themselves in the old methods, which they found could effect nothing against the carefully prepared protective tactics of the Japanese.

To come to the point, I think that, from all the above, it can be argued that the old-time methods are moribund or even dead, and that the Cavalry must look for new ideas if they wish to be as great a factor in the future as they were in bygone days.

There is a growing tendency to acknowledge, especially in France, that the sphere of Cavalry, instead of dwindling, is increasing: that, besides its own functions, it should be used as a mobile force of riflemen to be rapidly moved to any threatened

point in the widely extended front of a modern army or to seize advanced positions, &c. Now in our Army this can be perfectly well accomplished by the easily and cheaply raised Mounted Infantry, leaving to the Cavalry what might be called detached duties, i.e., scouting and reconnaissance, raids, advanced and rear guards and the pursuit.

These duties, especially the first three, can only be performed nowadays by men of intelligence and education, specially trained in skill at arms, horsemanship and horsemastership, and require, not great numbers, but judicious handling and intelligent performance. In a word, quality not quantity, and this is what we must aim for in our Cavalry.

It should become practically a corps of scouts not to be used tactically except as the outer line of outposts, advanced and rear guards, backed where necessary by Mounted Infantry and for the obtaining and transmission of information.

Although great improvements have taken place in training, I think no one will deny that, with all the pains and labour taken to perfect the material available, about 25 per cent. is useless, 50 per cent. indifferent, and only 25 per cent. good.

Hitherto as regards recruits we have only competed with the unskilled labour market. The military net catches for the most part the shiftless, the idle, the ne'er-do-wells, and the unfortunates. The industrious, ambitious, and well-placed will not accept military service with its irksome restraints for any paltry increase of a few pence on a shilling a day.

To obtain men of self-respect, self-reliance, and intelligence, such as are absolutely indispensable in the true scout, we must enter the skilled labour market, and must offer such pay and such privileges as will make service in the Cavalry a post of honour and envy to all men. As the country cannot be asked for more money, numbers must be so reduced that the residue shall receive, say, 5s. a day, and we should endeavour to attract men of a far higher class—the sons of yeomen farmers, colonials, and many of those who now wander over the world to seek their fortunes.

For such there would be no need for the most irksome restrictions of discipline. They could be allowed plain clothes off duty with greater freedom, and better barrack accommodation; could be treated in fact much on the same lines as the police. That a few men of this stamp, wisely led, are equal on many occasions to ten times their number was proved over and over again in South Africa by the Boers.

They could be educated as scouts, practical rifle shots, and horsemen to a degree only dreamt of now with our present material, and could be relied on to think for themselves and to act with their heads in emergency.

To sum up, the scheme which I venture to put forward will, I think, mitigate our shortcomings and put us on even terms with Cavalry far superior to us in numbers, and should answer equally well in any country against any kind of enemy. The chief points are as follows:—

- (1) Decrease of numbers and thus an increase in money available for higher pay, better barrack accommodation and training facilities.
- (2) Great improvement in the education and intelligence of the class of man enlisted, made possible by (1).
 - (3) Far higher training of the individual, made possible by (2).
- (4) Change of tactics in so much that Cavalry will always rely on Mounted Infantry for support when used in any quantity.
 - (5) A horse reserve.

Although to meet the reduction of the Cavalry there must be a large increase in the Mounted Infantry, there would still be a great saving of money.

The Cavalryman is an expensive article. He receives a higher rate of pay, takes over a year to train in the elements of his work, and is provided with a horse costing about £40, which has to be fed and kept in condition.

The Mounted Infantryman as required by this scheme would receive only a three months' training, and could then return to his battalion. Thus the same number of horses or cobs would suffice

for the training of great numbers of men. In cases of emergency large quantities could be imported at about £15 apiece, requiring little or no schooling.

The one important point is that the officers should be specially selected and more or less permanent. From the nature of their work the Mounted Infantry will always be in bodies of not less than a section, whether in camp or in the field, so that the want of individual efficiency and horsemastership will not be felt to any great extent, supervision being always present. The Cavalry, on the other hand, scattered through the country in pairs or small bodies, will be almost entirely dependent on individual effort for the care of their horses and their own safety, and will bring into play their higher intelligence and training.

As regards tactics, a new scheme must be drawn up defining the duties of the Cavalry and Mounted Infantry, giving the proportions of each, the occasions of their combined employment, the methods by which the work of the opposing Cavalry is to be frustrated, and giving instruction for all operations to be performed by the mounted forces. The actual changes from the present system need not be great, except that it must be borne in mind that generals in command cannot count on the Cavalry as being an offensive unit, as one might say, except when combined with Mounted Infantry, and that any achievements he may expect from his mounted troops must be those in which the Mounted Infantry can bear the brunt of the fighting.

It should not be a very difficult matter to devise plans by which the enemy's Cavalry can be checked and held, and even defeated, while our scouts working singly or in pairs break through or go round their screen and obtain and remit valuable intelligence.

The best way to effect the necessary reduction in *personnel* is a matter of opinion. The simplest method would seem to be the cutting down of existing units, thereby causing as little confusion and change as possible. By making the establishment of each squadron, say, 100 strong, a total reduction of 5,000 or 6,000 men

would be the result, and by filling the staff billets from outside and employing reserve men as servants, grooms, sweepers, &c., a squadron would still be an effective unit for training and war.

I do not think that the above involves any great radical change except as regards the quality of men enlisted. There should be no difficulty in attracting men of a very superior class by means of the enhanced pay, while a little money spent on the barracks, coupled with the fact that owing to the smaller garrisons there would be plenty of extra space, should make them into attractive places to live in.

The very fact that the men are of a good class would make it possible to grant privileges that are now out of the question, such as plain clothes off duty, freedom out of working hours, &c.

For the ambitious, facilities for commissions would act as an inducement toward higher things, and open a new field for supplying the present demand for officers.

With more money available each man could always be training one or two young horses which, when his education is completed, could be let out on hire to farmers, tradesmen, &c., under proper guarantee to come out fit when called for.

Such are the outlines of the scheme, and under it I do not see that the chances of the ideal Cavalry leader would be in any way lessened. On the contrary, I consider that with the men he would have under him, he could dare to do things which would be impossible and foolhardy now.

As regards the employment of Cavalry on the battlefield, we must, like the poor, be content to do without luxuries we cannot afford, and must preserve the little we have for those duties which are absolutely essential if we wish it to remain efficient throughout a long and trying campaign.

I should like again to repeat that I in no way belittle the usefulness of shock tactics by great numbers, but as we have not those numbers, I contend that it is not a wise policy for us to train our Cavalry for such tactics, when it is probable that by using other methods we may minimise our disadvantage.



FIELD-MARSHAL H.R.H. GEORGE, DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE, K.G., G.C.B., &c.

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THE WAR OFFICE—WHITEHALL.
(Shouring position of the Statue.)

GERMAN VIEWS ON MOUNTED INFANTRY.

EXTRACTS FROM AN ARTICLE IN THE 'MILITÄR-WOCHEN-BLATT' ENTITLED 'THE MOUNTED INFANTRY IN ENGLAND AND ITS RELATION TO CAVALRY.'

The various phases through which the Mounted Infantry has gone. Discusses the value of large forces of Mounted Infantry. The question, whether Continental Armies need Mounted Infantry.

THE writer points out that the endeavour to unite in one and the same force the mobility of Cavalry and the fire-power of Infantry is no new idea, but that hitherto it has not led to any permanent establishment in peace time.

In England the Mounted Infantry question has occupied much attention, and the views thereon have undergone many changes. He then gives some account of the various phases, which he divides into three distinct periods: viz. The time prior to the war in South Africa, that immediately after the close of the Campaign, and the present day.

We need not follow him through the details of the first period, where he points out how the need for Mounted Infantry came early into prominence for the frequent small wars which England had to undertake, in connection with her oversea possessions, where the enemy was generally very mobile, and the theatre of war very extensive. To meet these requirements two Mounted Infantry schools for instruction were established in 1888 at Aldershot and the Curragh.

In this connection the views of Lord Wolseley, the former Commander-in-Chief, are of interest, since in his time he used all his influence to establish these Mounted Infantry schools. He recognised that large self-contained bodies of Cavalry are in great need of a certain amount of fire-power to capture or to hold

important points, but he considered that Cavalry could not do two things equally well—either they were good Cavalry for the mounted attack, in which case they could not be expected to accomplish much in the fire fight; if on the other hand they were trained to use their fire-arms, they lost their power of attack. Since, however, Wolseley wished above all that the Cavalry should retain their aptitude for the attack, he gave them Mounted Infantry to carry out dismounted work. Generally speaking, these were the views in England as to the rôle and employment of Mounted Infantry prior to the great Boer War of 1899–1903.

This campaign made entirely new demands on the English the nature of which are too recent in our memory to need recapitulating here. The writer concludes his remarks on this phase as follows:

'None the less it is to be noticed that immediately after the war there arose in British military circles the idea that the days of successful Cavalry attacks on a large scale were over; Cavalry must in future scout and reconnoitre mounted, but must do all their actual fighting on foot; many even believed that Cavalry was 'played out' and that only Mounted Infantry could justify its existence, since scouting and similar duties could equally well be carried out by them.'

A New 'Cavalry Drill' appeared just at this time, in which the dismounted combat was placed in the front rank, and then, too, the lance—the queen of weapons for attacking Cavalry—was done away with, and the mounted troops were armed with the Infantry rifle.

Increased attention was then given to the Mounted Infantry. At home a new school was opened, and the number of men annually trained was increased; in South Africa several Mounted Infantry battalions were organised; while in India also great importance was attached to similar establishments. The limit for the employment of Mounted Infantry in war was very greatly extended; in addition to the duty required of them in

small colonial expeditions, their employment as a support for Cavalry was placed upon a broader basis, and for this purpose the number of Mounted Infantry companies with a Cavalry brigade was increased from two to four. Such a brigade comprising nine squadrons, trained to fight on foot, four companies of mounted infantry, four pom-poms, and five machine guns, is possessed of a fire-power which is not to be despised.

A third duty, in addition to those already enumerated, has now been assigned to Mounted Infantry in the drill books and in publications of other kinds. Mounted Infantry is now to constitute 'a mobile reserve' at the disposal of a leader, and as such is to be employed against important points, such as the flanks of an opponent, for decisive action. No doubt the idea of such employment has been taken from the lessons of the Boer War, but whether such action is possible in European warfare, as people in England appear to believe, seems doubtful. It cannot be admitted that, in a battle where several army corps are engaged on either side, the appearance of a few thousand Mounted Infantry on one flank can exercise any real influence, even though they might occasionally be of some value. But for this the strength of the detachments would have to be very appreciably increased. That this was at one time actually considered is clear from a scheme whereby seventy-two companies of Mounted Infantry were to have been called up on mobilisation.

At this date, however, the high value formerly placed on the employment of Mounted Infantry has sensibly declined. It may have been considered that the regular Infantry was not so numerous that a certain proportion of the best of them could safely be taken away to form mounted units. It was also no doubt acknowledged that after all, the value of the training given to Mounted Infantry in riding and horse management can only be a qualified one, and that for that reason one would have to allow in war for very great wastage in the matter of mounts. Further, it was no doubt questioned whether, in European

warfare, where a powerful well-trained Cavalry has to be taken into consideration, Mounted Infantry would not offer a tempting objective for attack, for even in England it is admitted that Mounted Infantry on their horses are helpless against real Cavalry.

However this may be, two of the three existing schools have been done away with, while nothing more is now heard of mobilising large bodies of Mounted Infantry. In the latest drillbook of this arm which was published in July 1906, its importance is not insisted on to the same extent as in the regulations for 1904. But even the new book recognises three methods of employment for Mounted Infantry: as a support for Cavalry, as an especially mobile reserve, and as very useful troops for foreign field service. While Mounted Infantry now seems to be retiring again within the proper limits of its possible employment, more attention is again being paid to the utterances of those who would retain the true attack-efficiency of the Cavalry. The impression is once more gaining ground that, even in these days, well-trained, well-mounted Cavalry can still attack with the best results. is admitted the gaining of information, the Cavalry's first duty, can only be accomplished with great difficulty before the opposing Cavalry has been defeated. For this reason it is now held that Cavalry can never be replaced by Mounted Infantry. The real equestrian spirit, which exists in no country as it does in England, now demands that its true rôle should be restored to the Cavalry.

The spectres which were summoned cannot, however, be so quickly laid. At the present moment—so far as can be judged from what is seen at manœuvres—the British Cavalry leans more upon the rifle than on lance or sword. The dismounted work is excellent, but it is said that, when working in closed bodies mounted, there is a want of cohesion. It is evident that it is a dangerous thing to deprive Cavalry of all intention of attack, for in peace time the readiness to take risks, inseparable from the charge, is easily lost, and it will then certainly not come to the front during war.



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It is, however, probable that in time the English Cavalry will regain its proper place, once it is clearly recognised that Mounted Infantry cannot take the place of Cavalry, but that rather under the peculiar English conditions there is room enough for both arms side by side.

If having now examined the British organisation the question is then put whether the provision of Mounted Infantry is necessary for the large armies of the Continent, the answer must be in the negative. There is full justification for Mounted Infantry in England as originally raised, viz. for foreign field service; there is no place for it in continental armies for wars in Europe.

Even as a mobile reserve for the Commander-in-Chief there is no use for Mounted Infantry, unless an enormous number of such troops were forthcoming. The training of such masses of Mounted Infantry, and the supply and up-keep of their horses during war, would entail great difficulty and much expense. Then in regard to the third nature of employment—as support to the Cavalry; this cannot be altogether rejected offhand, for with the Cavalry of the Continent which is chiefly trained for the charge, Mounted Infantry might well relieve the Cavalry of that work which they do least well, and at the same time appreciably add to the fire-power of self-contained mounted forces. One may only enquire whether this object could not be attained without the creation of a distinct and separate arm. It appears, however, not only possible but absolutely necessary to train Cavalrymen thoroughly in dismounted work with the splendid arms of precision they already possess, so that they may themselves be able to solve the problem which is now submitted to them. This can be done without encroaching upon the hours of work already allotted and without interference with thorough training in mounted duties.

It might be possible, under certain circumstances, to attach, as is done in France, cyclist companies to the Cavalry.

In any case there seems no urgent need for the establishment of Mounted Infantry units in continental armies.

THE NECESSITY FOR TRAINING THE OFFICER TO RIDING BY NIGHT

By Colonel Baron von Maltzahn, Commanding the 8th Brigade, Prussian Cavalry

(Translated from the Kavalleristische Monatshefte)

THERE can be no possible doubt that the art of cross-country riding is of primary importance quite as much for the commander of a patrol as for an orderly officer. An obstacle which can only be overcome either by means of a long détour or after a struggle between the rider and his mount, may hinder a proper reconnaissance, or the opportune arrival of an order, or of information, and thus cause the loss of thousands of lives. For this reason. therefore, we accustom our horses, after having broken them in, to prolonged gallops over broken and difficult country; with the same object we carry out long-distance rides, the great importance of which military history has taught us. To complete what is learnt in the hunting-field, and by riding over obstacles, a special training in riding across country is requisite, which consists, for an officer, to transport himself in the minimum of time to a point fixed upon, whilst carrying out the various duties which may devolve upon the commander of a patrol or on an orderly officer.

It is the duty of every officer to prepare himself in peace time for the various duties which may fall on him in war; his chiefs should instruct and test him as to the degree of aptitude he has attained. For this object practice in orientation by night in unknown and more or less difficult country is essential. During



operations in the field, orders based on intelligence which, very frequently, only arrives late at night, must be sent out at a still later hour during the night. Aides-de-camp and orderly officers must then ride through an unknown country in the dark, perhaps without a map, and on bad, slippery roads, and the issue of a battle may depend on their success. It will be seen, then, of what importance it is that an officer should have prepared himself in peace time to recognise and to overcome these difficulties. The consciousness of having already vanquished like difficulties will help him enormously in war to carry out similar and even more difficult tasks. Herein lies the most important advantage of night-riding, and this reminds us of the absolute necessity of always keeping the horses in a state fit to carry out such operations.

These exercises will best fulfil their object if they are carried out on really dark winter nights, when the moon is new, under conditions of snow, frost, and thaw. The art of orientation by night is one of such difficulty that it should be constantly practised even by a *personnel* with a gift for it.

It is of no use to ride daily quickly over a piece of ground, the inequalities of which one doesn't observe—even if it is only the usual parade ground—or to grope one's way through a pitch-dark wood, or to guide oneself by the feeble glimmer of adjacent farm buildings. Night rides have many instructive lessons for our branch of the Service, a few of which may here be briefly touched upon.

Night exercises develop that most rare and important gift, from a military point of view, which consists in fixing in the memory a tract of country (especially as regards communications, localities, &c.) by merely inspecting a map, so that one can do without one when on the march. An officer in command of a patrol must possess this gift. The practice which obtains in peace time of carrying out all the scouting during the early hours of the morning has no place in war. The patrols would then remain all night in touch with the enemy. The service of

observation would not be interrupted. We must, therefore, accustom ourselves to finding our way about, to ride, to see, and to hear in the dead of night.

But neither orderly officers nor aides-de-camp would always have a sufficiency of maps, with the exaggerated use of which we spoil ourselves in peace time. It is, therefore, recommended that maps should not be taken on night rides, but that one should rather confine oneself merely to tracing the various means of communication, with a few strokes of the pencil, from the map to assist the memory. The ride would be greatly retarded if, at every crossroads, the map had to be taken out and consulted.

One gets accustomed to using them and cannot readily do without them. They should be taken with one, but only used in case of absolute necessity, viz. to consult a signpost or such-like. When riding quickly the flickering rays of light confuse. Outside the circle of light one sees absolutely nothing, whilst the darkness itself obscures the upper outline of the trees and similar good points of direction. In the inky darkness of the forest paths the rider can always see the direction of the opening against the horizon. One is thus able to advance quickly by riding straight ahead, and keeping one's attention fixed on that opening. But in order to ride straight ahead one must exercise an equal pressure with both thighs, and ride the horse up to the bit so as not to allow the pace to slacken.

The average pace should never be under six minutes to the kilomètre (one kilomètre equals 1,000 yards). The rider would do well to double the pace when the ground is favourable, so as to gain time for negotiating the difficult places. The man who wishes to ride at a uniform pace from the beginning to the end will certainly arrive too late at the end of his journey. Unpromising short cuts should be avoided by night when good narrow by-paths are available. On the main roads, especially, one should always ride in the middle of the road, so as to avoid stumbling over stones, and heaps of earth. An occasional

leading of the horse by night, when he is beginning to tire, is recommended.

Special attention should be paid to the shoeing before rides of this nature. One should take frost-nails with one, and replace the old screws by new, so that should the necessity for rough shoeing arise one would not be obliged to first clean out the holes.

With regard to the organisation of night rides, there are certain points to be noted. Although it is here more a question of correct orientation of, than of riding over, broken ground, the latter must not be lost sight of, as difficulties may lie in the rider's way, such as the necessity for avoiding certain localities, &c., which may occasionally oblige him to leave the roads and ride across country and thus compel him to surmount natural obstacles.

In order to oblige the officer to reflect, to examine and study the country, it would be of advantage to select a point for concentration, and to direct the officers of several garrisons to find their way to it by different roads by night. An officer of the Administration should be at the place of arrival, who should also examine the state of the horses.

In all exercises of this description the main object is to develop amongst the participators the faculty of finding their way about in the dark.

Even if the above-mentioned exercises entail a severer demand on officers, their utility as regards active service cannot be denied. We need self-reliant officers, who, away from the troop, know how to move on all ground by night as well as by day, zealous and indefatigable in the pursuit of the task which has been allotted them. The old proverb should never be forgotten, 'Where there's a will there's a way.'

CAVALRY IDEAS IN THE 'SPECTATEUR MILITAIRE'

Remarks by General L—— on the future of Cavalry—Lient.-Colonel Zeerleder of the Swiss Staff on the progressive instruction of the Cavalry soldier.

THE Spectateur Militaire of April 15 is to all intents and purposes a Cavalry number. General L-, continuing his remarks on the French manœuvres of last autumn, discourses chiefly on Cavalry, and points out that if those are in the right who declare that in the future Cavalry will play only a minor part in warfare, the numbers of this arm should be lessened; while if it is necessary for success that the Cavalryman should fight equally well mounted or on foot, then the numbers must be greatly increased, since with a service of only two years it is impossible to make the same man a finished horseman and a first-rate skirmisher. General L--- complains that we all nowadays have far too much to say about the tendencies of Cavalry—with the French it is the tendencies of the German Cavalry—and that one should give up attaching too much importance to the views and theories of the employment of this arm by foreigners who know no more about such subjects than anybody else. In the event of war, says the writer, a well-mounted, well-led Cavalry, trained thoroughly in the use of its weapons, will be able to do all that may be required of it.

General L—— admits that in organisation Germany may be, or possibly will be, ahead of France, but declares that in strategy and tactics his compatriots have nothing to learn. At the same time he cautions his readers against accepting the tactics of the manœuvre-ground as those of the battlefield, and instances the charges of masses of horsemen, led by the Emperor at recent manœuvres, as incidents which may be magnifique

without being la guerre. Already, however, he declares there are signs even in Germany that their horsemen ont renoncé à chercher à produire la décision finale.

CAVALRY TRAINING

The Spectateur Militaire contains also a translation from the German of an article by Lieut.-Colonel Zeerleder of the Swiss Staff, on the subject of the instruction of the mounted man in field work. In école du Cavalier he treats of the teaching of the individual in the art of getting about country, of seeing and of reporting. He must learn how to get about over all kind of country and at the same time to spare his horse; he is taught how to judge of pace—first on a measured track—and then to cover a certain distance in a certain fixed time, changing from the walk to the trot and back again. The man is then taught how to find his way from point to point—first over easy country and then over more difficult—and finally is instructed in so making his way that he avoids certain points where he might be seen by a watchful enemy.

In teaching the soldier what to observe, he is first instructed in barracks in the duties of a vedette, and is then taken into the open country, posted in a certain spot, and encouraged not only to observe, but to note the particular points upon which he should specially fix his attention—main roads, cross roads, &c. He is then given a certain area of country to watch, and made to select for himself the best position whence to do so. Lastly, he is told off to search a farm, to traverse a wood, to move along a road; and throughout he is constantly questioned and made to find and give a reason for everything he does.

When giving instruction in reporting the man is shown first how to carry a despatch and how to destroy it in the event of capture. He is then made to learn to carry in his head a simple verbal message, which is then written down, put in an envelope and given the man to carry to a certain destination, where the message is compared with his verbal report of the same. He is then taken out by the instructor and shown

practically what items he should include in any verbal report of what he may have seen on patrol.

It is claimed that in this way the instructors soon discover those of their men who possess a special aptitude for scouting or despatch riding. Such men are specially noted in the squadron and are put through a further course of instruction, both by day and night, by one of the squadron officers.

The chapter on école du groupe is quite applicable to us for section instruction by section leaders; as explained by Lieut.-Colonel Zeerleder, the object of the école du groupe is to familiarise the junior non-commissioned ranks and the older soldiers with the various duties to be carried out by them and by those under them on service. They are put through a regular course of instruction in the following order: in the duties on sentry or vedette; patrols; point of an advancedguard; flanking patrols; point of a rear-guard; reconnaissance work; reconnoitring patrols; despatch riding; ground scouting. Non-commissioned officers are also taught to make out reports and to draw sketches. In regard to sentry and vedette duty, the men are taught how to select their station by day and night; how to make themselves acquainted with the ground to be watched; how to organise a regular system of surveillance; how to tell off their men; what to do by day and by night. They are placed in all sorts of varying situations and are trained to rely upon their common sense rather than upon the mere recollection of orders received for guidance.

When instructed in patrol work they are taught how to select their route, what points to make for, how to know their road, to arrange where to rally if suddenly driven in. Frequently an enemy is represented when necessary to elaborate some special ideas. As point of an advanced-guard, the men are taught to make their advances a series of advances from one observation point to another, the country between being examined en route. Arrived at one place, the next to be made for is impressed upon all.

Two kinds of flank-patrols are taught: the one case, where

the party is sent out to the flank from the advanced-guard and maintains its position until the whole column has gone by, and the other, where the patrol moves parallel to the column, occupying all spots whence the column might be annoyed. This patrol advances in like manner to the point of the advanced-guard—from one observation post to another.

The point of the rear-guard is taught in the same manner as for the advanced-guard, connecting files linking the rear-guard to the main body, and the whole falling back before the chain is strained too far. In reconnaissance work the instruction follows a regular order—the reconnaissance of woods, villages, rivers, up to the reconnaissance of an enemy. Particular care is given to the following: judicious selection of roads and of points for observation; rapidity of movement; what to report, and how to report it.

In reconnoitring patrols stress is laid on the selection of roads to be followed, how to move from point to point, how to avoid occupying inhabited places, to watch bridges and defiles. How to find the way without map or guides—if the latter are employed, never to tell them the actual destination; dispositions for the night; supplies. The necessity of making prisoners on meeting the enemy; how to dispose of the prisoners taken.

In despatch-riding, the arrangement and placing of the relay posts; supplies; measures to ensure safety; the organisation of the line; the forwarding and registration of messages; how to destroy messages if a post is overwhelmed or a rider captured.

Ground scouts are taught to move by a series of advances from obstacle to obstacle; to examine each on arrival and find the best point of passage, placing a mounted man at each until the main body comes up.

When the men have gone through the école du Cavalier, and the junior non-commissioned officers have executed with their fellows all the exercises of the école du groupe, the same thing is gone through in the section which is made up as it would be on service. Whenever this can be done, an enemy is represented in all the trainings of the école du groupe.

'WHAT CAVALRY SHOULD LEARN FROM THE LATE CAMPAIGN IN MANCHURIA.'

The problem stated above was given as the subject of a prize competition to the Austrian army in October 1906. Thirty writers competed for the prize, and the essays of seven of them are published in the pamphlet under review, entitled The Future of Cavalry. The judges were the General Commanding the Cavalry Division at Lemberg, and the Brigade commanders at Tarnow and Agram respectively. The essays are very short for the importance of the subject, each averaging only fifteen pages of the pamphlet.

It is remarkable that the conclusions arrived at present practically unanimous opinion on the most important points. Each writer insists on the necessity for developing the fire power of the arm, though some go further in this direction than others. Stress is laid by the majority of them on the need for the very best material in leaders, men, and equipment which the State can produce, in view of the increased demands made upon Cavalry by the development of contemporary tactics and armament. Several writers discuss in some detail the different duties of Cavalry in the field, comparing the relative importance of its strategic with its tactical rôle. The conclusion is general that while Cavalry must be prepared to fight on foot against superior forces of the best Infantry, yet nevertheless it must be able to manœuvre swiftly and certainly, and must be able to deliver its charge on horseback, which the essayists consider still to be its trump card. The opportunities lost after the battles of Jalu and Nanshan, and the escape of the Russian army from Mukden, which cost Japan her indemnity, are cited in support of this opinion. Austrian tacticians are in accord with the other armies in denouncing the expedient of Mounted Infantry 'as a feeble half-measure,' and as a costly expedient into the bargain.

It may seem strange to know that so much labour should be



expended in discussing what the Civil War in America had already proved-namely, that Cavalry must be prepared in future to fight on foot with the carbine, as well as on horseback with the sword or lance. It should, however, be remembered that the Austrian has always been an extremely conservative society; moreover, any officer who has witnessed the handling of masses of troops at Continental manœuvres will realize the effect of the training there received. Large forces of Infantry and Artillery are deployed, and apparently are smothering one another with missiles. Fresh columns are to be seen moving up in reserve on the day of the important engagements. The impression is given that there are more guns and rifles already at the disposition of the Commanding General than he can continue to supply with ammunition. It would seem that if another arm is to be employed, the shock of charging horsemen, dealt as a surprise against a weak part of the hostile forces, would be more likely to exercise a decisive effect than the prolongation of the firing lines with dismounted men. Nor is this view always incorrect. The campaign in Manchuria, however, gave fresh proof of how even a small force of Cavalry, handled with skill and daring, can, by its dismounted attack, influence the fate of great battles.

Among other questions discussed in these essays are: the difficulty of finding time for extra work, in addition to the tasks already imposed in training Cavalry troops—something must be sacrificed; the influence of mountainous and intersected country on Cavalry operations; the need for the co-operation of howitzers to deal, for example, with an Infantry which flings itself into small fortified forts, such as are constituted by the villages of the Indian and Chinese plains. The influence of intense climatic conditions, heat or cold; lack of food and forage for large forces, and the feasibility of fighting at night.

Perhaps the most interesting and instructive part of these essays is the discussion on the vexed question of Cavalry raids. In spite of the great numerical superiority of the Russian Cavalry, and the well-defined plan of their Commander-in-Chief

to utilise his superiority of mounted troops in order to interrupt the enemy's communications, yet the annoyance he caused to the Japanese by several such raids, executed by a whole division of Cavalry, hardly exceeded the loss sustained by the Russians. One writer does not fail to point out that General Mischtschenko, the Russian Cavalry Commander on their right wing, who failed so lamentably, was only an Artillery officer. He draws the deduction that none but leaders of the highest quality, thoroughly conversant with the tactics of all arms, as well as with the special aptitudes and capacity of Cavalry, can be expected to succeed in the most difficult rôle of Cavalry Commander, a conclusion with which one is compelled to agree.

The failure of Mischtschenko's great raid is held to have illustrated the need for defining the task of any Cavalry detachment as precisely as possible, particularly if required to act in concert with any other force. It is said to be insufficient merely to issue general instructions to 'reconnoitre and report upon the strength and positions of the enemy,' to quote the wording of orders very often issued by a General when he detaches his Cavalry to clear up the situation. Opposing forces which exceed 100,000 men necessitate the employment of a Cavalry detachment of not less than a division, in order to ascertain what is happening behind the screen of hostile posts and patrols, for it will certainly have to fight to achieve good results. It will probably stand a better chance of success if accompanied by Horse Artillery with howitzers; and if the mounted troops are not sufficiently numerous, chosen troops of Infantry must march in support of the Cavalry division, imitating the dispositions of the battalions of Chasseurs-à-pied attached to the Cavalry divisions of the French army.

The fact that Japan seized the initiative in every campaign of the war, both by land and sea, and maintained it in spite of the numerical inferiority of her Cavalry, is worth remembering. The Japanese leaders held fast to their own plans without paying too much regard to their enemy's. Sooner or later, Kuropatkin

in each trial of strength was compelled to conform to the scheme of his adversary, who thus succeeded in fashioning events. The most critical phases of the fighting, both at Liau-Yang and Mukden, had taken a turn distinctly unfavourable to the assailants, when clever manœuvres, audaciously executed, turned the tables, and forced the Russians to retreat. In the final struggle before Mukden these manœuvres could not have been resorted to but for the successful work of the Japanese Horse, though their sixty squadrons formed but a handful in comparison with the forces engaged. Much remains doubtful as to the tactics employed, and as to the details of marches and engagements in Manchuria; but it is certain that on each important occasion the Russians were deceived as to the flank against which the decisive attack was aimed, and thus out-manœuvred. The Japanese were slow in preparing their schemes, but executed them with a skill and persistence which has seldom been surpassed in the history of war.

The great lesson to be deduced by us from what is known of these operations is that to win great victories in the future, as in the past, great risks must be undertaken. These risks are reduced to a minimum for the Commanding General whose Cavalry dominates its opponent, which keeps him well informed, while it screens his turning movements and marching columns. Manifold are the disadvantages under which the British Army labours from political management, from its different rôles of protecting distant Colonies, feeding the army in India with drafts, while it is expected also to prepare itself for Continental war. In spite of much that is discouraging, we should never forget how splendid is the material in men and horses which we have at our disposal. The British General who can organise and lead the Cavalry which the patriotism and sporting instincts of his countrymen place gratuitously at the service of the State will ever enjoy a unique advantage over Continental opponents, whose Cavalry forces, however excellent, are of forced and not spontaneous growth.


THE ARMAMENT OF THE SERVIAN CAVALRY

(Translated from an Article in a Belgrade Daily, "Stampa")

THE necessity of firearms for modern Cavalry is undisputed: gone are the days, ideal of every true Cavalryman, when combat on horseback precluded their use.

As soon as war is declared, during mobilisation and concentration, before, during, and after battle, in retreat-firearms, and those of the very best, are indispensable to Cavalry. The need is particularly acute for our own, which will be called at a decisive moment to lead the army through mountainous and rugged tracts such as surround Servia almost everywhere on the Turkish and Bulgarian frontiers. To begin with, the carbine now in the hands of our Cavalry must be rejected and replaced by a modern weapon. Although we have been, since the last war with Bulgaria, 'on the threshold of fateful events,' we may nevertheless cross that threshold any day; and should it be to-morrow, our Cavalry before the superior equipment of our probable enemies would be worth, on foot, a simple '0.' Our present carbines must go; for in the twentieth century we dare not be satisfied with a heavy and awkward weapon unable to hit the target at 500 or 600 mètres, and sending off thick clouds of smoke to indicate the range, strength, and movement of our troops for the benefit of an invisible enemy who annihilates at 1.800 mètres.

The manner of carrying the carbine is also much alike in all armies: namely, it is slung on the back, while the sabre is on the pommel. Great Britain is an exception; her Cavalry carry the rifle on the right side of the saddle. This is unjustifiable when we know that the firing cannot take place on horseback,



 and that in battle the rider must be prepared in a trice to find himself on the ground while his sabre and carbine are on his mount, which perhaps escapes with them, leaving him weaponless.

We think that our horsemen should keep to the old methods—that is, to leave their sabres attached to the animal, since these can only be used when on his back, while in case of dismounting or falling they have with them the weapon most useful to a foot combatant. In our opinion, that weapon should be our own quick-firing Infantry gun, model of the year 1900, just as it is; for it is one of the best in Europe, and cannot be surpassed by any other carbine. Its quality being well known, it only remains to be seen if it is convenient for riders.

Somebody may reproach us, that the arming of our Cavalry with an Infantry gun, which has moreover a steel weapon attached, might create a perverted notion of the real Cavalry task; that the men would thus lose the Cavalry spirit, and become Mounted Infantry rather than veritable Cavaliers. To this we will reply (counting on the adherence of all Cavalry officers to our saying) that if the regulation rules imprinted in a Cavalier's mind remain his directive principles—if the blood of a genuine Cavalier runs in his veins—if his heart throbs as should the heart of a born Cavalryman—then no manner of equipment can transform him into an Infantry-man, not even if he were altogether deprived of his 'cold' weapons. Perhaps there are some among us still unaware of the fact that President Roosevelt commanded a Cavalry Regiment in the Spanish-American war-a regiment trained and sustained by himself. In its ranks he had gathered the best equestrian volunteers, whom he equipped with firearms only; justifying this by the maxim that, in a Cavalry charge, the moral effect the force and fierceness of the shock—were paramount. This is what we say ourselves in Servian: 'The battle is not fought with a weapon, but with a heroic heart.'

PROBLEM No. 4

When old Booker was in command of our column in Zululand, we got an order to saddle up one night in order to surround a small impi of Zulus, who were reported occupying a koppie among some hills about fifteen miles away.

It was a pretty filthy night for trecking, as black as your hat, and raining. However, everybody seemed very cheery, in view, I suppose, of the surprise we were going to give the niggers in the morning.

But somehow it didn't come off quite as we had expected.

Old Booker seemed to know pretty well how the land lay, and just before dawn we were at our appointed spot on the reverse of a ridge exactly facing the enemy's position. This lay among rocks and bush, about halfway up a big hill-side, just above which there was a labyrinth of caves. These caves the enemy were not as yet occupying, and Booker's idea was to send our native contingent round behind the mountain to come over its top and to come down to the caves before the enemy got wind of it, and so to prevent them getting into them.

The 23rd Dragoons were posted at the head of the valley to stop any escape in that direction. The Donegal Mounted Infantry and a party of natives, covered by a section of mountain guns, were sent down the valley to seize the cattle and to cut off any retreat that way; while we, the Lambshire Mounted Infantry and mountain guns, were to cover the direct attack by native contingent on the position itself when the time came.

Here is the map of the whole show.

Everybody was very strictly cautioned against showing himself on the skyline, or elsewhere, in order that the surprise should be complete, otherwise, if the enemy got the alarm and took refuge in caves, we should have a long job, and a nasty one, in getting them out.

All appeared to go well. By daybreak we all were close to our appointed stations, and the native contingent well on its way to the rear of the enemy's position. There was a pause of expectancy, awaiting the next move. Nobody spoke; all were silent and tensely on the alert.

Suddenly from old Booker, who had been peering about, burst out a violent explosion of anger, and in a flow of fervent language, of which on such occasions he was an absolute master, he rolled forth what he thought of a certain corps, its officers, its non-commissioned officers, its men, women, and children. He didn't appear to like any of them.


What had happened?

It was soon evident to us. Some of the gallant corps in question had unwittingly shown themselves to the enemy's view, and had thus given away the fact of our being in the neighbourhood, and the niggers were rapidly scuttling into their caves, and taking their cattle and women with them before the ball had begun.

It appeared afterwards that some officers of the corps in reading the map had agreed that a certain spot would be a useful one to utilize, and that its occupation by us would not be visible to the enemy. The event proved that they were wrong.

You can see the spot on the accompanying map, and which corps gave the show away, and how it did so.





Problem No. IV.

Open to Non-commissioned Officers and Men of the Mounted Branches of the Regular or Auxiliary Forces at home and abroad.

All Solutions (which should be as short as possible) must be attached to this page with name, rank and address of sender, must be countersigned by an officer, and must reach

THE EDITOR,

'Cavalry Journal,'

Royal United Service Institution,

Whitehall,

not later than November 15, 1907.

A Prize of a "Cavalry" Watch will be given to each of the first three whose solutions are considered the best.

The Editor's decision will be final.

From			
	Name		
	Rank	Regiment	
	Address		
	Countersigned by		

London, S.W.,

PROBLEM No. 8

RESULT

THE number of competitors who forwarded solutions to this problem is very gratifying, and shows the interest which N.C.O.s take in the CAVALRY JOURNAL. The following are the names of three whose solutions are considered the best:—

Corporal G. H. Buckland, 17th Lancers, India.

Sergeant F. B. Dyer, Sussex Imperial Yeomanry.

Corporal R. A. Thomas, Duke of Lancaster's Own Imperial Yeomanry.

A cheque for $\mathcal{L}2$ 2s. has been forwarded to each of the above-mentioned non-commissioned officers.

All the solutions show that much interest has been taken in the situation, and all the competitors realise that it was of the greatest importance to get between the Boers and the convoy, but most of them have taken it for granted that there were no Boers anywhere except in the donga, and that they (the Boers) would have allowed us to get on to the high ground at the west end of the ridge of kopjes, and so to their right rear, without either rushing out for that position or having it already held.

As the incident actually occurred, it may be of interest to give the sequel of Captain Jenkin's narrative, showing what happened. This should be read with reference to the sketch-map facing p. 116, CAVALRY JOURNAL, January 1907.

CAPTAIN JENKIN'S NARRATIVE

Sergeant Wary was evidently very much on the alert, for within a few seconds of the outburst of fire from the Boers in the donga, the troop in support of the advanced guard had dismounted for 'action right' and let all their horses loose. Wary told me afterwards that he had noticed that the wire fence was not cut, so knew that the horses could not get away to the south, and as there was no cover they would have suffered very severely had he kept them near the men in the open. The horses all came galloping back to us, and the rear scouts soon had them rounded up. Meanwhile the advance scouts had rallied and galloped for the western end of the line of kopjes to their north-west, thus getting between the Boers and the convoy. The fire of the dismounted troop prevented the Boers from quitting the donga, and held their attention whilst the leading troop occupied ground commanding the ambush, and so saved the situation. As I was over a mile away from the Boers, when they opened fire, I was too far away to have brought an effective fire to bear on them had I dismounted, but seeing Wary's action, I was at liberty to manœuvre against the Boers' left. They quitted that donga pretty quick, leaving their sub-commandant and several others in our hands badly wounded. We took good care to hold that line of kopjes till the convoy was safely past, and got back to the column before nightfall next day without further adventure.



RECENT PUBLICATIONS

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR

Vol. V. deals with the guerilla warfare, which began shortly before Lord Roberts gave up his command and continued for the two following years up to the peace in 1902.

Mr. Amery, the General Editor, introduces the volume in a preface, which is well worth reading; the book is admirably got up, with quite sufficient maps conveniently arranged, and the details of the long and weary struggle render fair justice both to the Boer leaders and our own.

We commend to our readers an article which appeared on this book in the Saturday Review of June 15, from which we quote the following:—

'The mobility which was essential to success throughout the South African war will not "be equally valuable in any campaign of whatever sort that the future may have in store for us." In South Africa we met a special opponent on a special terrain. In a region more enclosed and in face of an adversary less endowed with mobility Artillery and Infantry will again prove the decisive factors in the combat. Nor is it true to say that South African tactics should form the ideal pattern for mounted troops. As Mr. Childers himself shows later on, a squadron or two charging home would over and over again have averted disaster and crowned success with decisive results during the last phases of the war when the Boers themselves took to charging, well knowing that, owing to our Cavalry being relegated to Mounted Infantry work, they could do so with The assertion that "skilled Mounted Riflemen can do all that Cavalry of the old stamp can do, can do it better, and can do much more besides" is pernicious nonsense, and will be endorsed by none who know the British soldier and the environment he has lived in before entering the ranks. Undoubtedly some Boers, and some other races who have been brought up in the open country and have learned to ride and shoot from infancy, can both shoot and charge. Even with them it is only a small minority who will do so, but amongst European troops it is impossible to preserve the Cavalry spirit and at the same time teach men that they are to trust to the firearm rather than to the arme blanche.' The manner in which the Russian Cavalry—trained as mounted riflemen-failed to turn their vast numerical superiority to account was a striking evidence of this contention.'

'LE CONTACT'

General Izzet-Fuad, of the Turkish Army, deals in this book with the rôle of Cavalry on service, and energetically repudiates the conclusions of certain superficial observers, that Cavalry is nowadays almost useless.

He lays constant stress on the immense importance of moral force in battle, and demonstrates by a number of examples from history that the rôle of Cavalry always maintains its preponderating influence.

It is not only before the battle that Cavalry is indispensable. Once gained, contact should never indeed be lost. After the battle, failing any decisive issue, it is all the more important that contact should be maintained, to ensure a general knowledge of the retreat of the beaten enemy, so that the pursuit may achieve the maximum results.

If Osman Pasha was unable to profit by his early success at Plevna, it was because he was quite deficient in Cavalry. For the same reason after Mukden, Oyama was unable to turn defeat into a rout, and to put an end to the war with one blow.

'CAVALRY IN FUTURE WARS'

We quote the following letter which appeared in the Canadian Military Gazette from the pen of Captain W. J. Brown, Second Brigade Canadian Field Artillery. It shows what an interest is taken in European military ideas by our brother officers of the Canadian forces:—

'I should like to recommend for the consideration of my brother officers of the Canadian mounted forces, one of the most interesting and valuable military books it has been my privilege to secure. It is entitled "Cavalry in Future Wars," by His Excellency Lieut.-General Frederick von Bernhardi (London: John Murray), and is translated by Charles Sydney Goldman. The introduction is written by Lieut.-General Sir John French.

'This work is the greatest of its kind produced in modern times. It is not only worthy of careful reading, but will probably become a manual for the instruction of Cavalry in the British and the French as well as in the German Army. It should be read and studied by Cavalry officers, as it outlines and discusses the maximum use of their arms under modern service conditions. Officers of Horse and Field Artillery will also find it valuable, chiefly because of the practical suggestions it offers regarding the handling of horses on service; but all officers should read it in order to comprehend how Cavalry may be used, and how very important is this arm when properly handled in armies of great strength and high technical training. Although this book was written for the benefit of the Germans, there is hardly a paragraph in it that is not equally applicable in its teaching to every civilised people who maintain military forces.

'There is at present a disposition in some quarters to belittle the value of Cavalry, but this is wrong. There has been no time in all history when this arm was so important or when the need for it was greater than at present. In future civilised wars Cavalry will play so great a part that upon its efficiency and leadership will hang the destiny of armies.

'I should like to suggest that the Canadian authorities make some arrangement with the publishers of this excellent work to have it issued in cheaper form, that it may be distributed free or at a nominal cost to Canadian officers of all branches of the Service.

'Military knowledge of this character may some day be invaluable to the forces of this country.'



'THE SIEGE AND FALL OF PORT ARTHUR'

By W. Richmond Smith. (Publishers, Nash.) Many strange and wonderful things were to be seen by a foreigner living for months with the Japanese troops, but there was nothing more intensely impressive than the effect of the reading of an Imperial message on the eve of a great battle (the Mikado always sent a message to his army previous to a battle, and it was read out on a special parade to each company). It told more about why the Japanese are good soldiers and why they had never yet been beaten than all other reasons put together.

During the reading the men looked what they felt—they looked like men who had decided the matter in their own mind. On the morrow they were to die. One felt instinctively that these soldiers had not a reserve note; they had simply sentenced themselves to die. For instance, the Japanese officer through whose kindness I heard one message read stood like a stone image until the ceremony was over. Then he turned to me and said 'Let us go and have some saké.' 'But,' I replied, 'you do not drink saké.' 'No,' he said, 'not usually, but it does not matter now; I will not see you again, to-morrow I die.'

I asked him if he had really given up hope of coming through all right. He quickly replied he had not thought of coming through all right, that was not the way to go into a fight. There would be plenty of opportunities for an officer to do what he would not do if he expected to come through all right. If, on the other hand, he had made up his mind to die, he would do those things, and his men would get inspiration through his sacrifice.

If he was to have the idea of going through all right, he would be cautious. If he were cautious, so would his men be. A cautious army never won a hard fight.

'I have sworn to do all I can to bring victory to-morrow, and I will die to do it. My efforts may be as nothing in the gaining of the result, but my example may be a great deal; that is why I shall die to-morrow.'

'RECORDS OF THE ROUGH RIDERS'

By Captain H. G. McKenzie Rew. After the early reverses which befell the British arms at the commencement of the Boer War, the urgent need of more mounted troops was felt, and an appeal was made to the manhood of the Empire, which was freely responded to from all parts of His Majesty's dominions.

The British Isles alone, in the space of a few weeks, raised, equipped, and despatched to the front, a force of over 10,000 horsemen.

This narrative deals with the fortunes of one of the units which composed this force.

The Twentieth Battalion Imperial Yeomanry was the last raised for this contingent, and its members were enrolled at 68 Victoria Street, Westminster, early in March 1900. The committee which organised the Battalion was composed of Major the Earl of Lathom (Lancashire Hussars), Major H. A. Barclay (Hants Carabiniers), and Major Chadwick (Reserve of Officers).

The book gives the experiences of this battalion during the Boer War, 1899–1902, and is illustrated with maps, plans, and photos.

'SCOUTING AND RECONNAISSANCE IN SAVAGE COUNTRIES'

By Captain C. H. Stigand. All books on 'scouting,' &c., are useful to Cavalry officers, and this book is concise in its language, and should be of assistance to both officers and men in developing the scouting instinct. It is issued in the form of a pocket-book, and contains some valuable hints in connection with the art of tracking.

'AIDS TO SCOUTING'

A new edition of this well-known book by Lieutenant-General R. S. S. Baden-Powell, C.B., has lately been published by Gale & Polden, price 1s. Additional chapters have been added on the subject of 'spying' and 'despatch riding,' also a good deal of new matter, which brings the book thoroughly up to date. It is now translated into five languages, and adopted in several countries as the text-book for instruction of scouts.

'HINTS ON HORSES'

Major H. P. Young, late 4th Bombay Cavalry, has brought out a second edition of this useful little book. The hints on farming are omitted, and there is more information about polo, vice in horses, and gymkhanas. The author is to be congratulated on the very varied practical hints so clearly and concisely put, which cannot fail to be of value to officers of the mounted branches.

'PREJEVALSKY'S HORSE'

By W. Salensky, translated by Capt. Horace Hayes and Mr. O. Charnock Bradley, with introduction by Professor Cossar Ewart. London: Hurst & Blackett, 1907.

The species of horse known as Prejevalsky's was discovered in the Great Gobi Desert some thirty years ago, and in 1902 a herd of about thirty reached Europe, those which came to England attracting considerable attention. It is now generally recognised by naturalists that there are several species of horses, as there are of zebras and asses.

The book deals most accurately with the anatomical differences between Prejevalsky's horse and the well-known domestic species. It is well illustrated by plates showing the anatomical difference between the skull of Prejevalsky's horse and that of the ordinary species. The translation is pleasantly readable, and the volume may be regarded as a valuable addition to our stock of books on equine animals.

'PERSONAL ADVENTURES AND ANECDOTES OF AN OLD OFFICER'

By Colonel J. P. Robertson. London, 1906.

The writer commanded the military train at Lucknow in 1857, which was converted into a Cavalry regiment, and as such did yeoman service during the mutiny. On one occasion, he says: 'I dismounted a troop, and with their

carbines we soon drove them back.' Further on he relates another incident, where they charged as Cavalry against a strong force of rebels; thus showing that they had acquired the true Cavalry spirit.

'DIE REITEREI IM OSTASIATISCHEN FELDZUGE'

By Gustav Count Wrangel. Vienna: Seidel & Son, 1907.

In this pamphlet of barely seventy pages the author gives a very impartial and thoughtful review of all that was achieved and left undone by the Cavalry of either army in the late war in Manchuria; and in the observations which he has to make he has set himself to answer four questions, viz. what was actually accomplished; what should further have been done; what was the reason of any shortcomings; could our own Cavalry—the Austrian—have achieved anything better? The great and unpardonable fault which the writer finds with the Russian Cavalry—apart from its want of proper training—is the total lack of any spirit of real self-sacrifice; there was an absence of any craving to be 'up and doing,' and in support of this he points to the long periods of Cavalry inaction for which he can find no reason or excuse. He admits that at least early in the war the Russian Cavalry had few opportunities of effecting anything on the battle field, and does not see that any continental Cavalry could perhaps have done any better, but he holds that at least at the Sha-ho and at Mukden, if the Russian Cavalry had been more concentrated and not scattered over the whole front, they might have exerted a real influence upon the issue of those battles. Something, he considers, might at least have been attempted by huge bodies of Cavalry, if for no other purpose but to relieve the pressure on the other arms.

Of the achievements of the numerically weak, indifferently mounted Japanese Cavalry, Count Wrangel has nothing but good to say; he considers, indeed, that with the means at their disposal, the Japanese mounted men achieved all that could possibly be expected of them, but at the same time he points out how dearly the Japanese nation paid for the weakness of this arm, since the presence of but a few Cavalry divisions to take up the pursuit after Mukden might well have secured such a peace as the nation deserved and hoped for. A remark made by the author that up to the present time no details are to hand as to the extent of the wastage in horse-flesh on either side during the war, leads up to a consideration in his closing paragraphs as to how the Austrian, or indeed any other continental Cavalry, would have stood the climatic conditions under which much of the work—the raid on Inkow, for instance—was carried through. Of the Russian Cavalry leaders, Rennenkampf is practically the only one for whom Count Wrangel has anything like admiration, and in his case the author seems to think that his achievements were lessened by the limitations of the personnel of his command. To the increased importance of the fire action of Cavalry in modern war, the author of this pamphlet—like the majority of foreign military writers expresses a somewhat grudging agreement; some people may think they read between the lines, for Count Wrangel, with others, seems to despair of trying to teach the conscript Cavalry soldier more in the shorter time at disposal.

'LA CAVALERIE DE 1740 À 1789'

By Commandant Desbrière and Captain Sautai. Paris: Berger-Levrault & Cie., 1906.

This is a curiously interesting fragment of military history, wherein is recorded the evolution of the Cavalry of France from the days prior to the commencement of the war of the Austrian Succession down to the downfall of the Monarchy. In those early days the Cavalry was almost wholly the property of individuals—with the exception of the few regiments of the Maison du Roi; the unit was a company and the one object of the proprietor being to ensure the financial success of his property, he was naturally averse to permitting his company to take any undue risks, whether in quarters during peace, or in the field during war. It is on record that the regiments were singular in which a mounted parade was held twice a week in the summer, or in which the horses left their stables once a week during the winter months. Cavalry in those days charged at a walk and, occasionally, at a trot, and at Minden it would appear to have been the British Infantry which charged the Cavalry, while that arm awaited the onset without moving forward to meet it. The state of the Cavalry during the Seven Years' War; the reforms of Choiseul, who had the courage and the power to take the mounted arm from its petty proprietors and place it under the State; the decadence of the French Cavalry on the fall of the great minister; and the subsequent reforms by his successors, St. Germain and others, are all well described, and put forward with a minuteness which is none the less deeply interesting to the military student.

The authors are to be congratulated on the contents of their pamphlet as on the lesson which they would seek to convey; it is this—'that many existing problems have for long past been offered for consideration, that solutions now accepted have been already more than once studied or tested, that in regard to organisation matters the past treads upon the heels of the present, although sometimes at immense intervals, that reformers never altogether throw aside old ideas, and that all doctrines, all systems, are merely so many phases in an evolution which is slow but constant.'

'THE JOURNAL OF THE MILITARY SERVICE INSTITUTION' (U.S.A.)

The May number of this Journal contains some interesting matter, on the subject of Arab blood in horses, following on Mr. Davenport's article which appeared in the January number of the Journal, and which seems to have attracted a good deal of correspondence, the bulk of it testifying to the value of Arab blood for Cavalry horses. Colonel Spencer Borden recalls the fact that some of the greatest soldiers of history, to mention only Washington, Bonaparte, and in our own day, Lord Roberts, would ride none but pure Arabs.

Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel Dodge is convinced that the best means of getting docility, bone endurance, and weight-carrying capacity, where these are lacking, is by an infusion of Arabian blood. Every fine quality harks back to the desert, but any experiment with Arabian blood must be long continued and broad. The first and second generations are apt to be weedy, and unable to carry the Cavalry load.

Lieutenant Lahn, Sixth Cavalry, attending the French Cavalry school at Saumur, writes strongly in favour of the Anglo-Arab on which the French Light Cavalry is mounted, and which the French officers describe as 'the best type of light Cavalry horse produced.'

'THE JOURNAL OF THE UNITED STATES CAVALRY ASSOCIATION'

The April number has an interesting report by First Lieutenant Briand, 15th Cavalry, on the 'Danish Rifle Mitrailleuse,' which has been adopted both in the Danish Army and Navy. It can be carried by a man in exactly the same way as a rifle, and can follow Cavalry anywhere, which is impossible with other machine-guns. It is very easy and quick to bring into action, and may be brought forward anywhere like an ordinary rifle. It is impossible for the enemy to observe if the Cavalry or Infantry is furnished with these arms or not before shooting begins. It is very easy with these guns to cover a moving target and also to follow the enemy with the fire when he is advancing or retreating, and it is also easy suddenly to change the fire to another point in case the enemy appears in quite another direction.

The article has illustrations of the various methods of carrying it, and the necessary ammunition.

There is also an instructive account by Major Foote, Artillery Corps, of a 500-mile march through the Rocky Mountains by the 8th battalion, Field Artillery, Fort Douglas, Salt Lake City, Utah, to Fort D. A. Russell, Cheyenne Wyoming, April 25, to May 20, 1906.

Nearly all the 227 horses on this march were mountain bred—Utah and California. Many of them were too light for Artillery horses. Three died on the trip. The veterinarian reports: 'One wheel horse died May 1 of stomach colic (gastro enteritis).' One horse died May 16 of diabetes. One horse died May 20 of inflammation of the bowels (enteritis).' All had lost flesh perceptibly by the end of the second week, some more than others, due to weak constitution or nervous temperament. The week crossing the Red Desert was hard on them. Some hot weather, plenty of dust, water in buckets from railroad tanks, cisterns and cars, wild hay (wire grass), all helped to pull them down somewhat.

The steel collar when properly fitted is better in every respect than the leather collar.

'KAVALLERISTISCHE MONATSHEFTE,' MARCH, APRIL AND MAY

The first two of these numbers contain the four prize essays on the subject of Lessons on the Employment of Cavalry from the War in the Far East, sent in to the management of the Austrian Journal. Thirty essays were sent in, and in none of them was the opinion expressed that any radical change is required in the general principles governing the organisation, weapons, training, and employment of Cavalry; but that the experience of the war has emphasised the importance of absolute efficiency coupled with the knowledge on the part of the leaders to adapt themselves to circumstances of the moment, to peculiarities



of terrain, and to the methods of the opponent. Not one of the thirty essayists considered the probability of Mounted Infantry ever taking the place of Cavalry; on the other hand, the majority urged a considerable augmentation of the Cavalry arm. On the same theme as these prize essays is a lecture in the March number, given in Buda-Pesth, by Rittmeister Spaits, in which he very justly points out that all critics on the operations of the Russian Cavalry in Manchuria should bear in mind that the arm there represented was in every way very greatly inferior to the Cavalry which Russia should be able to put into the field in the event of a European war. There is a short paper in the March number on 'Signalling or Telegraphy,' wherein the author discusses the difficulty experienced by a rapidly moving Cavalry in maintaining communication with troops in rear a difficulty which one can appreciate on learning from the writer that with flagsignalling the highest possible rate of sending is ten letters (sic) per minute! He suggests something like a shorthand Morse Code or a language of signs. In the April number there is a paper of some interest and of considerable value on the increased importance of due co-operation between Cavalry bodies and Horse Artillery; and there are two articles which, individually and taken together, possess a certain attraction—the one on the selection and training of the charger for field service, the other on horse-breeding and the Remount. In a short paper are given some statistics of the Russian Veterinary Service during the war in Manchuria, and from these it would appear that during the twenty months which the campaign lasted, the percentage of fatal casualties among horses was only eleven!

Some thirty pages of the April number are taken up with an account illustrated by several sketches of last year's Kavallerieübungsreise; there is a paper of which the burden is, as one hears often in continental journals, that a well-trained Cavalry will do well all that can possibly be asked of it in the field—a comforting doctrine if not an especially illuminating one; and there are two short articles of a veterinary character—one containing a suggestion for an improved form of military shoeing.

With the March number this Journal reserves a certain number of pages for the consideration of matters exclusively affecting the German Cavalry.

'THE JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL ARTILLERY'


The February number of this Journal contains a lecture on 'Horse Artillery with Cavalry' by Colonel J. P. DuCane R.A. As the author truly remarks, there is little or no literature on the subject in our own language, and Cavalry officers are much indebted to him for helping to fill the gap. The lecture will well repay careful study. We quote the following on the action of Horse Artillery in support of Independent Cavalry.

- '1. Always endeavour to bring off your attack on the enemy's Cavalry at right angles to the line of fire of your guns.
- '2. Have your guns well to the front in your manœuvre formations and separate them early from the Cavalry.
 - 'To illustrate these principles I would refer you to figs. 1 and 2.
- 'We must imagine that two similarly constituted forces of Cavalry and Horse Artillery are approaching a plain overlooked by two bits of rising ground. In

fig. 1 the Red Commander carries out the principles mentioned by sending his guns, accompanied by a suitable escort, well to the front to occupy the fire position as shown. He retains his Cavalry under cover till the time arrives when his enemy is committed to the plain. I have shown the Blue Commander also conforming to the principles, so that at the moment of shock the Horse Artillery of each side enfilades the opposing Cavalry.

'In fig. 2 I have shown the Red Cavalry making a wide detour under cover while the Horse Artillery are retained. The Blue Commander allows his Cavalry to hug his guns so that at the moment of shock the Red guns are seen enfilading the Blue Cavalry, while the fire of the Blue guns is masked.

'To obtain the maximum advantage from the application of these principles it is necessary to conceal the position of the Horse Artillery till the last moment,




so that the fire may come as a surprise, and it will of course be necessary to fire direct. It is needless to say that to apply these principles to varying conditions of ground and different directions of the line of advance of the enemy, requires tactical training of the highest order, prompt decision, and a great readiness of resource in the Commander. The whole operation takes place, if at all, so rapidly that there is no time to send elaborate instructions to the Horse Artillery Commander. The latter must be allowed a considerable latitude and must rely largely on his knowledge of the situation and his own intuition as to the meaning of the manœuvres of the Cavalry which he sees taking place before him.'

After some account of the Cavalry actions which took place near Mars-la-Tour on August 16, 1870, including the charge of von Bredow's Brigade, Colonel DuCane says:—

'The conclusions that are forced upon one are that if a similar opportunity offered, the charge might be repeated with success, but that it would require

considerably more moral courage on the part of the Commander who ordered it to take place, more steadfastness on the part of the troops carrying it out, and that they would suffer greater losses. Without a doubt, a prime factor in the creation of the opportunities for such an employment of Cavalry in battle would be an overwhelming superiority of Artillery fire. This as we know is more difficult to attain than formerly, owing to the indecisive nature of Artillery engagements due to concealment. As regards the employment of the Horse Artillery on such occasions, it is clear that if they are to be used it must be in the same manner as the rest of the Artillery are used. They must come up into



line with the remainder and do their utmost by their fire to develop a situation suitable for the employment of the Cavalry. Finally, I should say that if such opportunities are to be utilised it must be by leaders who are imbued with the power and efficacy of the Cavalry arm. Those who dally too long with the Mounted Infantry theory are likely to let such opportunities slip.'

'GUNS AND CAVALRY'

By Major May, R.A. In this book the co-operation of Cavalry and Artillery is thoroughly dealt with; instances from many wars being given—Frederick the Great, Napoleon, and the Crimea.

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NOTE BY MANAGING EDITOR.

Owing to doubt having been expressed as to the extent to which Officers may now contribute articles to the 'Cavalry Journal,' in view of the recent amendment to paragraph 423 of the King's Regulations, it is notified for general information that the 'Cavalry Journal' is issued with the sanction of the Army Council. Officers are consequently encouraged to submit papers for publication, on the understanding that should their articles prejudge questions under consideration by superior authority, or criticise existing orders or regulations, the Editor will make such emendations in the text as he may deem advisable.

STATION VETERINARY HOSPITALS

With reference to a suggestion on the above subject by Major Ansell, which we published in our April number, the following notes will the better explain to our readers the point of view from which it is regarded by the veterinary profession.

With regard to training men for veterinary work, there are hospitals in four large stations: Aldershot, Woolwich, Bulford, and the Curragh, and they just suffice to train the staff for eight field sections, the very smallest number that will be required to meet the necessities of a war of very moderate dimensions.

In all other stations in the United Kingdom, where mounted troops are quartered, the old regimental system is still in force, and the staffs of the various infirmaries are furnished by the corps concerned and trained under the supervision of the veterinary officer in charge of the station, or unit, who also instructs the officers, non-commissioned officers and men in the principles of veterinary hygiene and horse mastership.

A mistake made by many officers is that amateur doctoring is a part of true horsemanship which, however, really consists in maintaining the horse in health by good management, hygiene, and dieting, to obtain the most possible out of him at the least cost (expenditure of force), and to recognise in time when he is about to break down (played out), and to relieve him accordingly. If a squadron officer knows and can effect all this he will understand all the better when a horse is out of sorts, and will send him to be dealt with by the proper person—the veterinary officer—who, by his expert training, is alone in a position to decide what is and what is not a trifling ailment.

The dressing of wounds by amateurs is a potent source of evil in the opportunity it gives for the spread of contagious diseases.




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It would be impossible to place the responsibility on squadron officers as suggested by Major Ansell, for they, not being professional experts, could not be held responsible for want of knowledge or errors of judgment, and the veterinary officer certainly would not accept any responsibility for cases of which he had not had entire charge from the first.

MOUNTED INFANTRY EQUIPMENT

Major H. Findlay, the Buffs, forwards some suggestions for the equipment of Mounted Infantry, including a drawing of proposed horse attachment, which we reproduce.



The following should be included in the equipment of the Mounted Infantry:—

Short rifle, with sword bayonet, rifle bucket, web sling, the latter to be three and a half inches broad.

Colonial pattern saddlery.


For head ropes substitute leather thong, as per sketch.

The idea of the sword bayonet: Occasions have arisen in the past—and I see no reason why they might not again when Mounted Infantry have been defeated and captured

owing to the fact that when mounted the Mounted Infantry have no means of defending themselves. It is all very well to say that Mounted Infantry never

should be taken by surprise when mounted, but they have been, and they will be again.

A sword bayonet could as a last resort be used when mounted, and might save the situation, and I think it would really be quite as efficient as the short bayonet when dismounted; in fact I think it quite a matter of opinion as to the result of a bayonet fight between two equally skilled men, the one armed with the



short rifle and present bayonet, and the other armed with the short rifle and sword bayonet. Personally, I would back the latter.

MANES FOR RIDING AND DRAUGHT HORSES.

Major P. E. Gray, R.H.A., sends us the following:-

It is not many years since that a hogged mane on a Troop horse was the mark of the Beast.

It represented the ultima ratio of a harassed Battery Commander, when pains and plaiting were alike ineffective, and whose patience was exhausted.

Such a horse was at once recognised as a bad doer, an underbred, unsatisfactory brute. The Officer Commanding, who, greatly daring, possessed more than a very few in his Battery, had to keep various excellent reasons very handy to his finger-tips during an inspection, or face the indignant wrath of the Inspecting Officer, whoever he might be.

Times have changed however, though not all of us have changed with them.

A few officers' horses, according to a fashion which came into vogue about 1898 for hunters, embarked for South Africa with hogged manes, a charger without a mane was a thing unheard of then.

During the Campaign our troop horses lost condition, and the vermin resulting therefrom, and from unavoidable neglect, made it necessary in many cases to remove the mane.

This, an exceptional condition of active service, has become perpetuated, in many cases, in our regiment.

Officers returned to this country, and continued the practice, without the justification that existed in South Africa.

At the present time, instead of the rule, it is the exception to see a battery of Royal Horse or Royal Field Artillery serving at home, whose horses are as nature made them. The usual and, so far as I know, the only arguments in favour of this unnatural practice are tolerably familiar to us all.

They are, saving of time in grooming, and an idea of added smartness in appearance.

The considerations in favour of a mane generally are, to my mind, the following:—

Nature gave a mane for a very good reason. What is it? Protection.

I am personally convinced that a forelock and mane protect a horse to a marked degree from sun, flies, and from bad weather when standing in the open; and in this connection, I would point out that while a mane can be taken off in five minutes, it cannot be grown again under six months.

That it can be successfully grown in that time, I assert with confidence. Certainly if, on active service, manes become verminous, remove them; but until that happens, I believe all horses will do better for the protection they afford. Besides, it does not follow that because special conditions of the warfare in South Africa encouraged vermin, all active service will produce a similar result.

To argue that gunners and drivers have insufficient time to groom them is far-fetched, almost absurd.

In the days of shaft draught, full harness, collars, and breechings, packed valises and wallets, collar chains and logs, and a marching order parade once a week that took a fairly lengthy and careful preparation, while the usual driving drill and drill order, with complicated movements by sub-divisions and half



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batteries, required constant practice and application on the part of drivers to learn their duties and places on parade; the men were certainly kept hard at work in a smart battery. In the present days of skeleton harness, peat moss litter, no marching order to speak of, and a much simplified drill, the gunner and driver must be truly degenerate creatures if, in addition, to groom one or two manes is an excessive tax on their powers.

As regards the rider himself, are there no occasions now when a mane will be of inestimable value, in peace or war?

Are the semi-perpendicular bank, the sunken road, the unfordable river, the buck-jumping remount, the confirmed rearer, factors no longer to be reckoned with? Is rapid mounting in action under fire, with frightened horses—a broken stirrup leather, a severed rein, no longer a possibility on active service?

Are there many officers of, say, five years' service and over, who cannot remember at least one case in which the mane has prevented an accident either in the ranks or in draught?

It is freely admitted that there are some horses whose manes are impossible, they rub or break them incessantly, and such are best removed, but to cut off all manes, without discrimination, and for no reason beyond a fashion, and a fashion initiated for appearance only in Polo ponies and small hunters, this, in my opinion, savours of barbarity and is at the same time no gain to, but a loss in efficiency.

EDUCATION OF OFFICERS.

Many of our readers may not know that Mr. Ruskin once delivered a course of lectures to the cadets at Woolwich, and afterwards wrote a book based on these lectures called 'The Crown of Wild Olive.' In this book occurs the following piece of advice:—'Your knowledge of a wholesome herb may involve the feeding of an army; and acquaintance with an obscure point of geography the success of a campaign. Never waste an instant's time, therefore; the sin of idleness is a thousandfold greater in you than in other youths; for the fates of those who will one day be under your command hang upon your knowledge; lost moments now will be lost lives then, and every instant which you carelessly take for play you buy with blood.'

ROYAL NAVAL AND MILITARY TOURNAMENT

The 28th Tournament was, like its immediate predecessor at Olympia, a brilliant success, and it is anticipated that after all charges have been met, and a sufficient sum placed to the reserve fund, between 5,000*l*. and 6,000*l*. will remain to be devoted to philanthropic military purposes. The general opinion seems to be, that the Lancer ride was by far the most popular scenic effect, conveying thereby the lesson that the public prefers genuine soldiering to soldiering dressed up by theatrical costumiers.

The entry of a seaman for the riding and jumping competition was something of a novelty, and Lieutenant Sherbrooke alone upheld the honour of the Royal Navy against thirty-seven military rivals. However, sitting a hunter in fine style, he won the third prize.

One of the most interesting competitions was the Sword v. Lance (Mounted), in which, even after four extra rounds, the judges decided that the three com-



petitors left in the final, Major R. M. Poore (7th Hussars), Lieutenant H. Boyd-Rochfort (21st Lancers), and Staff-Sergeant-Major A. Cooper (11th Hussars), should be bracketed equal. The judges decided to award the gold medal to Staff-Sergeant-Major Cooper, Major Poore, and Lieutenant Boyd-Rochfort, each being authorised to purchase and wear a championship gold medal.

The other winners of mounted events were as follows:-

Lemon Cutting.—Major R. M. Poore, 1; Staff-Sergeant-Major E. Broadley (Westminster Dragoons, Imperial Yeomanry), 2; Lieutenant H. W. Naylor (Royal Field Artillery), 3.

Tent Pegging.—Staff-Sergeant-Major E. Broadley (Westminster Dragoons, Imperial Yeomanry), 1; Sergeant Vesey (18th Hussars), 2; Lance-Sergeant W. Chapman (Army Service Corps), 3.

Heads and Posts (Officers).—1st prize, Second Lieutenant D. W. Godfree, 21st Lancers; 2nd, Lieutenant H. Boyd-Rochfort, 21st Lancers; 3rd, Second Lieutenant P. L. E. Walker, 7th Hussars.

Riding and Jumping (Officers).—1st prize, Lieutenant and Riding-Master L. P. Thwaite, Cavalry School; 2nd, Captain A. S. Pilcher, 21st Lancers; 3rd, Lieutenant H. G. Sherbrooke, Royal Navy.

Lemon Cutting (Officers).—1st prize, Captain and Riding-Master D. Aherne, Riding Establishment, R.A.; 2nd, Lieutenant and Riding-Master T. Sinfield, Army Service Corps; 3rd, Major and Riding-Master W. H. King, Royal Horse Guards.

Tent Pegging (Officers).—1st prize, Captain G. Mathew-Lannowe, R.F.A.; 2nd, Captain C. R. Harbord, 29th Lancers, I.A.; 3rd, Lieutenant H. Boyd-Rochfort, 21st Lancers.

Sword v. Lance (Officers).—1st prize, Lieutenant H. Boyd-Rochfort, 21st Lancers; 2nd, Captain C. R. Harbord, 29th Lancers, I.A.; 3rd, Lieutenant and Riding-Master L. P. Thwaite, Cavalry School.

Sword v. Sword (Officers).—1st prize, Captain C. Van der Byl, 16th Lancers; 2nd, Lieutenant and Riding-Master J. Turnbull, 8th Hussars; 3rd, Lieutenant and Riding-Master L. P. Thwaite, Cavalry School.

Foil v. Foil (Navy and Army Championship).—1st prize, Lieutenant and Quartermaster J. Betts, Army Gymnastic Staff; 2nd, Chief Petty Officer Smeaton, R.N.; 3rd, Squadron Corporal-Major Elliott, 2nd Life Guards.

Sword v. Sword, Mounted (Navy and Army Championship).—1st prize, Captain C. Van der Byl, 16th Lancers; 2nd, Yeomanry R.S.M. J. T. Marshall, Royal Bucks Hussars; 3rd, Major R. M. Poore, 7th Hussars.

Sabre v. Sabre (Navy and Army Championship).—1st prize, Lieutenant and Quartermaster J. Betts, Army Gymnastic Staff; 2nd, Company Sergeant-Major Williamson, Army Gymnastic Staff; 3rd, Squadron Corporal-Major F. Eggleton, Royal Horse Guards.

Heads and Posts (Navy and Army Championship).—1st prize, Squadron Sergeant-Major P. Mordaunt, 18th Hussars; 2nd, Major R. M Poore, 7th Hussars; 3rd, Staff-Sergeant-Major E. Broadley, Westminster Dragoons.

Riding and Jumping (Regulars).—20th Hussars beat 21st Lancers.

R.F.A. Trotting Competition.—101st Battery R.F.A. beat 99th Battery R.F.A.

R.H.A. Galloping Competition.— 'B B' battery R.H.A. beat 'A A' Battery.

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THE CONCOURS HIPPIQUE AT BRUSSELS

Captain Duetch, a French officer, won first prize with his thoroughbred Eminence, the victory entitling him to 250*l*. offered by the committee, and to a gold medal bestowed by the King's own hand. The French officers were first, third, fourth, seventh, and ninth.

SWORD PRACTICE IN FRANCE

By a recent memorandum the Minister for War has authorised the use, by Cavalry for practice with the sword, of a wooden horse invented by Adjutant Moulin of the 3rd Dragoons at Nantes.

The novelty of this apparatus consists in the figure, which is the target for the point or cut of the sword, being easily moveable according to the will of the officer directing the exercise. A fly-wheel with a driving shaft and two cogwheels, admit of the 'mannequin' being turned round the rider, who is seated on a wooden horse on the central pivot. Other soldiers on foot, or mounted, take part in the practice, and as the movements of the man who controls the flight of the 'mannequin' are almost imperceptible, they have to keep a sharp eye on its vagaries to enable them to score a 'hit.'

A CAVALRY CIRCUS

A most successful Circus was held by the 11th Hussars in their Riding School, at Marlborough Barracks, Dnblin, during the third week in April.

The principal event was a Musical Ride dressed in the old uniforms of the Regiment, the types being:—

1715 to 1758. Breeches, scarlet, trimmed white, scarlet coatees, and three-cornered hat, with wigs as worn at Culloden.

1758 to 1782. White breeches, short blue coats and cocked hats in which the Regiment fought in the 'Seven Years' War.'

1783 to 1825. Light blue coatee, with same coloured overalls, and high shako as worn in Flanders and throughout the Peninsula and Waterloo Campaigns.

1826 to 1840. Scarlet coatee and dark blue overalls were now worn, and in this kit the Regiment served in India, including the siege and capture of Bhurtpore in 1826.

In 1840, when Prince Albert, just married to Queen Victoria, became colonel, the regiment became Hussars, and were given crimson overalls in which they fought throughout the Crimean Campaign, including the never to be forgotten charge of Balaclava.

There was also very good barebacked and trick riding, while the performance of Squadron Sergeant-Major Instructor of Fencing Simmonds and Corporal Hamilton was by all recognised as being equal to any Music Hall or Hippodrome turn.

The part of Clown fell to Bandsman Hall who, with Bandsman Mason as 'Policeman' and Corporal Luff as Pantaloon, made as good a trio as could be desired.



In conjunction with the Circus a Torchlight Tattoo was held on four nights in which the Royal Irish Constabulary, South of Ireland Imperial Yeomanry, and boys of the Royal Hibernian School assisted, and as the nights were fine large crowds visited the barracks.

The entertainment was patronised by His Excellency Lord Aberdeen and General Lord Grenfell and, after paying all expenses, the regiment was able to give 62l. to local military charities.

THE SCOTS GREYS

In view of the interest aroused as to the movements of the Royal Scots Greys, it may be as well to state that the following are the arrangements that have been made. The regiment will come south at the end of certain drills in Scotland, probably about August 1, when one squadron will proceed to Dorchester and the other two will be accommodated in the infantry barracks at Tidworth, the horses of the latter being picketed in the open. Meanwhile the work of converting one of the unused barracks originally intended for a battalion of infantry in the Tidworth lines is in hand, and it is hoped that by the winter accommodation for the whole regiment will have been provided. Should, however, this not be found possible, the regiment will spend the winter months at Bulford.

YEOMANRY OFFICERS

The last class of Yeomanry officers at the Cavalry School took the greatest interest in their work throughout, finishing up with a night march, individually, on compass bearings, across Salisbury Plain to Salisbury, a distance of 12 miles, on foot.

THE ESSEX REGIMENT IMPERIAL YEOMANRY

We have been favoured with a diary of the training of this Regiment—which we publish as it may be of interest to other Yeomanry Regiments for purposes of comparison.

- May 24. Regiment assembled.
 - " 25. Squadron drill. Rifle competition for Squadron Challenge Shield and best individual shot Challenge Cup.
 - " 26. Church parade, Bishop of Colchester. Camp inspection by Commanding Officer.
 - " 27. Squadron drill. Riding school. Fire alarm. Recruits medical inspection. Practice for sports.
 - " 28. Regimental squadron drill. Saddle and arms inspection. Practice for sports.
 - ., 29. Convoy and rearguard action. Epping Forest scheme.
 - ,, 30. Day outpost scheme.
 - " 31. Regimental drill. Examination of Sergeant-Majors and Sergeants for Challenge Cup.
- June 1. Inspection by G. O. C. in C. Lord Methuen in day outposts.
 - , 2. Church parade abandoned. Shifted horse lines.
 - 3. Inspection by Col. T. O. C. de Crespigny, Staff Officer I.Y.





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- June 4. Scheme. Invasion at Maldon. Engagement at Danbury, 20 miles from N. Weald, and bivousc.
 - 5. Returned to camp. Advance and rearguard action scheme.
 - ,, 6. Inspection by the Lord-Lieutenant. Scouts competition for Challenge Cup.
 - ,, 7. Regimental sports.
 - 8. Regiment paid and dismissed. Horse sale.

A Rough-riding Sergeant-Major of the 21st Lancers superintended the manage, the musical ride and sports.

A Corporal-Trumpeter 8th Hussars instructed the squadron trumpeters (8) who became very efficient.

A signalling Corporal 8th Hussars instructed the signallers (13).

Messrs. White, of Aldershot, catered for the regiment, officers and men.

MERITORIOUS SERVICE MEDAL

The undermentioned warrant and non-commissioned officers have been awarded the medal for 'meritorious service':—

Regimental-Corporal-Major A. White, late Royal Horse Guards.

Trumpet-Major W. Bowles, late 1st Dragoons.

Serjeant-Major W. Holmes, late 12th Lancers.

Serjeant T. Kirkby, late Royal Artillery.

Master-Gunner E. Newton, late Royal Artillery.

PAYMENTS TO PENSIONERS AND RESERVISTS

Pensioners and reservists residing in the United Kingdom will, without regard to their place of residence, be paid by the accountants detailed below by means of Army Money orders, unless the total sum to be paid amounts to more than 40l., in which case the issue will be made through the cashier nearest to the pensioner's place of residence, in cash or by draft, under direct authority from the Royal Hospital, Chelsea.

Household Cavalry, Accountant, London District.

Hussars, District accountant, York.

Dragoons and Lancers, Regimental accountant, Dover.

Imperial Yeomanry, Regimental accountant, Dover.

OBITUARY

Since our last issue the Cavalry have to regret the deaths of no less than three full Colonels, Commanding Regiments.

Lieutenant-General Lord de Ros, Colonel of the 1st Life Guards, died in Ireland the end of April, aged 80. He was premier Baron of England on the roll, joined the 1st Life Guards as Cornet and Sub-Lieutenant in 1845, became Captain in 1851, Major and Lieut.-Colonel in 1859, Colonel in 1864, Major-General in 1870, Lieutenant-General in 1881, and Colonel 1st Life Guards in 1902. It will thus be seen that he was connected with the 1st Life Guards the whole of his service.



The 7th (Queen's Own) Hussars have lost their full Colonel by the death, at the age of seventy-two, of Major-General R. Hale. He entered the Army in 1852, and reached the rank of colonel in 1876. He was aide-de-camp to the Duke of Cambridge, Commander-in-Chief, from July, 1879, till December, 1885, when he was promoted to be Major-General. From February, 1894, till February, 1896, he was Colonel of the 12th Lancers, since when he had been Colonel of the 7th Hussars

Major-General George Salis-Schwabe, C.B., Colonel of the 3rd (Prince of Wales's) Dragoon Guards, died in June, at the age of 63. General Salis-Schwabe entered the Army as a cornet in the 6th Dragoon Guards in 1863. He exchanged into the 16th Lancers in 1878, and in the following year served in the latter part of the Zulu War in command of the Native Carrier Corps (2,000 strong), which he organised. From 1882 to 1886 he commanded the 16th Lancers.

Colonel Sir Richard Martin, K.C.B., died in May. He entered the Army in 1867 as an ensign in the 77th Regiment, and in 1877 became a captain in the Inniskilling Dragoons, which he afterwards commanded.

Brevet-Major Alexander George Fullerton, of Ballintoy Castle, Antrim, who died at Folkestone on May 12, at the advanced age of 99, was probably up to the time of his death the oldest officer who had held Army rank. Born in 1808, he was educated at Eton, where he was a contemporary of the late Mr. Gladstone. When serving in the Royal Horse Guards, he paraded at the funeral of King George IV., and was for some time an attaché to the British Embassy in Paris.

Major Harry McNeale Patterson, 5th Cavalry, died at Saharanpore of plague in April at the early age of 40. He served in the South African war as a transport officer—was mentioned in despatches, Queen's medal and five clasps, and brevet of Major.

O. Lumley, Colonel.

SPORTING NOTES

RACING

The Household Brigade Meeting, which was held as usual at Hawthorn Hill, brought together a large and aristocratic gathering; the entries were numerous and sport good. The Irish Guards' Challenge Cup was won by Mr. A. Fitzgerald's Stora (owner). The 1st Life Guards' Challenge Cup was carried off by Mr. Arundell's Egypt (owner), and the Grenadier Guards' Challenge Cup was won for the fifth year in succession by Mr. R. C. de Crespigny on his horse Longmoor Lass. Lord Gerard secured the Royal Horse Guards' regimental race on his horse Blackbird III. after an exciting finish with Lord Alistair Innes-Ker. Mr. Paget's Alert III., with Mr. R. de Crespigny up, won the Household Brigade Cup, and Mr. Noel Newton's Irish Poplin (owner) the 2nd Life Guards' Challenge Cup. For the third year in succession, Mr. Whaley took the Coldstream Plate on his horse Coinage, and Capt. G. Paynter on Red Cent won the Scots Guards' Challenge Cup. On the second day that sporting event, the Household Brigade Hunters' Challenge Cup, took place. Mr. R. de Crespigny on Kozak came in first, but the 3rd Grenadier Guards coming in second, third, and fourth, won the Cup, with the 2nd Life Guards second, and the 1st Life Guards third. Mr. Christie Miller's Chiretta, Mr. C. W. Banbury riding, won the Household Brigade Handicap Steeplechase. Mr. C. Bewicke and Mr. Lumley Smith also won races, riding their own horses.

At the Norwich Staghounds Steeplechases, Mr. W. Vincent, riding his own horses, won both the Military Steeplechase and the Staghunters' Steeplechase.

At the Glamorganshire Steeplechases the Yeomanry Hurdle Race was won by Sergt. Boyle's Black Esther ridden by Sergt.-Major Knowles.

The Aldershot Spring Meeting was carried through successfully on May 7 and 8. On the first day, the Tally Ho Steeplechase was won by Mr. C. G. Mayall's (R.H.A.) Flycatcher, Capt. Stackpole riding; the Past and Present Military Handicap Steeplechase was won by Capt. R. J. Bentinck's Amethyst (owner up), and Col. H. P. Gough, 16th Lancers, rode his own horse Winnipeg II. to victory in the Aldershot Command Light-weight Hunter's Steeplechase. On the second day, Mr. A. L. Samson's Alice Delvin (owner up) was first for the Aldershot Cup; Mr. Geoffrey Brooke's Peggy Royston (owner) was first for the Army Corps Steeplechase, and Col. H. P. Gough (16th Lancers) secured another popular victory on his horse Winnipeg II. in the Aldershot Command Welter Hunters' Steeplechase.



The Grand Military International Steeplechase promoted by the Société de Sport de Belgique was run on May 22 on the Boitsfort course, and was won by a French horse ridden by a French officer, the Belgians supplying the runners up.

The Shropshire Yeomanry held some good races at their annual training near Shrewsbury. The programme included seven events. The Regimental Race was won by Sergt. Roberts's Sweet Biddy (Moore) and the Officer's Cup by Lieut. Meredith's Appleby (owner). There were also four squadron races and a Licensed Victuallers' Consolation Race.

The Derby winner this year, Orby, was trained by Dr. F. MacCabe, who is well known to Cavalry soldiers for the excellent lectures on hygiene which he delivered to the troops in Ireland, and which have been circulated throughout the Army. He is also an enthusiastic Yeomanry officer and automobilist; the versatility of his talents is remarkable, and his book 'War with Disease,' price 1s. only, is useful for both soldiers and civilians.

The King has graciously presented a Cup for a two-mile flat race for horses, the property of, and to be ridden by, officers of the Army and Navy or Irish Militia or Imperial Yeomanry. The Cup is to be run for on July 11 on the occasion of His Majesty's visit to Ireland.

POINT TO POINT RACES

The 18th Hussars held a successful meeting on the Yorkshire estate of Lord Wenlock. There were twenty runners for the Regimental Cup, which was won by Mr. Alcock on his horse Mimpo.

At the East Kent Meeting great interest was aroused by an inter-regimental contest between the regiments of the 2nd Cavalry Brigade. This resulted in a great victory for the 20th Hussars, who secured the first four places, Colonel Whatman's Shy Lady, ridden by Major Edwards, coming in first.

Eleven started for the Suffolk Imperial Yeomanry Race run for at the Suffolk Hunt Meeting, and a good race resulted in a win for Trooper P. Hammond's Willoughby (owner).

The Military Sweepstakes at the Mid-Kent Meeting was won by Mr. H. M. Soames's Develine (owner). At this meeting, Captain McTaggart rode the winners of both the Light and Heavy-weight races.

At the Kirkham Harriers' Races, the Duke of Lancaster's Own Imperial Yeomanry race was won by Capt. Bibby's Pedro (owner), the Lancashire Hussars' Challenge Cup by Capt. Pilkington's Random (owner), and the Yeomanry Cup by Capt. Piercy's Carlocini (owner).

The Salisbury Plain Military Races resulted as follows: Light-weights, Captain J. Ballard's Goshawk (owner). Heavy-weights, Capt. F. M. C. Maitland's Marigold (owner). Cavalry School N.C.O.'s Challenge Cup, S. S. M. Vaughan's (17th Lancers) Fairy; nine ran.



POLO

The Indian Polo Association with five exceptions has adopted the Hurlingham rules. The exceptions are: (1) the height of the ponies to remain at 14·1, while the standard height in England is 14·2 hands; (2) the duration of play to be seven minutes and a half in each chukker as against ten minutes in England; (3) in case of a tie, the goals to be doubled, i.e. forty-eight feet, and play to continue until a goal is scored; (4) left-handed players not to be allowed; (5) the penalty hit for a foul shall be taken from a line fifty yards from the goal line. The Hurlingham rule says sixty yards.

It will be noted that the adoption of the Hurlingham rules abolishes subsidiary goals. The representatives of the I.P.A. on the Hurlingham Committee are Major R. St. John C. Lecky, Major Vaughan, 10th Hussars, and Major Hobson, 12th Lancers.

As regards the Hurlingham rules, the following alterations have been recently made.

Rule 32 will in future be: 'If a player leaves the game in order to change a pony, or to get a fresh stick, or for any other purpose, the penalty for off-side cannot be exacted against the opposing side until the return of the player into the game. (N.B.—The definition of the word "game" is "under the umpire's eye.")' The words 'into the game' have been substituted for 'on to the ground,' which will allow a player to get into his proper place without fear of putting his side off-side.

A rather important alteration has been made in Rule 15. As it formerly stood, the players could come as close to the boards as they wished when the umpire was throwing in the ball. Now, by introducing the words 'no player to stand within five yards of the side line,' the rule will lessen the amount of scrummaging that sometimes goes on, ending frequently in the ball being at once hit out of play again.

According to the altered Rule 31 the umpire will be called upon to act differently when he has cause to stop the game on account of a broken ball. Hitherto a new ball has been thrown into play at the spot where the old one was damaged; in future it will be thrown in 'as near as possible to where the ball is when the whistle sounds.'

By the new Rule 36 a minute extra time may be played when a penalty is incurred towards the end of a match and there is not time to exact the penalty before the final bell rings. Previously the proviso was 'in case of a foul occurring at the end of a match,' which was somewhat ambiguous.

The fifth part of Rule 20 will in future read: 'That a list of existing lefthanded players be registered at Hurlingham on or before July 31, 1907, and that no other player be permitted to play with his left hand.'

Owing to the abnormally wet weather the Polo season has opened dismally, the sodden state of the ground rendering much play impossible, and many matches have had to be abandoned. It is unfortunate that on such a year the Maharajah of Bikanir and our Spanish confrères should have paid us the compliment of bringing over teams to play. One of the best matches that has taken place was that between Roehampton and the Rest of England; the teams were

Roehampton, 1906 team: C. Nickalls, Capt. Wilson, P. Nickalls, and Hardress Lloyd. Rest of England: R. Grenfell, F. M. Freake, C. Miller, and W. Buckmaster. It was a fine game, but Roehampton, after two seasons' unbeaten record, were defeated by England by seven goals to four.

The Household Cavalry are playing better polo than ever. At Datchet, the Royal Horse Guards, consisting of Mr. Bowlby, Capt. Rose, Capt. H. Brassey, and Major J. G. Fitzgerald, beat the all-conquering Rugby team consisting of Mr. W. Jones, Lord Shrewsbury, and Messrs. G. A. and C. D. Miller, by six goals to five.

A most sporting afternoon tournament also took place at Datchet between the Royal Horse Guards and the 1st Life Guards, in which practically the whole of the officers of each regiment took part. Each regiment formed four teams in order of seniority and played four matches against each other, the regiment making most goals to win. The contest was most exciting, the Blues finally winning by a total of ten goals to nine goals.

At Aldershot there have been some good games in which the 16th Lancers beat the 5th Lancers, and the 21st Lancers defeated in their turn the 16th. In Ireland, the 11th Hussars have been showing fine form, winning many matches.

Many Yeomanry regiments have also been playing polo during their annual training, notably the Cheshire Imperial Yeomanry, the Sussex Imperial Yeomanry at Brighton, the Northumberland Hussars, and the Royal North Devon Hussars at Fremington.

The tournament for the Army Cup—a challenge trophy presented by Col. R. S. F. Walker—played at Ranelagh has been much interfered with by the weather. Instituted in 1904, the competition is open to officers, past and present, classified under the following heads: Teams of Household Cavalry, Dragoons, Dragoon Guards, Hussars, Lancers, Royal Artillery, Royal Engineers, Brigade of Guards, Infantry, and Departments. A complete team may be entered from any regiment provided half its members are past officers. In the first tie the Hussars beat the Household Cavalry.

Mr. Francis Grenfell and Captain L. W. de V. Sadleir-Jackson, D.S.O., have been added to the Hurlingham Recent Form List.

POLO ABROAD

India.—The Subalterns' Tournament at Umballa secured a good entry, comprising the 15th Hussars, 17th Lancers, 10th Hussars, 12th Lancers, Royal Horse Artillery, 3rd Hussars, and 6th Dragoon Guards. The final was a magnificent game between the 10th Hussars and 12th Lancers. The score stood two subsidiaries all till there were but a couple of minutes left for play. Then the 10th Hussars, out of a hot attack, hit a goal, and most people thought the game was practically over, as not a full minute now remained. However, within three seconds of full time, the Lancers, out of a sustained assault, equalised with a straight shot between the flags. Intense excitement now prevailed, and play had to continue for an extra five minutes, which witnessed a level and exhausting bout without any result. The game had to be continued till a score was made, and



now the Lancers held the ball in the Hussars' end, where there was a stout and successful defence, though once the Lancers' shot was stopped a few inches short of passing out between the flags. Later the Hussars broke through the opposition, through Palmer's fine shooting, and attacked the Lancers' flags, where soon a crowning goal was signalled. Thus the 10th Hussars won by two goals two subsidiaries to one goal two subsidiaries. This tournament has taken a high rank from not only the grand game for the final, but the equally good one between the 10th and 15th Hussars.

The teams were: 10th Royal Hussars—The Hon. A. Annesley, 1; Mr. Palmes, 2; Mr. Palmer, 3; Mr. Chaplain, back. 12th Royal Lancers—Mr. Badger, 1; Mr. Wood, 2; Mr. Reynolds, 3; Mr. Truman, back. The umpires were Majors Campbell and Lucky.

After the game, General Clements presented the cup to the winning team, and eulogised the splendid play.

The 10th thus carried off both the Inter-Regimental and Subalterns' Tournaments.

In the final of the Cawnpore Tournament the Durham Light Infantry (Capts. C. L. Matthews, J. S. Unthank, J. W. Jeffreys, and A. W. B. Wallace) met the 8th Cavalry (Capts. H. C. Kay, G. A. Becher, W. A. Fetherstonhaugh, and Mr. F. B. Lane) and secured the victory by the close margin of one goal five subsidiaries to one goal and one subsidiary.

The Bombay Tournament final was between the Indian Staff College and 34th Poona Horse, the former winning by one goal one subsidiary to three subsidiaries. Teams: Staff College—Capt. H. R. Hopwood (33rd Cavalry), Capt. P. Howell (Guides), Major A. A. Kennedy (3rd Hussars), Major C. Wigram (18th Tiwana Lancers). Poona Horse—Lieuts. M. C. Raymond, R. W. Grimshaw, B. H. Alderson, and Duffadar Ghulam Hussein.

Egypt.—A fine match took place for the Cairo Open Cup in presence of the Duke of Connaught between the Inniskilling Dragoons and a Staff team. The latter were the favourites, but the Inniskillings won a great game by seven goals to six.

South Africa.—The open Subalterns' Tournament was played for the second year of its existence at Pretoria in May; nine teams took part, viz. the 12th Brigade R.H.A., King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry, 4th Hussars, Queen's Bays, 6th Mounted Infantry, A team, 4th Dragoon Guards, 6th Mounted Infantry, B team, 5th Dragoon Guards, and 5th Mounted Infantry.

The final was between the 4th Dragoon Guards and the 4th Hussars (last years' winners). A close match was anticipated, but the result proved an easy victory for the 4th Dragoon Guards by eight goals and two subsidiaries to two goals. The players were: 4th Dragoon Guards, Messrs. R. I. B. Oldrey, C. B. Hornby, A. C. de Wiart, and R. W. Oppenheim (back). 4th Hussars: Messrs. C. V. W. Stokes, L. C. Brodie, W. Neilson, and D. D. Bell (back). The umpires were Colonel Kirk and Major Wilberforce. His Excellency the High Commissioner kindly presented the cup to the winning team, and the 4th Dragoon Guards are now holders of the Inter-Regimental (Clements) Cup as well as the Subaltern (Anderson) Cup.



The 4th Hussars won the Beresford Cup Polo Tournament at Johannesburg beating the 2nd Dragoon Guards in the final by seven goals to four goals two subsidiaries. The winning team were Lieut. Stokes, Lieut. Neilson, Lieut.-Colonel Hoare, and Lieut. Bell (back).

GOLF

In the inter-team Challenge Cup contest among London Service Clubs, the United Service Club beat the Junior United Service Club, and the Naval and Military Club beat the Army and Navy Club. The final tie took place at Richmond, when the Naval and Military beat the United Service Club in the singles by seven matches to one, and in the foursomes by three matches to one.

CRICKET

A match between the Royal Navy and the Army took place at Devonport. Weather stopped play the first day, but on the next day one innings was played off, in which the Navy proved victorious by 256 runs to 141.

FOOTBALL ABROAD

India.—The final of the Murray Tournament under Association rules was played at Lucknow between the Carabiniers and 2nd Royal Welsh Fusiliers, the former winning by two goals to one. Lieut.-General Sir E. Locke Elliot presented the cup and medals. In the semi-finals the 1st Durham Light Infantry had to meet the Carabiniers no less than three times before the former defeated them.

PIG-STICKING

The Kadir Cup, which is the Blue Riband of pig-sticking in India, was won by Major J. Vaughan of the 10th Hussars. The event attracted a big entry of all the best-known soldier and civilian pig-stickers in the country. Those left in the final were Major Vaughan, Sir John Milbank (also of the 10th Hussars), and Captain Carden (17th Lancers); the trio had a good boar in the final to test their steel, and the victory for Major Vaughan was an immensely popular one, as he had ridden well throughout the heats, and not been favoured unduly by luck, which so often enters into pig-sticking contests. He rode a Waler horse named Vedette.

The Hog Hunters' Cup was won by Mr. Bromilow of the 14th Lancers, on Battle-Axe, and the Pony Hog Hunters' Cup by Mr. de Gale, of the 5th Cavalry, on Joe.

HUNTING

Official sanction has been obtained for the revival of the Aldershot Drag Hunt.

The Ootacumund Hounds, under the Mastership of Captain Godfrey Heseltine of the Carabiniers, commenced their season with a good day the beginning of May. The meet was at Fernhill, by kind invitation of the Maharajah of Mysore, who,



with a large and distinguished company, including H.E. the Governor of Madras, Lady and the Misses Lawley, General Sir Wolfe Murray, and Colonel Desaraj, Uro, was among the riders. The prospects of good sport are excellent, as the puppies and new draft shape well, and there are plenty of jackals.

BOXING

The Tournament given by the National Sporting Club for Royal Navy and Army Competitors proved a huge success. No less than 163 entries were received, and three long evenings of many stirring bouts ensued before the finals were decided. The scene in the theatre was of an animated character; soldiers and sailors were disrobing and dressing in every part of the place, and two scales were kept hard at work. It was after midnight, on the third evening, that the finals were fought out. In the 9st. 4lb., Private H. Berry (11th Hussars) defeated Signalman G. Kilham (Royal Navy Barracks, Chatham) somewhat cleverly. The light-weight furnished a close and determined struggle between Seaman W. Dunkley (H.M.S. 'Ocean') and Corporal Coles (2nd West Yorkshire Regiment), which went to the first-named—not, however, until an extra round had been contested after a disagreement by the judges. The middle-weight fell to Stoker J. Doran (Royal Navy Barracks, Devonport) who scored a win over Private Farnan (Irish Guards). Corporal Sunshine (Royal Fusiliers) took the heavy weight from Trooper Cooke (Royal Horse Guards). The National Sporting Club deserve the greatest praise for this sporting encouragement of boxing in the Services.

The 1st Royal Welsh Fusiliers gave one of the best two-night competitions witnessed at Aldershot this season, at which a splendidly matched contest took place between Curley Watson (late Royal Navy champion Middle-weight Army and Navy) and Bombadier W. Davis (129th Battalion R.F.A.). The verdict was in favour of Watson. Directly after, Davis challenged again for 50% aside, which challenge was accepted.

BOXING ABROAD

India.—The All India Tournament was held at Trimulgherry. Brigadier-General C. F. Francis presented the prizes, and said it was the most successful tournament ever held there, the competitors having come from all parts of India. Results:—

Middle-weights: Lance-Corporal Martin, Carabiniers.

Intermediate-weights: Bombadier Kilby, S. Battery, R.H.A.

Light-weights: Private Strickland, 14th Hussars.

Feather-weights: Private Blake, 1st Middlesex Regiment.
Bantam-weights: Private Rounds, 1st Manchester Regiment.

South Africa.—The Army and Navy Boxing Championships of South Africa were held at Pretoria. Lord Selborne, the Governor, presented the prizes; and General Sir H. Hildyard in a speech said he trusted to see boxing kept up during the winter months, as it was a fine training for all men, especially soldiers. The results were:—

Officers' Competitions.

Heavy-weights: Lieut. Thompson, R.A.M.C. Middle-weights: Lieut. Finlayson, R.H.A. Light-weights: Capt. Groves-Raines, The Buffs. Feather-weights: Capt. Springfield, Queen's Bays.

N.C.O.'s and Men's Competitions.

Heavy-weights: Lance-Corporal Styles, Queen's Bays. Middle-weights: Private Anderson, 9th Lancers. Light-weights: Able-Seaman Stevens ('Crescent').

Feather-weights: Private Evans, 9th Lancers.

CYCLING

The twenty-five mile grass record for India has just been lowered by Private E. C. Fay, 10th Hussars, who has also put up some other fresh records. His record was 1 hour 3 min. 25 sec., made at Rawal Pindi.

Mr. Bachmann, at the B.C.A. Championship in 1899, put up 1 hour 9 min. 15 sec., but the previous best in India was 1 hour 17 min.

ATHLETICS

The Army Athletic Meeting will take place at Aldershot on July 30 and 31.

HORSE SHOW

The International Horse Show at Olympia was an enormous success, but we hope that another year some of our best soldier and civilian riders will come forward and prove that we are still able to hold our own in horsemanship.

The fine performances, dress, and bearing of the foreign officers and noblemen who competed enchanted everyone, and should furnish us with an object lesson. The Haute École of horsemanship is not studied in England, and, compared with foreigners, the ordinary riding school master is not worthy of the name. To Lord Lonsdale and the judges great praise is due.

POLO: INTER-REGIMENTAL TOURNAMENT

This popular tournament secured an entry of fourteen teams as against sixteen last year, but this is accounted for by the Scots Greys and 18th Hussars being unfortunately unable to compete. The following entered, viz. 1st and 2nd Life Guards, King's Dragoon Guards, 3rd and 7th Dragoon Guards, 5th Lancers, 8th and 11th Hussars, 16th Lancers, 20th Hussars, 21st Lancers, Coldstream and Irish Guards.

In the first tie played at Roehampton the 2nd Life Guards, who were the better mounted side, defeated the Coldstream Guards by 11 goals to 0.

At Datchet the Royal Horse Guards played the 1st King's Dragoon Guards. A splendid game resulted in a victory for the Blues by 5 goals to 4; the King's Dragoon Guards were leading in the last chukker until just before the bell rang, when the Blues made it a tie of 4 goals each. So evenly were the sides matched that it was not till thirty minutes' more hard play that Capt. Brassey hit the winning goal for the Blues. Their team was the same as that which was

victorious against Rugby, and the King's Dragoon Guards consisted of Capt. Rasbotham, Mr. Cheape, Mr. Weinholt, and Major Bell Smyth (back).

The second round commenced with a match between the 5th and the 21st Lancers. Both sides had had good practice, and the fine form shown by the 21st Lancers in a match at Wellington caused them to be the favourites, especially as it was known that Captain O. K. Chance could not take his place as No. 2 for the 5th Lancers. He broke his collar bone in a practice match. The sides were:—

5th Lancers: Captain M. F. McTaggart, Mr. W. Sebag-Montefiore, Captain J. B. Jardine, and Major R. Browne-Clayton.

21st Lancers: Mr. C. H. Delmege, Mr. D. W. Godfree, Mr. C. C. Lister, and Captain P. H. A. Anderson.

The game was one of the best of those which have been played on Queen's Parade, Aldershot, this season, goal for goal being hit until well into the second half, when the 21st Lancers got the lead and held it to the end, and they won by the narrow margin of 5 goals to 4.

The 2nd Life Guards beat the 1st Life Guards by 2 goals to 1 at Hurlingham in miserable conditions, rain falling nearly the whole of the time, but in the circumstances the ground played very well. All the scoring was done in the first period, the 2nd rushing the ball between the posts from a scrimmage after a few minutes' play, but the second stage was blank. Sir George Prescott gave the 2nd another goal in the third ten, then just before the bell rang for half-time Captain Brassey moved a sitter and hit the first point for the 1st Life Guards. There was no further scoring, the tie therefore being decided in the first half. The teams were composed as follows:—

2nd Life Guards: Sir George Prescott, Mr. F. Penn, Captain H. C. S. Ashton, and Captain de Crespigny.

1st Life Guards: The Hon. C. C. Fellowes, Captain E. H. Brassey, Lord Hugh Grosvenor, and the Hon. E. S. Wyndham.

The 11th and 20th Hussars both won their preliminary matches easily, the latter subsequently met the 8th Hussars, whom they defeated by 5 goals to 1 after a good match, and so even was the play in the first half that the only goal hit was one put through by Mr. Cawley for the 20th Hussars within five minutes of the throw in. Afterwards the 20th Hussars added to their lead, Mr. Schreiber and Mr. Cawley hitting goals for them before Captain Mort scored for the 8th Hussars with a long hit. Although the 8th Hussars pressed for the remainder of the game they could not score, and the 20th Hussars won the tie by 5 goals to 1. The sides were:—

20th Hussars: Captain J. S. Cawley, Mr. B. A. P. Schreiber, Captain H. C. Hessey, and Captain H. R. Lee.

8th Hussars: Mr. E. Blakiston-Houston, Sir Charles Lowther, Captain G. M. Mort, Captain J. Van der Byl.

The Royal Horse Guards qualified for the semi-final by defeating the 2nd Life Guards by 5 goals to 1. Major Fitzgerald, who has played for the Blues for a number of years, unfortunately put out his collar bone recently, so Lord Alistair Innes-Ker replaced him in the team. In the first ten Mr. Bowlby made a nice run, and hit a goal for the Horse Guards. Before the period ended Mr. Ashton got away with the ball, and placing it well to Sir George Prescott, the latter

scored. A big hit by Captain Brassey enabled Mr. Bowlby to hit another goal, and the Blues were leading at half-time by 3 goals to 1. In the fourth period they got two more goals, both from the stick of Captain Brassey, and as there was no score in the last two periods the tie resulted in a comfortable win for them by 5 goals to 1.

The 16th Lancers—Captain G. E. Bellville, Mr. W. J. Shannon, Captain C. L. K. Campbell, and Major J. E. Tuson (back)—met the 21st Lancers at Aldershot, and qualified for the semi-final by defeating them by 5 goals to 2.

THE SEMI-FINALS

20th Hussars, 4 goals; Royal Horse Guards, 2 goals

On past form the result of this match should have been an easy win for the 20th Hussars, but they failed to play up to their reputation, and only two goals separated the teams, although at one time the Hussars led by 4 goals to none. Not a single goal was scored by either side in the last half-hour. It was Captain Brassey's fine hitting that gave the Hussars an anxious time, and he was probably the best man in the game. Mr. Schreiber scored three of the goals for his side, the second being the best and the result of a gallop along the boards ending in a neat centre.

11th Hussars, 10 goals; 16th Lancers, 1 goal

11th Hussars: Major T. T. Pitman, Mr. F. H. Sutton, Captain P. D. Fitzgerald, and Mr. M. L. Lakin.

Rain fell for practically the whole time play was in progress, which, by the way, lasted only fifty minutes. The final period of ten minutes was not played, as the Lancers retired when ten goals had been hit against them and the situation was hopeless. After scoring a goal within the first two minutes of play, the Lancers never had a 'look in.' There was only one team in it, that being, of course, the winners. They were superior in every way. They commanded the best ponies, which enabled them to be quicker on the ball and out-gallop their opponents, while their hitting, considering the soft and broken state of the ground, was nothing less than splendid.

THE FINAR

20th Hussars, 6 goals; 11th Hussars, 4 goals

As was generally anticipated, this was an excellent match, and it was not until the last period that the 20th gained a hard-earned victory. The first period was unproductive: in the second the 20th led off with two goals, the 11th scoring one just as the bell rang. Early in the next the 20th scored a third goal, after which each side scored. Thus at half time the score was four to two in favour of the 20th. In the next two periods the 11th more than held their own, scoring two goals. Thus at the end of the fifth period it was still anybody's game. In the sixth the 20th scored two goals, the last just before time, and so gained a victory which they thoroughly deserved, as their hitting was hard and accurate. The 11th, especially in the first and last periods, were somewhat unlucky in just missing goals.

J. WATKINS YARDLEY, Lieut.-Colonel.



THE

CAVALRY JOURNAL

OCTOBER 1907

THE ACTION OF CAMPO MAYOR*

By LIEUT.-COLONEL R. M. HOLDEN, 4th Battalion The Cameronians (Scottish Rifles)

Our Frontispiece depicts Count Chamarin, colonel of the 26th French Heavy Dragoons, engaged in a single combat by Corporal Logan, of the 13th, who was well mounted, a good swordsman, and conspicuous by the dexterity with which he encountered those who came in his way. The French colonel singled him out for attack. The corporal twice cut his opponent across the face; at the following blow the colonel's helmet was knocked off, and, finally, by a cut which nearly cleft the skull asunder, cutting in as deep as the nose through the brain, the career of the brave Frenchman was terminated.

Perhaps no action during the Peninsular War occasioned so much discussion in proportion to its importance as that fought between Campo Mayor and Badajos on March 25, 1811. In the accepted accounts of the engagement an injustice is done to the 18th Light Dragoons, which an effort is made here to repair. For many years after the appearance of Napier's 'History of the Peninsular War' a heated and bitter controversy raged between the historian, on the one hand, and Lord Beresford and Colonel Long, the principal actors in the scene, on the other. But the result of that discussion is very little known. This article is based to some extent upon it, but principally upon a private

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


letter, which came into the hands of the author some years ago, written immediately after the action by Lieutenant-Colonel Patrick Doherty to his former brother officer and friend Captain T. H. Bund.

EVENTS BEFORE THE ACTION

When the French, under Masséna, retired from Santarem early in March 1811, Beresford was sent in pursuit; but after following them for a considerable time midst the disgraceful scenes of devastation, slaughter, and confusion which marked their disastrous retreat, he was detached by Wellington to relieve Campo Mayor, then being besieged by a portion of Soult's army, under Mortier, and, if possible, invest Badajos before the garrison should have time to repair the defences and prepare for a siege. But Campo Mayor, with its scanty garrison and weak defences, surrendered before Beresford's arrival; and upon his approach, Mortier retired after leaving in it a small force under Latour Maubourg to watch the movement of the Allies.

By the evening of March 24, the British force, except one division, which joined on the following morning, had assembled and bivouacked at Monte de Reguengo, between two and three leagues from Campo Mayor, by which time Beresford learned of the fall of the town. On the following morning Beresford, in hopes of surprising the town, put his whole force in motion, unaware of the enemy's intentions, though they knew of his approach, but resolved, should they decide to hold the town, to intercept their retreat to Badajos. His force consisted, in addition to artillery, of two divisions of British infantry, a Portuguese division, five troops of the 13th Light Dragoons, five small squadrons of Portuguese Cavalry (first and seventh Regiments), and a Heavy Brigade, under Colonel the Hon. George Grey, of eight squadrons of the 3rd Dragoon Guards and 4th Dragoons. The Cavalry amounted roughly to 1,200 sabres, under the command of Brigadier-



A Corporal of the 13th Light Dragoons killing a French Colonel. Campo Mayor, Spain, 1811.

General Robert Ballard Long, and these being ordered forward, soon fell in with the enemy's piquets and drove them in.

The Cavalry advanced until they came on to a ridge about three-quarters of a mile from, and overlooking, Campo Mayor from which the French were plainly visible, with the Cavalry formed up outside. They consisted of some horse Artillery, a battery train of sixteen guns, four regiments of Cavalry, and three battalions of the 100th Regiment. Beresford then ordered General Long forward with the light Cavalry (13th Light Dragoons and Portuguese), to turn them and gain the rear of the town. But as it was apparent that the enemy was already. running from it, and hastily forming in order of march towards Badajos, Beresford, with the idea of overtaking and capturing their Infantry, ordered General Long to push on with all the Cavalry, turn the enemy's right, and so delay them until the British Infantry, or some portion of it, came up; but he was to keep clear of the guns of the town, and, if a favourable opportunity offered, might attack their Cavalry, provided he ran no risk of being cut off.

THE OPPOSING FORCES

General Long detached one troop of the 13th to engage the enemy's skirmishers on his right, and moved forward with the remainder of the Cavalry at a sharp gallop, under cover of, and hidden by, a chain of hills on his right, until he ascended some rising ground, which concealed the French, but in doing this he took a far wider circuit than was intended by Beresford, or indeed was necessary. This brought him on the left flank of the retiring enemy, and for the first time in sight of their whole force which was moving in good order. It consisted of:—

2nd French Hussars	•	•	•	•	300	sabres
10th French Hussars		•	•	•	350	,,
26th French Heavy Dragoons			•	•	150	,,
4th Spanish Chasseurs		•	•		80	,,

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making, after deducting some eighty skirmishers, a total of eight squadrons, 800 sabres, with a column of Infantry over 1,200 strong. The Infantry had a squadron of Cavalry in front, another in rear, and six squadrons in two divisions *en potence*, covering its retreat.

General Long disposed his force for attack thus:—The two squadrons of the 13th Light Dragoons to charge three of the six French squadrons covering the retreat, while three squadrons of Portuguese under the General in person, were to cut off the retreat of the other three French squadrons, and to cover the flank of the 13th. The other two Portuguese squadrons, under Colonel Otway, would be on the General's left flank, parallel with the head of the column, to counteract any manœuvre of the enemy in that direction; and the Heavy Brigade, some distance in the rear, to the right, advancing slowly, to watch and support the entire movement as the General directed.

In that formation the British Cavalry appeared in the plain opposite the enemy, who halted to receive them. General Long immediately rode up to Colonel Head, commanding the 13th Light Dragoons, and in a few words gave him his orders:— 'Colonel Head, there's your enemy. Attack him!' Adding:— 'And now, Colonel, the Heavy Brigade are coming up on your rear, and if you have an opportunity, give a good account of these fellows' [meaning the enemy]; to which the Colonel, in his characteristic manner, replied:— 'By gad, Sir, I will!'

Directly the French perceived the two columns moving in parallel lines to outflank them, they changed their position to the left, and advanced in three bodies or columns of squadrons—a situation which Colonel Head grasped, and very smartly formed the 18th in line to their front. This practically amounted to the regiment charging the entire French Cavalry, a force exceeding them by four to one, for the Portuguese on their wretched ponies were some distance off to the left, and only just in line with the 18th, while the Heavies were some way in rear.

Colonel Head took his place in front of the regiment, between the two squadrons, Lieutenant and Adjutant Holmes riding immediately behind him. At the same time, the officers detached with the skirmishers rejoined with as many men as were in their reach. The opposing horsemen were now within 200 yards of each other; the right squadron of the 13th, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Patrick Doherty, being composed of Captain R. Buchanan's and Captain M. Bower's troops, and the left squadron, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph Muter, consisting of Captain J. Gubbin's and Captain Doherty's troops.

THE CHARGE

Colonel Head led the 18th in a very gallant manner. The regiment increased its pace with the regularity of an ordinary field day, and there was no confusion and no hurry.

The French at a smart trot advanced in a determined style; and when within eighty or 100 yards Colonel Head, in clear tones, gave the order to charge. The French increased their pace, and both bodies were soon into each other. The scene was said to be inspiriting and beautiful—two forces of Cavalry dashing into each other. Many riders and horses were overthrown and stunned by the shock. The number of Frenchmen placed hors de combat bore rather ghastly testimony to the superior swordsmanship of the English.

A stout resistance, and the superior speed and strength of the English horses carried them clean through the ranks of the French Cavalry. But equally exciting was the succeeding scene in this little drama, for, when a short distance in rear, the 13th wheeled smartly round, and reformed—a movement which, with the better command they maintained over their horses, they performed more quickly than the French, who rode with a loose rein. The French reformed as quickly as they were able, and both forces, for a second time, hurled themselves against each other. The French fought for a time with confidence, while the

18th, somewhat impetuous, but bearing an air of confident superiority, were cutting and thrusting right and left with some execution. The point was the *cheval de bataille* of the French, but it failed, as the 18th parried with ease. Several instances of individual bravery are recorded, and many hand-to hand encounters took place, among our wounded being Lieutenant and Adjutant Holmes, Lieutenant Geale, and Quartermaster Garnham.

While these scenes were being enacted, a young French officer of the Grenadier troop of the 26th Dragoons, finding that they covered more ground than their assailants, wheeled inwards to the left, and thereby completely surrounded the left of Lieutenant-Colonel Patrick Doherty's squadron; but Head's troopers quickly reforming their ranks, again charged, completely routing the French.

THE PURSUIT

Colonel Head saw the favourable opportunity alluded to by General Long, and had every intention of fulfilling his promise to give a good account of his enemy. So without further consideration, but with his men together, in good order, and under perfect control, he led on the regiment after the French Cavalry, unaware of the blundering going on in his rear, and trusting—indeed, taking it for granted—that he was being properly supported. Along the road leading to Badajos and up to the very walls of the city, the 18th continued the pursuit, followed closely by two squadrons of Portuguese under Colonel Otway. For some distance hand-to-hand encounters took place, as many a plucky Frenchman fronted his pursuers and sold his life dearly; but the majority made little show of resistance, and on being overtaken threw down their arms and begged for quarter, which was invariably granted by the 18th.

As fast as the tired horses could carry them along, the 18th continued the pursuit, and were so far successful that when they pulled up breathless on the bridge of Badajos, not a score of the

enemy's Cavalry had succeeded in reaching the town, and the road was strewed with prizes—baggage of every description, stores, provisions, horses, and mules, artillerymen, and sixteen guns, with accompanying wagons, each drawn by eight fine mules. Some of these were in sight of the town, and the drivers, considering themselves safe under the fire of its guns, whipped on their mules, and, refusing to dismount, were cut down.

Here, then, was presented the curious spectacle of some 130 Cavalrymen, the remnant of five troops of the 13th, and a few Portuguese, standing unsupported on the bridge of Badajos, quite ten miles from the original point of attack and almost surrounded by valuable captures. They had succeeded in their attack, had put their opponents to flight, had pursued them for ten miles, had taken or killed nearly all of them, and captured their artillery and baggage. But where was their support? Not within sight. On the bridge, within range of the batteries of the town, this small group of English and Portuguese officers discussed the situation. They argued that they had nothing to fear, for the column of French Infantry, whose fire they had tasted, was the only portion of the enemy's force which they left in rear. Before the charge the Heavy Brigade was close behind to support them, and within easy distance of the French. The allied Artillery and Infantry must have been on the move and advancing rapidly; and, surely, a comparative handful of French Infantry would not be permitted to make good its escape in the face of such an enemy.

But we must see what actually was taking place. General Long, hesitating as to following the 13th, of the result of whose charge he was strangely ignorant, returned to find the Heavy Brigade, in the absence of his orders to the contrary, had not supported the 18th, but were following the French Infantry at a prudent distance, and waiting further instructions. The two Portuguese squadrons on the left of the 18th had followed them in the pursuit; and the other three, originally under the

General's command, having had a few shots fired into them by the French Infantry, and threatened by some of his Cavalry, had bolted, but were rallied and brought back. Beresford just then arrived on the scene to find, from the reports of General Long and Baron Trip, by whose unfounded statements he allowed himself to be misled, that the 18th had been cut off and captured. The three squadrons of Portuguese the Marshal saw were in a state of extreme wildness, and fearing to risk the Heavy Brigade, the only steady Cavalry left to him, he allowed the French to resume their retreat and escape. The enemy were at one time in the most critical position, and, from all accounts, on the point of surrendering. They were nearly surrounded by the allied Cavalry, the German Artillery were firing upon them, the Heavy Cavalry within a few yards and anxious to attack, and the English and Portuguese Infantry not 500 yards off, and advancing rapidly. Nevertheless he ordered the Cavalry to halt, and the Artillery to cease firing. French Infantry, finding themselves unmolested, gave a shout of joy, and marched off.

THE RETIREMENT

To return to the 13th. Colonel Head, after consultation with his officers, decided to retire, collect the captures, and drive them before him until he met his supports. His men had scarcely put about than the batteries of the town opened on them a fire of grape and canister, sufficient to impress upon them the prudence of getting out of range as quickly as possible. They then collected their prisoners and captures, dismounting some of their troopers and putting them on the mules attached to the guns, and in this manner were returning quietly, when they came in sight of the body of French Infantry, supported by Cavalry—the latter made up partly of the enemy's skirmishers, and partly of men who had surrendered, but who, on seeing their Infantry advancing, secured their arms, remounted, and joined in. The position of the 18th and Portuguese was one of extreme danger.

In the circumstances an attack upon the French was out of the question, so they very wisely left the road, made a detour to the right, and rode for headquarters across country, by which means all the captures had to be abandoned; and the Army and the regiment were to reap no benefit from their gallant achievement.*

With feelings better imagined than described, they wended their weary way back. They met with no opposition, however, and reached the Army between six and seven o'clock in the evening, to the extreme astonishment of their comrades, by whom they had been given up, and more particularly of Beresford, who spied them through his field-glasses, and made little attempt to conceal his annoyance. Colonel Head rode immediately up to the Marshal, and, though a particular friend, was to his pain and astonishment coldly and formally received. The Marshal drily inquired whether he thought he had proceeded in a military manner in this mode of pursuing the enemy, and expressed a hope that, for the future, he would recollect that courage was not the only requisite either for troops or officers. And he was currently reported at the time to have concluded with these words:—'And I suppose, Sir, if the gates of Badajos had been open, you would have galloped in!' to which the following very unlikely reply, but at the same time so characteristic of the ardour of the plucky Irish colonel, was said to have been made:—'Indeed, Sir, of that you may feel quite certain.' This was followed a few days afterwards by a

[•] The loss of the allied Cavalry was 5 officers, 154 rank and file killed, wounded, and missing; and 163 horses killed and missing, the loss of horses being partly accounted for by the Portuguese abandoning their own for those of the French, and making a return of the loss but not of the gain. The loss of the 13th amounted to 4 officers wounded, 1 N.C.O., and 55 rank and file, killed, wounded, and missing; and 51 horses killed and missing. The French losses were estimated at nearly 600 killed, wounded, and taken prisoners; a howitzer, a forage cart, and some tumbrils. All the men attached to the French train of Artillery were killed, and of 16 officers of the 26th French Heavy Dragoons only 6 remained for duty.

very severe reprimand from Lord Wellington, which, like Beresford's personal rebuke, was administered under a distinct misapprehension of the circumstances attending the pursuit.

The gallantry with which the 13th Light Dragoons charged the French Infantry, the dash exhibited in the pursuit, the rapidity and orderly manner in which it was conducted, and the temporary success which crowned their efforts, were the theme of conversation and admiration in the Peninsular Army for many a day. That the pursuit was conducted beyond prudent limits is possible, but there is ample evidence that, notwith-standing General Long's testimony to the contrary, at no time was there any want of discipline or semblance of disorder; the men were throughout completely in hand, and the pursuit was carried on in orderly regular manner. In fact, the conduct of the 13th throughout the day was worthy of a regiment whose successes earned for it so bright a name on the fields of Waterloo and Balaklava.

General Long does not come well out of the controversy. While praising the regiment to their faces for their behaviour in the action, he appears from Lord Beresford's pamphlets to have reported against them officially in a disparaging and unfair manner. On his report Beresford administered the personal reprimand to Colonel Head on the day of the action, and on that report, coupled with others made by the General through Beresford, Lord Wellington issued his strong admonition; but it is satisfactory to find that General Long's attempts to shield his own conduct at the expense of Lord Beresford and the 18th were not successful. The Marshal afterwards made ample reparation to the regiment in this respect. 'After reading the evidence of Colonel Doyle, Sir Loftus Otway, and Sir Henry Watson, on the pursuit of the 13th Light Dragoons, I am convinced,' he writes, ' that I was misinformed by General Long with respect to the disorder and irregularity that was said to have attended it.' And Colonel Patrick Doherty, in the letter already referred to, says that Lord Wellington was induced to

change his opinions also:—'It is some gratification to hear, which we have done from authority, that his lordship's sentiments have since totally changed, and that he now invariably gives us the credit which we at first expected to receive.' General Long appears first to have disobeyed, with insufficient reason, Beresford's order in regard to the wide detour he made which allowed the enemy to get two miles on the road before he came up with them. He attacked their Cavalry on the left flank instead of in front, as the Marshal intended; and neglected even then to make proper arrangements for the attack being supported. He appears to have been, indirectly, one of the chief causes of the whole day's misfortunes in misrepresenting the 13th as cut off.

Napier attacked Sir William Beresford without mercy. In his reply to the Marshal's strictures on his history of the war, he concluded with these remarks:—' History, my Lord, deals with very great men, and you sink in the comparison. speak of you as a General far above mediocrity, as one who has done much and a great deal of it well; yet, when she looks at Campo Mayor and Albuera, she will not rank you amongst great commanders; and if she should ever cast her penetrating eye upon this your present publication, she will not class you amongst great writers.' This is severe, but surely there is justification for questioning the Marshal's conduct of the operations on this day. He was unfortunate. His plans were partly frustrated by General Long allowing the enemy to go so far before he attacked their Cavalry and stayed them; and the position was rendered worse by General Long attacking them on the flank of their Cavalry instead of in front and driving them on to their Infantry. Not being up with the advance portion of his army, and unable to see the result of the charge, and not taking proper steps to ascertain it, he allowed himself to be misinformed as to the result, and declined to risk his Heavy Cavalry, remarking that the loss of one regiment was enough. It is an extraordinary thing that he did not bring all the six guns of the German Artillery to bear on the French

Infantry when they were all equally at hand; and the horses. on fairly good evidence, not tired. Surely the fire of six guns would have been more effective than that of two, and must either have annihilated the enemy at a distance of from 160 to 200 yards, or at all events have obliged them to loosen their formation and afford an opening for the Heavy Cavalry to act against them with effect. The French were without question in a state of considerable uneasiness bordering on surrender, but he declined to risk his Heavy Cavalry, and indeed seems altogether to have failed to grasp the favourable situation in which he was suddenly placed. There may be a taint of personality in Napier's severity, but he is nevertheless the most brilliant, the most penetrating, and the most comprehensive of military historians, and his summing up of the proceedings at Campo Mayor is masterly, and worthy of his reputation:— 'To profit from sudden opportunities, a general must be constantly with his advanced guard in an offensive movement.' When this combat commenced Beresford was with the main body, and Baron Trip, a staff officer, deceived by appearances, informed him that the 18th had been cut off. Hence the Marshal, anxious to save his Cavalry, which he knew could not be reinforced, would not follow up the first blow, truly observing that the loss of one regiment was enough. But the regiment was not lost, and the country being open and plain, the enemy's force and the exact posture of affairs was easy to be discerned. The 18th were reprimanded, perhaps justly, for having pursued so eagerly without orders, yet the unsparing admiration of the whole Army consoled them. He afterwards added:—'In my work I have said that they were perhaps justly reprimanded. I now retract that assertion. Having gained fuller information of the conduct of the 13th Light Dragoons, and of the actual state of affairs, I retract it as unjust; I think they were unjustly reprimanded; I think they deserved the greatest praise, and that the "unsparing admiration" of the whole Army was well founded.'

BALAKLAVA

'REMEMBER, there is no retreat from here! You must die where you stand!'

These words were spoken by Sir Colin Campbell, on October 25, 1854, to 400 men of the 98rd Highlanders who held a small ridge protecting our base at Balaklava Harbour, in the Crimea, when it was being threatened by a force of over 20,000 Russians.

The Highlanders had no intention of retiring from their post, although the Turkish battalion alongside them had fled incontinently; nor did they mean dying until they were dead.

In a 'thin red line' they received the first charge of the Russian Cavalry, with such unmistakable effect that the remainder did not like to come on.


Our Commander-in-Chief, Lord Raglan, had seen the difficult and isolated position in which the 98rd were placed, and sent a hurried message to the Cavalry, who were not far off, to go to their support.

The Heavy Brigade, under General Scarlett, were ready mounted outside their camp, and at once moved off by squadrons independently to their flank, to get to the more open ground, where the Brigade could be re-formed to support the Highlanders.

Being within their own lines, it had not occurred to them (just as it had not occurred to us at Sanna's Post, in South Africa) to send out advanced guards and flankers before clearing their camp ground. Consequently, as they were picking their way between the horse lines, squadron by squadron, in no regular



order, and with the Brigadier away on the left, they were astonished suddenly to see the head of a huge column of Russian Cavalry bearing down upon them over the sky-line within a few hundred yards of their left flank.



A German critic has recently said of us that, though we British may blunder into tactical mistakes, we do not lose our heads, but do the right thing in the emergency, and consequently we come out of it better than might be expected. An instance occurred the other day at the Cavalry manœuvres, when two brigades found themselves suddenly and unexpectedly





in juxtaposition. The collision which resulted was regrettable in its effects, but an observer—in high authority—has stated that it was worth the cost, since it showed that the correct impulse immediately seized both sides, and every squadron leader, without exception, seemed to do the right thing, on his own initiative, in such a way as would have ensured success had the incident occurred in action.

It was almost identical with what happened at Balaklava. On finding himself in the near presence of the enemy, General Scarlett did not hesitate one moment. He ordered his eight squadrons to wheel into line to the left, and without giving the usual parade preliminary paces of 'Trot' and 'Gallop' he sounded the 'Charge,' and started at best pace himself, with his A.D.C., trumpeter, and orderly, to lead the attack.

The Brigade did not wait to form line, but flung itself into a kind of double echelon while on the move, and swung round in the wake of its leader to attack the enemy.

In the front line were thus the Greys (two squadrons) and a squadron of the Inniskilling Dragoons.

To the right rear came on a second squadron of Inniskillings, while to the left rear came the 5th Dragoon Guards, the Royals, and the 4th Dragoon Guards—not more than 300 all told.


The Russians, meantime, were no less astonished than ourselves; instead of surprising the British, they were themselves surprised.

For a minute or two they hesitated. No officer took the initiative; the front line halted. There was a pause, a want of orders, and in another moment the bolt burst upon them.

General Scarlett and his Staff came bang, smash through their front ranks, followed immediately by the crashing weight of the Greys and the wildly cheering Inniskillings.

The impetus of the charge rolled the foremost ranks of the Russians down underfoot as it ploughed its way into the centre of the column, and gave the whole mass a kind of backward surge.

The flank squadrons of the Russian front line, which had widely outflanked our small charging line, now wheeled inwards like two arms to enfold it; but just at the moment of doing so these wings were charged almost simultaneously on the right by the Inniskillings, and on the left by the Royals. In both cases they were caught in flank and rolled up; and, at the same moment, the 5th Dragoon Guards, charging in between them, overrode whole ranks of the Russians who had turned about towards their rear with a view to completely enveloping the Greys.



The total force of these successive blows seemed to send the great Russian mass staggering backwards, when, at this critical moment, a sudden plunge into its right flank by two squadrons of the 4th Dragoon Guards seemed to complete the break-up of the column, which reeled again, and then gradually dissolved and spread itself over the hills in impetuous flight from the field.

Our loss was under fifty, while that of the Russians was somewhere about four hundred. The whole fight only lasted eight minutes.

The Russian casualties were, as a rule, only slightly wounded, since, owing to the thick great-coats worn by the men, cuts from the sword—which were at that time more in use than thrusts—

had little or no penetrative effect, and more seems to have been done by pommelling the enemy in the face with sword-hilts than by using the blade.

This charge of the Heavy Brigade at Balaklava took place early on the same day that the celebrated charge of the Light Brigade occurred, and is apt to be overshadowed by it. But it was, none the less, an equally, if not more, satisfactory feat of arms, with far more useful lessons in its train.

It showed, for one thing, that the success of Cavalry in action depends very much on the character of the leader and on the Cavalry spirit in the squadrons. Whatever mistake or incompetency of leaders may have caused the useless, though glorious, death-ride of the Light Brigade, the Heavy Brigade charge was of great practical value, and was successful chiefly through the quick appreciation and resolution of the Brigadier, acting on the spur of the moment and seconded by a good lot of squadron leaders, all keeping their heads and playing the game; while opposed to them were officers who hesitated at the critical moment to take the initiative, and whose squadrons were thus ridden down by a very insignificant body of enemy, attacking uphill, in impromptu formation.

It was a fine feat of Cavalry work, of which our nation may well be proud, and which should not be less honoured on October 25 than the more romantic incident which is so generally connected with that glorious day.

THE NATIVE CAVALRY OF INDIA

By Lieut.-Colonel Wm. W. Norman, 22nd Cavalry (Frontier Force)

The mounted forces of India in the middle of the 18th century—The three different systems of organisation—How the Madras and Bengal Light Cavalry were raised—Organisation early in the 19th century—The Cavalry at the time of the Mutiny—Silladar and Non-Silladar system—Reasons for discontinuance of latter—Conclusions.

In view of the recent discussion which has taken place on the merits and demerits of Silladar and Non-Silladar Cavalry, it may perhaps be interesting to show how these systems were originally evolved.

Consequent on the outbreak of war between England and France in Europe in 1744, military operations were extended to India, in 1746. In September of the latter year the French suddenly appeared before Fort St. George, which, being practically defenceless, surrendered. Thus started the wars with the French in India, which continued till the French power was irretrievably ruined, after a long and hard struggle. was carried on mainly by comparatively small handfuls of European Infantry soldiers, but the need of Cavalry was strongly felt. To supply this want the French, in 1754, brought out from Europe a regiment of 600 Dragoons, to which the English replied by sending out a Swede, named Baron De Vasserot, to train 50 men from the European battalions as Dragoons. But the disparity did not end here, for the French early allied themselves to the Mahrattas and Mysoreans, who brought several thousands of predatory horse, and overran the Carnatic, in which province the operations were mainly conducted. To



cope with these Major Lawrence, who was the first Commander-in-Chief in India, could only raise about 1,000 irregulars, supplied by the Nawab of Arcot, who was our ally. From time to time the Mahrattas transferred their services from French to English, and English to French, according to which side could, for the moment, pay the most.

ORGANISATION

To appreciate the value of the mercenary horse maintained by the English and French it is necessary to consider their system of organisation, which was as follows. They were formed into three classes, termed Pagah, Khudaspa, and Barghir. Pagah means literally a stud or stable, and the pagah horse were the household Cavalry, maintained by the prince himself, the horses, arms, &c., being his own property, while the men received monthly pay for their services. They were not, however, merely hirelings, but individuals whose interests were intimately connected with those of the prince. Khudaspa means a horseman who owned his own horse; such a man was also called a silladar, which term means literally an armour-bearer or cavalier. Khudaspas were formed into bodies under a leader, who received a commission for this purpose and paid the khudaspa according to the size and value of his horse, a good horse bringing in from thirty to forty rupees a month. Lower in rank to the pagah and khudaspa came the Barghir, which term means literally a horseman who does not provide his own horse; consequently the term might have been applied to the pagah horseman, but was restricted to retainers of petty chiefs and other individuals of influence and means. The number of barghirs an individual possessed varied from two or three to a thousand or more. When, however, the number ran to a considerable figure, they were practically the private pagah of some semi-independent chief or noted adventurer. The pay of the barghir horse was drawn by their owner in the form of a contract, out of which he paid his horsemen such sums as he considered proper.

G G 2

In conflicts between native princes true reliance was placed by them only on the pagah horse. This was partly due to the fact that princes could rarely trust any but their own immediate adherents, but mainly to the fact that the pagah horseman had nothing to lose by the death of his mount, and so did not fear to undertake a somewhat risky venture when necessity demanded. The case was, however, very different where the khudaspa and barghir horse were concerned; these latter served under a contract which ceased the instant a horse was killed, while at the same time the owner lost its pecuniary value and had to remount himself and his barghir at his own expense. Under such circumstances neither the master of barghirs nor the khudaspa cared to undertake risky ventures. To this defect was added another. The financial arrangements of princes were so irregular that their contracts for payments of services were usually so much waste paper, and this was so well understood between employer and employee, that it became an accepted condition that, in lieu of money payments, the horsemen should recoup themselves by plunder and the levying of contributions. these conditions, which pertained to the barghir and khudaspa, tended to produce in them the avoidance of any energetic action on the battlefield, and to confine them to the rôle of licensed marauders, who devastated the country far and wide. They might be present during a battle in overwhelming numbers, but they remained spectators till victory had declared itself, when they rode hard and straight into the enemy's camp, with the one supreme object of gaining all the plunder they could lay hands Here and there we come across certain instances of undoubted bravery among the mercenary horse, but these instances are few and far between. The most notable exploits were performed by Morari Row, a Mahratta, who constantly, during the war, transferred his services from French to English, and back again; he did certainly, at times, lead his private pagah most gallantly, but this was the exception and not the rule; he served to get all he could out of the war, and, to do so, it was obvious

that the horsemen should not be diminished in numbers by any risky adventures.

ORIGIN OF THE MADRAS LIGHT CAVALRY

In 1767 Hyder Ali invaded the Carnatic, with an army composed of 42,860 Cavalry and 28,000 Infantry, to cope with which we could only muster 80 Dragoons, 1,000 Arcot Horse, and 5,800 Infantry. This war commenced the long struggle with the rulers of Mysore, which, with periodical intermissions, lasted till the storming of Seringapatam in 1799, when Tippoo Sahib, the son of Hyder Ali, was killed. During the early part of these wars the Arcot Horse were found to be quite useless not only on account of their inferior numbers, but on account of the Nawab being unable to pay them, while their inferiority and the fact that the war was carried out in their own country prevented them from recouping themselves by pillage. They very soon disappeared as a fighting force, and their place was taken by a regiment raised by the Company, which consisted of 500 men, selected from the Sepoy regiments and mounted on horses the property of the Company. An armistice being declared soon after, they were considered too expensive and disbanded, and arrangements were made with the Nawab that he should entertain some regiments to be commanded by British officers; but these the Nawab was also unable to maintain, and they were a mutinous lot. At last, in 1784, it was decided that there should be a permanent body of Cavalry attached to the Company's army; and the Nawab's pagah was taken over bodily and formed into regiments, officered by English officers, and horsed and maintained by the Company out of revenues which the Nawab allotted for this purpose. From these regiments arose the Madras Light Cavalry, three of which exist at the present day, and which have always been non-silladar. Under this change of system the Arcot Horse no longer hesitated to meet the Mysoreans; a complete change had come over them, and their value was inestimable.

ORIGIN OF THE BENGAL LIGHT CAVALRY

If we turn now to Bengal, we find that the experience there was very similar. At the battle of Plassy Clive had no Cavalry. and when, after the battle, Major Eyre Coote started on his magnificent march of 400 miles into the interior of Bengal, in pursuit of the Nawab and the French detachment under M. Law. he found the Native Cavalry supplied him by the renegade, Mir Jaffir, worse than useless. In 1760 a small but most expensive body of European Cavalry was raised, and, at the same time, two troops of Mogul Horse, who were horsed by the Company; but for the preponderance of this arm we relied on the Nawab of Bengal, whose horse was admitted to be a rabble. In 1763 the Nawab was induced to reorganise his army, and, by reducing its numbers and initiating regular monthly payments, to make it more efficient. His rabble horse were, to a great extent, disbanded, and three regiments raised in their place. No sooner had this been done than the Cavalry in the pay of the Company was very materially reduced, it being found that a good class of native would not serve, and that only very low-class men were entertained. In 1776 sanction was accorded for the Nawab's army to be commanded by English officers, and it then included six regiments of Cavalry; but this experiment barely lasted a year. In May following the Nawab was induced to hand his army over bodily to the English, assigning them revenues for its due payment.

Of the six regiments which formed the Nawab's Cavalry, two were taken over bodily into our service, while, out of the remaining four regiments, a third regiment was formed of selected men and horses. The organisation of the first two regiments was on the pagah or non-silladar system, the horses, &c., becoming the property of the Company. The third regiment was composed partly of non-silladars and partly of silladars or khudaspas. Orders were at the same time issued that, later on, a fourth regiment should be raised, but wholly on the silladar or

khudaspa system. In regard to the khudaspas, it was arranged that compensation should be paid to the owner for loss of his horse; such compensation was paid to him direct, and he was responsible for remounting himself. In October, however, all was changed, an order being issued that all horses were to be the property of the Company. About this time a force was sent from Bengal, right across India, under Colonel Goddard, to co-operate with the Bombay troops against the Mahrattas; it was accompanied by the second regiment, and by a body of khudaspa mercenaries raised for the occasion called the Kandahar Horse, who did good service. In July 1781 the fourth regiment was raised on the pagah system and not, as originally intended, on the khudaspa system. In 1788, however, the expense of maintaining Cavalry was considered prohibitive, and all the regiments but one were disbanded. Finally, in May 1784, this regiment was reduced to two independent squadrons, the supernumerary horses being sent down to Madras to mount the 19th Light Dragoons, which had just arrived from England. December 1787 the two independent squadrons were again made into a regiment, which eventually became the 1st Bengal Light Cavalry, and which existed at the time of the Mutiny. It was followed by other regiments till, by 1808, there were six regiments, all non-silladar. Contemporary with these were seven regiments of Madras Light Cavalry, all organised on the same system.

In 1808 war was declared against the Mahratta Confederacy, formed by Holkar and Scindiah. Allied to these was a noted adventurer, one Mir Khan, a Bonerwal, who had at his disposal a very large force. Lord Lake, then Commander-in-Chief in India, commanded the army to operate in the north, and had as his Cavalry the 8th, 27th, and 29th Light Dragoons and the six regiments of Bengal Cavalry. Sir Arthur Wellesley commanded in the south, and had with him the 19th and 25th Light Dragoons and seven regiments of Madras Cavalry. Both had, in addition, a certain number of irregulars in the employ of allied native

princes. The armies led by Holkar and Scindiah were very efficient, being commanded by Europeans, both English and French. On the declaration of war, the Governor-General issued orders that all English in the employ of the hostile princes were to withdraw from their service, and they accordingly did so, among them being Messrs. Lucan, Skinner, Gardiner, and others. On September 4 Lord Lake won a decisive battle at Allighur, one of the consequences of which was that a very large body of native horse deserted the Mahratta's cause and asked to be allowed to serve the English; these men were mainly Rohillas, a race of Afghan descent. There being need of their services, Mr. Lucan was, on September 18, ordered to raise a corps. Shortly after both Skinner and Gardiner were granted similar commissions. Lucan's Horse were cut to pieces during a disastrous retreat when he and his men did wonders, but were overpowered by Mir Khan's superior force. Skinner's and Gardiner's corps existed till 1806, when both were disbanded. In 1809, however, Skinner was ordered to raise another corps on the khudaspa or silladar system, and, later, Gardiner received similar orders. These two corps eventually formed the present 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Bengal Cavalry.

Here, then, we find there was a reversion to the khudaspa system, but there was just one very important difference between the khudaspa of Skinner's and Gardiner's corps and the old khudaspa, who had in earlier days not been found reliable. This difference was the formation in each corps of assamis and a chanda fund. I am not quite sure who was the inventor of this system, whether it originated from Government or from Skinner, possibly it was the outcome of a committee. The assami was the value of the property the trooper was bound to maintain in order to be an efficient soldier, and was made up of the following items:—

Value of a horse.

Half-share of a pony for transport purposes, there being one pony between every two troopers.

Value of uniform, arms, accourrements, and saddlery. Share of tent.

SILLADAR AND NON-SILLADAR CAVALRY

In Skinner's time the value of an assami was from Rs. 800 to Rs. 350, and this amount had to be deposited by each man on enlistment, with the exception that men often brought with them their own horses, receiving in lieu the money value. When a man was discharged, his horse, pony, and uniform, &c., were purchased by the regiment and sold to the incoming recruit. The chanda fund was an insurance fund for the provision of horses, and had two sources of income—namely, one by receipt from Government, as compensation for horses killed or dying in Government service, and the other by subscriptions, at Rs. 1/8 per mensem, from each man's pay, which subscription relieved him of all responsibility of remounting himself, this duty being taken over by the Commanding Officer, and the necessary expenditure incurred from the chanda fund. Certain provisions were laid down to safeguard the interests of the chanda, or insurance fund, by which men who ill-treated their horses were at times called on to pay extra donations to the chanda, while, in extreme cases, the horse was actually handed back to the man to make what he could out of it, in lieu of receiving its original value from the fund. The vast difference that this system must have produced between the khudaspa of days prior to 1808 and the khudaspa as raised by Skinner and Gardiner, is at once evident. former, weighted by the load of responsibility which made him at all times provide his own horse, did not dare take risks; while the latter, being relieved of all responsibility, dared to go whereever his British officers led him, knowing that, if his horse was killed, he still drew pay as a soldier, and that his Commanding Officer would provide him with a fresh horse at the expense of the chanda; while, no matter how many horses he might have gone through, the original value paid by him remained a permanent asset to his credit till the day he took his discharge,

when it was paid him in full. So successful was this new system that, by the time the Mutiny broke out in 1857, there were on the Bengal establishment eighteen regiments of silladar Cavalry who were termed irregular. There were, at the same time, ten regiments of Light Cavalry on the non-silladar system, and these were termed regular. On the outbreak of the Mutiny, all these ten regular regiments mutinied or were disbanded; while of the eighteen irregular regiments, ten mutinied or were disbanded. To refill the gaps thus caused, several regiments were raised on the silladar system, mainly from the Punjab, and did excellent service. On the reorganisation of the Native Army in 1861, it was decided to discontinue the non-silladar system in Bengal, and reform the Native Cavalry entirely on the silladar system. Accordingly, nineteen regiments were raised in Bengal, and these existed intact until 1882, when the 16th and 17th Regiments were disbanded in a fit of economy. In 1885, however, they were re-raised, while, at the same time, the whole of the Native Cavalry in India were augmented by an extra squadron.

The reasons for the discontinuance of the non-silladar system in Bengal were mainly three: extra expense, less efficiency in the rough and ready work of a campaign, and the lower social standing of the men as compared with the silladar. It was not a sudden decision, arising from events which occurred during the Mutiny itself, but was due to much discussion which had gone on for many years on the merits and demerits of the two systems. At times this discussion was very heated, but the consensus of opinion was on the silladar side, and when the reorganisation took place in 1861, the adherents of the silladar system won the day. During the Afghan War, 1889–41, and the following Sikh War, the silladars, or irregulars as they were called, were much to the front.

Lord Wm. Bentinck (Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief in India) wrote in 1835 as follows:—

'The Irregular Cavalry is the arm of all others in India that may be placed on a par with any of the military means that we could command for our defence against foreign invasion—not even excepting the European Cavalry. I need not repeat what has so often been stated, that the Rohillas and all the highest caste and bravest men of India, who will not enter our ranks from dislike to our rigid discipline . . . have no repugnance to serve in the Irregular Cavalry. The Irregular Cavalry is of peculiar importance in India. It is the favourite arm of the native. It attaches him to our Service by the strong ties of interest and affection. It prevents their being engaged against us, and if the system were sufficiently extended it would at a trifling expense afford us all the advantages, moral and military, which the Russians have derived from the Cossacks, who from being the bitterest enemies of Russia, in the time of Peter the Great, have become the most faithful subjects of the Empire. This force should be increased to 20,000 men.' The total strength of Irregular Cavalry in all India in 1835 was 3,358.

In the Sikh War the Cavalry were commanded by Sir Joseph Thackwell, whose son wrote a history of the war. In this he states: 'If the directors were to consult their own real interests, they would convert all the Light Cavalry into Irregulars.' This, of course, was the writing of a junior officer, but one who, serving as A.D.C. to his father, was in the position to hear daily the opinions of very senior officers. Sir Henry Rawlinson also, who had much experience, wrote an article in 1844, in which he stated: 'The Irregular Cavalry forms an outlet for the gentry, who do not otherwise enlist.'

Conclusions

The above is a brief history of the silladar and non-silladar Cavalry. From it can be learnt how these two systems have been evolved from the old khudaspa and pagah horsemen of India, the silladar coming from the khudaspa, and the non-silladar from the pagah stock, There is, however, some distinction to be made between the old and new systems. The pagah of ancient days was, as I have already pointed out, not a mere hireling, but an actual adherent of the prince he served;



if that prince's cause was lost, the pagah was adrift on the world. The non-silladar of the present day is a hireling, pure and simple, from a race alien to ourselves; he is not then a true descendant of the pagah, but of the barghir, the man who could provide nothing for himself. The silladar of the present day is, on the other hand, of the true khudaspa stock, a man of the warrior class, one entitled to bear arms, a yeoman—that is, one who possesses property of sufficient value to enable him to ride to battle on his own horse, with his own equipment, transport, and The defect of the organisation, which lay in the responsibility of having to personally maintain and keep up his horse, has been removed by the system of assami and chanda funds, which amounts to an insurance system, in which the sowar buys a policy and pays a monthly subscription. The assami nowadays amounts to about Rs. 500, and this sum, or such smaller sum as the regimental funds can afford to take as a first deposit, is paid by each recruit on enlistment, but he continues to subscribe the balance until the full amount lies to his credit.


Opinions will always differ, but I cannot conceive, for my part, how there can be the slightest doubt that it is an incalculable advantage to Government to have, as their servants, men who not only have a very large pecuniary stake locked up in regimental funds, but who, being landed proprietors, have a predominating influence in their villages. A silladar regiment costs annually Rs. 4,22,521, whereas a non-silladar regiment costs Rs. 4,45,375, the latter thus being the dearer by some Rs. 23,300 per annum. A silladar regiment has this further advantage: that it has 23 men, 109 horses, and 320 transport mules more than the non-silladar. Presuming that it was decided to convert all the 39 silladar regiments of the Bengal and Punjab into non-silladar, the account would stand:

Greater expense	•	•	Rs. 8,08,700
Loss in men .	•	•	. 808
Loss in horses .		•	. 4,251
Loss in mules .		•	. 12,480

That there are certain defects in the silladar system no one will deny. There is much, undoubtedly, to be done, especially in regard to uniformity of equipment. I have never seen it myself, but am told that Messrs. Cooper & Allen, at Cawnpore, have a storeroom, a veritable museum of patterns of equipment. all used by some regiment or another. There are two objections which at times are urged against the silladar, one of which relates to the supply of horses, and the other to the state of regimental funds. In regard to the supply of horses, it is said that the system of supply would break down on service. It quite depends what form the active service takes. No one can possibly imagine that a silladar regiment could, of its own arrangements, be able to support wear and tear of horse-flesh such as took place in South Africa during the Boer War. In all probability the superior horsemanship in a silladar regiment would, to a very great extent, prevent any such wear and tear; but should this occur, there can be no doubt that the supply of remounts would be a matter of State policy. The condition of service for which silladar regiments were raised never for a moment contemplated that the chanda fund should at all times, and under all conditions of active service, maintain the full number of horses. As a matter of fact, beyond explaining for the benefit of those who do not know the silladar system, this question as to the supply of horses in war needs no consideration. There never has been any question as to the responsibility of Government, which has, vide Military Department Letter, No. 2470 D., dated June 5, 1905, undertaken the supply of horses and also of equipment on service. In regard to the maintenance of a full number of horses during peace, no doubt it is a difficult matter, the difficulty being due mainly to the disproportion of supply to Another difficulty is that while the chanda fund remains practically on the same footing in regard to income, as it was at the time of the Mutiny, the wear and tear of horseflesh on account of increased manœuvres, &c., has very largely increased. The above are some of the main points which make

it at times difficult for silladar regiments to make both ends meet in the management of the chanda fund and supply of remounts. While we should be glad of assistance, we realise that the difficulty of making both ends meet is not confined to the chanda fund; it permeates all branches of finance throughout the world. We do our best, and I, for one, believe there is a bright future before us in regard to supply of remounts, now that Government has provided us with regimental horse runs.

In conclusion, I would refer to a remark made by Colonel Edwards, in his late paper on the question of assamis. He states that the right way of looking at an assami is to consider it a 'Provident Fund' which saves the sowar from resorting to menial employment on his discharge. I think that this is hardly the correct way of regarding the matter; the right way is rather to consider that an assami gives us the yeoman and not the mere hireling as a soldier. Surely there must be a vast difference between the man who can purchase an assami in a silladar regiment and the man who, according to Colonel Edwards, comes under the heading, 'Nanga ata, nanga jata' (naked he comes, naked he goes).



The Cavalry Journal Nº8



FIELD
FIRING
THE
SCOTTISH
MOUNTED
MANOEUVRES

Lieut-Colonel the Marguis of Tullibardine at the Firing Line of the Fife & Forfar Imperial Yeomanny.



Field Marshal HRH The Dake of Connaught & General Sir Edward Leach watching the Operations.

THE SCOTTISH MOUNTED MANŒUVRES, 1907

(Communicated)

The composition of the forces and their various stations at the commencement of hostilities—General and special ideas, and narrative of the operations.

The training of the Scottish Yeomanry regiments during the latter half of June was taken advantage of this year to give them some practical manœuvres in combination with Regulars. The success of these manœuvres was due in great measure to the keenness with which Regulars and Yeomanry alike threw themselves into the work. The emulation between corps gave great spirit to the operations, and an additional realism was lent by the intense interest taken by the people of the country. The martial instincts of the Scottish race and the old clan feeling were awakened, and sides were keenly taken in favour of 'the Frasers' or 'the Murrays' as the case might be.

By securing the services of Colonel Rimington to direct the operations, General Sir E. Leach made the most of this exceptional opportunity for the practice of some 8,200 mounted troops in hill warfare.

Special recognition is due to the public spirit shown by the Duke of Atholl and other Scottish landowners in throwing open a wide area of fine manœuvring ground and so removing the greatest obstacle which besets the practical training of troops in England.

The whole management of affairs was greatly facilitated by the interest evinced by the Duke of Atholl, as well as by the untiring personal efforts of Lord Tullibardine, in arranging for the manœuvre area being unreservedly placed at the disposal of the troops, and in the many matters concerning camping grounds and supplies in the Atholl district. Central Scotland, from the Moray Firth on the north to the Firth of Forth on the south, formed the theatre of operations, a country of varied features, and teeming with reminiscences of past Scottish wars.

The campaign centred in that beautiful tract of mountain and moorland, forest, river and loch which surrounds Dunkeld and Pitlochry.

The actual manceuvring area which was entirely thrown open to the troops, and in which all the latter part of the operations took place, was a hilly and wooded tract which stretches north from Dunkeld for about 8 miles, and about 4 miles wide from the Tay on the west to the forest of Clunie on the east.

The Regulars who took part were the 72nd battery R.F.A. from Bradford, with their new 18-pr. Q.F. guns; the Scots Greys and 18th Hussars—the men and horses of both thoroughly fit after several weeks of camping and marching in the worst of weather since they left their quarters at Edinburgh and York respectively.

The Yeomanry regiments were the Fife and Forfar Imperial Yeomanry, the Scottish Horse, and Lovat's Scouts.

The Fife and Forfar, 4 squadrons, are a fine corps, from the eastern counties, well mounted, and well turned out. The men of a very good yeoman farmer type, of fine physique and good riders.

The Scottish Horse, commanded by Lieut.-Colonel the Marquis of Tullibardine, are 800 strong, in two regiments. The men, recruited from the Central Highlands and South Perthshire, are of excellent quality, many of them stalkers and gillies, hardy mountaineers who have little to learn in the art of scouting. They are mostly mounted on strong serviceable cobs or ponies accustomed to rough work in the hills.

Lovat's Scouts too are a splendid lot of men, the two regiments numbering nearly 900. Drawn from the far north of Sutherland and Caithness, from Skye and the Western Islands, Argyll, Inverness, and the north-eastern counties; they are mostly crofters, gillies, shepherds, and fishermen, well seasoned men of fine physique. They too are mounted on sturdy cobs, generally of a rougher and heavier stamp than those of the Scottish Horse, but thoroughly serviceable.

The equipment of all three corps is practical and work-manlike.

The transport arrangements were excellent; Lovat's Scouts had strong one-horsed two-wheeled carts, and the Scottish Horse similar larger carts drawn by two horses harnessed tandem.

The first four days were devoted by the Yeomanry regiments to very necessary preliminary work, elementary troop drill, fitting saddlery, horsemastership, and instruction in outpost and patrol duties.

From the General and Special Ideas for the manœuvring period it will be seen that Colonel Rimington's scheme was one which gave the commanders on either side wide scope for the use of their discretion, and to the troops ample opportunity for reconnaissance work, which was one of the main objects of the operations.

GENERAL IDEA

- 1. The Island of Great Britain contains two peoples: the Northerners (Blue) comprising a number of separate warlike tribes, nearly all of whom are mounted; the Southerners (Red), united and more highly civilised. A prolonged war lasting several years has recently taken place between the two, with the result that the former, who were much the weaker, were beaten and disarmed, and the whole of the country North of the Firths of Clyde and Forth was pacified and occupied by Red garrisons.
- 2. Peace was formally declared in June 1906, but these garrisons remained until the spring of 1907, when Red became engaged in an oversea war with a neighbouring power.
- 8. This war is taxing Red's resources to the utmost; all detachments have accordingly been withdrawn from Blue Land with the exception of a central garrison consisting of some 1,000

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mounted troops with guns, occupying an entrenched camp in the Atholl District.

The House of Representatives in the Capital (London) of Red Land has decided that at all costs this garrison must remain for the purpose of overawing the Blue tribes and upholding the right gained by Red to occupy their territory. By the end of May provisions for six months and ample stores of ammunition have been accumulated at the Blair Atholl Camp, which has been entrenched.

4. The Northern tribes are grouped as follows:—

Friendly to Red—The inhabitants in the immediate neighbourhood of Blair Atholl.

Neutral—The tribes in Perthshire.

Violently hostile to Red—North-Eastern tribes round Beauly; North-Western tribes from the country North and North-West of Fort William; Western tribes in Argyllshire; South-Eastern tribes in the neighbourhood of Cupar (Fife).

SPECIAL IDEA—RED

1. Towards the end of May the Red Commander (Lord Tullibardine) has reason to report to his Headquarters in London that there are increasing signs of insurrection among the tribesmen.

To this he receives the following reply from the Government:—

- (a) 'We anticipate no trouble, and consider your fears groundless; but if any armed tribesmen should assemble in bodies, you must consider this an act of war, and nip the insurrection in the bud by at once crushing such detachments before they can concentrate and develop a general rising.
- (b) 'In the event of the latter, you must maintain your position at all costs, as you are all we can count on, not only to uphold our authority in Blue Land, but also to check the tribes invading our territory.



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'Three additional squadrons are on their way to you; we can send you no further reinforcements.

Sd. M. P., Secretary of State.

- ' London, June 7, 1907.'
- 2. On June 14 definite information is received that the Western tribes are arming and concentrating in Argyllshire, also that others are concentrating at either end of the Caledonian Canal; and, at 4 P.M. June 17, that a rising of Fifeshire men, who are concentrating at Cupar, has taken place.
- 8. Reinforcements, consisting of three squadrons, 18th Hussars, have reached the Forth; the Officer Commanding reports the wires to the south to have been cut behind him, and informs Red Commander that one of his squadrons will reach Perth during the evening of June 17, and his other two squadrons the line Dollar-Dunblane, south of the Ochills.

At 5 P.M. on June 17, the Red Commander's Headquarters, with 2 guns Royal Field Artillery, and 8 squadrons Scottish Horse, are at Dunkeld.

SPECIAL IDEA—BLUE

1. With the gradual withdrawal of Red Troops from Blue. Territory, the tribes see their chance of throwing off Red's yoke, if they can only combine and crush the Red Force.

For this purpose they have elected a Governing Council, and preparations for a general rising of the tribes have been pushed forward with secrecy, and the utmost despatch. Rifles, ammunition, and accourrements have been smuggled into the country by Red's oversea enemies.

Lord Lovat has been selected by the Governing Council to take command of the united forces of the tribes, as soon as the propitious moment arrives for them to take the field.

2. Early in June, news is received of reverses to the Red Army engaged in distant war. This precipitates matters, and the Blue Governing Council orders the armed forces of the tribes to concentrate by June 15 at the various points of assembly previously decided upon.

3. This concentration takes place more slowly than was expected, but it is practically completed by 5 P.M. on June 17, when the force named below is handed over to the command of Lord Lovat, who with his staff is at Inverness.

North-Western tribes represented by Lovat's Scouts at Spean Bridge.

North-Eastern tribes represented by Lovat's Scouts and 2 guns, Royal Field Artillery, at Brodie.

South-Eastern tribes represented by Fife and Forfar Imperial Yeomanry, in 2 detachments at ABOYNE and CUPAR (FIFE).

Western tribes represented by Scots Greys at KILLIN.

- 4. Lord Lovat's Orders are comprised in the following Memorandum:—
 - ' To LORD LOVAT, Commanding the Forces of the Combined Blue Tribes.
- 'SIR,—I am directed by the Council to instruct you as follows:—
 - '(a) Advance your forces on Blair Atholl as soon as possible, invest the camp, and shut up the Red Force.
 - 'If Red detaches a force or advances with his main body to attack you, endeavour to cut off his retreat back to the camp. Red is being reinforced. One squadron of Regular Cavalry reached Perth, and two other squadrons are reported to have crossed the Forth at noon to-day.
 - '(b) The Council desires to impress upon you the importance of arranging that the various portions of your force can mutually support each other so as to prevent any danger of the enemy beating you in detail.
 - 'Sd. L. of M., Secretary to the Council. '8 P.M., June 17, 1907.'



4 A.M. on June 18 was the hour fixed for the opening of hostilities, though scouts and despatch riders, to the number of about 70 from either side, had been previously sent out.

On the 17th the troops were posted as follows:—

Red.

At Dunkeld: two regiments, Scottish Horse (less one squadron), one section R.F.A.

At Blair Atholl: one squadron, Scottish Horse.

At Perth: one squadron, 18th Hussars.

On the line Dollar-Dunblane: two squadrons, 18th Hussars.

Blue.

At Brodie: Lovat's Scouts, five squadrons.

At Spean Bridge: Lovat's Scouts, three squadrons.

At Grantown: one section R.F.A.

At Killin: Royal Scots Greys, three squadrons.

At Ladybank, near Cupar: Fife and Forfar Yeomanry, three squadrons.


At Aboyne: Fife and Forfar Yeomanry, one squadron.

The Red Commander had the advantage of a central position, and the course to be followed was clearly to strike vigorously at the most threatening hostile gathering, so as to check the insurrection at the outset, prevent the combination of the enemy's forces, and beat them in detail.

The Northern forces of the enemy were far distant, and the barrier of the main range of the Grampians lay between. To the west, however, the tribal gathering represented by the Scots Greys at Killin were within comparatively easy striking distance of Dunkeld.

Hence Lord Tullibardine decided to endeavour to crush the Western tribesmen, calling upon his reinforcements advancing from the south to co-operate with him, and so intervening between the enemy at Killin and their allies in the south-east.





With this object in view Lord Tullibardine ordered the following movements for the morning of the 18th:—

One squadron, Scottish Horse, to watch all approaches from the north.

The squadron Scottish Horse at Blair Atholl to reconnoitre towards the west and north-west.

One squadron, Scottish Horse, from Dunkeld, to march viâ Perth to locate and delay the advance of the Fife and Forfar.

All three squadrons of the 18th Hussars to march from their respective positions upon Lochearn Head.

The remaining five squadrons, Scottish Horse, and the guns, to march from Dunkeld on Amulree.

As the site of his entrenched camp, to be defended in the last extremity, the Red Commander selected a rocky eminence on the north side of Loch Ordie, some six miles north of Dunkeld. Lying at an elevation of 1,200 feet, surrounded by forest and moorland, with few approaches, it was not easily accessible to an enemy.

Lord Lovat, the Blue Commander, was exposed to the danger of having his scattered forces beaten in detail. He determined to make the most of such numerical superiority as he possessed, and by rapid marching to concentrate all his forces in the neighbourhood of Red's entrenched camp, which he believed to be near Blair Atholl. He intended to effect two preliminary concentrations:—

- (a) The Scots Greys and the Fife and Forfar on the line Perth-Crieff.
- (b) Lovat's Scouts and the Aboyne squadron Fife and Forfar, in the Dee Valley.

His orders for the morning of the 18th were therefore:—

Lovat's Scouts from Spean Bridge to Mains of Glen Truim.

Lovat's Scouts from Brodie to Grantown.

Aboyne squadron Fife and Forfar to Braemar.

Fife and Forfar from Ladybank to Bridge of Earn.

Scots Greys from Killin to Crieff, with a detachment to Aberfeldy to cut Red's communications should he move south.

June 18.—From the foregoing it was clear that the interest of the first part of the campaign would centre in the south. A small detachment only was thought sufficient to hold the Red entrenched camp, which did not appear to be threatened by any immediate danger, and with his main body and guns Lord Tullibardine started in the misty light of the early morning on his march up the Braan Valley. Amulree, a little village among the hills, was reached at 7 a.m. without any news of the enemy. An advanced patrol which would have given warning of the enemy's movement was captured by a cleverly laid ambush on the part of the Scots Greys scouts.

Fortune too was against the Red Commander, for a carefully arranged line of signal stations on the mountains south of Loch Tay was busy transmitting news of the Scots Greys having quitted Killin southwards, when the mist came down upon the last station and effectually stopped the all-important message. Thus Lord Tullibardine remained in uncertainty, and in anxiety about his communications till 10 a.m.; a fatal delay. The Scots Greys, after detaching one squadron towards Aberfeldy, had made Crieff their objective, and gone straight for it. By 7 a.m. their leading squadron had occupied the town, having covered twenty-six miles in three hours.

The 18th Hussars in the meantime from their three starting points had been drawing together towards the same objective, Crieff. The squadron from Perth was the first to come into collision with the Scots Greys, at Gilmerton, before 8 A.M.

With the other squadrons approaching on the southern roads, it looked as if the Scots Greys were safely penned up. If the Red squadrons had held the enemy to their position by persistently attacking instead of merely watching, the latter could hardly have evaded them as they did.

Lord Tullibardine, acquainted at last with the situation, after detaching one squadron viâ Loch Freuchie to Kenmore, hastened from Amulree to the scene of action. Too late, however. By some unaccountable omission the road out of Crieff by High-

landman Station was left unguarded. The Greys seized their opportunity and slipped out along this road, favoured by mist and rain. Hotly pursued they held the enemy off with their rearguard while they withdrew, baggage and all, to Kinfell Bridge.

In the south-east, the Fife and Forfars, leaving Ladybank, had come into collision with patrols of the 18th Hussars in the early morning, and pushing on seized the Bridge of Earn. They thus anticipated the squadron Scottish Horse sent to oppose them, but the latter, entrenched on high ground near Craigend, checked their progress. Working round to the west, however, they crossed the river at Forteviot and Dunning, outflanked the Scottish Horse squadron and forced them to withdraw. They then advanced into the woods of Findo Gask. Thus early in the afternoon the Scots Greys and the Fife and Forfar were within four miles of effecting their intended junction, and here something seems to have been wanting in the Blue scouting, for it was nearly 5 P.M. when they actually joined hands at Gask, where they bivouacked for the night. The Red Commander having failed to keep the hostile forces apart, fell back on Methven, leaving 2 squadrons, 18th Hussars, in Crieff.

In other parts little of importance had happened. The squadron Scottish Horse detached from Amulree to Kenmore had pushed on to Fearman and encountered the squadron of the Greys marching from Killin on Aberfeldy, but with no decisive result.

The squadron Scottish Horse that had marched from Blair Atholl surprised and captured an advance party of Lovat's Scouts at Dall on the southern shore of Loch Rannoch.

In the north Lord Lovat with his guns and five squadrons was at Grantown at midday. Here he learnt that the site of Red's entrenched camp was six miles north of Dunkeld, instead of at Blair Atholl as he had supposed. This led him to change his plan of campaign. Giving up his proposed concentration in the Dee Valley, he decided to march down the main road

following the Highland railway. He accordingly moved to Boat of Garten covered by patrols pushed forward to the south.

To the united forces in the south he sent orders to push steadily northward prepared to act on either flank. The squadron at Braemar was to remain there and engage any of the enemy who might penetrate to the Dee Valley.

June 19.—Lord Tullibardine decided that the time had come to fall back upon his central position, thence to strike in whatever direction he should first see an opening.

He accordingly left his bivouac in the early morning and marched straight back with his guns and the Scottish Horse to Loch Ordie. The 18th Hussars following, camped at Dunkeld.

Thus hampered by anxiety for the safety of his base, the Red Commander was induced to abandon the plan of vigorous offensive action on which he had embarked, and by which alone he could hope to dominate the insurrectionary tribesmen. Both sides lost touch with one another, and from this stage the initiative passed into the hands of the Blue force.

As regards the detached squadrons of the Scottish Horse, the one near Kenmore lost touch with the squadron of the Scots Greys, and the latter marching round them seized the road in their rear at Dull, cutting off their retreat to Ballinluig. Fearing, however, to be surrounded themselves, the Greys withdrew later northwards, and the Scottish Horse retired unmolested.

The squadron at Kinloch Rannoch reconnoitred as far as Rannoch Station, encountered Lovat's Scouts in force, and withdrew to Kinloch Rannoch.

Thus the respective positions of the Red and Blue forces on the night of the 19th-20th was:—

Red.

At Loch Ordie—Main body with guns.

At Dunkeld—18th Hussars.

At Ballinluig-1 squadron, Scottish Horse.

At Kinloch Rannoch—1 squadron, Scottish Horse.

Blue.

At Glen Truim House-Main body with guns.

At Dalnacardoch with advanced guard towards Struan—1st Lovat's Scouts.

At Braemar-1 squadron Fife and Forfar Yeomanry.

At Perth-Scots Greys and 3 squadrons Fife and Forfar.

June 20.—During the 20th, the Red Commander from his entrenched position at Loch Ordie patrolled the roads leading to Pitlochry, Kirkmichael, and Blairgowrie, while the 18th Hussars from Dunkeld reconnoitred all the roads on the south side. Contact was thus regained with the enemy's southern forces, who had marched from Perth at 8 A.M. to Blairgowrie, and in the evening to Bridge of Cally. Orders were sent to the 18th Hussars to fasten on to this force, prevent its co-operation with the enemy in the north, and report its movements. The leading squadron finding Blairgowrie unoccupied at 8.30 P.M., pushed on up both banks of the Ericht River, and near Ericht Bridge came upon the advanced guard of the enemy (Fife and Forfar Yeomanry, and Scots Greys). This southern Blue force had received orders from Lord Lovat to co-operate with him in an attack upon the Loch Ordie position at 3 A.M. on the 21st. They were accordingly retracing their steps to Blairgowrie to make that place their starting point. At Ericht Bridge the road crosses the rapid stream in a narrow valley between wooded hills. Suddenly coming upon the enemy in the dark, the squadron of the 18th attacked with an impetuosity somewhat too realistic for peace manœuvres, for in the rough and tumble which followed serious casualties occurred to both men and horses.

Though captured in the end, the 18th were able to send the important news of the change of the enemy's march.

In the evening of this day an attempt was made by the Blue force to blow up the big bridge at Dunkeld by which Red's main line of communication with the south crosses the Tay. A squadron of the Scots Greys with the pioneers was detached at

Caputh Bridge on this mission. Conducted by a local guide, an officer with the pioneers made his way over the moorland north of the river and reached the left bank at Dunkeld close to the bridge. Under the rules of the manœuvres no bridge was to be accounted to be destroyed unless wooden slabs representing the necessary quantity of dynamite should be affixed in such a position as to effect the demolition. Before the little party could succeed in doing this, they were detected by a picquet of the 18th Hussars, and driven off.

In the north Lord Lovat had marched from Glen Truim to Blair Atholl. After a few hours' halt he pushed on in the evening to the Pass of Killiecrankie, which had been seized by his advanced guard.

The whole column, now numbering 8 squadrons and 2 guns, reached Pitlochry by nightfall, where a halt was again called. The only attempt to retard this march was made by the squadron of the Scottish Horse from Kinloch Rannoch, which had got on the flank of the Blue column $vi\hat{a}$ Trinafour. They were, however, held in check by a flank guard of Lovat's Scouts.

The Fife and Forfar squadron in the Dee Valley crossed into Glen Shee, but not in time to join hands with the southern Blue force.

June 21.—At midnight on the 20th and 21st the Blue forces advanced for their converging attack on Lord Tullibardine's position.

Since early morning the main part of the northern Blue force had marched nearly forty miles. Lord Lovat now determined to do the remainder of the march on foot, taking advantage of the short midsummer night, only two or three hours of darkness in these latitudes. He accordingly left 200 men with his guns and the baggage and horses at Pitlochry, and with the remaining 6 squadrons, guided by a fellow clansman, struck east on to the moors about Loch Broom. Scouts were sent out to locate the Red position. One of these mistook the standing camp prepared for the Greys at Tullymet for the position, and the error was

only discovered when the column, following this wrong direction, reached the camp at 8 A.M.

Tired as the men were, they responded gamely to their Commander's appeal for a last effort. They pushed on up the wooded hills above Tullymet, and the Red position was soon located.

By 5 A.M. the dispositions were made, and the force, deploying, advanced with great spirit along the valley of the Pitrannoch Burn, crowning the heights to east and west.

The event, however, was disappointing, especially to the men who had made so plucky an effort, for it only proved a lesson in the great difficulty of bringing off a simultaneous attack by forces so widely separated. The Scots Greys and the Fife and Forfar coming from the south had delivered their attack more than an hour before, and both sides thought the fight was over before Lord Lovat's men appeared on the field. Although the attack by the latter was undoubtedly a surprise, it is impossible to say whether, finely as it was carried out, it would have been successful. Lord Lovat's men were exhausted, their horses and their artillery were 9 miles away, and they were without reserves of ammunition.

Lord Tullibardine's men were fresh, strong in the possession of their entrenched and well-stocked position, and there is no doubt that, cornered as they were, their resistance would have been desperate.

To revert to the southern Blue force.

Starting from Blairgowrie at 1 A.M. they had found themselves opposed by the 18th Hussars, but gradually forced them back from position to position. At Butterston the 18th made a stubborn stand, but finally withdrew and joined the main force at Loch Ordie about 3 A.M.

The Scots Greys and the Fife and Forfar marching quickly up the valley of the Buckney Burn, overran a Red picquet at the east end of Loch Ordie, and impetuously attacked the entrenched camp at 4 A.M.

Here again the issue must remain doubtful.

In real warfare the advance would hardly have been so rapid nor the attack so headlong. Delay might indeed have had the desired effect of making this attack coincide with Lord Lovat's on the west. Though Lord Tullibardine was entrenched, his position on a flat-topped hill with a steep face towards the line of attack had a good deal of dead ground, and his men had to expose themselves to fire effectively.

So ended the manœuvre period, and very instructive it had been for all. The obscurity of the weather in limiting the use of signalling had the effect of emphasising the importance of scouting and patrol work. The northern Blue forces employed officers' patrols with advantage. If the same means had been resorted to in the southern theatre there would perhaps have been less mystification.

In no military duties is there more need for careful instruction and frequent practice than in those of reconnaissance and observation. This was illustrated by several cases of loss of touch between opposing forces, as well as by a certain unpreparedness and want of alertness on outpost duty even at a critical period when attack was pending.

Some fine feats of marching proved the fitness and endurance of the men and horses. The Scots Greys' forced march on Crieff has already been noticed. One squadron of the 18th Hussars covered 72 miles in the first 36 hours of the operations.

The main body of Lovat's Scouts did 110 miles in 3 days, ending with their final effort of over 50 miles in the last 24 hours.

The week end's rest in standing camps was followed by some interesting tactical days.

MINOR TACTICS

The schemes as carried out were full of useful lessons, and the varied terrain of hill and forest, moorland, streams, and locks formed an admirable training ground. The presence of H.R.H. the Duke of Connaught, Generals Sir Neville Lyttelton, D.

Haig, H. J. Scobell, and many others testified to the wide interest taken.

Monday's operations consisted in an attempt by a northern cavalry force to cut off a convoy being sent up the road from Dunkeld to Blair Atholl for the supply of a southern army in pursuit of a defeated foe. The scheme was carried out under unseasonable conditions of piercing wind and drenching rain, but well illustrated the principles to be observed in such an action. For instance, the need for the attacking commander to block the route of the convoy with one portion of his force while attacking the flank vigorously with all the strength he can spare. The necessity for thorough intercommunication between the different parts to make this manœuvre successful.

On the defending side the need for attaching to the convoy itself sufficient force to ensure its immediate safety, and concentrating all the rest at the critical point to oppose the attack; the guns especially must be made full use of to delay the enemy, time being all-important for the main object in view.


On Tuesday both sides engaged in the practical entrenchment of defensive positions.

On Wednesday the rearguard of a Red force retiring from Killin viâ Ballinluig and Dunkeld to Blairgowrie was attacked from the north by a pursuing Blue force. This was an interesting day, somewhat marred by soaking Highland mist and rain, the clouds drifting low and obscuring the view.

The chief lesson was the need on the part of the attackers for early recognising which is their tactical flank, in this case their left, in order to break in upon Red's line of retreat, and, if possible, cut off his rearguard.

THE FIELD FIRING SCHEME.

On Thursday the Yeomanry regiments engaged in a very successful day's field firing. The scheme gave an illustration of a rearguard becoming engaged with a pursuing force and being cut off by a flank attack.



The targets represented a defeated northern force which had been retreating up the main Highland road towards Pitlochry, but had been driven off the road by the appearance of a hostile force from the west at Ballinluig.

The southern force pursuing comes upon the northern rearguard in position on Chapel Hill, just north of Loch Ordie, while the force from Ballinluig co-operates from the west, attacking the retreating enemy in flank.

The fight was opened by the guns from Loch Ordie Lodge firing across the loch upon the enemy's position. Both on this flank, and later in the left flanking attack, the 18-pounders made excellent practice, rapidly demolishing their targets.

The Fife and Forfar Yeomanry advancing up the steep slopes of Loch Ordie Wood seized the crest line of Creag Liath and opened fire upon the enemy entrenched along the Pitrannoch Burn. When the latter were adjudged to have been driven out the Scottish Horse advanced in pursuit over the wooded and broken ground between Creag Liath and the loch, but on emerging in the open were taken in flank by a counter-attack as represented by the targets E, F, G, and H. While they wheeled round to oppose this the attack developed on the left. Lord Lovat's Scouts and guns advancing through the gap between Creag Liath and Creagan Ruathair, deployed in a most spirited manner, advanced rapidly from cover to cover, and dismounting in successive positions, supported by the fire of three squadrons which had occupied the northernmost crest line of Creag Liath, completed the enemy's discomfiture. It is no exaggeration to say that the excellence of the fire discipline, the accuracy of fire, and the skilfulness and rapidity of the manœuvring were worthy of the highest praise.

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11

THE INCREASED IMPORTANCE OF TRAINING OUR CAVALRY IN MOBILITY

By Major H. Clifton Brown, 12th Lancers

Modern conditions and the difficulty of obtaining information—The combination of modern fire, mobility, and the arme blanche—Training in peace time.

In old days, armies drew up against one another and watched each other, lying opposite and manœuvring, sometimes for days and weeks, little more than a mile apart. Neither side could make a move by day or night without being seen or heard by the enemy's outposts.

Long-range guns and rifles have changed all this. cannot now go close up and see what is going on; nor can generals sit complacently on the top of a hill and watch the various evolutions of the enemy, or divine his intentions by Nowadays scouts and patrols must personal reconnaissance. have the means of getting about quickly and of covering long distances, or they can get no information of the enemy for their generals, who depend for their plans on the mobility with which that information is got and transmitted. No doubt in these days, and more so in the future, the telegraph, telephone, and motor will help to quicken the transmission of messages; but the scout has to get the information and bring it to the transmitting station. Telegraphs and telephones are easily cut and damaged, motors require good roads; yet the information must be sent on, and there will be times when the speedy transmission of a message will make all the difference between the magnificent success of an army and its utter destruction, and that 'speedy transmission' may depend on the 'mobility' of the man and horse who carry it.



THE RIGHT USE OF THE RIFLE

Though Cavalry tactics have changed, and chiefly, I hold, in the greater amount of mobility and dash now required by that arm, it is a false and dangerous theory that Cavalry will be able to dispense with either training for shock tactics or for the arme blanche. If Cavalry are not armed and trained for shock tactics, the spirit of mobility in the attack, which is vital to every Cavalry soldier, will be destroyed. It may not seem probable that Cavalry in the future will charge each other with the arme blanche in the big masses in which they are organised It may be difficult to imagine the country or situation in which a whole Cavalry division will meet another in the charge. But I see no reason for doubting that patrols and advanced squadrons, or even regiments and brigades, will frequently have to charge home with the arme blanche; and if they do not employ these tactics like the Germans did in 1870, they will become as useless and demoralised as the French Cavalry were. It is true that 'the Commander of the Cavalry mass who makes the best use of his guns and dismounted fire will have a great advantage.' But it must be remembered that a Cavalry action usually comes off on the spur of the moment. 'When the fight has begun' there is no time to dismount and use rifles, or gallop to a kopje. The initiative will be lost and the opposing lines will be already meeting in the shock, so the fire is masked before any damage has been done. It is also difficult to find such a position in the quickly and constantly changing phases of a Cavalry fight, from whence rifle fire becomes of use to its side. In the manœuvring stages, 'before the fight,' it is a different matter; and it appears to me that the right way to make use of the greatly increased power that the rifle gives Cavalry is to use it as the most important auxiliary towards the attainment of its object; which is, to get into the enemy with the arme blanche. To enable Cavalry to manœuvre before the fight, or to enable it to fight at all, it will probably

require to cover its movements with long-range fire, and to use its rifles as a feint to harass, annoy, and mystify the opposing Cavalry and to cover its real intentions. When the enemy has been disorganised and deceived by fire tactics, then it can charge home with disciplined ranks and the arme blanche, as in the old days of Cromwell and his Ironsides. The dismounted squadrons, who have been covering its movements with long-range fire, should come up into the fight as a last reserve, and can then be used to complete the rout of the enemy, or to charge off the field any of his dismounted squadrons.

To lay down any rules for a fight is, of course, impossible. Conditions of troops, ground and changing circumstances, especially in a Cavalry fight, render any sealed pattern absurd; but the points I would emphasise are these:

Make every use of the mobility of guns and rifles in all the manœuvring phases of the fight, but remember they will never decide the Cavalry fight.

Directly Cavalry get within charging distance of each other, there is no more time for effective rifle fire, and they must concentrate their whole force, and use their mobility to outflank and get into the enemy with the *arme blanche*.

Although modern fire has effected so many changes in the tactics of Cavalry, there are still many lessons to learn both tactical and strategical from the study of the campaigns of the great leaders of bygone years. The first objective of Cromwell, Marlborough, and Frederick in all their battles was the enemy's horse; and the success or only partial success of their various battles depended chiefly on the completeness with which they had defeated the enemy's Cavalry. General French in his preface to that excellent book of von Bernhardi says, 'How, I ask, can the Cavalry perform its rôle in war, until the enemy's Cavalry is defeated and paralysed?' It is then, and not till then, that they have full scope for their mobility against the enemy's infantry and guns; by rapid bursts of fire from unexpected places, by galloping to head off his columns at one

point, surprising him by fire from another, thoroughly playing with and puzzling him, they can finally dash in and reap the fruits of their mobility. Cromwell's tactics of regaining his mobility at once after a charge are as important to-day as they were then; and it was for this reason that he enforced good drill and iron discipline, and insisted on the 'Rally.' This enabled him, time after time, when the first shock had been indecisive, to use his mobility again on the battlefield to complete the rout of the Royalist Horse, or to overthrow their Infantry and win the fight, before their squadrons had rallied.

In the pursuit, I think it is quite evident, without looking to history for further examples, that the effect of modern fire has been to increase the necessity for mobility. When pursuing Cavalry is brought up by the fire of the enemy's rearguard, it must either charge him direct or turn his flanks; and the range of the modern rifle and long-range guns make both, especially the latter, much longer operations in time and distance than in former days. Unless Cavalry is still mobile after the exertions of the battle, the enemy, by making an extended and bold show with his horsemen, will certainly make good his escape.

WHAT TRAINING IS REQUIRED?

By comparing examples from the history of old battlefields with that of recent campaigns, the principal lessons, as a result of the changes that modern fire has necessitated in the tactics of Cavalry, seem to be:

- 1. That the effect of modern fire has been to enormously increase the necessity for the mobility of Cavalry.
- 2. That the effect of modern fire, though it necessitates the Cavalry soldier of to-day being armed with the same rifle as the Infantry, leaves the *arme blanche* and training for shock tactics as necessary to him as ever.

How can we cultivate in peace time, to the utmost of our power, this mobility, which is so essential a matter to our own arm and to the whole army, from the moment that war is declared?

I can see no better ways than:—(a) To train officers and N.C.O.'s to understand the enormous importance that mobility is to every Cavalry soldier in all phases of a modern campaign, so that they will realise the necessity of teaching their men the art of horse-mastership and of man-mastership.

To teach the men horse-mastership, every troop officer and N.C.O. must have some knowledge himself. I think that no 2nd Lieutenant should be dismissed or N.C.O. be promoted to sergeant until he can answer elementary questions on horsemastership to the satisfaction of his commanding officer; amongst other things, he should be able to tack on a shoe, bandage a horse's leg, and know how to treat simple wounds and sprains. Instruction and practice in the above could be given by the squadron farriers, under the squadron commander's directions. In the same way as regards man-mastership: no officer or N.C.O. is efficient as a Cavalry soldier unless he himself knows and instructs his men in the simple rudiments of hygiene. So many excellent pamphlets are constantly being sent round by medical authorities, or are published in orders, that by taking the trouble to read them, all officers can learn for themselves and instruct their men in all necessary details; and it is easier to make a man realise the necessity of something that directly concerns himself than it is to make him take care of his horse. Whenever possible, keep the same men and same horses in the same sections, under a section leader who is responsible for every man and horse in his section. Much can be done in this way towards making the men take a greater interest in and care of their horses. I only mention a few out of many ways that will occur to an experienced squadron leader by which he can make his squadron more mobile, and thoroughly fit for active service.

THE SQUADRON COMMANDER

There is one point which Cavalry officers must not overlook. The test of their horses in peace time is not how they look in the stable, but the fitness and strength of their squadron after a fortnight's or month's manœuvres. The squadron commander should be held responsible for his horses being in proper condition. But this cannot be done in fairness to him unless he is given a free hand in the feeding of his horses. The present Government ration of grain, 10 lb. per horse, is very small. A hunter gets at least 15 and 16 lb. of good oats to do three or four days' hunting a fortnight; and unless the troop horse's food can be varied often, both in kind and quantity, the 10-lb. ration will not be enough to keep horses in hard condition in the drill season. There are certain times of the year when the horses can be given less and soft food, and other times when they must have all the hard food which they can eat. Horses, like human beings, have different temperaments and require different diets. The troop leader wants extra food to get some of his horses into condition, and cannot feed them all alike on a fixed Government ration. To a certain extent this can be arranged, at least in India; or sometimes an accommodating supply officer will bother himself to oblige one. But the squadron commander should have more licence, and be allowed to send in his programme of what he wants for the whole month, both in amount and kind. The Commissariat should be able to supply any kind of food that is wanted, cheaper than he can get it in the market, or at any rate be able to secure it for him at market price. At present it often happens that no more oats or barley perhaps are left in stock, and one is consequently obliged to take one's 10 lb. in gram or some grain which is exactly the food one wishes to avoid giving one's horses at that time. It is the squadron leader and not the supply officer who knows when he can arrange to give his horses a little less, in order to save for the time when they will want more; or if certain of them require different kinds of feeding from the others. It is impossible for him to make his plans long before; and he must always have his horses fit for service. Unless he can draw at short notice exactly what he wants for his various horses, always keeping within the 10 lb. limit per horse, and settling up at the end of the year, he is not altogether responsible for the condition of his horses. This arrangement would be valuable training in peace time for officers and N.C.O.'s. They would learn by personal experience the kind and quantity of grain on which they could best condition their horses, and be better able in consequence to requisition or commandeer on service what was needful to keep their horses fit and mobile.

I should also like to see it laid down in mobilisation regulations that at least 5 per cent. of spare horses are to be led with each squadron. No Cavalry will remain mobile and up to strength without some spare horses. Even with the best horse-mastership accidents will happen, and more casualties occur among horses than among men. A horse may go slightly lame or get fever, and if he is able to be led quietly along for a few days, he will soon recover; but if he has to be ridden and to carry a heavy weight on his back, without an easy, or the chance of a rest, he will get weaker and weaker, until he has no strength left to recover, and die or be left at some farm, too weak to be of any use again during the campaign. experience in South Africa taught us that it was false economy to have no spare horses. I think mobility is of such importance that I would willingly weaken my fighting strength by five or six men per squadron, who would be needed to lead spare horses, if I could give my sick horses a chance thereby.

(b) To train our Cavalry in peace time to habits of discipline and endurance, so that the strain of war which falls on them first of all will not find them unfit.

The experiences of every war teach us that the side that can last the longest wins in the long run, and we can see clearly, by the many days that the battles of Liaoyang and Mukden

dragged on, of what supreme importance endurance and discipline have now become. If in peace time Cavalry have not been trained to do long marches, they will give their horses sore backs by rolling about in their saddles when tired; if they cannot endure long days without water, they will get enteric by drinking from every puddle; if they are not accustomed to do without rest sometimes at night, they will sleep on outpost; if they are not taught to look after their horse, they will overload their saddle with turkeys or geese from a neighbouring farm and gorge themselves, while they leave their horse saddled and unfed, tied to the gatepost—thus wearing out their horses, on whose mobility they depend, and becoming themselves only a useless encumbrance to the corps whose misfortune it is to own them. Certain rules of stable management, such as feeding, watering, or shackling horses properly, etc., must be enforced by strict discipline in barracks, in camp, and especially on the march. Men must be punished for carelessness or neglect in saddling or overriding their horses, and should have their proficiency pay lowered or taken away if they become immobile owing to their own fault. The strictest discipline is needed, even in peace time, to ensure that horses are not overweighted by extra things being put into nosebags or being tied on to the saddles, and 'service marching order' should be the usual 'turn out' for all parades except those merely for drill on the drill ground.

(c) By frequent manœuvres to make sure that the Organisation and Transport are mobile, and in good working order.

Every commander should realise that his Cavalry requires rest whenever possible, just as much as the Infantry, if they are to remain mobile. It seems to me that, to get full value out of manœuvres, they should be short but continuous, and under service conditions. For example: after three or four days bivouacking, etc., it should be arranged for two days' rest in a comfortable standing camp or barracks; then three or four more days of the 'strenuous life' and so on, according to the

climate and conditions. The greatest difficulty to the mobility of Cavalry is the amount of mobile transport it requires, and constant practice in mobilising and manœuvres is the only way of testing in peace time its readiness to move. It is a great pity that British Cavalry cannot have their own first line transport always with them; squadron leaders would get to know their animals and drivers, and be responsible for their loads. Our native Cavalry in India have a great advantage in this respect; they have their own first line transport always with them in their lines and can move off with three days' supplies at a moment's notice. If this cannot be arranged for all, it is all the more necessary to practise the transport on manœuvres.

The man's food, groceries, biscuit, and tinned meat does not need much transport; but the bulk of grain required to keep horses going in hard condition for any length of time is often an impossible conundrum for the transport officer. Until some compressed food is invented on which horses can live and work, it will be, I fear, the chief difficulty in making use of the mobility of Cavalry in many parts of the world where British Cavalry may be called on to fight. In most European countries, especially at the beginning of the war, there will be ample forage for horses to be found and carts to transport it on. It is surely a good thing in peace time to practise squadron leaders, troop leaders, and their men in going out and living on the country in which they happen to be quartered, without transport at all. Intead of the forage and ration allowance being drawn, give the squadron leader the money—perhaps some more can be added from some manœuvre grant or some regimental fund-send out his squadron for a few days' manœuvres to make their own arrangements and buy all the food and forage that is necessary. Amongst other things, this accustoms men to cook for themselves, forage for their horses, and learn what they can find in the villages; it makes them look about and sharpens their wits, much more even than manœuvres, when, as a rule, on coming into camp they find dinners cooked and everything

ready for them. At the beginning of the war in South Africa, when men were offered fresh meat in the shape of so many live sheep, they preferred tinned meat, because it took less time to prepare. After a few months' campaigning, if there happened to be an unlucky flock of sheep near the halting place, a good many would be skinned, roasted, and eaten, and the men ready to move again with good fresh meat in them, in the same time as they would have taken a few months before to have killed the sheep, let alone cooking them. If in peace time men are taught how to look after themselves and their horses independently of transport, it will greatly increase their mobility in time of war.

If Napoleon found it possible a hundred years ago for his large armies to live on the country, it is surely much easier now. His campaigns of 1805-6-7 are especially instructive on these points. His men never carried tents; in 1806 the captured Prussian tents were cut up, partly for bandages for the hospital, partly for shirts for men. If cantonments were out of the question, they bivouacked in the open, whatever the weather. His pursuit of the Prussians after Jena and Auerstadt was certainly one of his masterpieces, and I venture to think that not even Napoleon's columns could have accomplished what they did if they had had to depend solely on supply trains and waggons, instead of living on the country.

It is, I hope, clear that the writer has a strong belief in the splendid future of the Cavalry arm, that in times to come it will discharge in the main the same functions as in the past; that some of those duties will be more completely discharged by Cavalry than they have been, and that brilliant as were the deeds of the Cavaliers of Rupert, magnificent as was the work of Cromwell's Ironsides, deeds just as brilliant, work just as splendid will await the Cavalry of the future. We in the British Cavalry have good stuff to work upon, and I am confident that if all of us in our several departments do all we can to make our Cavalry 'mobile' in every detail, there will be no Cavalry equal to us in the world.

CAVALRY TRAINING IN HOT WEATHER

By Major E. M. J. Molyneux, D.S.O.

We give some extracts from a lecture on the above subject which was given to subaltern officers, and was subsequently published in the Journal of the United Service Institution of India in April last.

In the most recent text-books both of Cavalry and Infantry great stress is very properly laid upon teaching N.C.O.'s and men 'to use their own judgment.' But there is not really very much suggestion conveyed in these works as to the concrete meaning of 'using their own judgment.' And yet, under certain not infrequent conditions of modern war, the fact of their having been so trained becomes all-important. Nothing, to my mind, is more trying to the officer in command of a squadron scattered in fire action for the first time in war than the feeling of his own complete personal helplessness to influence events; that all the control has passed out of his hands for the moment, and that all now depends upon the training of his men—a training the deficiencies in which he then realises fully for the first time.

It is then that the conscientious and painstaking squadron commander will find himself richly repaid, and the 'idle apprentice' suffer, as surely as in Hogarth's story. It is only the man who has not seen war or does not understand human nature that can lay the flattering unction to his soul that 'they will do it all right when the bullets begin to fly about.' Will they? Their commander may himself, when in action for the first time under a hot fire, know what to do and what his men should each do. But he may very possibly find that he, like the rest, is chained to one spot: to move up and down the



line may mean certain death for no advantage. And he will find that the mental paralysis which comes upon many men when under the strain of intense excitement—as will be caused by their first serious action, which, for reasons of ground, etc., may quite possibly be a dismounted one—prevents their minds from acting at all except along familiar lines. I remember the conduct of a couple of raw recruits on one occasion when a patrol in Natal was retiring under fire. We had been across the Tugela into the enemy's lines, and some men had been dismounted to open fire and so check pursuit. We had got some distance back towards the river, when, to my horror, I saw two of the men who had dismounted were far behind. They were running towards us on foot, holding their horses between themselves and the bullets, now spattering all round them, for protection. Not until an officer rode up to them, and, gripping their bridles, forced them to mount, did they get into the saddle. They were not demoralised by terror: only, as they explained, their minds became too much of a blank to think out an unfamiliar situation.

ATTACK AND DEFENCE

Many exercises involving the practical combination of musketry principles with a tactical idea can be well carried out in the hot weather. In an operation such as the turning out of a hostile patrol or other small body from a well or farmhouse in which he is checking the advance—a very frequent proceeding on service, which cannot be always avoided by riding round his flanks—all ranks should have practice in putting into execution what they are all taught in theory: that when any unit rises to make a forward rush, other units still lying under cover should support the advance by pouring in, without waiting for orders, the most rapid and concentrated fire upon the objective; fire at other times being slow and deliberate. They should all know the object of this: that as the enemy rises to fire on advancing troops, the sudden storm of bullets will make him involuntarily duck, or in any case unsteady his aim sufficiently to make his fire harmless. Make the men give you the reason for what they do; it is not enough for them to know that 'it is the order.' If you will fall out all officers and non-commissioned officers when doing practices such as the above, you will probably be disappointed at first to find how slow and unhandy the men are at watching for a forward move from another portion of the advancing line, and at commencing a rapid fire on their own initiative.

AMBUSCADES

The practice of ambuscades, again, does not necessarily call for physical exertion. A useful practice is for the squadron commander, with a pair of good field-glasses, to ride forward along a road on either side of which cover and broken ground exist, leaving orders with a native officer or non-commissioned officer to ambuscade him on his return. On his return he should dismount, and, field-glasses in hand, examine everything in the nature of cover on either side of the road for the slightest trace of the ambuscade as he slowly approaches. Given keen sight and good glasses, his men will very soon find that not only none of the ambuscading party can show themselves, but not even the look-out men can observe otherwise than through a bush or tuft of grass or from under dense shadow. At first all kinds of errors will be observed: the ground will be ill chosen, the men will fire into one another from across the road, the outbreak of fire will not be simultaneous, or proper arrangements made for communication, fire control, or resistance to counter-attack.

Scouts

Another item, for which adequate time is hard to find in the drill season, is the training of scouts. As there is no inducement in our service for any man to become a scout, it will possibly be found necessary to make it a rule in the squadron that no man will be considered for promotion who has not fulfilled the duties

of a scout satisfactorily. As promotions will constantly lessen their number, a dozen men must be under training at once, either as scouts or as understudies. A good exercise is to start them in two parties four or five miles apart and let them work towards one another, but necessarily without either party being aware of when the other started, so as to keep them on the alert from the very start. Whichever side sees the other first wins. The squadron commander must be very careful not to betray either side by his presence if he rides about to watch. Apart from disguises, any ruse should be allowed—such as getting up a tree and allowing the other side to pass, etc. In course of time, with patience and good temper, you will find them surprisingly fertile and ingenious in expedients. I remember on one occasion two parties engaged on the above exercise both arriving simultaneously at the edge of a belt of absolutely open ground. Neither knew for certain that the other party was on the opposite edge, but strongly suspected that they were there. The situation looked like 'stale mate.' But from the party with which I was lying concealed, an irrigation channel, a couple of feet deep and overgrown with bushes, ran halfway across the belt, and then lost itself in the fields. As we watched for any sign of the opposite side, a couple of buffalo calves came out from a well at the far side and wandered across together towards the end of the irrigation channel mentioned above. On arriving there they separated and commenced to browse. A scout from our side now began to crawl down the same channel: when halfway down he was fired at by a hostile scout under a bush within half a dozen vards of him-which ended the exercise. I rode up, and asked him how he had got there unseen. He had seized on the two buffalo calves, and, stooping between them with a tail in either hand, had guided them to cover; then, letting go their tails, he dropped flat into the channel unseen: once there he could again crawl forward. The simple expedient that had occurred to his bucolic mind might never have suggested itself to an educated man.

BLANK FIRING

All horses should be thoroughly accustomed to passing through a line of men firing blank cartridge at them as hard as they can load. This can be done equally well in the hot weather. Dismount a troop, and extend them standing at about ten paces intervals, between the remaining troops and the water troughs, as the squadron returns from work. When in extended order the horses are fifty yards away, the line opens fire, and gets in another round (aimed well up in the air) when the horse is quite close. Each rider is nevertheless to pass so close to the man who fired at him that he can touch him with his hand. This to be done at all paces: there is plenty of blank cartridge available, and it cannot be put to a better use. Later, the dismounted men to spring up and fire when the horsemen are close up. If the horses are thirsty and want their drink they will go on unless genuinely frightened; in the latter case they will be marked down for extra practice until they do not mind the fire in the least. In accounts of the charges of French Cavalry in the war of 1870, we find allusions made to the fact that they failed to damage the German Infantry much, because the horses at the last moment shied off and refused to face the fire. We might at any time be called upon to do the same work: we can only be sure of horses doing this properly in war if practised in peace to consider fire innocuous.

CAVALRY SWORDSMANSHIP IN 1854

By Colonel H. J. Landon, Inspector of Gymnasia in India

The question of 'cut' versus 'thrust' has long been under discussion, and an article which we published in October 1906 showed how entirely the 'cut' for Cavalry had lost favour. We republish here the practical opinion of a soldier with great experience of actual fighting.

For many years past there have been but few opportunities for Cavalry to test in battle the relative merits of cut and thrust, and as the condition of a Cavalry charge on actual impact with the enemy can hardly be said to have altered since the earliest ages, the recorded opinion of tried men at any date must always be worth consideration.

It may, therefore, be of interest to give the reply of Brigadier-General John Jacob, C.B. (one of the finest characters in British military history), to a letter asking, in 1854, for his opinion on the 'cut versus thrust' question for the information of the Commander-in-Chief of the Bombay Army, together with an extract from his diary on the same subject.

The extracts are from a book now out of print, entitled 'The Views and Opinions of Brigadier-General John Jacob, C.B., A.D.C. to the Queen,' collected and edited by Captain Lewis Pelly, 1858, and cannot fail to be of interest to all to whom the subject appeals, and who have probably not had access to the book referred to.

As is well known, General Jacob spent about twenty years of his life in practical mounted warfare in Scinde, with an enemy who were skilled riders and swordsmen; and the result of this long experience is entirely in favour of the cut, and against the thrust, for mounted men.

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Most of the old swords seen in armouries and collections were for the use of men on foot, when undoubtedly the point is of far greater effect than the cut; but I think that if Cavalry are to be armed with a weapon with which an effective cut cannot be delivered, we shall regret the decision when the time comes to put it to the battle test.

Adjutant-General's Office, Headquarters, Bombay, 15th February, 1854.

SIR,—With reference to the prevailing general opinion that the native Cavalry soldier, when in personal conflict with the enemy, is more disposed to make use of the edge of his sword than the (more effective) point, and for which the weapon with which he is at present armed is more particularly adapted, I am directed by the Commander-in-Chief to request that you will report whether, with the view of habituating the trooper to the more general use of the point, you consider it advisable to discontinue the practice of the 'cuts' in the sword exercise, restricting the men to the 'guards,' 'parries,' and 'points.'

(Signed) J. Hale, Lieutenant-Colonel,

Deputy Adjutant-General of the Army.

SIR,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your circular letter, No. 760, of the 15th February, 1854, to my address, and with reference to its subject to state, that experience in real fight shows that, for horse soldiers, the cut is far more deadly and effective in every way than the point of the sword.

The straight sword, and the use of its point, are far more formidable than the cutting sword in the hands of men on foot, and I was myself strongly prejudiced in their favour for use on horseback also, until many trials in the field quite convinced me of the contrary.

On horseback, when moving at a rapid pace, as the Cavalry ought always to be in attacking, the arm, after a home-thrust, cannot be drawn back sufficiently quickly; the speed of the horse carries all forward with great velocity, and the blade runs up to the hilt, or breaks before it can be withdrawn.

I have had my own sword forcibly struck from my hand in this manner, the hilt striking with the greatest violence against a man's breast after the blade had passed through his body. The blade happened to be very good and strong, and the hilt was attached to my wrist by a stout leather strap; neither gave way, but as the horse passed on at speed, the body of the tall heavy man who had assailed me was turned completely round and over by the blade of the sword in it, before the weapon could free itself.

The violence of the shock, and the concurrent circumstances attending this and hundreds of other somewhat similar circumstances, perfectly convince me that on such occasions the chances are ten to one that the sword will break or the Cavalry soldier be torn from his seat; or both these accidents may occur.

I have for long past had not a doubt but that the cutting sword is by far the most formidable weapon for the hands of the Cavalry soldier.

The old curved dragoon sabre is about its best form; these blades, made of the best English cast steel, mounted with steel basket-hilts, with the scabbards lined with a complete scabbard of wood, appear to me to be the most perfect weapons possible.

The native soldiers much prefer them to any Eastern blade whatever, and I can imagine nothing more effective.

I have never used any sword exercise with the men of the Scinde Irregular Horse, thinking that it is not required; but I have myself witnessed very many instances of the terrible power of their cutting weapons, and those of the enemy.

Two remarkable instances occur to me which it may be well to mention.

At the battle of Meeanee, a well-mounted Belooche warrior was flourishing his sword and challenging all comers. A sowar of the Scinde Irregular Horse rode at him at speed, and in an instant cut the man's head off at one blow. In the same battle,

a sowar of the Scinde Irregular Horse, riding hard at the man opposed to him—a stout, able-bodied Belooche on foot, armed with sword and shield—the latter was knocked violently down by the horse's shoulder, but as he lay on his back on the ground, the Belooche warrior struck upwards so violent a blow with his heavy curved blade, that the sword cut completely through both branches of the under jaw of the sowar's horse, and the front part of the animal's lower jaw, with all its incisor teeth, remained hanging by a piece of skin only.

The force of this blow appeared to me so extraordinary, that I for long preserved the skull of the horse on which it took effect.

In my opinion it would be of very great advantage to replace the straight swords at present in use by the broad curved cutting blade, like those now used by the Scinde Irregular Horse.

I have the honour, etc.,
(Signed) JOHN JACOB, Major,
Commanding Scinde Irregular Horse.

To Colonel Hale,
Deputy Adjutant-General of the Army,
Bombay.

Extract from Brigadier-General John Jacob's Diary

CAVALRY SWORDS (1854)

It is no mistake to arm Cavalry Sepoys with good cutting swords of one uniform pattern. The English sword (not the Government regulation iron, but a weapon made in England, of good steel, and of proper shape) is infinitely better than any Eastern blade. All the native soldiers prefer it, and even my wild Belooches are all begging to be allowed to buy these swords at any price. The things cut of themselves, however unskilfully handled.

The steel scabbard is best, if it have a complete wooden scabbard inside it, a construction, however, which I have never yet been able to persuade any English maker to adopt or understand. They always leave the wood open, or imperfectly closed at the edge, where it is wanted most, and put a lot of screws and iron springs about the mouth of the scabbard, which totally defeat the object of the wooden lining. The scabbards of the Scinde Horse are of wood and leather, made as strong as may be; but still they wear out too fast, and break too often to please me. My own swords have metal scabbards, made large purposely, and lined with complete wooden scabbards, the bell-mouth being formed of wood. These scabbards are best of all.

Great mistakes exist regarding the respective powers of the edges and points of swords. On foot, or when moving slowly, it is unnecessary to argue in favour of the point of the fencer its superiority is evident to all. But on horseback, the speed of the horse prevents the swordsman from drawing back his arm with sufficient rapidity after a home-thrust. So that if going at speed, as every Cavalry soldier ought to be in attacking, his sword, after passing through his enemy, is very liable to be knocked out of his hand, the weapon running up to the hilt, and then, of course, violently stopping. This has occurred to myself, when I should have been disarmed had not the sword been buckled to my wrist with a very strong leather strap. The same thing must have occurred to others. Such a tremendous twist, too, will certainly break any but a very first-rate blade, and is not a fair trial for a good sword. Wherefore, for Cavalry soldiers, curved cutting blades are best. Straight swords will not cut, save in skilful hands; curved blades cut fearfully, with very little or no skill on the part of the soldier.

THE CAMEL CORPS OF THE EGYPTIAN ARMY

By Captain A. J. B. Percival, D.S.O.


In writing on the above subject I am confining myself entirely to the Camel Corps as it at present exists, and have not ventured to include an account of the Camel Corps which, consisting of Egyptians and Sudanese, established its reputation throughout the Dongola and Nile Expeditions under Colonel Tudway, culminating in the final overthrow of the Khalifa under General Henry.

In 1902 the Sirdar decided to establish an Arab Company, and Colonel Wilkinson was authorised to raise 150 men, and thus the foundations of the Camel Corps were laid. In this year and the next a clean sweep was made of the whole of the old system of the Camel Corps, both in personnel and equipment.


A Sudanese Company was formed, out of the nucleus of the old Sudanese companies, on the same lines as those of Arab companies.

In 1902-1903 another Camel Company was raised. In 1904 a Horse and Abyssinian Mule Company was also raised, and yet another Camel Company in 1906, so that at present the Camel Corps consists of four Camel Companies and one Mounted Infantry Company, mounted on horses and mules, making a total of five companies with a headquarters staff of 7 B.O.'s, 21 Egyptian officers, 750 N.C.O.'s and men, exclusive of artisans, etc., 714 camels, 30 horses, and 160 Abyssinian mules. The unit is the company, and each company is commanded by a British officer, who has four Egyptian officers to assist him and

THE CAMEL CORPS OF THE EGYPTIAN ARMY.




A SECTION IN FOURS.



A SECTION IN LINE.

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
From Photographs kindly sent by CAPT. H. R. HEADLAM (Egyptian Army).



A CAMEL-MAN OF THE EGYPTIAN ARMY.



THE MULE COMPANY OF THE NIAM NIAM PATROL.



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150 N.C.O.'s and men, with 166 camels (or in the mule company 80 horses and 160 mules) to look after.

The men are drawn from many various tribes all over the Sudan, and are up-to-date, eager, and willing to enlist; in fact, there would be at present no difficulty in raising more Arab or Sudanese Companies if they were required, as it is a popular service. They enlist for three years, and can re-engage if willing (or if wanted) for periods of two years at a time.

The powers of the Commandant as regards discipline are of necessity frequently delegated to the company officers owing to the distances involved, and consequent isolation from head-quarters; the Commandant has also powers of reduction of N.C.O.'s and discharge of men.

The men are armed with the Martini-Enfield rifle and a sword of the pioneer type which is not only a useful weapon of offence, but enables men to make zeribas, clear paths, etc.

Every man feeds and clothes himself, and provides his water, forage, and bread-skins. Otherwise, the Government finds everything. Their kit is simple and practical, being modelled on the lines of the native costume:

- (a) For patrol work a khakee suit, consisting of emma, waist-coat, jibbeh (a loose shirt which comes down to the knees), green kamarband, loose drawers, and putties and sandals, with a great coat.
- (b) For parades and barrack duties, the same in white with green kamarband, blue puttees, and a tuft of black ostrich feathers tucked into emma.

A month's leave per annum is given if possible.

No barracks are provided. Each man builds his own straw hut, in which he can keep himself and his family, but no harimat is recognised by the Government, and if the company shifts its headquarters the men bring their families along at their own expense to the new station; so hindrances of this kind are not taken into consideration.

Under this system each company becomes to a great extent



an independent command, and consequently the officer in charge has, what every British officer revels in, his own show to run with as little interference and red tape as possible.

The raison d'être of the Camel Corps is to supply the place of Mounted Infantry, and its main objects are:

- (a) To help to maintain the peace, and prevent by patrols any small risings and raids which are liable to occur among the wilder tribes in the outlying districts of the Sudan.
- (b) To supply the want of a rapidly moving self-contained force in case of need arising.

The necessity of a corps of this kind will be readily comprehended when the vast size of the Sudan is taken into consideration, and the impossibility of providing troops everywhere is realised.

Consequently, the main idea in raising, organising, and equipping the Camel Corps has been to make the force as light and as self-contained as possible. .

The result is that it has been found practicable for a Camel Company to be ready to march anywhere within four hours of receipt of orders, each man having with him five days' forage for the camel, five days' water and food for himself, and 260 rounds of ammunition, so that, without any previous notice, within four hours of the word 'Go,' a Camel Company can march five days (or more in the cold weather) in any direction on its own resources.

As each man is responsible for his own food practically no supply corps arrangements are necessary in barracks or on patrol, the men can live on very little, and the local resources of the country have up to date been found adequate. Another advantage of the camel is the great distances which can be covered without replenishing water supply—e.g. a detachment this year went 250 miles without renewing their water supply from one well to another, and returned by the same route after a few days' rest.

The Horse and Mule Company is organised on the same lines as the Camel Company. The Abyssinian mule is a very hardy

animal, and can keep its condition well on grass only. The company has marched for two days without water, which is a fair test of endurance for both man and beast. Both camel and mule companies have had frequent and heavy patrol work to do during the past three years, and have been out on continuous patrol work for over six months at a time, so they keep in training.

The Arabs are naturally high-spirited, are born riders of any animal, have no fear at any personal pain, but are very independent. This latter trait is apt to cause occasional trouble, and it requires considerable tact and discretion in dealing with them; but as soon as they realise that the chain of responsibility must be maintained, and once a feeling of trust has been established, so that the English and Egyptian officers feel that they have gained the confidence of their men, there is no work, however hard or dangerous, which the Arabs would not undertake with a light heart.

Thus, although under the new system the Camel Corps has not as yet been engaged in any serious warfare to test the Arabs' capabilities, and although there exists the disadvantage to a certain extent of the discipline being maintained on the part of the Arabs by a sense of personal attachment to their officers, as long as the officers reciprocate this feeling and show that their interest in the men is keen there need be no fear of failure when the time comes to prove their worth.

In conclusion, I think I may assert without any exaggeration that the life of a British officer in the Camel Corps of the Egyptian army is very attractive and full of interest, for not only does he gain great experience and have plenty to do in training his company in patrol work, in obtaining a good working knowledge of each of his men, and in mastering the vernacular, but he also has a chance of some shooting, of seeing a new country, and also of learning a good deal about the habits, customs, and treatment of that much abused but very excellent and patient servant the camel.

HOW TO HIT YOUR MAN WITH A PISTOL

Although in action a man's life so often depends upon his revolver, it is wonderful how few officers and non-commissioned officers took the trouble, till within the last two or three years, to make themselves into good pistol shots. Deliberate standing fire at a black-and-white target is, of course, of very little practical use except as an elementary step; it does not make the man a good pistol shot any more than lying on the floor and working one's arms and legs to learn the movement of swimming makes one into an expert swimmer. As in so many other branches of the soldier's education, the aim has gradually become lost sight of, and the steps towards it have become the object of training.

Sword exercise was originally intended as a step to make a man a swordsman, but it became a drill; as soon as he had attained the correct attitude and could cut, point, and parry exactly in time with his neighbour the soldier was dismissed his sword exercise, and after a little stage sword-play with singlesticks of 'Ead, 'ead one,' he was passed as a trained swordsman.

The object of instruction in pistol shooting is that a man should be able to shoot his enemy in the movement and rush of action; but his only practice to that end was to stand before a black-and-white target and fire deliberate aimed shots at it. The quick, unaimed fire required on service was never indulged in, and yet once the knack of this is acquired it is a most effective defence, and the man who has it is blest with far greater self-confidence in a tight corner.

The knack consists in loosing the hammer of the cocked pistol exactly at the moment when the muzzle is pointing at the object, and it can be acquired by anyone after practice. The pistol is quickly swung into direction and fired without aim being taken along the sights.

It may be either flung upwards by an underhand movement, or overhand into alignment, according to the taste of the firer, though underhand is preferable.

The act of firing is accomplished either by holding the hammer at full cock with the thumb and releasing it at the right moment, pressure on the trigger being meantime kept up with the forefinger; or the trigger is pressed exactly at the required moment. The act is very much like that of throwing a stone—the finger releases the stone at the exact point of the swing of the arm when it will be projected on to the object.

As an elementary practice it is useful to stand before a big looking-glass, and, with your own reflection to represent the enemy, to swing and snap your pistol (N.B. not loaded), and notice in the glass where the muzzle pointed at the moment of firing.

Then practise it on the move, walking past the looking-glass without any pause for aiming. The next step is to practise in the same way, with ball, on a dummy target representing a man, or, better, a man's figure painted on an iron target, so that you can

see where your misses go to. As soon as you have got the hang of it standing, carry on the practice on the move by walking past the target or by firing at a moving target.


The final stage is to practise mounted shooting at a dummy, both at the walk, canter, and fast gallop.

Care should be taken not to fire much towards the front—that is, close past your horse's ears—as the sharp report is apt to make him pistol-shy.



But the best practice of all is, of course, to fire at a mounted opponent who is also firing at you, and this practice appears now to be very nearly feasible since they have invented, in France, a kind of wax bullet which, though it will not penetrate clothes &c., flies with sufficient force and accuracy at twenty-five yards to show where a bullet would actually go.

The bullet is made of a mixture of wax and grease and is inserted like the ordinary bullet into the head of a special form



of metal cartridge case, but without any charge of powder behind itthe detonating cap giving sufficient impulse to the bullet to propel it the required distance. The bullet thus discharged can be put into Detonating charge a target four inches by five at twenty yards.

When two opponents fight each other special precautions have to be taken to avoid their being struck on the bare skin by the bullet, therefore a wire mask like a fencing mask is worn, preferably one with plate-glass eye-piece. The hands are protected by gauntlets or by a metal guard attached to the pistol. A blouse may be worn over the clothing to take the grease stains of the bullet. These articles can be obtained from M. Piot Lepaye, 12 Rue d'Enghien, Paris.

The bullet is the invention of Dr. Devillers, President of the Paris Pistol Clubs.

These bullets were used in the pistol tournament in the Tuileries and the practice was very good, some of the competitors hitting their opponent six or seven times in eight shots at twenty-five yards.

There seems no doubt that with a little practical experience in mounted combats of this kind officers and others armed with the pistol should very quickly become really deadly shots.

NOTES ON SCOUTING

By LIEUT. F. W. BLAND, Legion of Frontiersmen

TRAINING

In the early stages of training men should work in pairs, commencing in their own town. They should walk round, and see everything, the small things in particular, such as the number and prices of objects in shop windows, or peculiarities of people and animals, each man to keep his observations to himself, making his separate notes at the end of the day. Compare two sets of notes, and it will be seen what a lot has been missed. The learners should peg away at this exercise until they can move about town and miss nothing.

A second useful exercise is for one man to go for a walk, and with a bit of chalk dot here a fence, there a wall, a post, or a paving stone. His partner must track him by these signs, which should be reduced in size and number with each day's training.

Having gained the habit of systematic and close observation, the students, still hunting in pairs, should work by map and compass, making a careful study of the surrounding country. They will find that there is a great difference, as the ground varies, in the tracks left by animals. They should study the habits and movements of birds and animals, and the different kinds of soil, the distribution of ridges and valleys, the reasons for each twist and turn in road or track. They should learn the clues for finding points of the compass: the church points its chancel to the east; the moss grows on north side of a lone tree; the average of the trees lean away from the W.S.W. wind (for United Kingdom only).

In all this the students should note everything without informing each other, each trying to distract the other's attention from work, but to guard his own study from disturbance. A scout who allows anything to distract him from his work is useless. Returning by same route, the students should note the different appearance of country as seen from the opposite direction. They should compare their notes in the evening.

Visiting any strange town or district students should learn the map first, but on no account ask the way, relying entirely on their own powers of observation for guidance. A special study should be made of the conduct of birds and animals when startled—for that is the smell of danger on active service. They should practise how near they can get to birds, rabbits, or cattle, always if possible working up the wind. They should lie down and with ear to the ground listen for the sounds made by passing vehicles, cattle, or persons, finding at what distance such sounds can be heard, from a given number at such and such a rate of speed.

All that was learned by day must now be practised at night, when the land looks totally different and every object unfamiliar. If they are strange to the scout, so also are they to the enemy. The scout in night work should learn to avoid the road, keeping a parallel course, near enough for seeing and hearing. He should move slowly, usually dismounted, for a horse cannot travel rapidly over open country at night. A scout should be just as well practised and proficient by night as he is by day. It is very trying work, and a scout's nerves are always strung up; but by practice he soon feels at home on the trail at night as much as by day. It is under night conditions that the senses of hearing and smell are most useful, when silence and caution are necessary, and the greatest care must be taken to look back, noting the landmarks for guidance in the retreat.

TACT

In illustration of the tact needed in a scout, the following example will serve. Two scouts were sent out from Thabanchu in the Orange Free State to reconnoitre the ground between that town and Winburg. It was supposed that a commando of 5,000 men held the district, and as we had but 40 men in Thabanchu an attack upon that town was not desired. The chief scout and his subordinate arranged that each of them, working on his own, should make a wide circle to meet at Brandsdrift, bringing to that place any burghers found on the way. When they met the chief scout had nine prisoners, and his comrade four, with information that the Boer strength was 1,000. Going home with the prisoners, the chief scout found that one of them lived on a farm near by, and being newly married was in a sad way at leaving his wife. The scout felt real sorry for this burgher, and on his promising to go home and not to the commando released the prisoner, telling him that General Hunter held Thabanchu with 5,000 men, eight guns, and a frightful temper. That is why the Boers left Thabanchu alone, and got a very warm reception at Ladybrand.

All small and advanced parties should be watched and noted, but avoided like the plague, for scout duty is information, not fighting.

The scout can find the enemy's position and strength by exposing himself and drawing fire, and although this is not recommended, an instance may be used in illustration: Three scouts met at Eden, and in the distance saw a large force holding the side of a kopje. This being an unusual position something must be behind it. The scouts having tired horses, being in need of remounts, and seeing enemy's stock grazing in front of the position, decided to draw fire. So at a few paces apart they rode to within 200 yards of the Boer front. Firing is as infectious as measles, and the whole commando opened. The scouts, their own horses being wounded, fired at the grazing herd.

A herd when frightened will always bunch round standing horses, so the Boer herd gathered round the wounded horses of the scouts, each of whom got a fresh mount.

Information

All information should be personal, nothing being hearsay or chance, and the scout must be prepared to prove everything shown in his report. At the same time the scout should collect, remember, and test all sorts of hearsay information, taking care to question women and especially children, using the utmost tact and sympathy of manner. This especially applies to the scouting of towns.

And if you return without any news to report do not be disheartened. The Commander-in-Chief may be testing, not for information, but to see what you are made of for future use.

Much depends on the absolute truthfulness and reliability of the scout, whose report may avert defeat or make victory possible. He should always work as though on him depended the responsibility of the campaign and the result to his country. For it is indeed true that bad intelligence work entails defeat and disaster, while good scouting is the beginning of victory.

There remain a few general rules.

Mere pluck is not worth a dog's bark at this game, although plenty of pluck is required.

If you are in danger go nearer, for in turning back there is a chance of being hit in a place where you would not care to show the scar.

Hear everything, but say little; for there is more learned by the ear than by the mouth.

If the person giving the orders is with you on the trail, obey in every detail; but if alone, obey such parts of the orders as seem right, following your judgment for the balance.

HOW CAVALRY MIGHT HAVE BEEN USED IN THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR

TRANSLATED IN BRIEF FROM THE Internationale Revue über die gesamten Armeen und Flotten: Beiheft 86.

THE writer starts with the statement that the Cavalry on neither side were so useless as has generally been supposed, and that there is much to learn not only from what was actually accomplished, but also from what was left undone. The fundamental mistake of the Russian military authorities lay in undervaluing the enemy, as was shown by the fact that it was not at first thought necessary to detail for service in the Far East any due proportion of the regular Russian European Cavalry. Only three regiments were finally detailed, and of these the 51st and 52nd Dragoons actually only joined the 17th Army Corps at the end of July 1904. These, however, were able to obtain and send in far more reliable information than the Cossacks had ever been able to furnish. The writer further points out that even of the Cossacks the best were not sent to the seat of war, that the Cossack himself had for long past no longer been in a position, as of old, to mount and arm himself, that the Government, which had undertaken to mount them, found it very difficult to do so satisfactorily, and that their mounts were anything but up to the mark.

It was expected that the *sotnias* of the three Siberian corps having been long in the country would prove the best suited for the work of the campaign, and the experiment was made of attaching to them officers of the Household or Line Cavalry—one which did not give good results. As the author of this article declares: 'Cavalry to be of any real use on service must have been associated with its leaders during peace, must have

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thoroughly learnt what its duties are in war, and must ever bear in mind that upon its performances depend often results of the very highest importance.'

Writing of the numerical weakness of the Japanese Cavalry, it is suggested that it would have been preferable had only one or at most two squadrons been given to divisions as divisional Cavalry instead of four, thus allowing of the employment of large independent bodies of Cavalry for special work, since the Japanese Intelligence was so thoroughly well organised that with battles of position there was less need of large bodies of mounted men for security and reconnaissance. The old reasons are here again brought forward for the organisation, and training of the Cavalry being less thorough than with the other arms in Japan the absence of a good breed of suitable horses, the want of a wellorganised remount department, the unadaptability as horsemen of the ordinary Japanese. None the less, the writer has nothing but praise for the intelligence, good marksmanship and aptitude in the field of such Japanese Cavalry as took part in the war. It is a mistake to suppose, as has been stated, that Oyama drew all the material for his operations from spies: the information gleaned by the Cavalry was plentiful and valuable, and the Japanese Commander has done this arm full justice. The Japanese Cavalry never shirked dismounted work, either alone or even shoulder to shoulder with the Infantry; this may, it is suggested, have been due to the fact that the mounted men could hardly hope to oppose with success, mounted, the Russian Cavalry masses, and that consequently they remained in close proximity to their own Infantry and adopted the methods of this arm when the enemy appeared in overpowering strength.

The writer here quotes numerous instances of dismounted action by the Japanese Cavalry, mentions occasions when positions were successfully held by them against the enemy's Infantry, and cites one instance of a mounted fight with Cossacks at Wafangkoo, where the Cossacks did not come off altogether second best. He has nothing but praise for the effect, moral

and material, of the raids by the Japanese Cavalry against the Russian communications!; he specially eulogises the work of Major Sasegawa in destroying the railway some ninety-five miles S.W. of Harbin, and the attempts of Major Naganuma on the line more than 150 miles N. of Mukden. Incidentally these operations proved that the Japanese knew how to work their horses in such raids, while they are also an object lesson in what may be carried through even by small bodies of a numerically weak Cavalry. Each of these parties consisted only of seventy-five men.

In small things as in great, the Russian Cavalry was disappointing; the fault lay in the defective peace training, and in the want of any clear instructions as to the conduct of Cavalry operations—a want for which Kuropatkin endeavoured to make up by a series of explanatory orders issued during the course of the war, which, useful as they should have been, were not properly studied and attended to. The Russian Cavalry began well enough: Mischtschenko reported fully enough Kuroki's march to the Yalu, and was even able to delay it; but in the battle itself the Cavalry reconnaissance failed altogether, and General Sassulitsch was completely taken by surprise by the turning of his left flank. After the battle, too, the strength of Kuroki's army and the direction of its march remained only imperfectly known to the Russian Cavalry on Numerous other cases are instanced where the either flank. Russian Cavalry failed—whether in minor or large operations. Even in the one case where the Cavalry of the 17th Corps learnt and made a timely report of the threatening advance of General Oku, the news, by some mischance, reached headquarters too late for Kuropatkin to take due steps to make the situation less unfavourable.

That neither Cavalry effected anything really important on the battlefield is no proof, says the author, that they could not have done so had they been properly organised, trained, and handled. He considers that at the battle of Liao-Yang the fifty-four squadrons of available Russian Cavalry might well and effectively have been employed—on any day between the 28th and 31st—against the flank of Oku's and Nodzu's exhausted armies. The Cavalry never had so good a chance again while the war lasted, and their bold and opportune employment might well have snatched victory from defeat. On their side, too, the Japanese Cavalry failed to convert the Russian overthrow into a rout by anything like a really effective pursuit.

The writer stoutly combats the assertion, which has so frequently been made since the war ended, that Cavalry can exert no longer any real influence on the field of battle. On the contrary, he declares that even in large bodies a really well-organised and well-led Cavalry will find opportunities for intervening in the battle with decisive effect. What is required is thorough regimental training, work in peace with the division in which the regiments will take the field, and, above all, first-class commanders. Attention is drawn to the care which is taken in France in the matter of the selection of Cavalry Commanders and in the work of the eight Cavalry divisions of the French army.

Still, the chief duty of the Cavalry in future wars will be reconnaissance and the conduct of operations against the opponent's communications. He urges the attachment of a mounted sapper company to each Cavalry division, and considers that while such would be invaluable for ordinary Cavalry pioneer requirements, they would also, from their Infantry training, be of the greatest service as escort for the accompanying guns or machine-gun detachment. The Cavalryman must carry a long-range carbine in addition to lance or sabre; each Cavalry division should have two machine-gun detachments attached to it, everything for these should be carried on pack animals, while the whole of the detachments must be mounted. The author repeats, in conclusion, that the late war is full of lessons for the Cavalry, and that there is nothing of which this arm in the future will be incapable.

THE DISMOUNTED ACTION OF CAVALRY

Showing how Cavalry are still of value as such in Modern War, even if in some short-service armies there may not be time to train them to act dismounted.

UNDER the above title Count Schwerin, Squadron Commander in the 17th Brunswick Hussars, replies at considerable length, in a recent issue of the Militär Wochenblatt, to a previous paper by an Austrian Infantry officer on the 'useful employment of Cavalry.' In the original article the writer would appear to have repeated all the old arguments as to the future minor rôle of Cavalry which we heard after the war in South Africa and during the Manchurian campaign; and Count Schwerin in reply points out that the somewhat negative results of the employment of the mounted arm by either side in the late war in the Far East are no proof whatever that the days of Cavalry are over. In support of this contention he produces a mass of illustration culled from the history of the war so far as we know it, and quotes extensively from the many authorities, such as Pelet-Narbonne, Bernhardi and others, who have written exhaustively on the subject of Cavalry employment under the latest conditions of modern war.

Count Schwerin himself appears to doubt whether it is possible to teach the 'whole duty' of the Cavalryman and make the individual a good foot-soldier as well in two years; it is difficult enough, he contends, to turn out a good Infantryman in that limited period. He points out that since a certain proportion of Cavalry acting dismounted must be utilised as horseholders, it will require a proportionately very much larger body of Cavalry to effect anything against a force of Infantry, and he queries whether it is better to lose from the outset the services of a certain number of Cavalrymen who cannot take part in the

action, or to use the whole mounted and thereby risk an equal or possibly smaller loss. It sounds all very well, he says, to declare that Cavalry must be able to fight equally well whether mounted or on foot, but, speaking for the short-service German Cavalry, the author states that no one has yet discovered how this can be done. Musketry results at targets over 800 yards, he says, are anything but good, and that men get little instruction in shooting at distances beyond 400 yards; it is to be gathered from this that it is not anticipated that Infantry fire at these ranges will effect much against Cavalry mounted.

Count Schwerin quotes from the German regulations wherein it is laid down that at ranges of about 400 yards a decisive result must be speedily arrived at, but points out that in Manchuria there were very many cases where the fight at such ranges lasted for hours; that on August 31 at Liao-Yang the opposing firing lines lay the whole day within 800-400 yards of one another, and that fire alone was insufficient to drive either opponent from his position. How then, asks Schwerin, can dismounted Cavalry do any good in similar circumstances? They have no spades with which to 'dig themselves in,' and no bayonets with which to supplement their fire. Their losses, then, must be far heavier than they would be if the Cavalry were retained for mounted work only. When, too, Cavalry act dismounted they sacrifice the moral effect of their action—which must be ever present in the mounted attack even against an enemy who is yet in no way demoralised. action of Cavalry during manœuvres the author admits to have no special value or significance, but he points out that on such occasions the results, so far as the action of the mounted arm is concerned, are usually judged to be nil, because the Cavalry are always employed against unbroken troops, there are no killed and wounded, and the Cavalry are consequently always subjected to an overwhelming fire. A Cavalry used in the field purely as Infantry, because for the moment there is no occasion for their employment mounted, will never, says the author, find their chance 'to take occasion by the hand.'

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Losses, of course, there must be when Cavalry charge, but will they be any worse than of old—than when, for instance, at Zorndorf Seydlitz charged unbroken Russian Infantry supported by guns at the head of sixty-one squadrons and lost 1,845 officers and men out of 7,000 horsemen?

In the early days of a campaign the opposing Cavalry can only be overpowered by Cavalry acting as such, and until this is done there can be no action of Cavalry masses during a battle upon the flank or rear of the enemy.

The results of the charge of Bredow's brigade in 1870, and of the Austrian Cavalry brigade under Pulz in 1866, are instanced as being such as could never have been attained by dismounted action. Count Schwerin appears convinced that an undue leaning to dismounted action in the Cavalry must lead to the loss of Reitergeist [Cavalry spirit] and instances the Russian Cavalry in 1877–78 and the Cossacks in the last war in support of his contention. He quotes, in conclusion, the speech of the German Emperor last summer to the officers of ten regiments of Cavalry, when he reminded them in the plainest terms that the days of Cavalry were not over, and that the mounted attack, not only after but even during the battle, would still, as of old, lead to great results.

COMPARISON OF FRENCH AND GERMAN CAVALRY

Translated from the 'Revue Militaire Suisse.'

GENERAL VON PELET-NARBONNE devotes an article to the French Cavalry in *Le Continent*. The German military writer rapidly sketches the history of the Army from Napoleon up to the present day. He praises the regulation of May 12, 1899, as 'constituting a marked progress.' The regulation of September 1, 1904, he declares, however, as 'far more important from the fact that it introduced new fundamental dispositions for the Infantry fight, based on a new musketry regulation of September 7, 1903.' This latter is of very special importance as indicating the modern use of fire-action by Cavalry.

'During recent years tactics, called tactics of échelons, was made more and more general use of, owing to the fact that drill was carried out in échelons of squadrons or of squadrons in column of march. By this method it was hoped to increase the mobility of Cavalry masses and to find a method of matching the German tactics, which are distinguished by greater cohesion. We need not here discuss the question as to whether this hope is justified. One fact is, nevertheless, firmly established, viz.: that since the defeat, mounted troops in France have made remarkable progress and that the work is carried out with intelligence and zeal.

'In Germany the French Cavalry is regarded as a formidable antagonist, courageous, well-mounted and well-trained, although not quite, perhaps, to the same degree as the German, as it lacks an equitation and horse-training regulation uniform throughout the Army. It has, however, the advantage of possessing eight Cavalry divisions, organised in peace time, which are not forthcoming in Germany.

'On the other hand, as General de Lacroix's report proves, the superiority of the German lance is fully recognised in France,

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which weapon, according to opinions generally adopted in Germany, the French are not able to introduce, as the riding qualities of the men do not permit the issue of it.

'By the introduction of the two-years period of service the French Cavalry will go through a most important crisis, after which it is improbable that it will be capable of giving such good results as the German. French Cavalry officers are perfectly aware of the inconvenience caused by the diminution of the period of service, and experiments in horse training by mechanical means are being everywhere actively carried out, and endeavours are being made to obtain more numerous re-engagements, but hitherto with but small success.'

Comparing the situation of the Cavalry of his country with that of France, the General gives the following table, which is made out to the end of 1906.

FRANCE.

89 regiments of 5 squadrons,* of which 31 are Dragoons, 21 Mounted Chasseurs, 14 Hussars, 18 Cuirassiers, 6 Chasseurs d'Afrique, 4 Spahis, 2 squadrons of Senegal Spahis, (in all 447 squadrons). In addition 8 remount squadrons and 1 native Congolese squadron. (The usual squadron has 134 horses; the reinforced squadron 150 horses; a squadron on a war footing 160 horses.)

GERMANY.

99 regiments of 5 squadrons,† of which 10 are Cuirassiers, 28 Dragoons, 20 Hussars, 26 Uhlans, 4 Mounted Jaegers, 4 Heavy Cavalry, 7 Light Cavalry (in all 495 squadrons). (Some squadrons have 189 and others 185 horses. In war the mobilised squadrons consist of 150 men and 178 horses.)

According to the budget for 1906, the French Cavalry consists, in peace, of 67,456 horses; the German Cavalry of 67,124 horses.

[•] Of these 89 regiments, 79 only are in France.

[†] According to the law of April 15, 1905, 510 squadrons should be formed by March 31, 1910.

In the event of war, Germany will have eleven Cavalry divisions, of which one only exists at present. Each of them will consist of three brigades of two regiments each, divided into four squadrons, one machine-gun section, one brigade division of two batteries of six guns each, one ammunition section, a detachment of engineer cyclists, and a signalling corps. This force of about 4,800 men, 5,300 horses, and 160 wagons would permit of placing 3,600 men and twelve guns in the fighting-line. The Cavalry corps would be eventually formed. Three squadrons would be attached to each of the forty-eight Infantry divisions of the first line.* The formation of Cavalry regiments of the Territorial Army is provided for.

On mobilisation, France would furnish eight Cavalry divisions (all existing in peace time) of almost the same strength as the German divisions, but without machine-guns. A brigade of corps Cavalry (two to three regiments) is attached to each of the twenty-one Army Corps, and a reserve squadron to the forty-six Infantry divisions.

Although Germany, in peace time, possesses ten more Cavalry regiments than France, the fighting strength of the two Cavalries would, in the event of war, be much the same, if it is accepted that France could dispose of her budgetary contingents, which is rather doubtful. Up to what point the reserve of the Territorial Army could adjust this balance it is impossible to say, the figures regarding Germany not being known. In France the establishment of thirty-eight reserve regiments and thirty-eight territorial squadrons is contemplated. All the German Cavalry is armed with the lance, independently of the sword and carbine, the latter sighted up to 1,200 metres. In France the principal arm is the sword; the front rank only of Dragoon regiments, forming part of Cavalry divisions, carry the lance. In addition to the sword, the men are armed with a carbine, sighted up to 2,000 metres, and the revolver for use when charging.

[•] The figures as regards Germany are taken from Veltzes Armée Almanach of 1906.



CAVALRY EFFICIENCY

'What conditions should be fulfilled by Cavalry to be at the height of efficiency for its various duties in modern war?'

LIEUT.-COLONEL OTTO BERNDT, of the Austrian General Staff, in an article entitled 'What Lessons may be drawn from the War in the Far East?' published by the *Kavalleristische Monatshefte* for April last, thus replies to the above question:

'As it is generally of primary importance at the very commencement of war to place the enemy's Cavalry in such a position as to be unable to continually interfere with our plans, it remains essential to-day, as formerly, to train Cavalry with a view to the Cavalry fight. For this object horses must be perfectly trained, the men must be good riders and able to make good use of their sabres, well versed in fighting exercises and in manœuvring, even in strong units, and must, finally, possess that *élan* so indispensable to every true Cavalryman.

' Modern Cavalry must thoroughly understand how to conduct the fire action, both in the offensive and the defensive, and that not merely as a temporary measure, but as a vigorously sustained effort. If necessary, there must be no hesitation in its employment dismounted in strong bodies. Anxiety for the safety of the horses is not sufficient reason to dismount a fewer number of squadrons than that demanded by the object of the fight. range of modern weapons makes it absolutely essential to place the horses under cover and as far from the danger zone as possible. The fire action must often be conducted with all possible energy up to the decisive moment. No adversary will ever allow himself to be duped by a simple demonstration followed by a retreat at the critical moment. The success of a dismounted action under the above conditions necessitates the following preliminary material conditions—viz. a practical and inconspicuous field uniform, as well as an abundant supply of ammunition;

occasionally a bayonet fixed to the carbine may give good results.

- 'During the war in Manchuria machine guns proved a most useful aid to Cavalry. As these weapons contributed greatly to increase the intensity of fire of that arm, and as they will be most useful to it in various situations, it is to be earnestly desired that machine-gun sections may be attached to Cavalry divisions.
- 'In all Cavalry actions in the field mobility plays an extraordinarily important part. This quality should display itself in two aspects—viz. (1) facility in carrying out changes of position or of formations, even by large units, by skilfully profiting by advantages of the ground; (2) capacity for carrying out long marches and supporting enormous fatigue for several consecutive days without completely exhausting the horses.
- 'Rapidity of movement, and especially endurance, are an essential factor the proper use of which will bring great success to Cavalry in the next war, and everything should be done to increase these qualities to the utmost. Numerous exercises and a practical equipment are the best means for attaining that result. The troops should manœuvre as much as possible in all weathers over country and on the roads, carry out frequent field service exercises and long-distance rides, often lasting for several days. Hunting and racing help to develop the initiative of both officers and non-commissioned officers. It is unnecessary to add that the greatest attention should be paid to the proper feeding and management of the young horses to keep the animals in good and hard condition.
- 'The clothing of the Cavalry soldier should be as simple, as easy, and as practical as possible; the equipment of both man and horse as light as it can possibly be made. During the last war, especially during the winter, the Cossacks were far too heavily loaded to be a really mobile Cavalry, and were in consequence obliged to march almost entirely at a walk. Most of the Cavalry, too, from Europe, were, on account of their absolutely unpractical uniform and equipment, of small use for the duties for which they were intended.



'The transport of useful Cavalry bodies must be light. Much baggage—for example, ammunition—can be carried on pack-horses. A mobile bridging equipment is an absolute necessity.

'Cavalry regulation formations have even nowadays but too little reference to the effect of modern weapons Cavalry cannot expose itself to artillery fire in its present massed formations without suffering heavy losses. The manœuvre formations must therefore be made more elastic, and adapt themselves more to the ground and to circumstances, as is practised by the Infantry. Under Artillery fire especially the least dangerous formations with quite narrow fronts should be practised, as well as the forming up to pass rapidly over beaten ground.

'Naturally the measure of results obtained by Cavalry depends in his branch of the service, more than in any other, on the personality of the Chief who leads it. Everything consists in knowing in whose hands will be placed an instrument sharpened with more or less care. This was proved in the last as in all former wars.

'In the preceding lines I have endeavoured to trace for the Cavalry of the future a picture which was suggested to me by the events of the war in the Far East. Many characteristics will be found in it recalling the Cavalry whose exploits astonished the world more than forty years ago. I allude to the Cavalry in the American War of Secession, first that of the Southern States and later that of the Union. Marvellously led, firm in the saddle, formidable in the attack, as cool and tenacious in action as the best Infantry, of an incomparable mobility and endurance, this Cavalry could not only carry out its world-renowned raids, but was also able to fight a hot independent action to a finish, decide the issue of more than one battle, and finally terminate that war of four years (Sherman's march).

'In the revival of those principles of the employment of large bodies of Cavalry, in their judicious adaptation to the conditions of modern war, by a lavish expenditure of the inexhaustible fund of existing Cavalry qualities, lies, in my opinion, the glory and honour of a promising future for our magnificent arm.'

PROBLEM NO. 5.

By COLONEL F. D. V. WING, C.B., R.F.A.

A HOSTILE force has suddenly landed on the east coast of England, and its mounted troops are pushing inland.

A British force is hastily concentrated at Paulborough, and some mounted troops are sent forward to watch and delay the enemy.

A squadron of Cavalry and two guns R.H.A., the latter escorted by a troop detached from another squadron, are sent under command of Captain X to prevent the enemy's advance troops from crossing the two bridges, Northbridge and Southbridge, over the river Ruse, which is wide and unfordable.

When Captain X reaches the road junction at A (vide sketch), a report is sent to him from the scouts that they can see the enemy from the ridge in front—thereupon Captain X, leaving his squadron and guns at A, gallops on, accompanied by his R.H.A. section commander and signallers, to reconnoitre from the ridge, and on arrival at point B he finds the situation as depicted in the sketch.

The ridge running north and south through B and C is the boundary of the enclosed land on the west of it, the country to the east of this ridge down to the river is open grass land with no cover except an inn, with a clump of high trees and brushwood at its back, placed just south-west of Northbridge.

Captain X knows that the Northbridge is built of solid masonry, and that the Southbridge is a light suspension one.

His squadron pioneers have only sufficient gun cotton with them to destroy one bridge.

The hostile troops are all advancing at a slow trot.

Reinforcements can be seen advancing about one and a half miles in rear of each of the two bodies of two advanced hostile troops.

What steps did Captain X take?

Problem No. V.

Open to Officers under the rank of Major of the Mounted Branches of the Regular or Auxiliary Forces at home and abroad.

All Solutions (which should be as short as possible) must be attached to this page with name, rank and address of sender, and must reach

THE EDITOR,

'Cavalry Journal,'

Royal United Service Institution,

Whitehall,

London, S.W.,

not later than February 15, 1908.

A Prize of a Wrist Watch will be given to each of the first three whose solutions are considered the best.

The Editor's decision will be final.

From			
	Name		
	Rank	Regiment	
	Address		
	Countersigned by		

RECENT PUBLICATIONS

'CAVALRY STUDIES'

By Major-General D. Haig, late Inspector-General of Cavalry in India. London: Hugh Rees, Limited. Price, 8s. 6d.

The doubt as to whether the British Army could under any probable circumstances take the field in numbers sufficient to cope with a serious adversary has long cast its shadow over our military training, and dulled the keen edge of effort by introducing an element of unreality into all our work. The book of the late Inspector-General of Cavalry in India is of great value as an example of enthusiasm and hard work, attainable only when the worker believes heart and soul in the reality and necessity of his task.

The introductory chapter contains a masterly exposition of the rôle of Cavalry, and refutes some erroneous opinions, based on too hasty conclusions as to the deadly nature of Infantry fire, or on false history of wars too often accepted without critical study. The key-note, in fact, of General Haig's system of instruction is close comparison with reliably recorded facts. Formerly, these were most difficult to obtain, but the last thirty years have produced a wealth of military literature which has placed within the reach of every careful student the real facts of many campaigns, whose events had hitherto been at the mercy of tradition. Carefully written histories of the great wars fought in America, France, the Balkans, and Manchuria, during this period, are also obtainable in every good military library.

Modern facilities for travel enable anyone at moderate cost to visit the scenes of the most important of these contests so as to gain an insight not otherwise obtainable.

In pursuance of this plan the chapters illustrating the imaginary operations related in this work contain a brief sketch of a parallel case in real warfare.

Chapter II. sets forth the organisation of the different Cavalry units composing the division, and contains some useful hints as to the duties of the staff. All military forces depend largely on suitable organisation to develop their destructive power, but Cavalry more than dismounted forces, because of the double needs of man and horse. The third and succeeding chapters describe a series of staff-rides, each one of which illustrates some important principle of strategy or tactics, and also explains the action of Cavalry in a well-known campaign fought under conditions similar to the imaginary case. For example, Chapter VII., the Attock Staff-Ride, treats of the strategical employment of Cavalry covering the concentration of the main army to one flank, and the Ulm Campaign of 1805 is given as a parallel instance. The 'General Idea' of the imaginary case is followed by

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notes on the Ulm Campaign, wherein Napoleon drew attention from the march of his Infantry corps by invading hostile territory with a corps of Cavalry on so formidable a scale as to absorb all the enemy's mind, while his Infantry masses swung round and barred the Austrian retreat. A diary of the movements of the French army is given up to the successful investment of Ulm, and in the General Notes which follow some shrewd remarks are made as to the strategy of the campaign and the skilful handling of Murat's corps, which made Napoleon's triumph possible.

It is worth while to quote the first of these notes as an example:

- 1. 'Mack's army should have acted as a strong covering force, or strategical advanced guard, for the Russian army advancing from Galicia against the French army from the Rhine. Under no circumstances should it have allowed itself to be cut off from the Inn, but should have retired, fighting step by step if need be, to gain time.
- '... The Austrian army had essentially a manœuvring rôle to play. If it had been handled in that way, great service might have been rendered to the Allies, and Napoleon might have been confronted with superior forces in the decisive battle.

'It will be noted that it was chiefly owing to the skilful use made of the French Cavalry that Mack was not only kept in ignorance of Napoleon's real objective, but was led to believe that the Cavalry which appeared from the direction of the Black Forest was part of the advanced troops of the Grand Army.

'There was no "Cavalry screen" put out, after the manner suggested by certain theoretical text-books, with clouds of patrols in front, all arranged with mathematical accuracy. On the contrary, Napoleon's Cavalry was kept much concentrated, and a large mass of it was boldly pushed forward into close contact with the enemy. It was thus an actual menace to the enemy. Moreover, contact was kept up by means of active reconnoitring bodies, not by a cordon of posts of observation.'

The chapter that follows describes in detail the imaginary operations of the staff ride. All these operations are illustrated by an ample supply of excellent maps. The data are given with the utmost brevity and clearness, and the remarks of the author are equally pithy and weighty.

Three appendices give some further information on the working of the staff rides, their organisation, the tasks set, and some criticisms thereon.

As an example of how such instruction should be given the book is not only a valuable contribution to military literature, but, so far as we are aware, is the only work in English which gives any information on the matter. Few, if any, officers in the armies of Europe combine the wide historical knowledge of the author with the practical experience he has had of leading Cavalry in war and instructing it in peace. The love for the Cavalry service and the profound confidence in the horsemen of the British Army, which are evident throughout the book, form an eloquent testimony as to their real worth from so good a judge, who has had such exceptional opportunities of forming his opinions. The reflection is forced upon us that the relative weakness of the British Army is due more to wasteful and ineffective organisation than to inherent defects of the officers and men. It is at the same time quite apparent that the late Inspector-General postulates a very high intellectual level for his corps of Cavalry



officers. Without the confidence which comes from considerable study and reflection, and the skill which some practice in troop-leading alone can produce, it is idle for a general of Cavalry to expect from his subaltern officers that sympathetic co-operation on their countless detached expeditions which alone produces great results, and enables such feats as the overthrow of the Austrians in 1805, of the Prussians in 1806, and of the Federals in August 1862, to be brought about mainly by the masterly handling of Cavalry masses.

The criticism to which a work of this kind is open, from the point of view of a student whose time for reading is strictly limited, is that it takes considerable close study to acquire a sufficiently correct picture of the imaginary circumstances in each staff ride to appreciate the situation. The writer too might be accused of taking results rather for granted. It might be argued that he does not take sufficient account of the numerous hazards of war in drawing his deductions, but reckons with his units as if they were pieces on a chess-board. The enemy is expected to do what is wanted of him, and above all not to be too illusive. The mental picture of crashing through hostile squadrons at the head of our regiments in the same fighting trim they show at a winter's camp of exercise is so alluring that hardly enough allowance is made for the natural reluctance of an inferior Cavalry to face the ordeal, and of the chances of avoiding it which modern firearms confer. Hardly enough stress, perhaps, is laid on the decisive results which are to be got by combining shock and fire tactics, and by the different arms playing into one another's hands. The book is rather a strategical than a tactical study, and hardly makes sufficient allowance for the changes and chances of actual collision with the foe.

When criticism has done its worst, however, our conclusion is, that the 'Cavalry Studies' form a most interesting and instructive volume, and not least so because they demonstrate in some measure the methods and theories of a general who we hope may be there to put his theories in practice should the British Army be called upon in the near future to meet a serious adversary.

'THE ART OF RECONNAISSANCE.'

By Colonel David Henderson. London: John Murray.

In his preface the author apologises for the incompleteness of his work failing to correspond to what he calls its 'pretentious title,' but it may be justly pleaded for him that military students have much to read, and that therefore brevity is the soul of wit for their purpose. The volume is light and handy, it consists of but 169 pages with a good index.

The writer judiciously bases his premises on the well-attested facts of recent military history; he seeks to establish certain principles upon which the art of reconnaissance is founded, and describes briefly the methods by which it is executed. The work of scouts and patrols is outlined, and some useful hints are given as to their training in peace and selection in war. The reconnoitring duties of outposts are touched upon, and contact reconnaissance as executed by forces strong enough to fight for what they seek is given as the second principal method. The third method is the independent system followed by scouts and patrols. Balloons are mentioned, but no allusion is made to the work of spies.

In discussing reconnaissance by contact, the duties of the different forces of Cavalry in an army come under consideration. The French organisation of 1886 is preferred. It divided the Cavalry into three echelons, the 'independent' under the commander-in-chief, and 'protective' which included the Cavalry brigades and regiments allotted to the army corps and divisions. Thus the main body of the Cavalry were freed to accomplish their task while the Infantry units still retained sufficient mounted strength to cover their immediate front, and feel their way for some distance ahead.

Colonel Henderson quotes the daring use made by the Confederate generals in 1862 of their small force of Cavalry, and also cites Mischenko's raid in January 1905 against the Japanese communications. The problems he touches upon in connection with this use of Cavalry are amongst the thorniest which confront the student of Cavalry strategy. To appreciate them properly a knowledge of the campaign of Gettysburg in 1863 is necessary, for no other affords so many lessons on the subject.

In the last chapter but one, the pedantry which has made surveying for military purposes its pet preserve is subjected to some sound criticism. It is a remarkable fact that at a period when elaborate surveys of ground, executed with extreme precision and neatness, were held to be the best criterion of a staff officer's ability, yet the British forces defending and relieving Ladysmith, which had been a British garrison for years, were hard put to, to obtain even a rough map of the surrounding country.

The last chapter treats on the transmission of information. It hardly gives an adequate idea of how much more difficult it is in war to transmit information than to obtain it sometimes. The remarkable use made by the Japanese of their Infantry for screening the whole front of their army, in order to retain their small force of Cavalry for fighting purposes, is not mentioned, nor the changes in the whole system of reconnaissance which may become necessary if this innovation is widely copied. Although this work is far from covering the whole field, it is interesting and instructive. The style is pleasant and soldier-like; and in a small compass it conveys a great deal of sound information.

'THE EVOLUTION OF TACTICS'

By Major Gerald Gilbert, Indian Army. The comprehensive nature of his title has had no depressing effect on the author's mind. He lightly traces the history of tactics, as he understands them, throughout the ages. The wars of the Persians and Greeks, Romans and Carthaginians, are drawn upon to illustrate his points, and he displays a wealth of learning, a knowledge of details and statistics of the armies of these remote ages, which is really amazing. The Cavalry age is said to be the period wherein the Huns and Saracens spread their empire by large forces of mounted warriors. It is of surpassing interest to know that '200,000 horsemen followed the banners of Tamerlane into China; but these numbers were greatly exceeded at the great battle of Angora, fought in 1402, in the heart of Asia Minor, where the Sultan Bajazet with an army of 400,000 men was completely crushed'; it would be of greater interest still to know where our author found authority for these figures, and what his theories might be as to how such forces could have been supplied with food and forage in the heart of Asia.



The chapters which discuss the wars of the Revolution and the wars of the nineteenth century contain some shrewd observations, though it is doubtful whether the author will convince on disputed questions which he somewhat airily dismisses.

In spite of its failings the book has some excellence. It collects a large amount of historical information, some of which is probably accurate. The plans of battles are excellent, and the more modern ones probably give a just idea of the event; its chief merit consists in that it suggests many questions for further inquiry and solution.

'WELLINGTON'S CAMPAIGNS, 1808-1815.'

By Major-General C. W. Robinson, C.B. London: Hugh Rees, Limited, 1907. Price 8s. 6d.

This very valuable work, which originally appeared in three separate parts, is now published in one volume, greatly to the improvement of the book as a whole, and to the advantage of the military student, for the benefit of whom Major-General Robinson's labours were primarily intended. The arrangement of the matter contained herein is wholly admirable; here is no mere crammer's book hastily got up to answer the purposes of a particular examination, and yet it is well adapted alike for the ordinary student of military history as for such as are seeking inspiration and knowledge for the special professional needs of the moment. The accounts of the different campaigns from 1808 to 1815 are something more than the mere outline sketches such as the author describes them; they are succinct descriptions of the chief actions of the war, and they show with exceeding clearness the reasons why each battle was fought; they describe the general character of the positions taken up, the main features, and the results. Not the least valuable parts of this book are the comments which are given at the close of the account of each phase, and General Robinson speaks here not merely from the knowledge acquired by his own study of war, guided by his ripe experience as an instructor, but from the wisdom of those critics who have studied the lessons of these epoch-making campaigns. Perhaps, of all students, Cavalry officers will arise from these studies experiencing—more than the other arms—a feeling of dissatisfaction; that there are many notable instances of the successful employment of this arm none can deny, especially in Moore's retreat to Corunna, an account of which is included in this book; but at Waterloo and even at Salamanca it is apparent that the Cavalry were left to work out their own salvation, and that their combined employment with the other arms was but little understood and less appreciated. Have we progressed since those days? We wonder.

There are thirteen excellent maps and twenty-two plans of actions and movements, and altogether Major-General Robinson may be congratulated on having given us a book which has been written in the light of all the abundant material which recent researches and publications have brought to the assistance of the historian, and as such it may be confidently recommended to the military student, whether he reads merely for examination purposes or for his own pleasure and profit.



'WATERLOO.'

By the late Captain J. W. E. Donaldson, R.F.A., and Captain A. F. Becke, late R.F.A. London: Hugh Rees, Limited. 1907. Price 2s. 6d. net.

There seems to be no end to the literature on Waterloo: hundreds of books on that three days' campaign have already appeared, and it is extraordinary how few of them there are which do not contain something that is fresh, and much that is of value. The present work, which is mainly a revised chapter extracted from the late Captain Donaldson's 'Military History Applied to Modern Warfare,' is less a history of the campaign than an appreciation of the strategy and tactics of either side, and therefore treats the subject from rather a different standpoint from other books. The authors offer for consideration an interesting suggestion in regard to the apparent apathy and indecision of the Emperor on the night of June 15-viz. that he deliberately gave Blücher time to partially concentrate in order that he might deal him the more decisive a blow, and the arguments employed in support of this theory will repay investigation; while, further on, the discussion as to what would have happened had Napoleon followed the model of 1796 instead of 1814 opens a very interesting train of thought and Altogether it seems that the surviving author has not been ill-advised in republishing at this juncture Chapter V. of the larger work, for its perusal will repay the student of this campaign. The map supplied is good and modern, and the plans are clear and satisfying.

'THE CAVALRY IN THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR.'

By Count Gustav Wrangel. Translated by Lieut. Montgomery, 3rd Hussars. London: Hugh Rees, Limited. 1907. Price 3s. 6d. net.

The views formed by so thoughtful a Cavalry soldier as Count Wrangel on the lessons of the Cavalry work in Manchuria were well worthy of translation and publication, and Lieutenant Montgomery has performed the first-named task in a very painstaking manner. The parts of the book of chief interest to the British Cavalryman are the Introduction and the actual criticism of the performances of the mounted forces of both belligerents; the remaining portion of the book being mainly occupied with a consideration of how the conclusions drawn from all that has come to light affect the particular conditions governing the training of the Austrian Cavalry. For many of his facts the author seems indebted to Captain Spaitz, of his own Service, whose book, 'With the Cossacks in Manchuria,' will doubtless one day be published in English; and from the remarks of this officer, as from conclusions drawn from evidence produced and sifted by Count Wrangel himself, there would appear to be an impression among Continental Cavalry critics that the Russian Cavalry failed, less from the actual inferiority of its representatives in Manchuria, than from the total absence of any real spirit—not only of selfsacrifice, but of the mere resolve to be up and doing. 'Neither the losses which they suffered in the three great battles,' says Count Wrangel, 'nor any other circumstances can justify the complete inactivity of the Russian Cavalry during the months of September, November, and December 1904, and further in April, May, June, and July 1905.' The author gives abundant praise to the numerically

weaker Japanese Cavalry, who kept their Generals well informed, never lost touch with their opponents, and held the field in spite of the overwhelming strength of the horsemen opposed to them. More could indeed have hardly been expected, or even desired, under the circumstances. Of General Rennenkampf the Austrian critic seems to hold a high opinion, while he describes the operations of the 1st Independent Cavalry brigade, under Major-General Akijama, as being 'full of lessons, and very interesting.' Count Wrangel's views, as evolved from his study of the Cavalry lessons of the war, on the due and proper employment of shock or dismounted action, are, some may think, shorn of much of their value by his honest admission that for his Service, as possibly for all conscript Cavalry, short service cannot make a man at one and the same time a clever rider, swordsman, and rifle shot; and it is worth, perhaps, consideration whether, in weighing the views of Continental Cavalrymen on this absorbing question, we give sufficient heed to the manner in which it is affected by the ordinary limitations of short service.

'AUS STÜRMISCHER ZEIT'

By Captain W. von Conrady. Berlin: Schwetschke und Sohn, 1907.

We have here the biography of the Captain Ludwig von Conrady, who entered the Hessian Regiment of Dragoon Guards in 1791 and took part in the campaign of the year following, when Austria, Prussia, and Hesse entered the field against the forces of the French Republic. Conrady was not a lucky soldier; in his first campaign his horse was killed under him and he was ridden over in the charge; in his second he was made prisoner and spent many weary months in captivity in France—a campaign which, like many of his countrymen, he made in the pay of the British Government. After Jena, when Hesse was incorporated in the new Kingdom of Westphalia and became a tributary of France, Conrady took service under the Emperor and went through the Russian campaign in a brigade commanded by General Damas. Taken prisoner at Wereja in October 1812 he was for many long months in confinement in Russia, but was released in time to take part in the battle of Waterloo—this time under the banners of Prussia. Conrady gives 4.30 p.m. as the hour when Blücher gave the order to attack.

As a record of those stormy days this biography is full of interest. There are some curious sidelights on the methods and manners—or rather want of manners—of General Vandamme.

'SCHEINSCHÄDEL UND KÖNIGGRÄTZ'

By General Count v. Degenfeld-Schonberg. Vienna: Carl Konegen, 1907. These reminiscences of the part played by the 7th Austrian Hussars in the above-named actions first appeared in the Austrian Cavalry Journal, in answer apparently to a very generally expressed opinion in the Austrian Army that the work of the regiment had received but scanty acknowledgment in the Official Austrian History of the War of 1866. This account of the services of the 7th Hussars, to the truth of which the Archduke Joseph bears witness, should satisfy all who read it that the Regiment then, as always, did its possible for Emperor and country.



'DIE MACHT DER PERSÖNLICHKEIT IM KRIEGE'

By Lieut.-Colonel Freiherr v. Freytag-Loringhoven. Berlin: Mittler und Sohn, 1905.

This booklet consists of a collection of ten essays, republished from the Vierteljahrshefte für Truppenführung und Heereskunde, and in each, one of the sayings, maxims—call them what you will—of Clausewitz is taken, expanded, and exhaustively discussed with the help of illustration and example. The author is chief of a section of the General Staff and is therefore well qualified to treat of the teachings of the Master, but his style is perhaps just a thought laboured. The plans are on a very small scale and sufficient care has not been taken to correct printers' errors. The date of the Great Frederick's defeat at Kolin was not June 18, 1857.

'DER BERITTENE OFFIZIER UND SEIN PFERD'

By Lieut.-Colonel von Kaisersberg. Berlin: Zuckschwerdt und Co., 1907.

The author has set himself to produce a vade-mecum for the mounted officer of all arms on the subject of the horse, how to buy and break him, stable management, and how to look after him in sickness and in health. The book is singularly devoid of all technicalities, and contains all that a ripe experience has taught the author that it is desirable or necessary that the mounted man should know.

'L'OFFICIER, LE HAUT COMMANDEMENT, ET SES AIDES EN ALLEMAGNE'

By J. Poirier. Paris: Librairie Mondiale, 1907.

This is merely an attempt to place before French readers a study of the German officer at every step of his career, regimental and staff. The author has evidently a very sincere admiration for the German system and a deep respect for its product. He makes no direct comparisons with the system on his side the Vosges, but possibly some readers may consider themselves qualified to read between the lines.

'GEFECHTSAUSBILDUNG DER KAVALLERIE'

By Major-General Karl de Nadas. Vienna: The Kavalleristische Monatshefte Press, 1907.

In this small book, abundantly supplied with plans and sketches, the author—who commands the 8th Cavalry Brigade—has put forward a number of short studies of situations which have been created or which have arisen at manœuvres or in the ordinary training. He makes no claim to the infallibility of the solutions arrived at, but since the problems cover almost every possible situation their study should be of service to other cavalrymen than those for whom primarily intended.

'GEFECHTSEXERZIEREN DER KAVALLERIE'

By Major-General Franz Rohr. Vienna: The Kavalleristische Monatshefte Press, 1907.

This would appear to be meant as a tactical guide for Cavalry commanding officers, the idea being that they should be taken out into the country with their



regiments, provided with a 'general idea' set by an officer of superior rank, who acts in a measure as director of manœuvres. On the decisions arrived at by the regimental commander, fresh situations are constantly devised by the director, with the result that the commanding officer has a large amount of practice—with troops in the field as opposed to with blocks in a war game within a building—in rapid appreciation, the issue of crisp orders, and all that pertains to what the author calls die Schulung der Kommandanten.

THE AUSTRIAN CAVALRY JOURNAL.

There are three numbers of the Kavalleristische Monatshefte to hand—those for June and July and one for August-September. In the June number the article which will perhaps best repay perusal and study is a criticism of the 'Evolution and Present State of the French Echelon Tactics' from the pen of General v. Pelet-Narbonne; there is also a translation of the French official account of the attack by Bredow's brigade in the war of 1870, wherein the credit freely given to the manner in which the celebrated charge was carried out and the results which were achieved by it seem to be a matter of much natural gratification to the German Cavalryman. English readers will be interested in an account by Freiherr von Esebeck—who seems to know his 'Jorrocks'—of a season's hunting in the shires. He appears to have formed the highest possible opinion of the Irish hunter, his endurance and his cleverness; but if we understand him aright he is inclined to think not so highly of his rider, who does not sit his horse so much as sit upon him. In the July number there are two papers on galloping machine-gun detachments; both writers discuss the subject very fully, and both strongly urge that such detachments should accompany Cavalry. There is a paper on the American Reitweise and one on the instruction in riding of the Russian Cavalry officer. One who took part in the long-distance ride last April from Agram to Sarajevo gives some interesting details of the results of a sugar diet on the horse he rode—both in regard to maintaining condition and the formation of muscle. The horse, however, would seem to have been a real good one, for he was purchased only four weeks previous to the start, and as a preparation he was ridden some 500 miles during that time. In this number and the following are some of the prize essays sent in on the subject of the Cavalry lessons of the last war, while the August number contains no fewer than three papers on the employment of machine-guns with Cavalry. Count Schwerin contributes a long and thoughtful article on 'Cavalry in Action' and draws many lessons from the past; this paper is well worth perusal, but the writer has fallen into an error in regard to Lord Raglan's orders to Lord Lucan at Balaklava. We do not know much about the Austrian Cavalry of Bosnia and Dalmatia, and consequently some account of the mounted forces of those hilly regions, whereof the native horses are unflatteringly described as pferdeähnliche Thiere, is very welcome. It is, however, admitted that the ordinary Cavalry troop-horse simply cannot get about the mountains by the stony, precipitous tracks which cross them, and the writer strongly advocates the Cavalry which serve there being mounted on the horse of the country. Not the least important of the papers in an interesting number is one—suitably enough from the pen of a Dragoon officer-'On the Musketry Training of Cavalry for the Fire



Fight,' followed by another criticising the new Cavalry musketry regulations. In connection with a paper in the July 1906 number of our Journal by the Inspector-General of Cavalry on 'The Grand International Long-distance Ride,' an article may be read by Lieut. Freiherr von Maercken zu Geerath on 'The Military Value of Long-distance Rides': he opines that distance can be overdone and is inclined to belittle the sugar diet, which he points out, appositely enough, cannot well be adhered to in the field.

'THE JOURNAL OF THE UNITED STATES CAVALRY ASSOCIATION'

The July number contains the experiences of Major Brown, Third United States Cavalry, who visited Australia last year for the purpose of investigating and reporting upon the feasibility of procuring horses from that quarter for use in the Philippines.

First Lieutenant W. N. Hughes writes on 'The Signal Corps in Manœuvres,' dealing with:—(1) Mounted orderlies. (2) Visual signals—the flag; the heliograph; the acetylene lamp. (3) Wire lines—(a) the buzzer wire lines; (b) the field wire line. (4) Wireless telegraphy. It is pointed out that the commanding officers of troops must have a keen knowledge of the use of tactical lines of information, which comes only from the study of their power and limitation and their practical application to the problems in hand.

First Lieutenant Gordon Johnston, 3rd Cavalry, gives an account of 'Riding to Hounds with Cavalry Officers in Germany':—

'They were so beautifully mounted that I have rarely seen as many horses of such class together. As for their riding, I must confess that I have swung all the way from amusement at their seat and slight esteem for its virtues to a serious and respectful regard. And why? The answer as it has come honestly to me should satisfy anyone. I have ridden with them at full speed over the worst country I have ever seen—fearfully deep, rough, full of holes, innumerable overgrown ditches, stiff fences with deep, slippery take-offs and landings, with ditches on one or both sides—and I have seen them go straight and hard behind the hounds. . . .

'The German officer has really only one sort of horse—a maid-of-all-work—while one hears that the English Cavalry officer has a private charger and, according to his tastes, steeplechasers for racing purposes, hunters to follow the hounds, hacks for park riding, ponies for polo, &c. The German officer rides all of his horses in the service, even his racehorses. The late riding-master, Von Heyden-Linden, won a race with "Orcadian" on Sunday, rode the same horse with his squadron on Tuesday, and won a race with him again in Hannover on Thursday. So our Prussian charger must perform all his duties—he must go well on the drill-grounds before the platoon; he must show the greatest endurance on patrols in manœuvres; in the fall he must follow the hounds and run in the regimental races, if necessary pull a dogcart homeward, and of course dance like a high-school horse in the riding-hall instruction, also go safely under ladies, &c. . . .'

First Lieutenant A. C. Knowles, 13th Infantry, contributes an illustrated article entitled 'Horseflesh as Telegraph Wire':—

'Heretofore, when a mounted operator, equipped with breast reel and Cavalry buzzer, wished to communicate with the base station from which he was sent out, it was necessary for him to dismount and establish his own station by connecting his buzzer to wire which he was reeling out, and to complete the circuit by driving a metallic pin into the ground.

'It is, therefore, seen that although the rider can communicate at pleasure with the base at any time by dismounting and cutting in as explained above, yet, on the other hand, the base has no means of notifying the rider that communication is desired with him until the latter chooses to cut in.

'A system which would permit inter-communication between the base and mounted operator, or between two mounted operators, at all times, whether at a halt or in movement, without the necessity of dismounting and establishing station, suggested to the writer the possibility of devising some such scheme which would accomplish the desired result.

'Experiments with this object in view have demonstrated not only the possibility, but the practicability, of such a system, which is briefly outlined below.

'By making some slight alterations in, and additions to, the present breast reel, and simple wire connections, tests were made in telegraph and telephone communication between rider and station, or between two riders, with results entirely satisfactory.

'In short, when a mounted operator is sent out from a column for the purpose of accompanying a reconnoitring patrol, a flanking detachment, or any body of troops whose duty will take them far enough from the column to make electrical communication both practical and desirable, constant electrical connection may be had with him. It is no longer necessary for him to dismount and cut in his instrument. He may be called at any time, even while moving. He is ready to transmit messages to base whenever necessary, and he doesn't have to stop to do it. The commanding officer of the body to which the operator is attached may ride alongside of his moving telegraph office and receive the message word by word as the operator receives it; or he may dictate his own message to the base in a similar manner. Should he desire to communicate by telephone, the operator hands him the combined receiver and transmitter, and without dismounting he may talk with the base.

'The only way to accomplish what is described above was to ground through the horse. This is done by placing a small piece of copper (properly connected to the instrument) against the animal's body, and as the horse always has one or more feet on the ground while moving at any gait, except possibly the gallop, which would seldom be resorted to, it is seen that the ground connection is completed through one or more hoofs. Of the several horses used in these experiments, only a few showed any discomfiture, and those that were affected by the current were soon quieted. They appeared to exhibit surprise rather than pain at something unusual, to which they quickly became accustomed.

'These tests were made over all kinds of ground—very wet, muddy, moist, perfectly dry and dusty roads and fields, with results of practical value.



'With two mounted operators similarly equipped, and separated by five miles of wire, conversation was carried on without difficulty, the horses standing in grass. The buzzer was loud enough to be heard several feet from the instrument.'

'JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION'

The July number of this Journal contains the 'Q' Club Prize Essay of 1906, 'Lessons to be Learned by Regimental Officers from the Russo-Japanese War,' by Captain Ashley W. Barrett, 16th Middlesex (London Irish) V.R.C.

This essay is replete with interest for officers of all branches of the Service, and deals with the officers and rank and file of the combatants, all branches of the forces, attack and defence, communications, armaments, equipment, and methods of fighting. With regard to the Russian Cavalry the writer says:—

In each Cavalry regiment there are now two groups of specially trained men. One consists of sixteen detached men under an officer trained carefully in recon-The other, of two officers and sixteen men trained in destroying railways and telegraphs and in establishing telegraphic and other systems of signalling. Without doubt this method of specialising will contribute to efficiency in the future. The whole of the Russian Regular Cavalry is now armed with the rifle and bayonet, the combined length of which is 5 feet 5½ inches, and the total weight nine pounds. The rifle is slung across the back, muzzle upwards, the butt being behind the right hip. A curved sword, weighing 21 lb., and with a blade 34½ inches long, is also carried, with a scabbard for the bayonet attached to the outside of the sword scabbard. Each man carries 45 rounds S.A.A., and a further 180 rounds per man are carried in the regimental transport. The lance is carried only by the front ranks of certain regiments, and by them only at ceremonial parades. The Cossack Cavalry are armed similarly to the foregoing, with the exception that the bayonet is not carried, and that on active service a 7-lb. lance, 9 feet long, with no pennon, is carried by the front ranks.'

There is also an instructive article, entitled 'Modern Tendencies in Strategy and Tactics as shown in Campaigns in the Far East,' by Lieut.-Colonel Yoda, Imperial Japanese Army, translated from the 'Kaikosha Kiji' (Officers' Club Journal), No. 352, December, 1906, by Captain E. F. Calthrop, R.F.A., communicated by the General Staff. The writer divides the subject into the following heads:—

^{6.} Adoption of entrenched positions and increase in the duration of an action.



^{1.} The development of modes of transport and the employment of large numbers.

^{2.} Development of means of communication and decrease of independent action.

^{3.} Decrease of strategy of a subtle or intricate kind, and increase of a large type of strategic movements.

^{4.} Closer co-operation between army and navy.

^{5.} Extension of the battle front and increase of the distance at which engagements are opened.

- 7. Prevalence of enveloping attacks, to the exclusion of frontal assaults, and the necessity for a fundamental method of deployment for battle.
 - 8. Increase of the cases when reconnaissance is made in force.
 - 9. Decrease in the distinctive character of fortress as opposed to field warfare.
 - 10. Increase of the use of night for operations.

In the August number there is an instructive article, well illustrated, on 'The Passage of Rivers by Small Bodies of Mounted Troops,' by Captain E. N. Mozley, R.E. The writer excludes bridging from the subject, but gives much useful information on various rough-and-ready methods of improvising crossings. This article is continued in the September number.

In the September number appears Part I. of an article entitled 'The Military System of the Future in the British Empire,' communicated by desire of the Secretary of State for War. Part II. will be published in the October Journal.

This article has been prepared with the view of explaining the object and intention of the 'Territorial and Reserve Forces Bill.' The authoritative source from which these articles emanate will lend them special interest in the eyes of officers.

'THE JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL ARTILLERY'

The August number contains an article on 'Hard-mouthed Horses,' by Major J. F. N. Birch, R.H.A., with illustrations by Captain G. H. A. White, R.H.A.

'It is hard to exaggerate the importance of long-rein driving and the excellent results that can be obtained from it, not only with young ones, but with intractable horses and refusers. Three weeks' long-rein driving by an expert at the commencement of a horse's education will shorten his training and save time in the end; all rough-riders are thoroughly grounded in this at the establishment.

'Bad-mouthed horses can be improved by being ridden by good horsemen, and if the man is not taught on joining to hang on by the reins, there should not be so many bad-mouthed animals to deal with in the future. France and Germany do not suffer from them as we do; most of their military horses are fit for anybody to ride. . . .'

'RALPH HEATHCOTE'

Letters of a Young Diplomatist. Edited by Countess Günther Groben. John Lane. 12s. 6d.

These letters form one of the most stimulating and delightful volumes which have appeared for many months. Ralph Heathcote joined the 1st Royal Dragoons early in the nineteenth century, and gives an excellent description of a young Cavalry officer's life in those stirring times, both at home and in the Peninsula. Writing from Piershill Barracks, Edinburgh, in 1806, he shows that his life was not too arduous: 'Our officers are not teased with the petty minutiæ of the Service; they are, and live like gentlemen.'

'THE DEFENCE OF DUFFER'S DRIFT'

Price 1s. Published by W. Clowes & Sons, Limited.

The third edition having been sold out, a fourth has recently been produced, and we have no doubt that there is still plenty of demand for this excellent and amusing little book.

'NOTES FOR THE TACTICAL FITNESS EXAMINATION'

By Major A. T. Moore, R.E. 2s. 6d. (nett.) Published by Hugh Rees, Limited.

A second edition of this useful book, revised to meet the latest regulations governing the examination, the new organisation and establishments of the Field Army, and the recent amendments to *Combined Training*, has recently been issued.

This is quite a short and very practical volume, which should assist officers to pass the examination with a maximum benefit and a minimum of unnecessary study.

'MILITARY LAW MADE EASY'

By Lieut.-Colonel S. T. Banning. 4s. 6d. Published by Gale & Polden, Limited.

A third edition of this book has been published this year, and will be found to differ considerably from the former editions, so as to bring it as far as possible up to date both with the recent alterations in the Rules of Procedure, and the King's Regulations, and the revised syllabus for examinations. Its chief object is to assist officers reading for the promotion examinations, more especially when they are working by themselves.

GUIDE TO MILITARY HISTORY FOR MILITARY EXAMINATIONS

By Captain G. P. A. Phillips. 2s. (nett.) Published by Gale & Polden, Limited.

Part III.: Peninsular War, 1813-14. Wellington's Campaign in South of France, 1814 to end of war. The numerous maps which this book contains, giving the various dispositions of the troops engaged and their line of route, will be found particularly helpful to students.

'HOW TO INSTRUCT IN AIMING AND FIRING'

By Quartermaster Squad Instructor J. Bostock. 6d. (nett.) Published by Gale & Polden, Limited.

A useful pamphlet, which should be of assistance to the squad instructor in the training of recruits.

LANTERN LECTURES

'CAVALRY JOURNAL' SERIES

For the assistance of Officers giving Lectures we propose to publish and to issue on hire or sale a Series of Lectures, illustrated by Lantern Slides, on subjects likely to be useful, such as Scouting, Field-ploneering, Minor Tactics, Horse-management, &c., also Historical Fights, with plans and illustrations.

A list of the Lectures available and rules regarding their hire and return will be sent as early as possible to <u>Subscribers</u> to the Journal who may desire them.

We are giving some extracts from the Lecture on 'Tracking' as a sample. This will shortly be ready.

The charge of hiring each Lecture, including about twelve Slides, will be 5s.; to purchase, 15s., carriage extra.

For the present it will not be possible for us to supply the Lectures on hire abroad, and in such cases they would have to be purchased.

For full particulars apply to the Managing Editor, 'The Cavalry Journal,' Royal United Service Institution, Whitehall, S.W.

Extracts from Lantern Lecture on TRACKING

'CAVALRY JOURNAL' SERIES

Note to Instructor.—Refer to the necessity for practice in—

- 1. Observation of small details;
- Deduction, or 'putting this and that together,' and so reading the meaning of such details.

Then show how valuable is the art of *Tracking*, and that it is, after all, a combination of the exercise of *Observation* and *Deduction*.

(See Lecture on 'Scouting.')

Tracking (or 'trailing,' or 'spooring,' or 'pugging' as it is variously called in different parts of our Empire) is the art of reading the marks left on the ground by men, animals, or vehicles, and of finding out information from them.

In all uncivilised countries and in most of our colonies tracking is the natural means employed for gaining information of an enemy's movements, or of lost cattle,

or of the whereabouts of game, &c.; and men who thus use it every day of their lives become expert in the art to a marvellous degree.

It is invaluable to a scout; and any of you scouts who pick it up will find that in war against a civilised enemy who has not practised it you will score all the time. A man who has never had experience of tracking often fights shy of learning it, as being too difficult; but many another man goes to the opposite extreme, and having seen a pretty clear track, and read its meaning, considers that he is a born tracker and has nothing more to learn.



SCOUT TRACKING
'How can you see that
this man is a novice
at the art?'

The truth is that, with care and patience, a man may make himself a very fair tracker; but no man can become good at it without a great amount of practice, and he is never likely to become absolutely perfect, because he will find that he goes on learning all his life.

Now I will show you a picture of a track which no doubt some of you will be able to read the meaning of without difficulty; and you will think tracking

is as easy as eating cheese.

[Show picture of the 'Track of the Diner-out.']

Here, on the other hand, is an instance of a track not quite so obvious, yet full of meaning. It occurred on service in East Africa.

[Show picture of foot-track in grass.]

A small column was following this path to go and surprise a native village, when the guide, who was leading, noticed these tracks in the grass: the deep impression of a man's toes on one side of the path, and one of his heel on the other side moving diagonally in a similar direction to the path.

He stopped the column and said, 'It is no go; a scout of the enemy has

gone on half an hour ahead of us to warn them that we are coming.'

The footmarks showed that the scout was running (i.e. longer strides than walking, and toes more deeply indented in the ground); he did not follow the path but jumped it, evidently wishing to avoid our notice, and therefore he was an enemy's scout. The track was fairly but not absolutely fresh (i.e. the grass though bent by the foot was no longer pressed down to the ground, and the stalks were no longer exuding juice as they would do when quite freshly broken). So he had gone on at least half an hour ahead of us. This instance shows the value of noticing every detail, even to the mark of a foot in the grass near the path; had the guide missed seeing this one track where it crossed the line of advance the column would have had a long march, with all the labour of hurry and secrecy, only to find the enemy gone.

The tracks of a horse at a trot are similar to those at the walk—that is, they are in pairs, but at a greater distance apart and with a deeper dig into the ground, especially at the toes, and with a certain amount of dirt kicked up.

[Show picture of track at a trot.]

The character of the horse can be told from his tracks by a practised tracker. Every horse has a different length of stride, and it varies in each horse as he is tired or fresh; but you ought with a little practice and careful measurement to tell whether a horse is big or little, long backed or short, light or squarely built, well shaped or a 'disher,' sound or lame, and so on.

Now here is the track of a lame horse.

[Show picture of lame horse's track.]

නවා නවා **නවා නවා** වනා වන වන වනා

Smith, can you tell me, first, at what pace that horse was going? Secondly, in which leg was he lame?

(The horse is at a walk and lame in off hind.)



LANTERN LECTURES.
"FOOT-TRACKS IN THE GRASS."

"THE DINER.OUT'S PROGRESS."
TELLTALE TRACKS IN THE SNOW.

NOTES

RUSES

'You didn't come here to play the fool, sir; you came here to carry out manœuvres.' That is the kind of rebuke which used very frequently to be heard on the field of training for war only a few years ago, if some young officer ventured on a ruse or stratagem that was not laid down in the drill-book—and there were not many ruses to be found in that old store of dry bones.

Lord Wolseley was the first general officer whom I can remember countenancing such a thing, and that was when a squadron leader, in manœuvring to capture a battery of Horse Artillery which was in action near him, drew away their Cavalry escort by pretending to move his squadron past within striking distance of them. He sent a couple of scouts, followed by half a dozen men towing big branches of trees behind them, down a dusty lane leading at some distance round the enemy's flank. The escort dashed down to catch the supposed squadron in its cloud of dust, leaving the coast clear for the real one to come in and capture the entire battery from its rear.

Only the other day at the manœuvres on Salisbury Plain, the Cavalry undertook to pretend to be the 11th Infantry Brigade at a point some six miles from where that brigade actually was. A regiment picketed its horses; the men took off their spurs, and slung their haversacks on their shoulders in the Infantry fashion, and then started out as a strong skirmishing line across country, and so came into full view of the enemy. Then they began flagwagging to and from their imaginary supports such messages as 'Two companies of the Leicesters will support you,' 'The East Yorks are supporting your left,' and so on, until it was quite evident to the watchful enemy that they could be none other than the whole of the 11th Brigade.

On that same day the enemy's guns were for some time busy shelling a battery improvised out of bicycles and bushes, and brought into action by bogus teams of six horses galloping up and unlimbering at the regulation distance apart.

Continual 'playing the fool' at manœuvres is strongly to be deprecated, but at the same time the development of cunning is desirable, whether it be to deceive or to avoid being deceived. We found out in the Boer war, if nowhere else, how an occasional act of 'slimness' pays, if well-timed.

Half the business of a commander in war is to deceive his enemy, but this he cannot do unless he has cunning and imagination, and has had experience in putting them into practice at least in a small way when at peace training. And it is very desirable for the success of such ruses that his officers and men should have become accustomed to play their respective parts sufficiently well to take in an equally crafty enemy.

We propose to publish, for the information of our readers, a number of instances of ruses in minor tactics which have actually been successful in war or at manœuvres.

For this purpose we shall be grateful for any authentic personal experiences of such, and we propose to give a prize for the best ruse described. (N.B.—Not necessarily for the best description of a ruse.)

THE CAVALRY MANŒUVRES.

Everyone must regret the death of the Lancer who was killed in the accident at the Cavalry manœuvres.

The essence of Cavalry action is rapidity of movement and surprise, and this accident was due to neither side appreciating until too late how close it had drawn to the other. This collision of Cavalry, on favourable ground in mere manœuvres, shows how wrong are those who have been teaching that charges and actual collisions of Cavalry were things of the past, and demonstrates the possibility in the future, as in the past, of Cavalry surprising and riding down troops otherwise engaged.

TO HOG, OR NOT TO HOG,
THAT IS THE QUESTION

Many say Army horses should be hogged for the following reasons:

- 1. It saves the men a considerable amount of time in grooming.
- 2. The mane is only ornamental: mules and donkeys don't have manes; therefore hogging is not cruel to the horse.
- 3. The mane is the home of scurf, and, in South Africa, of ticks; in India, of heat eruptions: hogging prevents these.
- 4. A man can mount better by grasping the horse's head-collar.
- 5. In swimming, it is better for the rider to hold on to the horse's headrope or his tail in preference to his mane.
- 6. Hogged manes look far more neat and uniform than the variety of manes usually seen.

Others say they should not be hogged because:

- 1. A well-groomed mane shows a good man is in charge of the horse.
- 2. A nice mane is a great ornament to a horse: hogging is unsightly.
- 3. Mane keeps off flies in hot countries.
- 4. Mane is useful to help the rider in mounting.
- 5. Mane is useful to a man swimming with his horse.

We should be very glad if any of our readers would care to take the trouble to collect the votes of their men on this subject. It would be very interesting to see which way general opinion trends in squadrons.

PLAN FOR VETERINARY INSTRUCTION

The following is the course of veterinary instruction for the young Cavalry officers at the school at Paderborn, in Germany:

- 1. General remarks about the frame of the horse.
 - a. The skeleton, connections of the separate bones, joints, &c.



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- b. Muscles, including their group action, sinews, tendons, &c.
- c. Internal organism, blood circulation, breathing, digestion, body temperature.
- 2. Look of the horse, judging the animal in general.
 - a. Shape of body, colour, and markings.
 - b. Position and motion of the limbs, shape of hoof.
 - c. Mechanism of the body, the limbs, and the hoofs.
 - d. Physiology of the natural paces.
- 3. Horse-shoeing, practice on dead hoofs.
- 4. Care of leg and hoof.
- 5. Hoof and leg diseases, prevention and treatment of the same.
- 6. Care and tending of the horse.
 - a. Stable accommodation and fittings, bedding, ventilation, feeding, and watering.
 - b. Testing of provender and drinking water.
 - c. Rubbing down, clipping, bandaging, and covering.
- 7. Massage.
- 8. Contagious diseases, their prevention and cure. Other internal diseases, how to avoid them, and the first measures to be taken when they appear.
 - 9. Treatment of the horse in distance riding.
- 10. Examination of the horse for purchase as regards practical soundness. Dentology.
- 11. Generalities about race and breeding; remount; organisation of the Remount Department.
 - 12. Breeding and raising of horses, and the treatment of foal hoofs.

CARBINE FOR GERMAN CAVALRY

A new pattern Carbine is being issued on trial to several regiments of the German Cavalry. It will also be used by the foot artillery and bicycle scouts. Experiments are to be made of various modes of carrying the Carbine.

THE FRENCH CAVALRY SCHOOL

The Cavalry School at Saumur was specially instituted to:

- 1. Perfect the instruction of lieutenants nominated to follow the course.
- 2. Complete the instruction of newly promoted sub-lieutenants.
- 3. Give non-commissioned officers desirous of obtaining commissions the general knowledge which every officer should possess.
- 4. Complete the technical instruction of newly admitted probationary assistant veterinary surgeons, teach them riding and regimental duty. For all the divisions, with the exception of telegraphists and fencing masters, the duration of the course is eleven months. The school receives in addition (1) assistant fencing instructors of regiments; (2) men from Cavalry regiments for a course of farriery; (3) men detached from their Cavalry regiments to be exercised in electric and optical telegraphy. Candidates must have at least two years' service as non-commissioned officers. After an examination before a regimental board, to obtain a certificate of general instruction, these non-commissioned officers are entered on a list for promotion to the rank of sub-lieutenant, by the Inspector-General.



LONG-DISTANCE CAVALRY RIDE

The Temps reports a remarkable ride which was accomplished by five officers and eighty men of the 6th Hussars, in garrison at Commercy. Setting out at twenty minutes past one o'clock in the morning for Mars-la-Tour, they sighted Vionville at seven o'clock, and thence rode to Mars-la-Tour. After a halt of three hours they set out again for Commercy, and cantered into the town at five o'clock in the afternoon, having covered 120 kilomètres (75 miles), without leaving a single trooper behind. The total distance was thus covered in twelve hours and forty minutes.

MERITORIOUS SERVICE MEDAL

The under-mentioned non-commissioned officers have been awarded the medal for 'Meritorious Service':

Quartermaster-Corporal-Major G. Marsh, late 2nd Life Guards.

Troop-Sergeant-Major W. Hughes, late 8th Hussars.

Sergeant T. Pearce, late 9th Lancers.

Troop-Sergeant-Major A. Lawrence, late 17th Lancers.

FORAGE ALLOWANCE

The following rates of money allowance in lieu of forage will be issued in the United Kingdom and the Channel Islands until further orders:

No.	Com	For each ration					
		 				s .	d.
1	Aldershot Command					1	8
2	Eastern Command .					1	6
3	Irish Command .					1	4
4	London District .					1	7
5	Northern Command.					1	7
6	Scottish Command .					1	6
7	Southern Command.					1	7
8	Western Command		•			ī	7
9	Channel Islands .		-	·		2	i

A CORRECTION

Major F. A. Hayden, 2nd Battalion, Duke of Wellington's Regiment, points out an inaccuracy in the article on 'General Lake's Pursuit of Holkar,' by Major G. F. MacMunn, in the April number of the CAVALRY JOURNAL, 1907.

On page 165 'H.M. 76th Highlanders' are referred to; this should have been 'the 76th Foot' (now the 2nd Battalion, Duke of Wellington's Regiment), which was raised in 1787 by Sir Thomas Musgrave, chiefly in the counties of Nottingham and Leicester. The 76th (MacDonald's Highlanders) was raised in 1778, and disbanded at the Peace of Versailles in 1783.

YEOMANRY

In the case of the Yeomanry it has been decided to increase the emoluments of non-commissioned officers and men who will draw the new rate of pay. In

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addition to Army pay of 1s. 2d., camp allowance of 1s., and ration allowance of 6d. already announced, every non-commissioned officer or man present at training who is certified to be efficient in equitation will receive an equitation bounty of 1l. as an addition to the new rate of pay.

The Yeomanry Commanding Officers Committee, with General Mackinnon, Director of Auxiliary Forces, and General Haig, Director of Military Training, on the General Staff, under the presidency of Lord Scarbrough, are considering the future arrangement for the training and management of the Yeomanry.

OBITUARY

The death occurred on July 29 of Lieut.-Colonel Douglas A. Cunninghame Graham, late of the 6th Dragoon Guards (Carabiniers), aged sixty-three years. He entered the Army in 1863, and served with the Carabiniers in the Afghan War in 1879-80, including the affair at Ali Boghan, under Lieut.-Colonel Fryer, and the expeditions against the Wuzeeree Khugianis and to the Hissarik Valley, under Lieut.-General Bright, receiving the medal. He retired in 1894.

Colonel FitzGeorge, eldest son of the Duke of Cambridge, died early in September, after lying ill for some weeks at Lucerne. Colonel FitzGeorge was born in 1843, and in due course, following the profession of his father, received a commission in the 20th Hussars. When the Egyptian Campaign of 1882 was undertaken, he went out to Egypt on special service, and was attached to the personal staff of Lord, then General Sir Garnet, Wolseley. He was present at the battle of Tel-el-Kebir, and brought home the despatches. His services in the campaign were mentioned in despatches, and he was rewarded with the brevet of lieutenant-colonel, the medal with clasp, the Fourth Class of the Osmanieh, and the Khedive's Star. He retired from the Army in 1895.

Lieut.-Colonel George H. Cameron, D.S.O., a Canadian soldier who distinguished himself in the South African war, died on August 28 in Winnipeg. On the formation of Strathcona's Horse for service in South Africa, he was appointed second in command. His war services began with the operations in Natal, May and June, 1900; and he continued to serve in the Transvaal and Orange River Colony till May 31, 1902, being awarded the medal with five clasps. Colonel Cameron was an enthusiastic rifleman and an equally keen supporter of cross-country riding, curling, baseball, and other sports.

BOUND VOLUMES

Volume I. of the 'Cavalry Journal' (first four numbers January to October 1906) and Volume II. of the 'Cavalry Journal' (January to October 1907) bound in white forril cloth, with red design and lettering. Price 10s. each.

Also a white forril cover for binding the four numbers January to October 1907. Price 2s.

Can be obtained by applying to The Editor,

R.U.S.I.,

Whitehall, S.W.

O. Lumley, Colonel, Editor.

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SPORTING NOTES

RACING

On the occasion of their Majesties' recent visit to Ireland the King graciously presented two cups to be run for at the Leopardstown Club Meeting, one for a soldiers', the other for a farmers' race. A gloriously fine day was vouchsafed for the special Meeting, the greatest interest was evoked in the races, and the arrival of the King and Queen was signalised by an extraordinary outburst of enthusiasm.

Twenty-two horses came out for the Royal Military Cup. The Hon. R. Bruce, 11th Hussars, ran two. Leucosia (ridden by Surgeon-Capt. McCabe, the trainer of the Derby winner Orby) was a strong favourite; but the race was a complete surprise, as Mr. Bruce's second string, ridden by Mr. Lawson (a brother-officer), won easily, his own mount being second, and Mr. J. E. Boulderson's Jane Morgan, with Capt. Rasbotham, K.D.G.'s, up, third.

The Farmers' Royal Cup attracted twenty-five to the post, of whom Flax Park, an Irish Derby winner, who also carried off the Liverpool Cup, was installed favourite, but got off badly, and Mr. D. G. McCannon's Royallen, well ridden by the Hon. R. Bruce, won a good race.

The King personally handed the Royal Cups to the owners of the winners, and both were congratulated by Her Majesty, the King cautioning the recipients to take care of the cups and not lose them!

The Lothians and Berwickshire Yeomanry Meeting on July 27 attracted a huge crowd to Belhaven course, near Dunbar. The entries were good and sport all through most interesting. Results:

Novices' Hurdle Race, Mr. Player's Lancer (owner); Tyninghame Hurdle Plate, Mr. Storie's Ballindair (Mr. J. Storie); Ladies' Hurdle Race, Mr. Hardy's Red Clover (owner); Belmore Selling Hurdle Plate, Mr. Dunn's Lady More (owner); Dunbar Town Plate, Mr. Hardy's Red Clover (Sergt. Hardy); Novices' Flat Race, Mr. R. Lowe's Speed (Mr. Duff); Belhaven Consolation Plate, Mr. G. Low's Scotch (Capt. N. Stewart).

STEEPLECHASING

In Germany the Government hold that steeplechasing is a school for Cavalry officers, and so this sport is almost entirely in the hands of Cavalry officers. Comparing the annual list of riders who have ridden three races and over, we find there are 82 gentlemen riders (nearly all of whom are officers), as against 23 professional riders. Some of their averages also are extremely good; for instance, Prince K. Wrede (Bavarian Cavalry) has ridden 65 times with 23 wins and 20 seconds; Lieut. V. Keller (60th Artillery) 59 times with 20 wins and 11 seconds;

Lieut. V. Platen (24th Dragoons) 57 times with 12 wins and 7 seconds; many others have also ridden forty to fifty times with good averages.

The German officers get plenty of practice, ride well over a country, despite the few natural facilities, and are fine horsemen.

Considering the decadence in our soldier riders this should afford reflection, for steeplechasing is a sport that requires coolness, patience, nerve, quick decision, and, above all, absolute fitness—qualities which are so essential to soldiers. The authorities not only in Germany, but also in France and other countries, recognise this, and we are certainly losing our ground as a nation of horsemen.

POLO

The Subalterns' Tournament was played as usual at Ranelagh. Seven teams entered, viz.—1st and 2nd Life Guards, Royal Horse Guards, Coldstream Guards, King's Dragoon Guards, 16th and 21st Lancers. In the semi-finals the 21st Lancers (Messrs. Lister, Godfree, Delmege, and Reynolds) opposed the King's Dragoon Guards (Messrs. Cheape, Wernholt, St. C. Cheape, and Brown).

This was a fine game, well fought out to the finish, which resulted in a win for the Lancers by six goals to five. The other semi-final was between the 1st Life Guards (Lord Hugh Grosvenor, Hon. E. S. Wyndham, Mr. Mundy, and Mr. Hardy) and the Royal Horse Guards (Mr. Howard-Vyse, Mr. Bowlby, Lord A. Innes-Ker, and Mr. Harrison). A good game resulted in the 1st Life Guards' favour by five goals to three.

The final was an exciting match between the 1st Life Guards and the 21st Lancers.

At the opening of the last chukker the score was seven goals to five in the Lancers' favour; then their ponies began to give out, and the Guards, playing a fine game, just secured the necessary three goals to win on the point of time, thus carrying off the cup by eight goals to seven. The Lancers, who were beaten by the same regiment in the final last year, were certainly unlucky not to win this year.

The Ranelagh Club must be congratulated and thanked for the success of the Aldershot Cup Day. In order to give a better chance to the Infantry teams it presented a special Cup for them, and ran the two tournaments simultaneously on three grounds from eleven o'clock in the morning until six o'clock in the evening.

That it was possible to bring off so many matches within the day on soft grounds, with frequent heavy storms, redounds greatly to the credit of the managers, Mr. F. A. Gill and Captain C. D. Jenner.

For the Aldershot Cup the following regiments entered teams: Royal Horse Guards, King's Dragoon Guards, 5th Lancers, 1st Life Guards, 2nd Life Guards, King's Dragoon Guards ('A'), 21st Lancers ('A'), 16th Lancers ('A'), 16th Lancers ('B'), 21st Lancers ('B'), and Aldershot Staff.

For the Infantry Cup: 1st Coldstream Guards, 2nd Coldstream Guards, Irish Guards, 6th Infantry Brigade, West Yorkshire Regiment, and the Coldstream Guards ('A'). The final for the Cavalry Cup was fought out between the 16th Lancers (Captain G. E. Bellville, W. J. Shannon, Captain C. Campbell, and Major G. E. Tuson) and 1st Life Guards (Hon. E. S. Wyndham, Lord



H. Grosvenor, Captain E. H. Brassey, and L. H. Hardy), the Lancers winning by five goals to two. The Infantry final, between the Irish Guards (J. Harvey, Captain H. Crichton, Major Hon. G. H. Morris, and Sir Hill Child) and the Coldstream Guards (P. L. Wyndham, C. W. Banbury, Captain W. M. Beckwith, and Colonel the Hon. W. Lambton), was won by the Irish Guards by three goals to two, after an evenly contested match on ground terribly cut up.

It was by the narrowest margin that the King's Dragoon Guards did not get into the final for the Cavalry Cup, and, had they done so, they would probably have won. Her Majesty the Queen presented the winning team with the cup.

Englishmen, amongst whom were several well-known soldier-players, have been much in evidence at the international tournaments on the Continent, notably at Ostend, Frankfort, and Deauville.

Most of the London clubs, as usual, closed their season at the end of July, but the various county tournaments, at which soldiers have been conspicuous, have been taking place, and much good play has been witnessed.

A great deal of play has taken place at Aldershot, and the recent tournament there secured an entry of fourteen teams. The final was between the Coldstream Guards and the 16th Lancers. Colonel Kenna, 21st Lancers, umpired, and the result was a win for the 16th Lancers by seven goals to two. Teams: 16th Lancers: Lieutenant Beddington, Captain Macarthur Onslow, Captain Campbell, and Lieutenant Howard. Coldstream Guards: Lieutenant Leigh-Bennett, Captain Hardy, Lieutenant Brand, and Lieutenant Brown.

RAILWAY RATES

The following letter has been sent out to the Metropolitan Polo Clubs, Service Polo Clubs, and to the Country Polo Clubs:—

Sir,—Polo has so largely increased of recent years, and the number of ponies travelling to and from matches and to and from shows is so much larger, that the Committee feel, in the interests of players, that a united effort on the part of the Metropolitan Polo Clubs, the Service Polo Clubs, and the Country Polo Clubs should be made to induce the railway companies to extend to the transit of polo ponies the same privileges accorded to hunters.

Will you, therefore, kindly send in to the Secretary on the enclosed slip:

- (a) The number of your playing members and the number of ponies owned by them.
- (b) The name of your delegate to attend a Conference at 12 Hanover Square in the Motor Exhibition week in November?

The Conference will discuss the whole question, with a view to appointing a representative deputation to submit the facts of the case to the railway companies.

Kindly reply at your earliest convenience.

Yours faithfully,

ARTHUR M. TREE, President.
TRESHAM GILBEY, Member of Committee.

County Polo Association, 12 Hanover Square, London, W.: August, 1907.



Returns covering 1,712 players and 6,196 ponies, have already been sent in from thirty-eight clubs, the list being made up of Hurlingham, Ranelagh, and Roehampton, twenty-five country and ten service clubs. Before the conference begins, a meeting of the committee of management will be held, at which the rules of the county cup tournament for 1908 will be considered.

The subject is an important one, so it is hoped that clubs will respond.

The International Polo Match between England and Ireland took place in August at Phœnix Park, Dublin. Contrary to expectation it was a close game, England only hitting the winning goal in the last minute of play, thus securing the victory by six goals to five. Teams—England: Mr. R. Grenfell, Capt. H. Wilson, Mr. P. Nickalls, and Capt. M. Lannowe (back). Ireland: Major A. Rotherham, the Hon. A. Hastings, Capt. H. Lloyd, and Mr. P. P. O'Reilly. Umpires: Mr. J. Watson and Capt. Miller.

Unfortunately the Military and Subalterns' Tournaments in Ireland have fallen through this year, so the 11th Hussars (the holders) will retain the cup.

POLO ABROAD

South Africa.—The Inter-Regimental Tournament was held at Bloemfontein, O.R.C., at the end of June. The entries comprised the 4th Dragoon Guards, 5th Dragoon Guards, 4th Hussars, 9th Lancers, and 6th Mounted Infantry.

The final between the 4th Dragoon Guards (Mr. Oldrey, Mr. Hornby, Capt. Lamont, and Mr. Oppenheim) and the 5th Dragoon Guards (Major Winwood, Capt. Dunbar, Capt. Home, and Mr. Black) was very even, and the issue was in doubt right up to the call of time, when the 4th Dragoon Guards rode off the winners by two goals, one subsidiary to one goal, three subsidiaries.

On one day of the Tournament the South African Polo Association held a Polo Pony Show, at which Sir Hamilton Goold Adams presented a Cup for the best heavy-weight polo pony, which was won by Lieut.-Colonel Kirk's (Queen's Bays) Snow. Capt. Hesketh's Bachelor took the prize for the best light-weight pony. The entries were good and showed that the class of ponies has greatly improved in South Africa.

At the conclusion of the Tournament the ponies of the Queen's Bays, who are shortly leaving South Africa for England, were put up to auction, and the twenty-four averaged 51 guineas.

In the final of the Durban Tournament the 4th Hussars (Lieut. Stokes, Brevet-Major Hogg, D.S.O., Lieut.-Colonel Hoare, and Lieut. Bell) defeated the 9th Lancers.

India.—In the semi-finals of the Beresford Tournament at Simla, Patiala beat the Viceroy's Staff, and the 17th Lancers beat the Commander-in-Chief's Staff. The final between Patiala and the 17th Lancers was a close game, Patiala eventually winning by two goals to one.

With regard to the Indian Polo Association, which has never been properly supported since its institution in 1900, Captain Heseltine, supported by Major-General Clements, the president, proposes that the country should be subdivided into eight districts, and that a preliminary tournament should be held in each

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of these districts. The winning team in each district would then play the next nearest district, while the semi-finals and final should be played off at Calcutta.

The 'recent form' list for India for the season 1906-07 is as follows: Mr. C. Graham, Calcutta; Maharajah of Cooch Behar; Raj Kumar of Cooch Behar; Colonel J. Turner, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Farran, 4th Cavalry; Colonel De Lisle, Mr. Tomkinson, Royal Dragoons; Captain Heseltine, the Carabiniers; Major Vaughan, Mr. Palmer, 10th Hussars; Major Hobson, 12th Lancers; Captain Fletcher, Captain Cardew, 17th Lancers; Captain Barrett, Captain Learmouth, the Hon. J. D. Y. Bingham, 15th Hussars; Captain Carden, Seaforth Highlanders; Captain Buist, the Guides; Mr. Lloyd, Captain Williams, Royal Welsh Fusiliers; Captain Ashbourne, Royal Fusiliers; Colonel Watson, Major Cotgrave, Captain Hewlett, Central India Horse; Thakore Dhokal Singh, Jodhpore; Shah Mirza Beg, Captain Osman Yar-ud-dowla, Golconda; General Pretum Singh, Patiala; Bakhtawar Singh, Moti Lall, Bikanir; Abdul Wahid, Imtiaz Ali, Bhopal; Maharajah of Alwar; the Rajah of Rutlam; Major Chaplin, 8th Cavalry; Captain Popham, 26th Cavalry; Mr. Anderson, Mr. Rennick, 11th Lancers; Mr. Mills, 18th Lancers.

The following teams took part in the Secunderabad Tournament, viz.—13th Hussars ('A' and 'B' teams), Golconda, 33rd Cavalry, 20th Deccan Horse, Royal Artillery, and Royal Fusiliers. The final was between the famous Golconda players and the 33rd Cavalry, the former keeping up their reputation and winning by four goals to one.

ROWING

The Diamond Champion Sculls at Henley Royal Regatta were won by Captain W. H. Darrell, Household Brigade Rowing Club—a very fine performance. There were fifteen entries, which included H. T. Blackstaffe, Vesta Rowing Club, and the German champion, Bernhard von Gaya, Viking Rowing Club, Berlin. The heat between Darrell and Blackstaffe will be long remembered by those who witnessed it; from start to finish it was the closest struggle, both sculling with fine judgment and in excellent form, Darrell's great staying power enabling him to land the race by half a length amidst the greatest excitement.

Captain W. H. Darrell followed up his success at the Metropolitan Regatta by carrying off for the second year the London Cup (Senior Sculls). There were four starters, Darrell winning a good race by two lengths, with J. de G. Edge, Auriol Rowing Club, second.

SHOOTING

At the Aldershot Rifle Meeting the 16th Lancers gained one good prize the first day, and followed it up by winning Lord Roberts's prize, for which there is always keen competition, on the second day, defeating some of the finest shooting battalions in the Army. A number of other prizes also fell to the regiment in individual competitions.

THE OLYMPIC GAMES OF 1908

At the invitation of Lord Desborough, who is President of the Association, the Duke of Argyll, K.T., presided at the raising of the first stanchion of the



great stadium to be erected at Shepherd's Bush. The stadium, when finished, will be 1,000 feet long, 700 feet wide (being oval in shape). The running track will be three laps to the mile, and the bicycling track will be two and three-quarter laps to the mile. Among other proposed contests will be Polo, Rifleshooting, Gymnastics, and Swimming.

CRICKET

At Portsmouth the Royal Navy beat the Royal Artillery by three wickets after a very close match.

A close match took place at Wormwood Scrubs between the Naval and Military Club and the Army and Navy Club, the former winning by 11 runs.

At Aldershot the 21st Lancers beat the 2nd Royal Irish Rifles by 234 runs to 93. Staff-Sergeant-Major Drake (73) and Lieut. Boyd-Rochfort (64) were the top scorers for the Lancers.

ATHLETICS

The twenty-eighth annual Army Athletic Meeting was held as usual at Aldershot. This year the mounted competitions were abandoned and a new event introduced. This was a 220 yards race for the public schools in camp at Aldershot, which was won by W. Messum, of Berkhampstead, in the good time of 24 sec.; Kirby, of Repton, being second. For the half-mile race for the Championship of the Army, Lieut. Haswell, the holder, owing to a recent breakdown, was unable to start. In his absence Private Willis, 2nd Grenadier Guards, won by a yard from Lance-Corporal Heaver, 2nd Lincoln, in 2 min. 2\frac{3}{4} sec. One of the most noticeable performances was the fine running of H. C. Hawtrey, R.E., in the Officers' mile race, which he won by 100 yards in the splendid time of 4 min. 30\frac{3}{4} sec., Second Lieutenant E. R. Nash, 16th Lancers, being second. At the conclusion Lady French presented the prizes.

The All Ireland Army Athletic Meeting was a great success. The Army Quarter-mile Challenge Cup was won by Lieut. C. A. Grantham, 87th Royal Irish Fusiliers. The mile race, as at Aldershot, was won by Lieut. Hawtrey, R.E., whilst Lieut. Euston, 3rd Dragoon Guards, was successful in the officers' jumping and Major T. Pitman, 11th Hussars, in the veterans' race. The tent-pegging was won by B Squadron 19th Hussars.

The Surrey Imperial Yeomanry had a successful meeting for their annual sports, which were held at Milford and consisted chiefly of mounted events.

FOOTBALL

His Royal Highness the Duke of Connaught has consented to become the first president of the Army Rugby Union, whose prospects for the coming season are most promising.

The Rev. J. T. Hales, Chaplain of the Forces, succeeds Capt. Curtis as hon. secretary to the Army Football Association. Correspondence should be addressed to the Rev. J. T. Hales, C.F., hon. secretary, Army Football Association, 36 Marlborough Road, Gillingham, Kent. Telegrams: 'Armyfa, Gillingham, Kent.' Capt. Curtis, who has done so much for the Association, is leaving England with his regiment for Gibraltar.



With reference to the recent formation of an Amateur Football Association, a general meeting of the Army Football Association, presided over by Colonel Pulteney, Scots Guards, was held at the United Service Institution, at which it was announced that the Association had decided by 152 proxies to twenty-five to remain affiliated to the Football Association for the ensuing season. The professional influence in the Football Association is very strong, but it was felt that the time was not ripe to secede from the parent body and join the newly formed Amateur Association. It is essential to the future welfare of Army football that all clubs should be in unity.

BOXING

The Army and Navy Championship took place at Aldershot on September 24, 25, and 26. A record entry of 204 was received for the light weights. On the second day a stupendous programme was got through by the officials; commencing at 10 a.m. no less than fifty-eight bouts were fought by 8.30 p.m. This constitutes a record in boxing.

WINNERS

Officers' Heavy Weights: Lieutenant C. C. Dix, R.N.

Officers' Middle Weights: Captain W. Long, D.S.O., Royal Scots Greys. Officers' Light Weights: Lieutenant D. D. A. Shaw, Royal Field Artillery. Officers' Feather Weights: Lieutenant D. D. A. Shaw, Royal Field Artillery.

Men's Heavy Weights: Corporal J. Sunshine, 1st Royal Fusiliers. Men's Middle Weights: Private Warner, 3rd Dragoon Guards.

Men's Light Weights: Lance-Sergeant W. Coles, 2nd West Yorkshire Regiment.

Men's Feather Weights: Private H. Berry, 11th Hussars.

At the conclusion Major-General Grierson kindly presented the prizes.

TRAVEL

The remarkable journey made by Mr. Boyd Alexander, of the Rifle Brigade, and his brother officers was the subject of a paper he read before the Royal Geographical Society. It is interesting to note that the specimen of the okapi they obtained comes from a district some 250 miles to the north-west of the part whence former skins have been obtained by Major Powell-Cotton and Mr. Harrison. They appear to have found game extremely abundant in some parts, especially along the Shari River, where the number of animals is spoken of as being truly wonderful

'HINTS ON SPORT'

By Major H. P. Young, late 4th Bombay Cavalry.

This little book (published at 1s.) compiles, in a short space, many useful hints on a great variety of sports. There is much in it which is valuable to all sportsmen, especially to beginners, and those joining branches of the Indian services. It can be procured from the author, at Bryansford, Leamington.

J. WATKINS YARDLEY, Lieut.-Colonel, Sporting Editor.





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